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SUMMARY
This thesis represents the first major research to be completed
either in the United Kingdom or the United States on the subject of
accounting for software. Part I concentrates on the financial aspects
of software accounting, and consisted of in-person interviews with a
number of individuals from software' vendor and user companies who
are knowledgeable about software accounting. The interviews were
followed by two mai I Questionnaires, one each to software vending
company executives and software user company executives. The
NAARSdatabase was also used to determine how software accounting
policies are disclosed for these two types of company. It was
concluded that more than one policy exists in practice. While
approximately 90% of the companies surveyed expense internally
constructed software, about two-thirds capital tze the cost of
purchased software. Reasons given for individual company policy
seem to be based on expediency rather than good accounting theory.
The interviews and Questionnaire responses in Part I seemed to
indicate that software vendor companies that cao: tal ize software
find it easier to raise debt and equity capital than do companies
which expense software costs. Part II presents the results of two
Questionnaires that were mailed to bank lending officers and one
questionnaire that was mailed to financial analysts for the purpose of
obtaining more information on this point. It was concluded that
companies that capitalize software costs find it significantly easier
to obtain bank loans than do companies that expense software costs.
The effect on stock price was less clear cut, although the
Questionnaire responses did indicate that a company's software
accounting policy does influence the value a financial analyst places
on a company's stock.
Part III discusses the United States federal and state tax aspects
of software. Thirteen appendices giving supplementary data are also
included.
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CHAPTER ONE
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING FOR SOFTWARE
-1-
BACKGROUND
In the decade following World War II, companies began to
use computers to solve business problems and process data to
an ever increasing extent. At this early stage in the
development of the computer industry, .the companies that
manufactured computer hardware also produced the software
that was used with the machines. These manufacturers gener-
ally sold the systems software as part of the hardware with-
out breaking down the purchase price into its hardware and
software components. The companies that used the hardware
hired employees to construct whatever "custom"
(individualized) software that might be needed. Very few
companies constructed systems or applications software for
sale apart from sales that were "bundled" with hardware.
As the use of computers became more prevalent in the
1960s, the demand for custom programming increased and led
to the development of a new industry that would supply these
software users with the programs they needed. However, it
was still not a common practice to purchase application
programs because these were supplied free of charge by the
hardware manufacturer.
In June, 1969, the policy of bundling hardware and soft-
ware costs changed when IBM decided to "unbundle," that is,
-2-
to state the cost of the software and hardware separately.l
This policy resulted in the creation of a new industry, the
software industry, whose members began to produce software
for sale to users of hardware. Companies that formerly
wrote their own software now had an option -- they could
purchase it. This option became very attractive, as the
cost of developing a program might run into six or seven
figures, whereas a comparable program could be purchased for
$50,000 or less. This cost relationship led to a rapid
increase in the number of firms that manufacture software
for sale, as a program that might cost $1 million to
construct could be sold to a multitude of customers for
$50,000 each. A software firm would be able to break even
after only twenty sales. Any additional sales would be
almost pure profit, as the cost of delivering a program is
basically equal to the cost of the medium used (tape, disk,
etc.) plus selling expenses.
The Beginning of the Problem -- How to Account for Software
In the same year IBM decided to unbundle, the Internal
Revenue Service issued a pronouncement addressing the soft-
ware issue.2 (See Appendix 0 for full text) This Revenue
Procedure provided tax accounting guidelines in connection
with costs incurred to develop, purchase or lease computer
software. Basically, this procedure stated that the costs
-3-
associated with the development of software could either be
expensed as incurred or capitalized and amortized over five
years or less. Thus, software development costs were to be
accorded the same treatment as research and development
costs3 for federal tax purposes.
Purchased software could be capitalized along with the
hardware if bundled. Software having a separately stated
price could be amortized if treated as an intangible asset.
Leased software is accorded the same treatment as rentals
under regulation 1.162-11.
Two years after that pronouncement was issued, the
Internal Revenue Service issued a second pronouncement
dealing with software.4 (See Appendix D) That ruling held
that for depreciation and investment tax credit purposes,
the cost of a new computer includes software costs not
separately stated but capitalized in accordance with the
taxpayer's consistent practice. Another pronouncementS
issued that same year (see Appendix D) held that the capi-
talization of software costs with respect to a new computer
where such costs had previously been expensed is a change in
method of accounting requiring the Commissioner's consent.
What is Software?
Prior to June, 1969, when IBM unbundled and created the
software industry, there was no need to define software for
-4-
accounting purposes, because it was accounted for as part of
the hardware. The few programs that were developed inter-
nally constituted such a small percentage of total expen-
ditures for most companies that a formal software accounting
policy was not needed.
However, as software expenditures continued to increase
and become more material, companies began establishing spe-
cific policies for software accounting. It was then that
the definition of software became important. Unfortunately,
there is no single readily accepted definition of software.
The broadest definition would be that software includes
everything that is not hardware.6 The definition of software
promulgated by the National Bureau of Standards7 and adopted
by the U. S. Bureau of Standards 8 is: "Computer programs,
procedures, rules, and possibly associated documentation
concerned with the operation of a data processing system."
The Internal Revenue Service defines computer software
as:
"...all programs or routines used to cause a com-
puter to perform a desired task or set of tasks,
and the documentation required to describe and
maintain those programs. Computer programs of all
classes, for example, operating systems, executive
-5-
systems, monitors, compilers and translators,
assembly routines, and utility programs as well as
application programs are included. 'Computer soft-
ware' does not include procedures which are exter-
nal to computer ,operations, such as instructions to
transcription operators an~ external control proce-
dures.n9
Several courts and State legislatures have also defined
software. Some have even made distinctions between systems
software and applications software. (The argument could be
made that systems software is really part of the hardware,
whereas applications software is separate and distinct from
the hardware.> The Supreme Court of TennesseelO has defined
a systems (operational) program as one that is fundamental
to the functioning of the hardware, or software that
controls the hardware and makes it run.
Bryant and Matherll state that systems software consists
of:
1. compilers, which are used to translate sym-
bolic code into machine language, and which are
also capable of replacing a series of instructions
with subroutines:
2. sorts, which assemble and file items of data
in a certain sequence or order; and
-6-
3. utility routines, which perform functions such
as transferring data from one magnetic tape to
another.
The Tangibility Issue
Another problem that grew out of unbundling is the issue
of tangibility. The Internal Revenue Service treats soft-
ware as intangible and, therefore, not eligible for the
investment tax credit unless bundled with hardware,12 but at
least one court has ruled that software is tangible and
qualifies for the investment tax credit.13 For state
14 15 16 t "the . .t fsales, use, and property ax purposes, maJorl y 0
courts have held that software is intangible and, therefore,
not subject to the tax. However, two recent cases have held
th . 17o erWlse. For Uniform Commercial Code18 and replevin19
purposes, software is tangible, but not for collapsible cor-
20poration purposes. (Replevin is a personal action brought
to recover possession of goods unlawfully taken. A
collapsible corporation is a corporation that is formed
for the purpose of converting what would otherwise be
ordinary income into capital gain. ) The sale of a
prewritten program is currently taxable in thirty-three
states and exempt in thirteen, with a few states not yet
taking a position one way or the other.
-7-
Financial Accounting Rules
The present financial accounting rules pertaining to
computer software are far from clear. The Financial
Accounting Standards Board has issued several pronouncements
that deal with software to a limited extent. One pronoun-
cement21 requires that research and development costs must be
expensed as incurred unless an alternative future use
exists. (An example of alternati ve future use would be
where an aircraft manufacturer constructs a wind tunnel to
test an experimental aircraft. If the company does not
intend to use the tunnel to test other types of aircraft,
the costs of constructing the wind tunnel would be expensed
as research and development. If the company intends to use
the tunnel for other projects, the cost of constructing the
tunnel would be capitalized rather than expensed.) Another
22pronouncement states that not all software costs are to be
considered research and development costs. A third
23pronouncement asserts that software costs not qualifying
as research and development expenditures are not necessarily
inventor iable or deferralbe. None of the FASB pronounce-
ments give clear guidance regarding when computer software
qualifies for capitalization treatment, and whether the
software costs should be included in the balance sheet
as tangible or intangible assets, although FASB Interpreta-
-8-
tion No.6, paragraph 8, footnote 2 seems to indicate that
software should be classified as intangible.24
The Accounting Principles Board, the predecessor of the
Financial Accounting Standards Board, issued a pronounce-
ment25 requiring intangibles acquired from others to be
recorded as assets and amortized using the straight-line
method unless some other method was more appropriate. The
Opinion went on to state that the cost of developing intang-
ibles that are not specifically identifiable should be
expensed as incurred. The issue of how to account for iden-
tifiable internally developed intangibles is not addressed,
and it is questionable whether computer software should be
classified as intangible in any event, since the courts seem
unable to agree on the tangibility of software.
On August 31, 1984, the Financial Accounting Standards
Board issued an Exposure Draft, entitled "Accounting for the
Costs of Computer Software to be Sold, Leased, or Otherwise
Marketed" , but this Exposure Draft does not address the
issue of how to account for software that is intended for
internal use. Furthermore, the Exposure Draft, in its pre-
sent form, has drawn much opposition from the accounting and
software manufacturing communities. (See Note at the end of
Chapter Seven for a full account of the Hearings on this
Exposure Draft.) As this thesis was going through final
-9-
typing, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued
Statement No. 86, entitled "Accounting for the Costs of
Computer Software to Be Sold, Leased, or Otherwise Marketed"
(August, 1985). This final Statement differs only in minor
detail from the Exposure Draft.
The Stages of Software Development
Software development goes through a ser ies of stages.
The initial stage is the feasibility stage, the stage at
which it is determined whether going forward with further
developments is likely to be worthwhile. A certain amount
of conceptual design also occurs at this stage. If the "go
forward" decision is made, the next step in the software
product life cycle is detail design, which takes product
function, feature and technical requirements to their most
detailed, logical form. Some coding (program writing> might
occur at this stage as well, but most coding takes place
after a substantial portion fo the detail design phase has
been completed, at least in draft stage. Coding involves
writing a series of detailed instructions that will carry
out the requirements outlined in the detail program design.
The next stage is testing, which determines whether the
coding lives up to specifications.
-10-
After testing has been successfully completed the pro-
duct is ready to use or market to others. For some software
products, additional phases lie in the future. Much soft-
ware goes through a more or less continuous maintenance
phase, in which changes, additions and corrections are made
to the software, either to correct errors or to update the
software. Enhancements are much like maintenance except
improvements to existingthat enhancements are substantial
products which tend to extend the product's life or signifi-
cantly improve its marketabil ity. Enhancements generally
involve an alteration in the product's design.
Present accounting rules (FASB No.2) require that
research and development costs (R&D) be expensed as incurred,
and this pronouncement has drawn much attention, because the
exact cut-off point between R&D and post-R&D expenditures
cannot be agreed upon by the accounting profession or the
software industry. Some view the R&D expenditures as encom-
passing feasibility, conceptual design and detail design
costs. Others view the R&D expenditures as including only
feasibility and conceptual design, with the result that
detail costs may qualify for capitalization treatment.
-11-
DEFICIENCIES IN CURRENT PRONOUNCEMENTS
FASB Statement No.2
FASB's Statement on research and development26 provides
as much ambiguity as it does guidance. Paragraph SCa) de-
fines research as:
"••.planned search or critical investigation aimed
at discovery of new knowledge with the hope that
such knowledge will be useful in developing a new
product or service or a new process or technique or
in bringing about a significant improvement to an
existing product or process."
Research is an activity that occurs early in the soft-
ware construction process, and although FASB Statement No.2
requires that research expenditures be charged to expense as
incurred, there is little guidance regarding which activi-
ties should be classified as research, and which should be
classified as development.
Paragraph SCb) defines development as
"••.the translation of research findings or other
knowledge into a plan or design for a new product
or process or for a significant improvement to an
-12-
existing product or process whether intended for
sale or use. It includes the conceptual formula-
tion, design, and testing of product alternatives,
construction of prototypes, and operation of pilot
plants. It does not include routine or periodic
alterations to existing products, production lines,
manufacturing processes, and other on-going opera-
tions even though those alterations may represent
improvements and it does not include market
research or market testing activities."
This def inition of development can be appl ied to soft-
ware accounting in two different ways. It could be inter-
preted to mean that the development phase does not end until
software construction is essentially complete, because suc-
cessful completion is uncertain until the development pro-
cess is nearly complete. For the development phase to end
it is necessary to have a working prototype. Lastly, the
fact that design modifications are needed throughout the
construction phase is evidence that development occurs
through that phase.
Another interpretation could be that the development
phase has essentially been completed before the construction
phase begins, and any design modifications that occur during
construction are minor in nature, and are not part of the
-13-
development phase. The formUlation, design and product
testing activities occur prior to the construction phase.
In fact, there must be a single product design before con-
struction can commence, and although testing occurs during
the construction phase, the testing at that stage involves
the product's operation rathe~'than the testing of alterna-
tive products. Furthermore, the software construction pro-
cess does not culminate in the production of a prototype or
the operation of a pilot plant, so these guidelines are
irrelevant for purposes of determining when the development
phase ends and the production phase begins. The key point
for determining when development has ended should be the
establishment of technological feasibility instead.
paragraph 31 states:
"•••Computer software is developed for many and
diverse uses. Accordingly, in each case the nature
of the activity for which the software is being
developed should be considered in relation to the
guidelines in paragraphs 8-10 to determine whether
software costs should be included or excluded. For
example, efforts to develop a new or higher level
of computer software capability intended for sale
(but not under a contractual arrangement) would be
a research and development activity •••".
-14-
The term "new or higher level of computer software capa-
b i1ity" can be interpreted in several ways. If" new" is
interpreted in the technological sense, most software would
be exc 1uded,
rather than
as most software is developed
new technology. ","New" could
using
also
existing
refer to
whether the product is new in the company sense, even though
developed wi th existing technology. "New" could also be
interpreted to mean new in the market sense. For example,
the first company to develop and market a payroll program
incurs development costs, but companies that later on develop
a similar product do not incur development costs.
The term "efforts to develop" could also be interpreted
in at least two ways. It could be interpreted to include
the whole construct ion process, which would place all con-
struction expenditures in the development phase. Or it
could be interpreted to mean that "efforts to develop" cease
prior to the construction phase. These two interpretations
lead to opposite results, as construction expenditures would
be classified as development costs calling for expense
treatment in the first instance, and such expenditures would
be nonresearch and development costs in the second instance,
and might call for capitalization treatment instead.
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Paragraph 9 of FASB Statement No.2 provides several
examples of activities that could be considered research and
development expenditures. These are:
(a) Laboratory research aimed at discovery of new
knowledge.
(b) Searching for applications of new research
findings or other knowledge.
(c) Conceptual formulation and design of possible
product or process alternatives.
(d) Testing in search for or evaluation of product
or process alternatives.
(e) Modification of the formulation or design of a
product or process.
(f) Design, construction, and testing of pre-
production prototypes and models.
( g) Design of tools, jigs, molds, and dies
involving new technology.
(h) Design, construction, and operation of a pilot
plant that is not of a scale economically
feasible to the enterprise for commercial pro-
duction.
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(i) Engineering activity required to advance the
design of a product to the point that it meets
specific functional and economic requirements
and is ready for manufacture.
The first four activities generally occur prior to the
construction phase. The fifth example, "modification of the
formulation or design of a product or process," can occur
throughout the process, but occurs only to a minimal degree
once the construction process begins. As was previously
mentioned, design modifications can be viewed as either
occurring as part of the development phase or as part of the
construction phase after development is completed.
Examples (f) through (h) are viewed by some as not being
applicable to software accounting. The end product is not a
prototype, but rather is the product itsel f. Others view
the prototype as being the end product itself in the case of
software, which would place the entire software construction
process within the definition of research and development
and, therefore, subject to expense treatment.
The last example relates to engineering activity. One
view holds that manufacturing is merely the duplication of
the program once the program is ready to market, and that
all activity occurring prior to this point is research and
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development. others view all engineering activity as
occurring prior to construction.
Paragraph 10 lists examples of activities that typically
would be excluded from research and development. These
activities include:
(a) Eng ineering follow-through in an early phase
of commercial production.
(b) Qual ity control during commercial product ion
including routine testing of products.
(c) Trouble-shooting in connection with break-
downs during commercial production.
(d) Routine, on-going efforts to refine, enrich,
or otherwise improve upon the qualities of an
existing product.
(e) Adaptation of an existing capability to a par-
ticular requirement or customer's need as part
of a continuing commercial activity.
(f) Seasonal or· other per iodic des ign changes to
existing products.
(g) Routine design of tools, jigs, molds and dies.
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(h) Activity, including
engineering, related
des ign and
to the
construction
construction,
relocat ion, rearrangement, or start-up of
facilities or equipment other than (1) pilot
whose sole use is
(2) facilities or equipment
f oz' a particular research
plants . . . and
and development project • . . .
(i) Legal work in connection with patent applica-
tions or litigation, and the sale or licensing
of patents.
The first three examples are subject to several inter-
pretations. These activities could be viewed as occurring
only after sales have commenced, and that similar activities
that occur during construction are part of development.
Another view is that these activities constitute construc-
tion and post construction activities, which is a further
indication that construction costs should not be considered
part of development.
FASB Interpretation No.6
Another PASB pronouncement states that:
"•••costs, including those incurred for programming
and testing software, are research and development
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costs when incurred in the search for or the eval-
uation of product or process alternatives or in the
design of a pre-production model."27
The phrase "search for or the evaluation of product or
process alternatives" is subject to varying interpretations,
as was prev ious ly men tioned, depend ing on whether deve lop-
ment is regarded as being virtually complete at the begin-
ning of construction or at the end. The term "preproduction
model" is not defined and its meaning is not clear as applied
to sof tware. The preproduction model could be interpreted
to mean the same thing' as a prototype, and all costs
incurred prior to the completion of the prototype could be
viewed as research and development costs. Another view is
that preproduction models are not made for software, although
systems makeups or product simulators are sometimes made
prior to construction.
This pronouncement also states that:
"•••costs for programming and testing are not
research and development costs when incurred, for
example, in routine or other on-going efforts to
improve an existing product or adapt a product to a
particular requirement or customer's need."28
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This statement could be interpreted to mean that pro-
gramming and testing costs are not research and development
expenditures only when they are incurred to improve an
existing product or adapt a product to a particular require-
ment or customer's need. Or it could be interpreted less
restrictively to exclude programming and testing costs from
class ificat ion as research and development for acti vities
other than those given in the example. Furthermore, it
could be argued that zeroing in on the costs associated with
product improvement or adaptation misses the point entirely,
and that the issue to be addressed should be accounting for
construction costs. Lastly, one could conclude by a literal
reading of the Interpretation that all enhancement costs
should be class ified as nonresearch and development. How-
ever, it could be argued that such a view is not reasonable.
The process involved in producing enhancements to an
existing product is essentially the same as that for a new
product, and some of the costs involved in the construction
of a new product are research and development costs.
Technical Bulletin No. 79-2
This pronouncement states that:
"•••all costs incurred in producing a given soft-
ware product or process are not necessarily research
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and development costs. However, a determination
that software production costs are not research and
development costs does not necessarily mean that
they would be inventoriable or deferrable to future
operations. Those decisions can only be made in
light of all of the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the particular situation.H29
From reading this pronouncement one can quickly conclude
that very little guidance, if any, is being provided. The
issue of which costs should be classified as research and
development is not addressed. Although there is a hint that
certain costs may be deferrable or inventoriable under cer-
tain circumstances, there is no suggestion elaborating on
when such circumstances might arise.
RELATED PRONOUNCEMENTS
Another approach might lie through a consideration of
generally accepted accounting practicesin industries which
in their technology or structure might seem not dissimilar
to the computer software industry. Such practices, together
with their supporting institutional or legal pronouncements,
might offer a framework within which detailed recommen-
dations for software accounting could be developed.
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The Record and Music Industry
The argument can be made that the cost of producing a
record master is similar to the cost of producing a computer
program. In both cases:
1. the majori ty of the product's value is the
result of the labor that is expended rather
than the material that is used:
2. logical patterns must be developed (coding or
music, either in written or nonwritten form)
and transferred onto a physical medium such as
a record, tape or disk (although this is not
necessarily
which may
computer) :
the case for a computer program,
be input directly into the
3. the value of the finished product far exceeds
the value of the material upon which the
coding or music is recorded:
4. both records and computer programs developed
for sale have estimated economic lives and
projected income streams that are difficult
but not impossible to predict.
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The National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works stated that:
"Both recorded music and computer programs are sets
of information in a form which, when passed over a
magnet ized head, cause minute currents to flow in
such a way that
accomplished."30
desired physical work is
On the other hand, it can also be argued that records
are of a different nature than computer programs that are
recorded on disks or tapes.3l For example, when information
is transferred from a tape into the computer, the tape is no
longer of any value to the user. In many cases, the tape is
not even retained by the user. It may be discarded or
returned. The information on the tape, unlike a phonograph
record, is not complete and ready to be used at the time of
its purchase. It must be translated into a language that is
understood by the computer.
Secondly, a computer tape or disk is not necessary to
transmit information. Such information can also be sent
over telephone wires or by satellite, or may even be pro-
grammed directly by the originator of the program.
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In late 1981, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
issued a Sta tement 'that permi ts the capital izat ion of a
record master in instances where past performance and
current popularity of the artist provides a sound basis for
estimating that the cost will be recovered from future
sales.
"The portion of the cost of a record master borne
by the record company shall be reported as an asset
if the past performance and current populari ty of
the artist provides a sound basis for estimating
that the cost will be recovered from future sales.
otherwise, that cost shall be charged to expense.
The amount recognized as an asset shall be amor-
tized over the estimated life of the recorded per-
formance using a method that reasonably relates the
amount to the net revenue expected to be real-
. d "32lze •
That same statement yoes on to define record master as:
"The master tape resulting from the performance of
the artist. It is used to produce molds for com-
mercial record production and other tapes for use
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in mak ing cartr idges, cassettes, and reel tapes.
The costs of producing a record master include (a)
the cost of the musical talent (musicians, vocal
background, and arrangements): (b) the cost of the
techn ical talent for eng ineer ing, direct ing , and
mixing: (c) costs for the 'use of the equipment to
record and produce the master: and (d) studio faci-
l't h "331 Y c arges. • •
In its comment letter to the Exposure Draft that even-
tually became statement No. 50, Coopers & Lybrand suggested
that the language of the Sta temen t be changed to spec ifi-
, 1 d ' b Li h 34 " 1 'cally lnc u e mUS1C pu 1S ers. Slml ar suggestlons were
made by other respondents,35 and to also include record pro-
ducers and songwriters.36
Motion Picture Films
Another Statement that might be related to computer
software costs is FASB Statement No. 53, "Financial Report-
ing by Producers and Distributors of Motion Picture Films,"3?
which allows the capitalization of film production costs.
This Statement requires that film production costs be cap i-
talized as film cost inventory and be amortized using the
individual-film-forecast-computation method38 or the periodic-
table-computation method.39 The individual-film-forecast-
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computation method amortizes costs in the ratio of current
gross revenues to ant icipated total gross revenues, with
adjustment for periodic changes in estimate.40 The periodic-
table-computation method amortizes film costs using the
historic revenue patterns of a large group of films.41
The analogy of motion picture films to software has also
been made in several court cases, and several court cases
deal ing with sales, use, property or federal taxat ion of
motion picture films or master negatives have been cited by
hear i ft' 42courts lng so ware ax lssues.
Preliminary Conclusions and Relevance
Although software has many similarities and differences
with both film-making and the record industry, it appears
that the similarities substantively outweigh the differences.
In all cases, the value of the finished product is primarily
attributable to the labor that was expended to bring the
product into existence rather than the amount of material
that went into the manufacture of the product. It is the
recorded logical patterns that have value, not the material
that contains those patterns. All three products have pro-
jected economic lives and income streams that could conceiv-
ably exceed one accounting period, which would seem to make
capitalization prudent. The fact that the medium on which
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the program is stored (disk, tape, etc ,) may be discarded
may be offered as further evidence that the value is in the
information rather than the physical medium being used to
store the information.
Because the manufacture of computer software has so much
in common with the manufacture of records and films, it
would seem logical that the accounting treatment for all
three items should be similar in the interest of consistency.
In fact, justifying a different treatment for software than
for mov ies and records would seem to be di fficult indeed.
Record and film masters perform the same funct ion as the
software product that is coded, tested and debugged. Each
is used to produce copies for sale or use. But the issue is
more complex than this, as we shall see below.
Research and Development Arrangements
Another FASB statement43 addresses the topic of research
and development arrangements. During the course of several
interviews conducted as part of this research project, it
was pointed out that some software vending companies enter
into research and development arrangements so that they can
treat costs that would otherwise be expensed as assets
instead. These arrangements may be structured so that a
separate entity undertakes the task of constructing software
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that would otherwise be constructed internally, and then
sells the finished software product to the arranging firm,
which then promptly records the software as an asset. Had
the software been constructed internally instead, there
would be pressure to expense the construction cost as
research and development. The survey that was rnailed to
software vendors bore this theory out to a limited extent,
although the responses revealed that a very small percentage
of software vendors participate in research and development
arrangements, and those that do have valid business reasons
for doing so apart from the benef icial financ ial statement
effect.44
SOFTWARE COSTS:
SHOULD THEY BE CAPITALIZED OR EXPENSED?
Prior to June, 1969, when IBM unbundled, this question
was a non-issue. Software costs were included in the price
of the hardware and were amortized over the useful life of
the hardware. After IBM began stating their software prices
separately from their hardware prices, and as firms began to
develop their own software, this question began to be raised
with increasing frequency. Over the past two decades, soft-
ware costs have become an increasingly important expenditure
in most corporate budgets. While it was easy to expense
relatively minor software costs in the past, for reasons of
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materiality, it has become increasingly difficult to state
"emphatically that software expenditures are immaterial when
they continue to increase every year.45
FASB Concepts Statement No.3, defines assets as:
"•••probable future economic benefits obtained or
controlled by a particular entity as a result of
past transactions or events."
The Statement goes on to say that:
"An asset has three essential characteristics: (a)
it embodies a probable future benefit that involves
a capacity, singly or in combination with other
assets, to contribute directly or indirectly to
future net cash inflows, (b) a particular enter-
prise can obtain the benef it and control others'
access to it, and (c) the transact ion or other
event giving rise to the enterprise's right to or
control of the benefit has already occurred."
Expenses, on the other hand, have doubtful future econo-
mic benefit (to carry the FASB reasoning one step further).
From these criteria, the answer seems simple. Software
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that has probable future economic benefit should be recorded
as an asset and amortized over its estimated economic life.
Software having doubtful future economic benefit should be
expensed. Unfortunately, the answer is not quite that
, 1 t t f '1" 46s i mp e. Some accoun an s argue or cap rta 1zat i on while
others continue to argue for expense treatment.47 Several
48articles have addressed the topic in recent years, and it
appears that the issue will continue to be in the news for
the next few years. The AICPA has formed a task force to
study the issue, 49 and the Securi ties and Exchange Commis-
sion has imposed a moratorium on the capitalization of cer-
tain software costs.50
The Controversy
The controversy, simply stated, is deciding whether
software costs should be classified as assets or expenses.
However, the question is more than just philosophical. The
choice chosen can affect a company's earnings and its abil-
ity to raise capital. There are at least 4,000 companies in
the United States that construct software for sale. For all
of these companies, software expenditures are a significant
percentage of net income, and choosing to classify software
expenditures as assets or expenses can make the difference
between making a profit or incurring a loss. One public
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company that reported a profit of $2.2 million in 1981 would
have had a loss of $1 million that year if certain software
expend i tures had been expensed instead of capi tal i zed. In
1982, the reported $2.5 million profit would have been a $4
million 10ss.51 There is some evidence to suggest that
accounting policy can affect expansion52 and the ability to
. . 1 53 hraise cap i t a r , T e interviews conducted in the course of
this study and the questionnaire responses add further
support to these contentions.
Question No. 18 in the questionnaire that was sent to
software vending company executives (see Chapter 3) asked
for an estimate of the reduction in their company's net
income that would result from expensing rather than capital-
izing software costs. Answers revealed that the vast
majority of private (69.4%) and public companies (84.3%)
would have a less than 5 percent reduction in net income if
software costs that are now being capitalized would have
been expensed instead. This does not mean that software
expenditures are immaterial for the vast majority of soft-
ware companies, but rather that many firms are presently
expensing rather than capitalizing most or all of their
software costs anyway. Even if th is factor is taken into
cons idera t ion, 30.6 percent of pr i vate companies and 15.7
percent of public companies would have a reduction in
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net income of at least 5 percent, which may be considered a
material reduction. If materiality is defined as a 10 per-
cent reduction in net income, then the percentages for pri-
vate and publ ic companies would be 22.2 percent and 15.7
percent, respectively. It is resonable to anticipate that
the controversy is of significant potential importance to
all software vendors, and to many if not all software users,
especially those who develop their own.
The Catalyst
If there is one single event which caused the software
accounting issue to come to life, it was the issuance by
the Association of Data processing Service Organizations
. f f . 54 .(ADAPSO) of 1ts Exposure Ora t on so tware account1ng 1n
April, 1982. This Exposure Draft set down clear guidelines
for accounting for software costs and revenues. Its issu-
ance caused the AICPA to form a task force to study the
issue. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has
been des ignated by the Securi ties and Exchange Commission
(SEC) to be the sole promulgator of financial accounting
standards. As a preliminary step, the AICPA forms task for-
ces to study specific issues and make recommendations to the
FASB. When ADAPSO issued its Exposure Draft, this move was
seen by the accounting community in general and by the AICPA
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and FASB in particular to be an encroachment on the FASB's
role as sole sette~ of accounting standards.
Role of the NAA
Prior to obtaining employment with the National Associa-
tion of Accountants (NAA), I was a member of the faculty of
the School of Profess ionalAccountancy, C.w. Post Center,
Long Island University. When I accepted a limited term
appointment as Manager, Accounting Practices for the NAA, it
was with the understanding that I could conduct some of my
PhD research during normal working hours and that the NAA
would support my research efforts.
Shortly after joining the NAA, the issue of how to
account for software costs became a "hot" issue. When NAA
members (NAA has approximately 97,000 members) called to ask
for advice on accounting issues, one of the most frequently
asked quest ions was how to account for software costs. By
mutual agreement it was decided that I conduct research on
software accounting, since nothing presently existed on this
topic. The NAA paid for all costs associated with the
printing and mailing of the questionnaire used in this
study, and allowed me to conduct the research as I saw fit.
The review panel used to evaluate the questionnaire drafts
partially consisted of the memebers of NAA's Mananagement
Accounting Practices Committee, its subcommittee on MAP
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Statement Promulga·tion and some of its chapter presidents.
When AICPA' s software task force was be ing formed, the NAA
appointed me to be one of its representatives.
Methodology
The methodology
following stages:
for this study consisted of the
1. Identify data suppliers.
2. Devise fact collection experiments.
3. Collate collected data.
4. Form a body of first interpretation, taking
case law (tax), existing opinions and regula-
tions into account, and
5. Formulate a set of recommendations, which were
6. Tested by AICPA's Software Task Force and NAA's
Management Accounting Practices Committee (see
Append ix M for a 1ist of members) by deter-
mining what they think of the precepts.
7. The question then asked was, "Were their views
based on principle or expediency?"
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Case law and regulations were stud ied in depth and are
reported upon in Part III and Appendix C of this thesis.
Review of Literature
A comprehensive review of the literature was completed
to determine the extent of research previously undertaken.
Literature on the financial accounting aspects of software
accounting was found to be practically nonexistent. FASS
statement No.2, "Accounting for Research and Development
Costs," 55 touches on the issue, as do FASS Interpretation
No.6, "Appl icabil i ty of FASS Statement No. 2 to Computer
Software,,,56 and FASB Technical Bulletin 79-2, "Computer
Software Costs.,,57 The Association of Data processing Ser-
v ice Organ i za t ions also had a few re levant publ icat ions. 58
only one article of any substance was in print at the time
h ... d 59the present researc was lnltlate • Literature on the tax
aspects of software was more readily available.GO A number
of court cases dealing with sales, use, property and invest-
ment tax credit have also been decided. (See Part III and
Appendix C.)
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Interviews
Upon completion of the review of literature, a series of
interviews were conducted with people who were knowledgeable
in various aspects of software accounting. Telephone inter-
views were conducted with twenty-two individuals repre-
senting several facets of the software industry. Eighteen
add itional ind iv iduals represent ing seven software vendors
and internal users were interviewed personally on company
premises.
The interviews led me to believe that, in many cases, a
company's software accounting policy was based on expediency
rather than principled reasoning. A number of new questions
were raised in my own mind as a result of these interviews.
I became aware that the accounting pol icy for internally
constructed software was often different from the policy for
purchased software, and I constructed a number of questions
in the vendor and user questionnaires to find out more about
this point. I also learned that software expenditures were
not always slotted in the same section of the balance sheet.
Some companies included software costs in the "property,
plant and equipment" section~ others placed these costs in
the "other asset" or "intangibles" section. Some companies
listed software costs separately and others did not.
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Companies that capitalized certain costs of constructed
software d id not seem to capi tal ize the same costs. Some
companies capitalized only coding and testing, while others
also capitalized detail design costs. Reasons given for
either capi tal izing or expens ing software somet imes seemed
to be based on expediency rathei than accounting principles.
Some interviewees seemed to think that they were required to
use the same accounting policy for financial statement pur-
poses that they use for the tax return, which is not at all
true, so some dec isions seemed to be based on erroneous
information.
The interviews also alerted me to the fact that some
software vendors feel strongly that the inability to capita-
lize software costs adversely affects their ability to raise
capital and expand. This view was confirmed in the mail
questionnaire (Chapter 3) and was further tested in the bank
lending officer questionnaires (Chapters 9, 10 and 11:
Appendices F, H, I, J and K). The question was also raised
as to the extent that companies engage in R&D partnerships
in order to capi tal ize software costs that would otherwise
be expensed. Responses to the questionnaire (Chapter 3)
revealed that this practice was not nearly as widespread as
some of the interviewees led me to initially believe.
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The interviews also alerted me to the federal and state
tax aspects of software, and revealed that there is a great
deal of confusion in this area, partly because the people
being interviewed, controllers for the most part, were not
tax specialists, and partly because the area is so complex,
confusing, unclear and constantly changing. Federal treat-
ment is unclear, and companies do not seem to be applying
the federal tax law consistently when it comes to software
expend itures. Some companies apply the federal and state
tax law aggressively and others are extremely conservative.
The interviews pointed in the direction that most software
tax litigation at the state level is being generated in
California, and this preliminary view was confirmed by the
questionnaire responses (Chapter 3). Another preliminary
view raised during the interviews and confirmed by the
questionnaire responses was that companies may classify
software as tang ible for some purposes and intang ible for
others. Software may be classified as intangible for sales,
use and property tax purposes because such class i ficat ion
will reduce a company's tax burden. Software may be classi-
fied as tangible for federal tax purposes for the same
reason.
Expensing software costs on the financial statements
reduces net income in the year the expenditure is recorded,
so there is an advantage to capitalizing such costs because
-39-
expenses are reduced, in the first year at least, by capita-
liz ing. However, there is an advantage to expensing rather
than capitalizing for tax purposes because expensing allows
a company to take a larger tax deduction in the year the
expenditure is recorded. Tax treatment and financial state-
ment treatment do not have to be consistent, so a company is
perfectly free to capitalize for financial statement pur-
poses and expense for tax purposes, but most companies have
a consistent policy, perhaps for reasons of expediency, or
perhaps because they do not know that their tax and finan-
cial statement policies need not be consistent. The inter-
views revealed that both of the two above-mentioned reasons
were given by accounting executives who were assumed to be
knowledgeable in their field.
The interviews raised a number of preliminary questions,
which were then written down in draft form and given to the
review panel for comment. The questions that eventually
emerged from the panel were deemed to be relevant to prac-
tice, important in theory, found relevant by profess ional
opinion and found material enough to be the ground of legal
enquiry and testing.
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The Review Panel
Upon completion of the interviews, it became apparent
that more empirical data needed to be gathered. A list of
topics and specific questions was then written and sent to a
review panel for comment using a modified version of the
Delphi technique. Upon receiving panel member comments, a
revised list of proposed questions was written and sent to
panel members for further comment. This process was
repeated several times until it was felt that further
mailings to panel members would no longer be of significant
value.
Panel members were selected in several ways. All mem-
bers of the National Association of Accountants' Management
Accounting Practices Committee were included, as were mem-
bers of the NAA Subcommittee on MAP Statement Promulgation.
Solicitation for members was also made in Management
Accounting and Association Leader, NAA publications having a
mon thly c irculat ion of 97, 000 and 10,000 cop ies, respec-
tively. Let ters were also sent to 371 NAA chapter pres i-
dents requesting them to announce the search for panel mem-
bers at their next chapter meeting. Some of the people who
participated in the interviews also agreed to serve on the
panel, as did members of AICPA's Task Force on Accounting
for the Development and Sale of Computer Software. The
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panel that reviewed the software vendor questionnaire was
composed of 57 people. The internal user questionnaire was
reviewed by 47 people.
Mail Surveys of Software Vendors and Users
The sample for the vendor 'questionnaire was drawn from
thirty known public companies and 368 other software ven-
dors, some of which were public and some privately held.
The latter group was selected randomly f rom Data Sources
(Summer, 1982) and the 1982 Data Decisions Software Vendor
Directory. All selected firms had annual revenues in excess
of S5 million, although some earnings could have been
derived from non-software sources. The questionnaire was
accompanied by a cover letter addressed to the chief finan-
cial officer. A self-addressed prepaid envelope was also
enclosed. Eighty-eight usable responses were received, for
a response rate of 22.1 percent. A summary of findings is
included in Chapter 3. The questionnaire used in this sur-
vey is reproduced in Appendix F.
The sample for the internal user questionnaire was ran-
domly drawn from the Fortune 1000 and specialty lists. Four
hundred fifty questionnaires, cover letters addressed to the
controller, and prepaid envelopes were mai led. There were
216 usable responses, for a response rate of 48 percent. A
summary of findings for this survey is in Chapter 6. The
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questionnaire used in this survey is reproduced in Appendix
G.
computer Surveys
In addition to the mail questionnaire surveys and per-
sonal interviews that were conducted as part of the present
study, a search of software vendor and user accounting poli-
cies was made using the NAARS data base.6l A summary of the
software cost and revenue recognition policies for more than
fifty publicly traded companies in the software industry is
included in Chapter 2.
A second survey using NAARS searched the financial sta-
tement footnotes of 4,197 companies for fiscal 1981-82 and
3,104 companies for fiscal 1982-83 for mention of software
accounting policy. The software industry firms that were
included in the other NAARS search were excluded. The sum-
mary in Chapter 5 includes only software user companies.
One hundred twenty-five companies listed on NAARS had the
word "software" listed in their accounting policy footnote.
Some compan ies appeared twice, once for each fiscal year
searched. Some firms were included in the software industry
search, and so are excluded from this summary. Other firms
mentioned software in a context that was not relevant for
purposes of this study. policies for the remaining firms
were included in Chapter 5.62
-43-
other Mail Surveys
Several surveys were conducted to determine the effect
that software accounting policy has on bank lending deci-
sions and stock price. The first commercial lending officer
survey consisted of two questionnaires and related financial
data that were mailed to two separate groups of commercial
lending officers,63 chosen from banks having at least $500
mill ion in assets. Data for Campbell Corporation, a com-
pany that capi tal izes software costs with net income of
$2,552,107, $2,213,154 and $903,131 for 1982, 1981 and 1980,
respectively, was sent to 174 commercial lending officers.
Campbell Corporation is a real, publicly held software com-
pany. (Comserv) The financial data sent was authentic. Only
pany name was changed. This data is reproduced in Appendix
K.
Data for Edwards Corporation was sent to 174 other com-
mercial lending officers. The only difference between
Edwards and Campbell was that Edwards expenses all software
costs. Edwards had a $2,103,000 net loss in 1982 and net
income of $498,000 and $301,000 in 1981 and 1980, respec-
tively.
Twenty responses were received for Campbell and thirty
for Edwards. Responses to the individual questions are sum-
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marized in Chapter 9. The questionnaire used in this survey
is reproduced in Appendix H.
A second survey was sent to I,002 commerc ial lend ing
officers, obtained randomly from a population of 5,700. The
list was purchased from a company that sells mailing lists.
In this survey, financial data for both Campbell and Edwards
were sent to the same lending officers.64 Accounts receiv-
able aging schedules and a listing of certain key financial
ratios for both companies were also included in the packet
f . 1 65o rnat e r i a s , The resul ts of the second lend ing of ficer
survey are reported in Chapter 10. The questionnaire used
in this survey is reproduced in Appendix I.
A third survey was sent to 803 f inanc iaI analysts in
order to determine whether software accounting policy has an
f k . 66effect 0 stoc pr i ce , The resul ts of this survey are
reported in Chapter 11. The questionnaire used in this sur-
vey is reproduced in Appendix J.
A fourth survey was mailed to a number of accounting
organi zat ions around the world to determine whether their
countries had any particular software accounting policy.
The results of that survey and a list of the organizations
contacted are contained in Appendix L.
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AUTHOR'S VIEWS
Drawing on the recommendations of received theory, the
precepts (such as they are) of professional opinion and the
precedents set by the overstudy of relevant case law, I
formed the following tentative views of a model of software
accounting.
1. Most software that is purchased or internally con-
structed does not fit the definition of research and devel-
opment. Most software is constructed from existing tech-
nology using existing coding methods, and any research and
development that Qccurs is at the early stages prior to con-
struction. Software is beyond the development stage when
technological feasibility is established.
The interviews conducted in conjunction with this
study and the questionnaire survey results indicate that
many companies automatically assume that internally con-
structed software falls within the definition of research
and development, and is therefore expensed. In the author's
opinion, this view is incorrect. Each software project
should be evaluated on its own merits and classified accord-
ingly.
Expenditures incurred for detail design, coding and
testing are incurred after the research and development
phase of the software product life cycle has been completed.
-46-
Responses from many companies indicate that software is
expensed
although
for reasons of exped iency rather than pr ine iple,
lip service is sometimes paid to principle. In
cases where cost is not material, such misclassification of
cost can be ignored. But for many companies, software
expenditures are material in amount, and where this is the
case, the costs should be classified properly.
2. The accounting treatment for purchased software
should be the same as that for comparable internally con-
structed software. If a company plans to use a payroll
program or accounts receivable program for the next five
years, the cost of obtaining that program should be amor-
tized over five years, regardless of whether the software
was purchased or internally constructed.
The interviews and questionnaire responses indicate
that present practice for most companies calls for the
expensing of internally constructed software and the capita-
lization of purchased software. The usual reasons for this
practice are either that it is easier to determine the cost
of purchased software,
has a better chance
or that a purchased software product
of having future economic benefit
because it has already been extensively tested and debugged.
In the author's opinion, these reasons are not sufficient.
Just because the cost of a purchased program is easier to
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determine is not sufficient reason to expense the costs of
internally constructing comparable software. And once a
project's feasibility has been determined, the risk of
failure is small enough to warrant capitalization treatment.
Furthermore, the product ion costs of mot ion picture films
and records are already being capitalized, and the produc-
tion process for software is similar in many ways to that
for records and films.
3. The cost of internally constructed software can be
broken down into the following six categories:
a. feasibility costs
b. conceptual design costs
c. detail design costs
d • cod ing costS
e. testing costs
f. maintenance costs
In cases where the finished software product is
expected to have future economic benefit, the costs that
are incurred for detail design, coding and testing ashould
be capitalized and amortized over the expected period of
benefit. Pre-design costs, such as feasibility and
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conceptual design costs, should be expensed, as should
maintenance. costs, as these costs have doubtful future
economic benefit, and more nearly resemble period costs
than capitalizable costs.
4. The straight-line method is an acceptable method of
amortization for intangible assets. In cases where software
is classified as intangible, this method can be used.
For software that is developed
two other methods may also be considered.
computation method, which is sometimes
motion picture film costs, can also be
software intended for sale.
for sale, at least
The period-table-
used' to amortize
used to amort ize
This method amortizes software costs prepared from
historic revenue patterns of a large group of previously
marketed software products. Although that revenue pattern
is assumed to prov ide a reasonable gu ide to the experience
of succeeding groups of software products produced and
distributed under similar conditions, these tables should
not be used for a software product that is expected to have
a significantly different revenue pattern from those pro-
ducts which were included in the table. The periodic tables
should be rev iewed regular ly and updated whenever revenue
patterns change significantly.
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Another acceptable method of amort izat ion is
the individual-software-forecast-computation method, a
variation of which is used to amortize motion picture film
production costs. This method may be illustrated by the
following example:
Assume that a certain software product cost $18,000,000
to develop and is expected to generate revenues of
$50,000,000 over its useful economic life. By the end
of the second year, the amount of total anticipated
reveriues is reduced to $30,000,000 due to lagging sales.
Actual revenue received in each of the first three years
is:
First year $10,000,000
Second year 6,000,000
Third year 5,000,000
Amort izat ion in each of the first three years is com-
puted as follows:
First Year
Amount of
Amortization
$10,000,000 x $18,000,000
$50,000,000 = $3,600,000
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Second Year
(a) Assuming change in anticipated
total revenues from $50,000,000
to $30,000,000:
$ 6,000,000 x $14,400,000
$20,000,000 = $4,320,000
Where:
(1) $6,000,000 is actual revenue in the second
year:
(2) $20,000,000 is the adjusted total anticipated
remaining revenue ($30,000,000 - $10,000,000):
and
(3) $14,400,000 is original cost ($18,000,000)
less accumulated amortization ($3,600,000).
(b) Assuming no change in anticipated
total revenues:
$ 6,000,000 x $18,000,000
$50,000,000 = $2,160,000
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Third Year
(a) Assuming change in anticipated
total revenues from $50,000,000
to $30,000,000:
$ 5,000,000 X $14,400,000
$20,000,000 =
The adjusted total anticipated re-
maining revenue ($20,000,000) and
adjusted cost (S14,400,OOO) need not
be reduced secondby the
revenue ($6,000,000), and second year
amortization ($4,320,000), respec-
tively, because adjusted total antici-
pated remaining revenue (520,000,000)
did change from the
reduction
secondnot
third If theyear.
made, the result would not change.
$3,600,000
year actual
to
were
$ 5,000,000 x ($14,400,000-54,320,000) = $3,600,000
$20,000,000
-$6,000,000
-52-
(b) Assuming no change in anticipated
total revenues:
$ 5,000,000 x $18,000,000
$50,000,000 = $1,800,000
Although the individual-software-forecast-computa-
tion method and the period-table-computation method may be
appropriate amortization methods in certain instances, they
are not necessarily the only acceptable methods. Other
methods that reasonably relate the amount of the revenue
expected to be realized to the amount of capitalized expen-
ditures are also acceptable.
5. Software costs meeting the definition of research
and development should be expensed as incurred in keeping
with FASB Statement No.2, unless the software has alterna-
tive future uses, in which case it should be capitalized and
amortized over the period of expected benefit. The alterna-
tive future use test does not apply to the internal develop-
ment of computer software. See FASB Interpretation No.6,
paragraph 8, footnote 2.
6. Sof tware expend itures class ified as assets should
be included in the "property, plant and equipment" portion
of the balance sheet if considered to be tangible property.
Intangible software expenditures qualifying as assets should
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appear in the "6ther assets" section of the balance sheet.
7. Software expenditures should not be separately
disclosed unless they are material in amount. Software
expenses can be considered material if they equal or exceed
5 percent of sales. Software assets can be considered
material if they equal or exceed 5 percent of total assets.
Disclosure may be by footnote or by separately stating soft-
ware expend itures in the body of the income statement or
balance sheet.
8. When the possibility exists to either acquire hard-
ware and software "bundled" or "unbundled," the following
factors should be considered:
a. Amortization -- Software
be expensed might be
with hardware costs.
that might otherwise
depreciated if combined
Likewise, software that
would be capitalized if bundled might qualify
for expense treatment if stated separately.
b. Investment Tax Credit -- Software that would
not otherwise qualify for the investment tax
credit may so qualify if it is bundled with
the related hardware. Even if sof tware is
acquired separately, the possibility of taking
an investment tax credit should be examined.
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At least one court has held that the invest-
ment tax credit may be taken on unbundled
software.
c. Sales/Use Tax -- Bundling hardware and soft-
ware may increase the amount of sales/use tax
a buyer is
not tax the
ately from
required
sale of
to pay. Some states do
software if sold separ-
the hardware.
on cards, disk or magnetic
Software delivered
tape might be sub-
ject to tax in some states, even though the
identical software, if delivered over tele-
phone lines, would not be taxed.
d. Property Tax -- Bundl ing hardware and software
may increase the amount of property tax the
owner must pay. Many states levy a property
tax on tangible property only. Software is
often classified as intangible property if
accounted for separately from the hardware.
e. Different Accounting Treatments -- The account-
ing treatment for financial reporting need not
be the same as that used for tax reporting.
Software expenditures may be expensed as in-
curred for tax purposes and capitalized and
-55-
amortized for financial reporting purposes and
vice versa. If different methods are used,
the tax effect of the difference is reflected
in the deferred tax account.
In what follows, these views are exposed to empirical
tests derived from a study of field practice (Chapters 3 and
6) and a more profound examination of the relevant case law
(Chapters 13 and 14 and Appendix C). Further empirical
tests of the impact of software accounting on enterprise
debt capacity, credit rating and equity appeal are described
in Chapters 8, 9, 10 and 11. Although the response rate to
enquiries to bankers and credit analysts is well below that
necessary to carry out meaningful statistical tests, the
resul ts are here reported as hopefully be ing not without
relevant informat ion content albei t of a nonrigorous
character.
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dissertation, Michigan State University, 1970.
65The ratios chosen for inclusion in this list were
selected partially based on a study that listed the ratios
most frequently used by lending officers. See Mostafa M.
EI-Maksy, "A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of the
Effects of FASB Statement No. 33 on Lending Decisions."
Ph.D. dissertation, City University of New York, 1983, 74-76.
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66A similar approach was used in Robert E. Jensen's doc-
toral dissertation at Stanford University. That study
invest igated relat ionships between (a) securi ty evaluat ion
and portfolio selection and (b) alternative inventory valua-
tion and depreciation methods in financial reporting. See
Robert E. Jensen, "An Experimental Design for Study of
Effects of Accounting variations in Decision Making,"
Journal of Accounting Research, Autumn, 1966, 224-238.
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CHAPTER TWO
FOOTNOTE DISCLOSURE OF SOFTWARE ACCOUNTING
POLICIES: PUBLIC COMPANIES IN THE
COMPUTER SOFTWARE INDUSTRY
-67-
INTRODUCTION
In addition to the mail questionnaire surveys and per-
sonal interviews that were conducted as part of this study,
a study of footnote disclosure of software accounting poli-
cies of software vendor and user companies was also made.
This chapter summarizes the findings for software vendors.
Chapter 5 summarizes the findings for software user com-
panies.
Information was gathered in several ways. The primary
source was the NAARS data base.l In some cases, annual
reports, 10K's and other Securities and Exchange Commission
filings were reviewed. Several telephone calls were also
made to selected executives of software vending companies to
obtain clarification or additional information.
The information provided in this chapter includes only
publicly held companies, since data on privately held com-
panies is nearly impossible to obtain. Information on the
lNAARS has financial statement data on more than 4,000
public companies, and is available by subscription from the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Thanks
go to Robert Kueppers of Deloitte Haskins & Sells in New
York, who provided me with access to the NAARS data base.
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56 public companies is arranged alphabetically, and includes
information regarding type of product sold, revenue recogni-
tion policy and cost recognition policy. Annual revenues,
total assets and audit firm are also given. A matrix sum-
marizing the accounting treatment of selected software items
is also included, as is a chart summarizing audit firms.
The Relationship Between Type
of Software and Accounting Policy
The footnotes of 56 public companies in the software
industry were examined. It is extremely difficult to clas-
sify these companies by type of product with any great exact-
ness because of the widely differing levels of disclosure in
their published statements. However, Table 2.1 attempts to
discover relationships between type of software product and
software accounting policy. Some companies have been included
more than once if there was an indication that they provided
software for more than one classific~tion of customer.
-69-
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There seems to be no correlation between the type of
software manufactured (systems or applications) and the
accounting treatment (capitalization versus expensing). The
sample size is small, some companies make both types of soft-
ware, and the classifications are tentative at best. How-
ever, some weak conclusions can be drawn from this imperfect
data. Software vendors that provide software to manufactur-
ing and industrial companies have a tendency to capitalize
enhancement costs more often than not. Three vendors capi-
talize such costs, compared to one vendor that expenses. A
fifth company nominally capitalizes enhancement costs. Five
vendors in this category did not disclose their accounting
policy for enhancement costs. Overall, for the 29 companies
that revealed their treatment of enhancement costs (See
Table 2.5), 34 percent capitalized and 66 percent expensed,
so it would appear at first glance that vendors providing
software to manufacturing and industrial companies are more
likely than average to capitalize enhancement costs. How-
ever, this conclusion is somewhat suspect because of the
small sample and degree of uncertainty regarding the relia-
bility of the data.
If we accept as valid the conclusion that vendors pro-
viding software to manufacturing and industrial companies
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tend to capitalize enhancement costs, we must then ask, "Why
do these vendors tend to capitalize, when two-thirds of the
publicly held companies in this sample expense enhancement
costs?" One possible reason is that software made for this
type of customer is not subject to the same degree of rapid
technological obsolescence that befalls other software. If
the software has a longer than average useful life, a vendor
may be more apt to capitalize it than if the software has a
short or questionable useful life.
A casual glance at the (Table 2.1) column headed "ac-
quired software" reveals that all companies that disclose
their treatment of this type of software capitalize it. This
revelation is confirmed by Table 2.5. Thus, it appears that
the type of customer served bears no relationship to the
accounting policy for purchased software.
A comparison of the last column of Table 2.5 with the
last column of Table 2.1 reveals that almost all companies
(91 percent) expense software construction costs. Comserv
capitalizes some construction costs. One of the five vendors
that provides software to the data processing service indus-
try capitalizes it. Miller Technology and Lodgistix capi-
talize construction costs of software provided to the non-
profit sector and the hotel industry, respectively. Again,
-76-
Missing pages are unavailable
groupings. There is a wealth of anecdotal and casual obser-
vation evidence that accounting control systems tend to be
more detailed and/or structured in older established manu-
facturing operations such as engineering, but less well-
developed in newer operational areas such as transportation.
However, there is similar evidence that accounting control
systems in the newer service industries tend to be more
flexible, more innovative and more readily changed. We might
therefore speculate that software for accounting control
systems developed for old manufacturing industry might tend
to have a longer life than that directed towards new typ~s
of service industry and that this might be reflected in the
accounting treatment of software. A visual scan of Table
2.1 did not reveal such an association between field of oper-
ation and accounting treatment. A second glance raised the
possibility that vendors servicing manufacturing and indus-
trial clients might have a better than average tendency to
capitalize enhancement costs, but this conclusion is only
tentative.
We also know that accounting systems reflect convenience
as well as principle, that asset accounting tends to be more
expensive and consuming of resources of human skill and time
than expense accounting. We also observe that larger com-
-78-
panies tend to be able to afford and indulge in more sophis-
ticated accounting systems than smaller companies. We there-
fore ask, is there any association between size of the soft-
ware company and the accounting treatment chosen? Do small
companies tend to expense, whereas larger companies tend to
capitalize?
A visual scan of Table 2.2 does not yield any evidence
of such association. Table 2.2 lists the 56 publicly held
software vendor companies according to sales revenue. It is
noticed immediately that construction costs are almost always
expensed regardless of company size. Of the four companies
having sales in excess of $100 million, only one reveals its
policy of accounting for construction costs, and that com-
pany expenses such costs. Two companies in the $25-$33
million range capitalize some construction costs and expense
others. Two of the 14 companies under $10 million that
reveal their construction accounting policy capitalize these
costs. The other 12 expense them. All companies that report
their accounting treatment of acquired software capitalize
these costs, so there appears to be no difference in account-
ing policy based on size of company for purchased software.
-79-
TABLE 2.2
SIZE ANALYSIS - BASED ON REVENUE
ACCOUNTING TREATMENT
CO. REVENUES PRODUCT ACQUIRED CONSTRUCTION
NO. ($M) ENHANCEMENTS· SOFTWARE COSTS
30 170.2 C
56 165.8 C
05 109.6 C
35 101.2 E C E
22 78.6 C E
18 76.3 C E
08 68.4 E C
01 65.0 C
53 64.4 E C E
13 58.1 E C E
46 46.5 C E
45 44.5 E
54 43.8 Not Disclosed
44 43.1 C E
14 40.5 C
16 39.5 Not Disclosed
09 39.4 E
24 37.5 E E
36 36.0 E E
50 35.S E
26 33.0 E C C/E
51 30.0 E C E
37 26.2 E E
17 25.0 C C C/E
32 24.3 Not Disclosed
06 23.8 Not Disclosed
23 23.5 E C E
20 20.6 E C E
43 20.0 C E
03 18.4 E C E
Code
C - Capitalize
E - Expense
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TABLE 2.2
SIZE ANALYSIS - BASED ON REVENUE
ACCOUNTING TREATMENT
CO. REVENUES PRODUCT ACQUIRED CONSTRUCTION
NO. ($M) ENHANCEMENTS SOFTWARE COSTS
07 18.0 E E
47 17.5 E
28 17.0 C E
31 16.6 E
04 16.1 E E
48 15.5 E
40 lof.3 Nominal Capitalization
55 13.4 E
42 12.8 Not Disclosed
25 12.6 C
34 9.2 E E
10 8.6 C
39 7.7 C C
29 6.5 C
11 6.1 E
21 6.1 E E
33 5.5 E C C
12 3.5 C/E E
52 3.1 E C E
15 1.9 C C E
19 1.6 C E
27 1.2 C E
49 .876 E
41 .525 C C E
38 .508 E
02 .218 E
Code
C - Capitalize
E - Expense
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The only area where there may be a difference in account-
ing policy based on size is in the accounting for product
enhancements, and here, the difference is not what might be
expected. Of vendor companies that disclose their policy of
accounting for enhancement costs, 14 of 17 companies (82.4
percent) having sales in excess of $10 million expense
enhancement costs, compared to only 4 of 11 companies (36.4
percent) having sales of under $10 million. One of the
smaller companies (9.1 percent) expenses some enhancement
costs and capitalizes other enhancement costs. Six out of
11 smaller companies (54.5 percent) capitalize all enhance-
ment costs, compared to 3 of 17 <17.6 percent) of the larger
companies. Although the sample size is small, it is safe to
conclude that, for this sample at least, companies having
annual sales of less than $10 million are more likely to
capitalize software enhancement costs than are companies
with annual sales in excess of $10 million.
However, several caveats are in order. The $10 million
cut-off is purely arbitrary. An infini te number of other
arbitrary cut-off points could have been selected. Further-
more, the companies included in this sample are all publicly
held. Had private companies also been included, the percen-
tages could have been far different. If it is valid to
assume that private companies tend to be smaller than public
-82-
companies, it would seem that smaller companies may be far
more likely to capitalize enhancement costs than these sta-
tistics show.
If we can tentatively conclude that smaller companies
are more likely to capitalize enhancement costs than are
larger companies, several questions come to mind. If it is
assumed that smaller companies will tend to choose accounting
policies based on expediency rather than principle, then why
do they tend to capitalize rather than expense enhancement
costs? It would seem that the larger companies, having a
more sophisticated accounting system, would be more likely
to capitalize than would the smaller companies. But the
evidence shows that this is not the case. One possible
answer is that the smaller companies find it more difficult
to raise capital, and that this difficulty can be partially
overcome by capitalizing enhancement costs. The issue as to
the relationship between software accounting policy and the
ability to raise capital carneto light during the course of
the interviews, and led to the mailing of several question-
naires to commercial lending officers and financial analysts.
This aspect of software accounting policy is discussed in
more depth in Part II of this thesis.
-8)-
If it is true that the smaller companies choose to capi-
talize enhancement costs in order to make it easier to obtain
capital, then why do they not also capitalize software con-
struction costs? The evidence shows that software construc-
tion costs are expensed rather than capitalized by almost all
software vending companies regardless of size. One possible
answer is that software construction costs are incurred
before technological and market feasibility have been estab-
lished, whereas enhancement costs are only incurred for soft-
ware products that have already passed the technological and
market feasibility tests. However, such an answer is imcom-
plete, because software vendors would not expend funds for
software construction if the technological and market feasi-
bility tests had not already been met. The feasibility test
argument is at the heart of the PASS Exposure Draft on this
topic, and this lineof reasoning was rather consistently
opposed at the PASS Hearings on software accounting that
were held in New York on May 2-3, 1985 (see Note at the end
of Chapter 7 for a summary of these Hearings).
Public Accounting Firms and Software Accounting Policy
Although all major public accounting firms have clients
in all of the major industry groups, it is generally con-
ceded that certain firms have a known or perceived expertise
-84-
in certain areas. Certain firms are thought to be experts
on the banking industry, while others specialize in oil and
gas, etc. It was not known whether any particular firm spe-
cialized in the software manufacturing industry, so an
attempt was made to determine if one particular firm tended
to have more than its ratable share of the software business.
An attempt to obtain this information was made in two differ-
ent ways. The first way, discussed in this Chapter, was to
determine which public accounting firm signed the opinion in
the annual report of the publicly held companies that could
be identified. This information is readily available from
the NAARS data base and from SEC filings. The second method,
discussed in Chapter 3, was to include a question on this
topic in the questionnaire that was sent to software vendor
companies. Information obtained using these two different
methods is not identical, because the method used in this
chapter includes only publicly held companies, whereas the
method used in Chapter 3 includes both public and private
companies.
-85-
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Table 2.3 lists the auditors of the 56 public software
companies alphabetically. Price Waterhouse audits 10 soft-
ware vendors, followed by Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Company
wi th 8, and Arthur Andersen & Company and Arthur Young &
Company, with 6 each. Coopers & Lybrand, Deloitte Haskins &
Sells, and Ernst & Whinney each audit 5 companies. Touche
Ross & Company, the other member of the "Big 8", audits only
2 companies. The remaining companies are audited by a vari-
ety of national, regional and local firms. While it appears
that Price Waterhouse is in first place, there are at least
4,000 companies in the United States that manufacture soft-
ware for sale, so the 56 companies represented in this sample
is a small percentage of the total number of companies in
this industry. Most companies in the software industry are
small and privately held, or are subsidiaries or divisions
of larger public companies, and do not have separate annual
statements.
In the course of the interviews it was learned that some
public accounting firms place pressure on their audit clients
to adopt or retain a certain software accounting policy. One
of the questions in the vendor questionnaire (see Chapter 3)
probed this point. As in the case with any other accounting
policy, there is a tendency among audit cl ients to II shop"
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for the public accounting firm that will allow the audit
client to use the accounting policies it deems most desir-
able. Table 2.4 attempts to determine the software account-
ing policies of the public accounting firms that audit com-
panies in the software industry, and whether their policies
are consistent from client to client. This approach is not
without fault, however. Although the public accounting firm
in question may have a policy for software accounting, its
individual clients may have views that differ from those of
the firm, so the fact that the firm may sign the company's
opinion paragraph that appears inthe annual report does not
mean that the firm fully agrees with the company's software
accounting policies. It only means that thereis not suffi-
cient disagreement to preclude the firm from rendering a
clean opinion.
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As Table 2.4 shows, the six clients audited by Arthur
Andersen & Company generally expense software costs, although
one client capitalizes the costs of acquired software and
one client capitalizes product enhancements and some pro-
gramming costs. Some companies did not reveal their soft-
ware accounting pol icies, so the results could be either
more or less consistent than the table shows.
The clients audited by Arthur Young & Company are a
mixed group. Three of the six clients expense enhancement
costs, one capitalizes and two do not disclose their policy.
Four of the six capitalize acquired software costs and four
expense construction costs. One client capitalizes construc-
tion costs and documentation costs. The off icial view of
Arthur Young & Company, as revealed in its testimony at the
FASB Hearing (see Note at the end of Chapter 7), is to capi-
talize detail design, coding and testing costs of constructed
software. Thus, the official policy of the public account-
ing firmis not followed by four out of five clients included
in this sample.
The five Coopers & Lybrand clients are also mixed,
although there is a trend toward capitalization. Two of the
three clients that reveal their product enhancement policy
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capitalize these costs: one client expenses. All three
clients that disclose their acquired software policy capi-
talize these costs. Two clients expense all construction
costs, and one client expenses some construction costs and
capitalizesothers. The official Coopers & Lybrand position,
as revealed at the Hearings, is that costs meeting the defi-
nition of an asset should be capitalized regardless of where
they are incurred in the software product life cycle.
Three of the clients audited by Deloitte Haskins & Sells
capitalize the costs of acquired software; their other two
clients do not reveal their accounting policy for purchased
software. The two clients that disclose their policy for
construction costs expense these items.
The Ernst & Whinney clients are fairly consistent in
their policies. All three clients that revealed their soft-
ware accounting policies capitalize the costs of acquiring
software and expense software construction costs. One
client capitalizes product enhancements and two clients
expense these costs. The official Ernst & Whinney policy,
as revealed at the PASB Hearings, is to expense all software
construction costs.
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The Peat,' Marwick, Mitchell & Company clients are also
fairly consistent. Three of four expense product enhance-
ment costs. All three that reveal their policy for acquired
software capitalize these costs. Five clients expense all
software construction costs ~ one client expenses some of
these costs and capitalizes others.
The Price Waterhouse clients also display a large degree
of consistency. Four of five expense product enhancement
costs; one client capitalizes these costs. All five clients
that reveal their policy capitalize acquired software costs.
Eight clients expense software construction costs. It is
amusing to note that the official Price Waterhouse position,
as stated at the FASB Hearings, is to capitalize all costs
incurred after the detail design phase of software construc-
tion.
Touche Ross & Company audited only two clients in this
sample, and one of these clients did not reveal its software
accounting policy. The client that did state its policy
expenses construction costs and expenses some product en-
hancement costs. The official ToucheRoss position at the
FASB Hearings was rather wishy-washy, to the effect that
some construction costs could qualify for capi talization,
and that enhancements could also qualify.
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From analyzing the official views of the major account-
ing firms, where these views could be determined, and com-
paring them to the software accounting policies of their
clients, it appears that clients do not always follow the
official policy of their audit firm. However, a number of
explanations may be given to account for this fact. Perhaps
the auditors in the field are not aware of their firm's
official view. Perhaps the view was only recently formu-
lated, and was formulated so that the firm could testify at
the FASB Hearings. Perhaps the company's deviation from the
official public accounting firm view was not considered to
be sufficiently material to withhold issuing a clean opinion.
Or perhaps the facts and circumstances of the particular
case justified a deviation from the official position.
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Table 2.5 provides a matrix summary of the software
accounting policies of public companies in the software
industry. The 56 companies included in the sample are
listed alphabetically. Many companies did not reveal their
software accounting policies in their financial statements
or footnotes, so the data provided in this table is incom-
plete. However, a few tentative conclusions can be drawn.
About two-thirds of the companies revealing their accounting
policy for product enhancements expense these costs (66 per-
cent), compared to 34 percent that capitalize. All 25 com-
panies that disclosed their policy for accounting for ac-
quired software costs capitalize these costs (100 percent).
The vast majority (91 percent) of the companies in the sample
expense software construction costs; only 9 percent capital-
ize these costs.
Comserv Corporation's Software Accounting Policy
Comserv Corporation's software accounting policy is
worthy of special mention at this time for several reasons.
For one thing, it is a large, publicly traded software com-
pany that capitalizes software costs. For another, it has
maintained high visibility and is controversal because of
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its software accounting policy.2 Comserv's reported $2.2
million 1981 profit would have been a $1 million loss had
Comserv chosen to expense software costs instead of capital-
izing them. In 1982, the reported $2.5 million profit would
have been a $4 million loss. Comserv has very plausible
reasons for capitalizing software costs, and these reasons,
as well as Comserv's software accounting policy, are dis-
cussed in Appendix A.
Briefly, Comserv capitalizes certain costs related to
the enhancement, improvement and adaptation to particular
requirements of the company's existing software. These cap-
italized costs are amortized using the straight-line method
over six years for software designed to operate on IBM-com-
patible mainframe computer equipment, and over 4 years for
2Comserv's software accounting policies are discussed in
Appendix A of this treatise as well as in John Barres,
"Comserv Corporation: Tracking the Accounting Methods of
the Computer Software Industry," MBA thesis, New York
University, 1984; Lee Berton, "Software Firms Debate Method
of Accounting," Wall Street Journal, April 4, 1984, p. 31:
Gary W. Burns and D. Scott Peterson, "Accounting for
Computer Software," The Journal of Accountancy, April, 1982,
pp. 50-51, 53-54, 56, 58: "Comserve Restates Its Results to
Show Wider Loss in First Half," Wall Street Journal,
September 26, 1983, p. 13; E. F. Hutton, "Comserv Corp:
Forbes Article Reaction Rating Increased From 3-1 to 2-1,"
wire No. 18, January la, 1982; "Expenses, Schmexpenses,"
Forbes, May 23, 1983, p. 13: Eamonn Fingleton, "Capital
Offense," Forbes, January 17, 1983, pp. 100-101; Eamonn
Fingleton, "U.S. Laws Hit Hi-Tech," Accountancy Age,
April 21, 1983, p. 21.
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all other software. The costs of purchased software are
capitalized and amortiz~d on the same basis. Research and
development costs are expensed, as required by FASB State-
ment No.2. Costs related to software deemed to have an
impaired future value are writtenoff immediately or amortized
over the remaining period of benefit once this becomes
apparent. Construction costs for its educational software
are capitalized and amortized over 4 years. Fuller detail
of the Comserv approach is to be found in Appendix A.
The criticism that has been made of the Comserv approach
is the same criticism that has been leveled against any cap-
italization policy, namely, that the expenditures being
capitalized more closely represent expenses than assets. It
is just that the effect of capitalizing these expenditures
has been somewhat more dramatic in the case of Comserv Cor-
poration than it has been for the average software company.
Also, Comserv has been outspoken regarding its policy, and
so has drawn more attention than has the average capitalizing
software company. In fact, it was partly as a result of
Comserv's software accounting policy that the Securities and
Exchange Commission decided to impose a moratorium on the
capitalization of software costs.
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SUMMARY
A comparison of data gathered by reading financial
statement information (Chapter 2) and questionnaire re-
sponses (Chapter 3) reveals some interesting similari ties
and differences. A further reference to the findings of
this part of the research will be found in the summary
discussion of Chapter 3, where the responses to the field
questionnaire addressed to software vendors are presented.
suffice it to say at this juncture that the results of the
two enquiries, though not identical, are closely similar in
most cases.
Thusfar, it would appear that accounting for software
as reported in the financial statements of participant com-
panies principally follows the following procedures: (1)
product enchancement costs tend to be expensed, as do soft-
ware construction costs, programmer salaries and documen-
tation costs; (2) the cost of acquiring software tends to be
capi tal ized. In the case of product enchancement costs,
programmer
minority
salaries and documentation costs,
of companies capitalize
a substantial
these costs.
There appears to be no consistent substantial asso-
ciation between these chosen procedures and either the field
of operation or the size of the company, although there may
be a tendency for smaller companies to capitalize enhan-
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cement costs. Thusfar, we have no clear evidence that the
choice of procedure is based strongly on principle, whether
of pure accounting theory or reasoned professional opinion.
Indeed, it was seen in chapter one that such is the ambi-
guity of formal professional pronouncements relevant to this
subject that it would be difficult to derive any firm ground
of principle from them. A serious attempt to derive a pro-
cedure from basic accounting principles has been made by
Comserv, whether we agree with their conclusions or not.
The rebuttals of the Com serv argument by practicing finan-
cial executives that have been made imply that theirs is not
a solitary recourse to basic theory. But the very enthu-
siasm which these initial propositions generated within the
industry affords a tentative evidence that, hitherto at any
rate, software accounting procedures have developed on
grounds of expedience or simplistic reaction rather than as
a logical interpretation of the economic status of the firm
or as a principled argument drawn from a material
consideration of theoretic issues.
It will also be observed that thusfar there is little if
any co i nc idence between the accounting procedures so far
developed in the software industry and the recommendations
der ived in chapter 7. At the end of Part I of this thes is
there is reported the details of the FASB Hearings on its
Exposure Draft "Accounting for the Costs of Computer
-101-
Software to Be
which it will
Sold, Leased, or otherwise Marketed",
accounting
thought and
from
still
the
be observed that software
appears
demands
to
of
reflect major confusions of
bottom-line reporting rather than attempts to
present a true and a fair view of the state of the financial
status of the reporting organization.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE SOFTWARE VENDOR QUESTIONNAIRE
-129-
Introduction
Information gathered during the interviews resulted in a
number of questions being raised regarding var ious aspects
of software accounting. It appeared that the major ity of
companies capitalize purchased software costs and expense
the costs associated with the construction of software.
Some interviewees also expressed concern about the ability
to raise capital if software costs were expensed rather than
capitalized, and it was thought that a few questions address-
ing this issue would be fruitful. It was decided that a few
questions on the tax aspects of software accounting should
also be asked with the hope that additional light could be
shed on this Shadowy area.
Drafts of questions to be included in this questionnaire,
which was to be sent to executives of software vending com-
panies, were constructed based on the interviews. These
drafts were then sent to a panel for
modified version of the Delphi technique.
comment using a
Upon receiving
panel member comments, a revised list of questions was writ-
ten and sent to panel members for further comment. This
process was repeated several times until it was felt that
further mailings to panel members would no longer be of
significant value.
-1)0-
Panel members were selected in several ways. All mem-
bers of the National Association of Accountants' Management
Accounting Practices Committee were included, as were mem-
bers of the NAA Subcommittee on MAP Statement promulgation.
Solicitation for members was also made in Management
Accounting and Association Leader, NAA pUblications having a
monthly circulation of 97,000 and 10,000, respectively.
Letters were also sent to 371 NAA chapter presidents
requesting them to announce the search for panel members at
their next chapter meeting. Some of the people who partici-
pated in the interviews agreed to serve on the panel, as did
all members of AICPA's Task Force on Accounting for the
Development and Sale of Computer Software. The panel that
reviewed the questionnaire discussed in this chapter con-
sisted of 57 individuals, most of whom had years of exposure
to the software accounting policies of at least one company.
The sample for this questionnaire was drawn from 30
known public companies and 368 other software vendors, some
of which were public and some privately held. The latter
group was selected randomly from Data Sources (Summer, 1982)
and the 1982 Data Decisions Software Vendor Directory. All
selected firms had annual revenues in excess of $5 million,
although some earnings could have been derived from non-
software sources. The questionnaire was accompanied by a
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cover letter written on NAA stationery addressed to the
financial officer. A self-addressed, prepaid envelope was
also enclosed. Eighty-eight usable responses were received,
for a response rate of 22.1 percent.
Questionnaire Responses
Below is a summary of the questionnaire responses, along
with related discussion. The questionnaire is reproduced in
Appendix F.
Question No.1: Wha t amorti zation method and time per iod
range are used for financial statement purposes to amortize:
Cl) purchased software intended for: Ca) internal use or
(b) resale; (2) internally developed software intended for:
Ca) internal use or Cb) sale?
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TABLE 3.1
AMORTIZATION METHODS
QUESTION 1 - VENDORS
Purchased For InternallO Constructed ForInternal Dse Resale Internal ae Sale
Amortization Method _!_ ~ _!_ i _l_ ,. _l_ t
None. All such costs are
expenaed
Private 16 25 36 29
Plblic 14 23 47 46
Total -m 48 B3 I>
Straight line method
Private 19 8 I 4
Public 37 25 4 4
Total 56 96.6" 33 82.5" -S- IOO.m. B 61. 5,.
Sum of the years digits
method
Private 1
Public - - - -Total l 1.7 - - -- - -- - -
Declining balance method
Pri vate
Plblic - - - -Total - - - -- - - -- - - -
Units sold melhod
Private 1 4 2
Pub lic - 1 - -Total +r 1.7 --; 12.5 - 2 15.4--
ather
Pri vate 2
Plblic - 2 - 1Tolal - 2 5.0 - ---; 23.1
Total
Private 37 37 37 37
Public 51 51 51 51
Total :l.[ :l.[ :n :n
-133-
TABLE 3.1
AMORTIZATION METHODS
QUESTION 1 - VENDORS
(Continued)
Purchased ror Interna11~ Constructed ror
Internal Ose Resale Internal Use Sale
Amortization Method _l_ i _l_ i _l_ i _L 1:
SUt-t1ARY
Companies expensing
software
Private 16 43,. 25 68,. 36 97,. 29 78~
. Public 14 27 23 45 47 92 46 90
Total -m 34 48 55 83 94 75 85
Companies capitalizing
software
Private 21 57 12 32 1 3 8 22
Public 37 ts 28 55 4 8 5 10
Total 58" 66 40 45 -5 6 13 15
Total
Private 37 37 37 37
Public 51 51 51 51
Total :E :E ::E :l[
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Question 1 attempted to determine the percentage of
software vendor companies that capitalize certain categories
of software expenditure. The responses to this question
also revealed the amortization methods used and the esti-
mated asset life, by category. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 summarize
the responses.
Based on the responses, it can tentatively be concluded
that:
1. For software purchased for internal use:
a. a majority of both private (57%) and public
(73%) companies capitalize these software
costs;
b. public companies are more likely to capitalize
these costs than are privately held companies;
c. the vast majority of the capitalized software
(75.9% or more) is amortized over 5 years or
less;
d. the straight-line method is by far the most
frequently used method (96.6%).
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2. For software purchased for resale:
a. slightly over half (55%) of publicly held com-
panies capitalize this type of software, but
less than one in three (32%) privately held
companies do so;
b. public companies are more likely to capitalize
these costs than are privately held companies;
c. the vast majority of the capitalized software
(85.0% or more) in this category is amortized
over 5 years or less;
d. the straight-line method is by far the most
frequently used method (82.5%).
3. For software constructed for internal use:
a. the vast majority of both private (97%) and
public (92%) companies expense such software;
b. public companies appear to be slightly more
likely to capitalize (8%) than private com-
panies (3%);
c. the majority of capitalized software (60%) is
amortized over 8 years or less;
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d. the straight-line method is by far (100.0%)
the most frequently used method.
4. For software constructed for sale:
a. the vast majority of both private (78%) and
public (90%) companies expense such software:
b. private companies appear to be slightly more
likely to capitalize (22%) than public com-
panies (10%):
c. the vast majority of the capitalized software
(at least 69.2%) in this category is amortized
over 5 years or less:
d. the straight-line method is by far the most
frequently used method (61.5%).
5. Purchased software is capitalized more frequently
than is internally constructed software.
6. public companies are more likely to capitalize
software costs than private companies.
7. Most software is amortized over 5 years or less.
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8. The. straight-line method is by far the most fre-
quently used method.
The analysis of the financial statement footnote infor-
mation presented in chapter 2 tentatively concluded that the
size of a software vending firm bears no relationship to its
software accounting policy, although there may be a possibi-
lity that smaller companies may have a tendency to capitalize
product enhancement costs more often than do larger com-
panies. The information gathered by this questionnaire was
unable to confirm or deny this possibility because the
questions were not structured to respond to this possibility.
However, a correlation between size of company (QUestion No.
26) and software accounting policy (Question No.1) was made
in the hope that doing so would serve to shed some light on
this possible relationship.
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TABLE J.J
SOfTWARE ACCOUNTING POLICY BY COMPANY SIZE
PURCHASED fOR DEVELOPED fOR
Internal Internal
COMPANY SIZE (Annual Revenues) Use Resale Use Sale
More than $50 million
Expense l8~ 9~ 100'* 91~
Capitalize 82 91 0 9
Between $20-$50 million
Expense l2~ 0,. 78,. 100'*
Capitalize 88 100 22 0
Between $5-$20 million
Expense 12~ 25~ 90,. 72'*
Capitalize 88 75 10 28
Less than $5 million
Expense 3B~ 50' 96' 81~Capitalize 62 50 4 19
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A direct correlation of the data gathered in the
questionnaire with the information obtained in the NAARS
search (Chapter 2) is not possible for a variety of reasons.
In Chapter 2, the policy of accounting for enhancement costs
was analyzed, whereas the presentation made in Table 3.3
analyzes the accounting for purchased and developed software
intended for internal use or (re)sale. In Chapter 2, the
sample was broken down into two groups, companies with sales
in excess of $10 million and companies with sales of less
than $10 million. Table 3.3 uses four sales categories,
ranging from less than $5 million to more than $50 million.
Furthermore, the sample discussed in Chapter 2 included only
public companies, whereas the sample in Chaoter 3 includes
both public and private companies.
Table 3.3 shows that companies have a tendency to capi-
talize purchased software and expense developed software.
For purchased software intended for internal use, the three
largest categories capitalize between 82-88 percent of the
time, whereas the smallest category capitalizes only 62 per-
cent of the time. While each category is more li~ely than
not to capitalize this type of software, it was expected
that the percentage of capitalizing companies would increase
as size decreased, if it is assumed that a company's soft-
ware accounting policy is chosen with the intent of making
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it easier to obtain capital, and that smaller companies have
a more diffLeuIt time raising capital than do larger com-
panies. (This line of reasoning also assumes that bankers
will act more favorably toward a company that places its
software costs on the balance sheet than to a company that
expenses such cost.s , ) The response would seem to refute
this assumption. Another assumption is that smaller com-
panies tend to expense whereas larger companies tend to
capitalize because smaller companies do not have the resour-
ces needed to maintain a complicated accounting system, and
expensing is easier than capitalizing. This assumption
appears to be borne out, based on the response to purchased
software intended for internal use.
Companies in the smaller two categories seem less likely
to capitalize purchased software intended for resale than do
companies in the larger two categories, although all four
categories seem likely to capitalize these costs. Thus, it
would appear that the smaller companies tend to follow a
software accounting policy based on expedience rather than
reasoned accounting principles: expensing is easier than
capitalizing, therefore the software is expensed. At least
this is true for the 25-50% of the companies that expense
this category of software.
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The response to the last two categories of software do
not bear out this line of reasoning, however. For software
developed for internal use, the smallest companies are
nearly as likely (96%) as the largest companies (100%) to
expense, and it is the second largest category that seems
less likely to expense, although 78 percent of this group
would also expense. However, for software developed for
sale, the second largest group is most likely to expense
(100%), and the third group is least likely (72%).
From this lack of consistency, it may be tentatively
concluded that company size has no discernible bearing on
software accounting policy.
Question No.2: How are software costs classified on the
balance sheet?
-14J-
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The responses to this question (See Table 3.4) revealed
that:
1. Software assets used internally, whether purchased
or constructed internally, are most likely to
appear on the balance sheet as:
a. a fixed asset without separate disclosure; or
b. a specific noncurrent asset line item.
2. Software assets intended for sale, whether
purchased or internally constructed, are likely to
be listed as a specific noncurrent asset line item.
Question No.3: Software costs appearing on the balance
sheet represent what percent of total assets?
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TABLE 3.5
sorTWARE COSTS APPEARING ON THE BALANCE SHEET
AS A PERCENTAGE or TOTAL ASSETS
QUESTION 3 - VENDORS
Private Com~anie8 Public Com~anies Total Public and Private
Percent Percent Percent
Percent of of Cumulative of Cumulative of Cumulative
Total Asseta .L: Total Percentage .s.: Total Percentage .L: Total Percentage
0-4.~ 26 70.3~ 70. '" 35 68.6~ 68.6" 61 69.3" 69. '"
5.0--9.9 6 16.2 86.5 8 15.7 84.3 14 15.9 85.2
10.0-19.9 86.5 5 9.8 94.1 5 5.7 90.9
20.0-29.9 2 5.4 91.9 1 2.0 96.0 3 3.4 94.3
30.0-39.9 2 5.4 97.3 1 2.0 98.0 3 3.4 97.7
68.0-76.8 _1 2.7 100.0 1 2.0 100.0 _2 2.3 100.0
..2. ..a ..!§.
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Software costs appearing' on the balance sheet repre-
sented less than 5 percent of total assets for about 70 per-
cent of the companies responding to this question. If
materiality is defined as 5 percent of total assets, then
software assets are a material item for 31 percent of the
companies in this survey. If mater iali ty is def ined as 10
percent, then the item is material for 15 percent of the
companies. For one private and public company, the percen-
tages were 76.8 and 68.0, respectively.
Question No.4: What costs are capitalized for internally
developed software that is intended for (1) internal use;
(2) sale?
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TABLE 3.6
CATEGORIES OF CAPITALIZED COSTS FOR
INTERNALLY DEVELOPED SOFTWARE
QUESTION 4 - VENDORS
Category of
Capitalized Cost
Number of
Companies Capitalizing
Software Developed for
Internal Use Sale
Feasibility costs 1
Design costs 6
Coding costs 8
Testing costs 5
Support costs
Service costs
Other 1
-148-
2
9
12
11
2
Responses to this question, summari zed in Table 3.6,
reveal that the categories of costs most frequently capita-
lized are design, coding, and testing costs. As was indi-
cated in Table 3.1, software construction costs were more
likely to be capitalized if the software was intended for
sale than if it were constructed for internal use.
Question No.5: For how many years has your company been
capitalizing software costs?
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TABLE 3.7
NUMBER OF YEARS SOFTWARE COSTS CAPITALIZED
QUESTION 5 - VENDORS
Cumulative
Years Companies Percent of Total Percentage
1--3 22 46.8% 46.8%
4--6 13 27.7 74.5
7--9 3 6.4 80.9
10-12 6 12.8 93.6
13-15 3 6.4 100.0
47-
Notes
(1) Some companies did not respond to this question.
(2) Although it appears that capitalization of software is a
recent phenomenon, it should be kept in mind that many
software firms have not been in existence for more than
six years.
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Responses to this question, summarized in Table 3.7,
indicate that the vast majority of the companies in this
study have been capitalizing software for 6 years or less.
This response might be interpreted to mean that there is a
trend toward the capitalization of software costs. However,
it should be kept in mind that many software companies have
not been in existence for more than 6 years.
Question No.6: Software costs that are not expensed are
capitalized because:
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TABLE 3.8
REASONS FOR CAPITALIZATION OF SOFTWARE COSTS
QUESTION 6 - VENDORS
Reason Number of Responses
An asset has been created 34
The matching concept 27
Inclusion improves net income
and EPS 5
Inclusion improves ability
to raise capital 3
IRS regulations on
purchased software 1
Conservatism 1
Notes
(1) Some companies did not respond.
(2) Some companies gave more than one response.
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Table 3.8 indicates that the most frequently given
reasons for capitalizing software costs are that either an
asset has been created or the matching concept requires that
costs be matched to the period of expected benefit.
It would appear that the two most frequently given
reasons and the last listed response are based on principle
rather than expediency. The third and fourth reasons listed
reflect self-interest. The fifth reason reveals a miscon-
ception, since accounting policy for tax and financial
accounting need not be the same in this case.
Question No.7: Software costs that are not capitalized are
expensed because:
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TABLE 3.9
REASONS FOR EXPENSING SOFTWARE COSTS
QUESTION 7 - VENDORS
Number of
Reason Responses
Such costs are considered research and
development 50
Uncertainty as to realization makes expensing
prudent 29
R&D cost elements are not easily separated
from non-R&D costs, so all costs are expensed 14
They are expensed for tax purposes, and we want
to use the same accounting method per tax and
book whenever possible 9
They are immaterial in amount 6
Our CPA firm strongly reco~nends that such costs
be expensed. Management is of the opinion that
certain software costs should be capitalized 5
Support and service costs are not considered to
be assets 1
custom software construction costs are charged
to expense as related revenues are invoiced 1
Compliance with correct accounting pronounce-
ments and interpretations 1
All internally developed software is expensed. 1
Note: Some companies gave more than one response.
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Table 3.9 indicates that the most frequently given
reasons for expensing software costs are that such costs are
either research and development or there is uncertainty as
to realization.
Classifying such costs as research and development would
be a mistake in many cases, so it app~ars that such classi-
fication is based on expedience rather than principle. Or
perhaps it is based on an incorrect impression of what
consti tutes research and development. Uncertainty as to
real ization could be given a.s a reason based on pr inc iple
(conserva tism ) or on expendiency. The other reasons given
reflect an amount of expediency rather than principle, or an
incorrect interpretation of existing accounting pronounce-
ments.
Question No.8: If a product intended for sale is found to
be unmarketable, but the coding is partially or wholly
reusable, and is reused in a new product intended for sale:
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TABLE 3.10
ACCOUNTING POLICY FOR REUSED CODING
QUESTION 8 - VENDORS
Number of
Reason Responses Percentage
Previously incurred costs are never
borne by the new product. All costs
are borne by the original product 44 74.6%
previously incurred costs are
apportioned if appropriate and
charged to the new product 11 18.6
All previously incurred costs will be
borne by the new product 4 6.8
Firms not responding 29
88
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Responses to this question (See Table 3.10) reveal that
the vast majority of companies (75%) allocate the coding
costs of a product failure to that pioduct even though the
code may later be used in another product. This treatment
seems to make sense, because it is at least questionable
whether the code has any future economic benefita t that
point in time.
Question No.9: How are development costs shared between an
internally used product and a product developed for sale
that uses all or a substantial portion of the code?
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TABLE 3.11
ACCOUNTING FOR SHARED DEVELOPMENT COSTS
QUESTION 9 - VENDORS
Reason
Number of
Responses Percentage
All costs are borne by the product
intended for sale 22 53.7%
All costs are borne by the internally
used product 7 17.1
Costs are apportioned 5 12.2
Costs are apportioned at current
rather than historical cost 4 9.8
Costs are shared equally between the
products 3 7.3
Firms not responding 47
88
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Table 3.11 shows that software construction costs that
are incurred for a program that is both used internally and
sold are generally allocated exclusively to the product
intended for sale.
Question No. 10: Does your company provide reserves for
future maintenance costs incurred in fulfilling warranty
obligations? If ·yes," how are such reserves estimated?
TABLE 3.12
ACCOUNTING FOR FUTURE MAINTENANCE COSTS
QUESTION 10 - VENDORS
Number of Responses Percentage
Yes
No
Firms not responding
20
63
5
88
24.1%
75.9
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Table 3.12 reveals that the vast majority of companies
(76') do not provide reserves for future maintenance costs
incurred in fulfilling warranty obligations. In cases where
reserves were estimated, the estimation methods used includ-
ed:
1. prior year history
2. percentage of revenue
3. future expected returns for failure within warranty
period
4. past experience plus previous 90 days sales
5. estimated labor hours to be expended
6. project by project basis
7. proration
evaluation
of revenues plus specific cost
8. pure guess -- new company with no previous history
9. deferral of recognition of maintenance revenue
rather than establishment of a reserve for future
maintenance costs.
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QUestion No. 11: Do you think the accounting treatment for
purchased software should be different than the accounting
treatment for comparable internally developed software? If
"yes," why?
TABLE 3.13
ACCOUNTING TREATMENT OF SOFTWARE COSTS
QUESTION 11 - VENDORS
Number of
Responses Percentage
Yes
No
No opinion
Firms not responding
Firms giving two responses
30
50
9
1
( 2 )
88
33.7%
56.2
10.1
Table 3.13 shows that a clear majority of respondents
(56%) do not think that the accounting treatment for pur-
chased software should be different than that for internally
constructed software. For those respondents indicating that
there should be different accounting treatment, the main
reasons given were:
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1. Costs associated with internally developed software
are not as easily identif ied and are subject to
judgment rather than unequivocal evidence.
2. Specific costs are more readily identified for pur-
chased software and its specif ic use/life can be
matched to product sales.
3. Purchased software has a predetermined value (pur-
chase price) and should be an asset, whereas intern-
ally constructed software is ever-changing and is a
period expense.
4. It is too difficult to allocate costs and resources
and to identify costs associated with software con-
struction. Capitalizing internally constructed
software opens the door to manipulation of income
by over-allocating costs to capitalized software.
5. purchased software has an established market value,
whereas internally constructed software costs are
at risk.
6. purchased software products have generally passed
technical marketability and user testing pr ior to
purchase. Future use and benef it are much more
likely than for constructed software.
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7. It is extremely difficult to separate R&D expenses
for internally constructed software.
8. purchased software is generally a standard product,
whereas internally constructed software is custom.
It appears that most of these reasons are based on ex-
pedience rather than principle.
Question No. 12: The inability to include software costs on
the balance sheet adversely affects your ability to raise
capital.
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TABLE 3.14
SOFTWARE ACCOUNTING POLICY AND ITS EFFECT
ON THE ABILITY TO RAISE CAPITAL
QUESTION 12 - VENDORS
Number of
ResEonses Percentage
Private ComEanies
Agree 12 36.4%
Disagree 17 51.5
No opinion 4 12.1
Firms not responding 4
37
Public ComEanies
Agree 9 17.0%
Disagree 37 69.8
No opinion 7 13.2
53
public and Private Combined
Agree
Disagree
No opinion
Firms not responding
21
54
11
4
24.4%
62.8
12.8
90-
Note: Some companies gave two responses.
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Table 3.14 summarizes the views of the private and public
companies regarding the effect of software accounting policy
on the ability to raise capital.
A slight majority of private companies disagreed with
the statement. However, the pUblic companies disagreed with
the statement by a margin of 4 to 1.
For those respondents who agreed with the statement,
some of the reasons given were:
1. Companies that expense software construction costs
are placed in an inferior position to those which
capitalize such costs, especiallY in start-up situ-
ations.
2. Income producing assets need to be reflected on the
balance sheet in order to fairly present the valua-
tion of the company. A company would be grossly
undervalued if these costs were expensed immedi-
ately.
3. Banks treat financial statements very literally.
4. Expensing software costs adversely affects current
earnings.
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5. privately owned companies and companies that are
not a subsidiary of a major cong~omerate are at a
definite disadvantage if they expense software
costs.
Those who disagreed did so f or the following reasons:
1. Ability to raise capital is impacted by future
revenues from software development rather than the
current balance sheet. Expensing software con-
struction costs actually improves future prof i t-
ability.
2. Other indicia of financial
(e.g., revenue projections,
are more meaningful than
policy.
strength and leverage
bus iness plan, e tc , )
software accounting
3. The amounts involved are not material (but, see
comments to Question 3).
4. The investment community offers a different mUlti-
ple to companies that capitalize software. Bankers
tend to delete software from the balance sheet.
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5. The ability to raise capital is a function of pro-
fit and loss and growth experience. (But how is
profit and loss affected by a firm's software
accounting policy?)
6. The majority of assets on many vendor company
balance sheets consists of cash and receivables.
7. The market is sophisticated enough to know the
software business. providers of capital to the
software industry recognize special situations.
8. The cost of software on a balance sheet usually has
no relationship to its value.
This question grew out of the interviews. Several inter-
viewees mentioned that inability to place software costs on
the balance sheet made it more difficult for their companies
to obtain capital. Responses to this question seemto con-
firm their view. As a result of the response received to
this question, the decision was made to probe this topic in
more depth. Part II of this thesis explores the relation-
ship between software accounting policy and the ability to
raise capital. Studies on this issue have been made by
Abdel-Khalik ["The Economic Effects on Lessees of FASB
Statement No. 13, Accounting for Leases", (Stamford, eT:
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FASB, 1981)] and others, but an in-depth study on the
effects of software accounting policy on securities prices
was thought to be inappropriate due to the small population
of public companies and the extent to which security prices
of software vendors is affected by other high profile para-
meters. (See Chapter 11.)
Question No. 13: The inability to include software costs on
the balance sheet adversely affects the interest rate your
company must pay to obtain capital.
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TABLE 3.15
SOFTWARE ACCOUNTING POLICY AND ITS EFFECT
ON THE INTEREST RATE ON BORROWED CAPITAL
QUESTION 13 - VENDORS
-Number of
Responses Percentage
Private Companies
Agree
Disagree
No opinion
4
24
9
37
10.8%
64.9
24.3
Public Companies
Agree
Disagree
No opinion
5
38
8
9.8%
74.5
15.7
51-
Public and Private Combined
Agree
Disagree
No opinion
9
62
17
88
10.2%
70.5
19.3
-
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Table 3.15 shows that the vast majority of both private
and public companies do not think the interest rate they
must pay on borrowed capital is adversely affected by the
inability to include software costs on the balance sheet. A
similar question was posed to commercial lending officers to
determine whether a company's software accounting policy
affected the interest rate it must pay. (See Chapters 9 and
10. )
Question No. 14: If all software development costs ~ere
expensed rather than capitalized, the level of these expend-
itures for software companies would have to be much lower;
companies would be forced to put a cap on investment in new
product programs in order to reflect good earnings perfor-
mance to shareholders.
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TABLE 3.16
SOFTWARE ACCOUNTING POLICY AND INVESTMENT
QUESTION 14 - VENDORS
Number of
Responses Percentage
Private Companies
Agree 18 51.4%
Disagree 16 45.7
No opinion 1 2.9
Firms not responding 2
37-
Public Companies
Agree 17 33.3%
Disagree 21 41.2
No opinion 13 25.5
51
public and Private Combined
Agree
Disagree
No opinion
Firms not responding
35
37
14
2
88
40.7%
43.0
16.3
-
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Table 3.16 summari zes the view of pr iva te and public
companies on the relationship of software accounting policy
on investment and growth. A small majority of private com-
panies (51.4%) feel that investment and growth would be
inhibi ted by requir ing software construction costs to be
expensed rather than capitalized. A substantial minority of
public companies (33.3%) feel the same way. Overall, the
sample firms are about evenly divided on the issue, with
40. 7 percent agreeing, 43.0 percent disagreeing and 16.3
percent having no opinion.
Because of the response to this question, it appeared
that a substantial number of software company executives are
of the opinion that a policy of expensing software costs
adversely affects their company in areas other than bank
lending. To probe this point deeper, it was decided to ask
a group of financial analysts for their opinions. The
results of this probe are reported in Chapter 11.
Question No. 15: If all software development costs were
expensed rather than capitalized, the price of your company's
stock, if publicly traded, would be adversely affected.
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TABLE 3.17
THE EFFECT OF SOFTWARE ACCOUNTING POLICY
ON STOCK PRICE
QUESTION 15 - VENDORS
Number of
Responses
Private Companies
Agree
Disagree
No opinion
17
18
2
37
Public Companies
Agree
Disagree
No opinion
16
32
3
51
Public and Private Combined
Agree
Disagree
No opinion
33
50
5
88
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Percentage
45.9%
48.6
5.4
31.4%
62.7
5.9
37.5%
56.8
5.7
Table 3.17 shows that private companies are about evenly
split on the question of whether expensing software adverse-
ly affects stock price. public companies disagree by a two
to one margin. Overall, a majority of companies (56.8%)
disagrees that expensing software adversely affects stock
price. This question is also raised in Chapter 11.
Question No. 16: If all software development costs were
expensed rather than capitalized, your company's long-term
growth would be adversely affected.
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TABLE 3.18
THE EFFECT OF SOFTWARE ACCOUNTING POLICY ON
LONG-TERM GROWTH
QUESTION 16 - VENDORS
Number of
Responses Percentage
Private Companies
Agree
Disagree
No opinion
12
24
1
37
32.4%
64.9
2.7
public Companies
Agree
Disagree
No opinion
Firms not responding
8
38
4
1
51
16.0%
76.0
8.0
-
public and private Combined
Agree
Disagree
No opinion
Firms not responding
20
62
5
1
23.0%
71.3
5.7
88
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Table 3.18 shows that the vast majority of both private
and public firms do not think that expensing software con-
struction costs adversely affects long-term growth. Private
and public companies disagreed with the statement by ratios
of two to one and five to one, respectively, which is even
greater than the disagreement rate for Question 14, which
asked basically the same question. On the other hand, a
substantial minority of private firms (32.4%) do think that
expensing software construction costs adversely affects
long-term growth.
An accounting policy that adversely affects growth has
political implications. American software companies are
feeling the sting of competition from overseas, particularly
Japan, and a software accounting policy that helps foreign
competitors is seen as intolerable to a number of the execu-
tives that were interviewed in the course of this study.
Members of the Financial Accounting Standards Board have
been made aware of this possibility and are deeply concerned,
because the individual members would like to come up with a
software accounting policy recommendation that is devoid of
politics.
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Question No. 17: Your company sometimes purchases software
that could be internally developed because it is easier to
justify placing purchased software costs on the balance
sheet.
TABLE 3.19
PURCHASING SOFTWARE IN ORDER TO
PLACE ON BALANCE SHEET
QUESTION 17 - VENDORS
Number of
Responses Percentage
Private Companies
Agree 2 5.7%
Disagree 29 82.9
.No opinion 4 11.4
Firms not responding 2
37
Public Companies
Agree 1 2.1%
Disagree 45 93.7
No opinion 2 4.2
Firms not responding 3
51
Public and Private Combined
Agree
Disagree
No opinion
Firms not responding
3
74
6
5
3.6%
89.2
7.2
88
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This question was included because it was discovered,
during the course of the interviews, that some companies
choose the method of obtaining software based on its effect
on the balance sheet and income statement. There is some-
times a tendency to classify software as an asset in order
to avoid placing software costs in the income statement, and
there is widespread feeling that costs expended for the
purchase of software are easier to justify for asset treat-
ment than are costs for the construction of software. (See
Questions 6 and 7.> Some firms, it is argued, resort to the
R&D partnership vehicle in order to capitalize costs that
would otherwise be expensed as software construction costs.
Table 3.19 shows that almost 90 percent of the com-
panies included in the survey disagree with the view that a
company will purchase software rather than construct it in
order to justify its inclusion in the balance sheet.
Question No. lB: If company policy were to expense all
software costs as incurred rather than to capitalize a por-
tion of software costs, my company I s net income would be
reduced by t.
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TABLE 3.20
PERCENT REDUCTION IN NET INCOME RESULTING rROMEXPENSING RATHER THAN CAPITALIZING sorTWARE COSTS
QUESTION 18 - VENDORS
Private Com~anies Pub li c Com~ani eB Total Public and Private
Percent Percent Percent
Percent of of Cumulative of Cumulative of CUlDUlative
Total Assets .L: Total Percentage .L: Total Percentage .s.: Total Percentage
o - 4.9~ 25 69.U 69.4~ 43 84.3~ 84.3~ 68 78.2' 78.2'
5.0 - 9.9 3 8.3 77.8 84.3 3 3.4 81.6
10.0--19.9 1 2.8 80.6 S 9.8 94.1 6 6.9 88.5
20.0--29.9 80.6 1 2.0 96.1 1 1.1 89.7
30.0--49.5 3 8.3 88.9 96.1 3 3.4 93.1
50.0--99.9 2 3.9 100.0 2 2.2 95.4
100.0-200.0 4 11.1 100.0 4 4.6 100.0
rirllB not
responding _1 - 1-
...ll 51 ...a-
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As is indicated in Table 3.20, the vast majority of pri-
vate (69.4%) and public companies (84.3%) would have a less
than 5 percent reduction in net income if software costs
that are now being capitalized would have been expensed
instead. However, this fact does not mean that software
expenditures are immaterial for the vast majority of soft-
ware vendor companies, because many firms are presently
expensing rather than capitalizing most or all of their
software costs anyway. Even if this factor is taken into
consideration, 30.6 percent of private companies and 15.7
percent of public companies would have a reduction in net
income of at least 5 percent, which may be cons idered a
material reduction. If materiality is defined as a 10 per-
cent reduction in net income, then the percentages for pri-
vate and public companies would be 22.2 percent and 15.7
percent, respectively. It is safe to say that software
expenditures as a percentage of net sales is significant for
all software vendors, as such costs are among the major
costs incurred by a software vendor.
Question No. 19: Has your company ever used an R&Dpartner-
ship, limited partnership or other off balance sheet arrange-
ment in connection wi th software development? If "yes",
what were your reasons for using such an arrangement?
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TABLE 3.21
USE OF R&D PARTNERSHIPS AND OTHER OFF
BALANCE SHEET ARRANGEMENTS
QUESTION 19 - VENDORS
Number of
Responses
Private Companies
Yes
No
No opinion
Firms not responding
2
34
1
37
Public Companies
Yes
No
No opinion
4
45
2
51
Public and Private Combined
Yes
No
No opinion
Firms not responding
6
79
2
1
88
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Percentage
5.6%
94.4
7.8%
88.2
3.9
6.9%
90.8
2.3
TABLE J.22
REASON fOR Off BAlANCE SHEET fINANCING
QUESTION 19 - VENDORS
Reason
Software
Coats as
Percent of
Total Assets
(~J)
Reduction
in Net
IncolIIe
(~lB)
Public
or
Private
(~27)
In order to fund software
develop.ent without severely
reducing earnings J9S 70s Public
To transfer risks to the partner-
ship and to provide an easier
method (purchased software
concept) to capitalize software
construction costs 2a Public
financing without giving up
equity - only Public
Risk sharing; lower cost of R&D Public
funding of R&D costs 3S Private
To keep our investMent in
software developMent off the
balance sheet 2S Public
Note: Six compsnies answered "yes" to Question 19. The reasons for
using off balance aheet financing are given here, along with
their responses to Question J, lB and 27.
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As is seen from Table 3.21, more than 90 percent of the
firms included in the survey did not use R&D partnerships or
other off balance sheet arrangements in connection with
software development expenditures.
Table 3.22 shows the reasons given and other data for
the six firms that answered "yes" to Question 19. The main
reasons given were either to boost earnings or to spread
risks and obtain favorable financing terms. Five of the six
companies using off balance sheet financing are publicly
held.
Question No. 20: On which categories of software is the
investment tax credit or R&D tax credit taken?
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TABLE 3.23
CATEGORIES or sorTWARE COSTS
UPON WHICH TAX CREDITS ARE TAKEN
QUESTION 20 - VENDORS
Investment Tax R cl D Tax
Credit Credit
Category _!_ Percentage _!_ Percentage
Internally developed software
intended for sale 2 2.'" 64 72.7"
Internally developed software
intended for internal use 3 '.4 30 34.1
Purchased software intended
for resale 17 19.' 10 11.4
Purchased software intended
for internal use 34 38.6 6 6.8
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Questions 20-24 refer to tax-related areas that came to
light in the course of the interviews. A preliminary view
of how these areas are treated was formed by the end of the
interviews, and it was decided to probe this area more fully
by asking software executives how their companies treat the
various tax aspects of software. In some cases, the soft-
ware company executive did not know how to answer these
questions, which were then referred to the company's tax
expert for reply.
Table 3.23 indicates the responses to the question, "on
which categories of software is the investment tax credit or
R&D tax credit taken?" A non-response might be due to the
fact that: (I) the tax credit was not taken, (2) the com-
pany filling out the questionnaire did not incur all four
categories of software costs, or (3) the person filling out
the questionnaire did not know the answer and the tax manager
was out of town. The computed percentages used 88 as a
denominator, the number of companies that completed the
questionnaire. The percentages are conservatively stated
because of the limiting factors mentioned above.
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The most frequently taken credit ,was the R&D tax credit,
for internally constructed software intended for sale, which
was taken by at least 72.7 percent of the companies sur-
veyed. The reason why more companies did not take advantage
of the available tax credits is not known, although it
should be mentioned that many software expenditures do not
qualify for either tax credit.l
QUestion No. 21: Is the same software item ever: (1) Capi-
talized for financial statement purposes and expensed for
tax purposes? (2) Capitalized for tax purposes and expensed
for financial statement purposes?
lThis low response rate for the investment tax credit
seems strange in light of the fact that the Internal Revenue
Service and at least one court case allow the investment tax
credit to be taken in some instances. See Rev. Proc. 69-21,
1969-2 C.B. 303~ Rev. Rul. 71-177, 1971-1 C.B. 5: Texas
Instruments v. United States, 407 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Tex.
1976), rev'd. 551 F.2d 599, 39 AFTR2d 77-1383 (5th Cir.
1977). See Case No. 38, Appendix C.
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TABLE 3.24
COMPARISON OF TAX AND FINANCIAL STATEMENT
TREATMENT OF SOFTWARE COSTS
QUESTION 21 - VENDORS
A. Capitalized for financial
statement purposes and expensed
for tax purposes?
Yes
No
Firms not responding
B. Capitalized for tax purposes and
expensed for financial statement
purposes?
Yes
No
Firms not responding
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Number of
Responses
8
41
39
88
1
75
12
88
Percentage
16.3%
83.7
1. 3%
98.7
TABLE 3.25
REASONS FOR DIFFERING BOOK AND TAX TREATMENT
Reasons for Capitalizing for Financial Statement
Purposes and Expensing for Tax Purposes
1. For twelve years the company expensed software enhance-
ment costs for both books and tax. In 1980, we changed
the book method. Obviously, we did not want to make a
change to the tax method.
2. Lower tax liability versus need to raise capital and
show "financial strength."
3. Tax definition of R&D is different than accounting defi-
nition of an asset. (See FASB-2, Interpretation-6,
Technical Bulletin 79-2, and other accounting literature
for treatment of software construction costs.)
4. The Internal Revenue Service, for many years, has per-
mitted the expensing or deferral of the costs of devel-
oping computer software, at the option of the taxpayer,
in accordance with the rules applicable to research or
experimental expenditures under Section 174 of the
Internal Revenue Code. See Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2
C.B. 303.
5. Significant software is capitalized for financial state-
ment purposes to improve cash flow.
6. To maximize the cash position of the company and to take
advantage of the alternative treatments available to the
company.
7. Per IRS regulations, software development is classified
as an R&D expense.
8. This policy has been in place for years
reason is to lower taxable income.
primary
Reason for Capitalizing for Tax Purposes and
Expensing for Financial Statement Purposes
All packages are capitalized for tax purposes. Other
software costs are expensed per tax. Immaterial pack-
ages are expensed per books but capitalized per tax.
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Table 3.24 shows that the vast majority of companies
treat software expenditures the same for tax and financial
statement purposes. Table 3.25 summarizes the reasons for
different treatments.
While the vast majority of companies treat the same
software item the same way for both financial and tax pur-
poses, a significant minority have different treatments in
some cases. Many firms did not respond to this question.
Perhaps the high nonresponse rate is because many firms
expense all software for both tax and financial reporting
purposes.
Question No. 22: If software is capitalized for both finan-
cial statement and tax purposes, are the amortization method
and time period used the same? If "no", please use this
space to describe why different treatments are used for tax
and financial accounting purposes.
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TABLE '.26
COMPARISON Of AMORTIZATION METHOD AND
TIME PERIOD fOR fINANCIAL STATEMENT AND TAX PURPOSES
QUESTION 22 - VENDORS
Nulllberof
Responses Percentage
Yes
No
firms not responding
36
13
39
7J.5~
26.5
Reasons for Different Tax and financial Statement Treatment
1. Amortization period for financial statements approximates useful life of the
asset. The limitation on useful life is statutorily dictated not to exceed
five years.
2. for purchased software, the straight-line method is used for financial report-
ing and the accelerated cost recovery system (ACRS) is used on the tax return.
,. Seven years straight-line for book purposes (useful life); five years ACRS for
tax purposes
Reasons for Different Tax and financial Statement Treatment
4. Straight-line amortization initially used for both tax and financial atate-ments would have resulted in distortion of gross profit (poor matching of
revenue and expense). The company switched ~thods for financial statement
purposes when the effect of the change was not material.
5. Different methods are uaed in order to lower tax liability and to ahow finan-
cial strength on the financial statements in order to make it easier to raise
capital.
6. Revenue ruling mandates tax treatment.
7. for tax treatment some software (eligible for ITC) is treated as Section 1245
property and depreciated over five years (ACRS).
8. ACRS per tax return; straight-line or declining balance per financial state-
lllents.
9. All federal tax amortization is calculated using the ACRS percentage method.
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Table 3.26 shows that the vast majority of firms that
capitalize software for both financial statement and tax
purposes use the same amortization method and time period.
However, for a significant minority of firms, there are dif-
ferent treatments. Many firms did not respond to this ques-
tion, presumably, because they expense all software costs.
Question No. 23: How is software classified: (1) for fede-
ral tax purposes? (2) for sta te sales/use tax purposes?
(3) for personal property tax purposes?
TABLE 3.27
CLASSIFICATION OF SOFTWARE FOR TAX PURPOSES
QUESTION 23 - VENDORS
Tangible Intangible
Number of Number of
Responses Percentage Responses Percentage
For federal tax
purposes 23 41.1% 33 58.9%
For state
sales/use tax
purposes 16 28.1 41 71.9
For personal
property tax
purposes 10 19.2 42 80.8
Notes: (1) Many companies did not respond to this question.
(2) Some compan~es gave more than one response for
some categories.
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The majority of companies classify software as intangi~
ble for both federal and state tax purposes, although for a
significant minority of companies it may be tangible. The
tax treatment for sales, use and property tax is determined
on a state by state basis, so it is possible that a software
firm may have a software item taxed as tangible personal
property in one state, but have an identical item exempt
from tax if sold in another state because that state classi-
fies it as intangible. In some states, software sold in the
form of a magnetic tape or disk is taxed as tangible, where-
as the same software, if delivered over telephone wires or
by satellite, would be intangible and exempt from tax. In
some states, custom software is exempt from tax, whereas
"canned" or "off the shelf" software is taxable.
Question No. 24: Has your company been a party to litigation
involving the sales taxability of software in the last three
years? If "yes", which stateCs)? What were the issues?
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TABLE 3.28
LITIGATION INVOLVING SALES TAXABILITY
OF SOFTWARE
QUESTION 24 - VENDORS
Number of
Responses Percentage
Yes 8 9.3%
90.7No 78
Firms not responding 2
88
State Issue
Wisconsin
Oklahoma
Massachusetts
Although not a party to litigation, the com-
pany is supporting the litigation efforts of
others. The company believes that software
is intangible. These states think otherwise.
California
Tennessee
Whether sales tax should be paid on software
license and maintenance.
Maryland
Missouri
Wisconsin
Whether statutes specifically identified
software as being subject to sales/use tax.
-19.3-
State
California
California
California
California
Not Given
TABLE 3.28
LITIGATION INVOLVING SALES TAXABILITY
OF SOFTWARE
QUESTION 24 - VENDORS
(Continued)
Issue
No issues stated.
California's position is that, if the sales
tax is applied to sales in other states, and
if the original package and documentation
come into California, then all copies are
taxable in California.
Whether certain software is "custom" or
"canned," the latter being subject to sales
tax.
Whether custom programs were subject to state
sales tax. The company was successful in
showing that there was no tangible transfer
to the customers (computer was programmed
directly), hence sales tax was not
appropriate.
No issue stated.
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Table 3.28 shows that more than 90 percent of the firms
responding to this question have not been involved in soft-
ware sales tax Litigation in the last three years. Of the
seven companies that have been parties to litigation (eight
companies checked the ·yes· box one non-litigant is
assisting in the litigation efforts of others), at least
five cases involve California.
Question No. 25: Which public accounting firm signs the
opinion for your company's financial statements?
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TABLE 3.29
PUBLIC ACCOUNTING fIRM
QUESTION 25 - VENDORS
Private Companies Pub lic Com!;!anles Total Coml2anies
Nulitierof NUri6er of NUliber offirm Res(!onses Percentage Reseonses Percentage ResE!onses Percentage
-Arthur Andersen & Co.pany 5 17.9S 5 9.8!'.: 10 12.7!'.:
-Arthur Young & Company 4 14.3 6 11.8 10 12.7
-Coopers 6: Lybrand 2 7.1 6 11.8 8 10.1
*De101tte Haskins &: Sells 1 3.6 3 5.9 4 5.1
-Ernst 6: Whinney 2 7.1 10 19.6 12 15.2
Main Hurdman 1 3.6 1 1.3
-Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
6: Company 3 10.7 7 13.7 10 12.7
ttprice Waterhouse 3 10.7 11 21.6 14 17.7
Seidman 6: Seidman
-Touche Ross 6: Company 1 3.6 1 2.0 2 2.5
None 3 3
Other 6 21.4 2 3.9 8 10.1
firms not responding 2 - 2-
..E. ..a ~
-Indicstes "Big 8" fir.
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Table 3.29 shows which accounting firm is the principal
audi tor. Price Waterhouse audi ts more publicly held com-
panies than any of the other firms, followed closely by
Ernst & whinney. Of the "big 8" firms, Touche Ross & Co.
audits the fewest public firms.
Arthur Andersen & Co. heads the list for private firms,
followed closely by Arthur Young & Co. Overall, Price Water-
house audited the most companies followed by Ernst & Whinney.
A similar result was found in Chapter 2.
Question No. 26: Total software related revenues for the
mest recent fiscal year were:
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TABLE 3.30
COMPANY SIZE-
QUESTION 26 - VENDORS
Number of
ResEonses Percentage
Private Comeanies
More than $50 million 2 5.4%
Between $20-$50 million 4 10.8
Between $5-$20 million 15 40.5
Less than $5 million 16 43.2
37
Public ComEanies
More than $50 million 12 24.0%
Between $20-$50 million 6 12.0
Between $5-$20 million 16 32.0
Less than $5 million 16 32.0
Firms not responding 1
51
public and Private Combined
More than $50 million 14 16.1%
Between $20-$50 million 10 11.5
Between $5-$20 million 31 35.6
Less than $5 million 32 36.8
Firms not responding 1
88
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Table 3.30 shows the breakdown of the sample companies
by size, measured in terms of software related revenues.
More than 72 percent of the sample was drawn from companies
having annual software related revenues of $20 million or
less. Sixteen percent, or 14 companies, had software related
revenues of more than $50 million. As expected, private
firms generally have less sales than public companies, but 2
of the private firms had sales in excess of $50 million,
which would rank them in the top quarter of publicly held
software companies.
Question No. 27: The company is: privately held? publicly
held?
TABLE 3.31
PRIVATELY HELD AND PUBLICLY HELD COMPANIES
QUESTION 27 - VENDORS
Number of
Responses Percentage
Privately Held
Publicly Held
37
51
42.0%
58.0
88-
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Table 3.31 shows the breakdown of the sample according
to ownership. Fifty-one of the firms (58%) were publicly
held. The other thirty-seven (42%) were privately held.
This sample was heavily weighted in favor of publicly
held firms. Although there are approximately 4,000 private-
ly held software companies and less than 100 publicly held
software firms, the major ity of respondents were publicly
held. This response is due to the sample selection method
chosen. All publicly held software firms that could be
identif ied were sent a questionnaire. Only a relatively
small percentage of privately held software firms received a
questionnaire, and these firms were chosen on the basis of
sales volume.
Summary
A comparison of data gathered by reading financial state-
ment information (Chapter 2) and questionnaire responses
(Chapter 3) reveals some interesting relationships. Respon-
ses to the questionnaire (Table 3.1) reveal that 73 percent
of public companies capitalize purchased software to be used
internally, and 55 percent capitalize purchased software in-
tended for resale. Financial statement data (Table 2.5)
reveals that 100 percent of the 25 companies disclosing
accounting treatment of purchased software capitalize such
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costs. This difference could be due to the fact that not
all companies disclose their policy of accounting for pur-
chased software. Perhaps nondisclosure can be interpreted
to mean "expensed". The data gathered by questionnaire is
probably more accurate, since financial statements are sum-
maries and provide an incomplete picture of what is actually
going on in the business.
Table 3.1 indicates that 92 percent of all public com-
panies responding to the survey expense internally construct-
ed software that is used internally. A similar percentage
(90%) of internally constructed software intended for sale
is expensed. Financial statement data (Table 2.5) revealed
that 91 percent of all companies disclosing such costs ex-
pense software construction costs, a percentage that is
nearly identical to that obtained in the mail questionnaire.
A comparison of auditors in Chapter 2 (Table 2.3) and
Chapter 3 (Table 3.29) reveals some interesting similarities
and differences. Reading the financial statements leads one
to believe that Price Waterhouse audits more software com-
panies than does any other accounting firm (17.9%), with
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Company coming in a close second
at 14.3 percent. Questionnaire responses confirmed this
view to some extent. In the questionnaire survey, Price
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Waterhouse came in first (21.6%), followed closely by Ernst
& Whinney (19.6%). Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Company came
in third with 13.7 percent.
The questionnaire provided extra evidence that companies
tend to capitalize purchased software and expense internally
developed software. This policy was noticed and commented
upon in Chapter 2. In Chapter 2, it appeared that there is
no relationship between company size and software accounting
policy, although there appeared to be a slight tendency for
smaller companies to capitalize enhancement costs. The
questionnaire responses seemed to indicate that there is no
relationship between company size and software accounting
policy, so perhaps the perceived enhancement cost treatment
was a false perception.
Reasons given for capitalizing or expensing seemed to be
based on a mixture of expediency and reasoned principle,
with a bit of short-term self-interest thrown in for good
measure. There seemed to be some concern that a policy of
expensing would have adverse effects on the ability to ex-
pand, borrow money or increase stock price, although these
views were those of a minority. Companies seemed to have
widely differing tax policies, which could be due to uncer-
tainty as to the proper treatment of software for tax pur-
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poses. other possibilities include a variety of individual
facts and circumstances. Companies that classify software
as intangible could do so because of the particular state
they happen to be doing business in, or it could be due to a
number of other factors. Perhaps more companies do not take
advantage of the federal tax credits because the particular
software in question does not lend itself to the tax credits.
Based on the interviews, it would appear that some of the
inability to take full advantage of the tax law is due to a
combination of ignorance of the tax laws (which change con-
stantly) and the hesitancy to take risks in uncertain cases
that might be uncovered upon audit. Pressure from the com-
pany I saudi tor undoubtedly plays a role as well. The tax
aspects of software are covered in depth in Part III of this
thesis.
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CHAPTER FOUR
A RECONCILIATION OF CHAPTERS 2 AND 3
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Upon completion of the interviews it appeared that, in
many cases, a company's software accounting policy was based
on expediency rather than principled reasoning. A number of
new questions were raised in my own mind as a result of
these interviews. I became aware that the accounting policy
for internally constructed software was often different from
the policy for purchased software, and I constructed a number
of questions in the vendor questionnaire to find out more
about this point. I also learned that software expenditures
were not always slotted in the same section of the balance
sheet. Some companies included software costs in the "prop-
erty, plant and equipment" section; others placed these
costs in the "other asset" or "intangibles" section. Some
companies listed software costs separately and others did
not. Studying the financial statements and accompanying
footnotes of the publicly held software companies confirmed
this view (Chapter 2). These views were confirmed again as
a result of the vendor questionnaire (Chapter 3).
Companies that capitalized certain costs of constructed
software did not seem to capitalize the same costs. Some
companies capitalized only coding and testing, while others
also capitalized detail design costs. Reasons given for
either capitalizing or expensing software sometimes seemed
to be based on expediency rather than accounting principles.
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Some interviewees seemed to think that they were required to
use the same accounting policy for financial statement pur-
poses that they use for the tax return, which is not at all
true, so some decisions seemed to be based on erroneous
information. This initial conclusion was given added sup-
port as a result of the vendor questionnaire responses, which
revealed that some executives were basing decisions on
incorrect information, and were choosing their software
accounting policy based on a combination of expediency,
ignorance and short-term self-interest as well as on solid
accounting theory.
Another bit of speculation revolved around the possibil-
ity that company size had an influence on software accounting
policy. Such a view seems plausible. Expense accounting is
simpler and less costly than asset accounting, so it seems
to follow that smaller companies, which do not have the
resources to administer a complex accounting system, would
opt f or expense accounting, whereas larger companies that
have the resources to keep the necessary records could
afford to establish an accounting system that is based on
good accounting theory rather than expendiency. A review of
financial statement footnotes (Chapter 2) led to a prelimi-
nary conclusion that company size has no correlation to
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software accounting policy. However, a review of the foot-
notes revealed that a number of smaller companies capitalize
enhancement costs, whereas larger companies tended to expense
enhancement costs. It then became a question of whether the
perceived difference was significant or illusory.
Although the questionnaire (Chapter 3) did not ask for a
response to this identical point, the responses did not seem
to reveal any perceptible difference in accounting policy
between the large and small companies. The vast majority of
companies of all sizes expense software construction costs,
and a majority capitalize the costs of purchased software.
Had the construction costs been broken down into their
various components, including enhancement costs, perhaps
there would have been a perceptible difference in accounting
policy based on size of company. Perhaps smaller companies
would have a tendency to capitalize enhancement costs, and
larger companies would have a tendency to expense these
costs, or perhaps the result would have been just the oppo-
site. Regrettably, the question was not asked.
The interviews also alerted me to the fact that some
software vendors feel strongly that the inability to capita-
lize software costs adversely affects their ability to raise
capi tal and expand. This view was confirmed in the mail
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questionnaire (Chapter 3), and it was learned that this view
was held by a substantial minority of software company exec-
utives. Chapter 2 did not address this issue at all, so it
is not possible to make comparisons between the empir ical
data in Chapter 2 with that of Chapter 3.
The question was also raised as to the extent that com-
panies engage in R&D partnerships in order to capi talize
software costs that would otherwise be expensed. Responses
to the questionnaire (Chapter 3) revealed that this practice
was not nearly as widespread as some of the interviewees led
me to initially believe. However, it did confirm the belief
that some companies do engage in R&D partnerships and that
some of the reasons for doing so include expediency and
short-term self-interest in addition to good business
reasons, which confirms and verifies the information gathered
during the course of the interviews.
The interviews also alerted me to the federal and state
tax aspects of software, and revealed that there is a great
deal of confusion in this area, partly because the people
being interviewed, controllers for the most part, were not
tax specialists, and partly because the area is so complex,
confusing, unclear and constantly changing. Federal treat-
ment is unclear (see Part III for a full discussion), and
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companies do not seem to be applying the federal tax law
consistently when it comes to software expenditures. Some
companies apply the federal and state tax law aggressively
and others are extremely conservative. The interviews
pointed in the direction that most software tax litigation
at the state level is being generated in California, and
this preliminary view was confirmed by the questionnaire
responses (Chapter 3). Responses to the questionnaire con-
firmed the initial view that federal and state tax law is
being applied inconsistently by software vending companies,
although the questionnaire did not shed much light on the
reasons for the inconsistent treatment. Reasons for the
different treatment might very well include ignorance, espe-
cially in the case of the smaller companies, which cannot
afford to retain top legal counsel, at least not on a full-
time basis. However, this view is mere speculation. Nothing
in the questionnaire would either strongly suggest or dis-
pute this view.
Another preliminary view raised during the interviews
and confirmed by the questionnaire responses was that com-
panies may classify software as tangible for some purposes
and intangible for others. Software may be classified as
intangible for sales, use and property tax purposes because
such classification will reduce a company's tax burden.
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Software may be classified as tangible for federal tax pur-
poses for the same reason. Where companies reported dif-
fering classifications· for software, the tendency was to
classify it in the way that would be most beneficial to the
company. For example, there was a tendency for a company to
classify software as intangible for state sales, use and
property tax purposes and tangible for federal tax credit
purposes. However, it is possible that these classifica-
at least, are being forced upon thetions, in some cases
companies in question, either by state law or by their audi-
tor.
Expensing software costs on the financial statements
reduces net income in the year the expenditure is recorded,
so there is an advantage to capitalizing such costs because
expenses are reduced, in the first year at least, by capita-
lizing. However, there is an advantage to expensing rather
than capitalizing for tax purposes because expensing allows
a company to take a larger tax deduction in the year the
expenditure is recorded. Tax treatment and financial state-
ment treatment do not have to be consistent, so a company is
perfectly free to capitalize for financial statement pur-
poses and expense for tax purposes, but most companies have
a consistent policy, perhaps for reasons of expediency, or
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perhaps because they do not know that their tax and finan-
cial statement policies need not be consistent. The inter-
views revealed that both of the two above-mentioned reasons
were given by accounting executives who were assumed to be
knowledgeable in their field, and the questionnaire confirmed
my suspicion that, for some companies at least, software
accounting policy is sometimes formulated based on faulty
assumptions. It is surprising that more companies do not
have different software accounting policies for financial
statement and tax purposes. Perhaps one reason for not
having different policies is that different policies would
add one layer of complication to an accounting system that
is deemed to be overly complex already. The cost of imple-
menting the additional system may be more trouble than it is
worth, in the eyes of software company executives.
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CHAPTER FIVE
FOOTNOTE DISCLOSURE OF
SOFTWARE ACCOUNTING POLICIES:
SOFTWARE USER COMPANIES
-212-
INTRODUCTION
In addition to the mail questionnaire surveys and per-
sonal interviews that were conducted as part of this study,
a study of footnote disclosure of software accounting poli-
cies of software vendor and user companies was also made.
Chapter 2 summarized the findings for software vendors. This
chapter summarizes the findings for software user companies.
Information for this chapter was gathered using the NAARS
data base.l The financial statement footnotes of 4,197 com-
panies for fiscal 1981-82 and 3,104 companies for fiscal
1982-83 were searched for mention of software accounting
policy. The software industry firms that were included in
the other NAARS search (Chapter 2) were excluded. This sum-
mary includes only software user companies. One hundred
twenty-five companies listed on NAARS had the word "software"
listed in their accounting policy footnote. Some companies
appeared twice, once for each fiscal year searched. Some
lNAARS has financial statement data on more than 4,000
public companies, and is available by subscription from the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Thanks
go to Robert Kueppers of Deloitte Haskins & Sells in New
York, who provided me with access to the NAARS data base.
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firms were included in the software industry search, and so
are excluded from this summary. Other firms mentioned soft-
ware in a context that was not relevant for purposes of this
study. Policies for the remaining 65 firms were included in
this chapter, and are listed below.
The analysis for this chapter is both similar and differ-
ent from that presented in Chapter 2. For software user com-
panies (Chapter 5), no attempt is made to analyze software
accounting policy on the basis of type of company because
the sample does not include enough companies from the same
industry to make such an analysis meaningful. Furthermore,
many of the companies included in the group of ·software
users are in a multitude of businesses, so there would be an
insurmountable classif ication problem if such an analysis
were attempted. In Chapter 2, an attempt was made to per-
form an operations analysis (Table 2.1).
Chapter 2 made a size analysis based on revenue (Table
2.2). No similar analysis was made here, because all of
the companies were large, so no comparison between the soft-
ware accounting policy of large versus small companies was
possible.
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Chapter 2 made an analysis by auditor. Again, Chapter 5
makes no such analysis, because the smallness of the sample
precludes any valid correlations from being made. Because
software costs are such a small proportion of total cost for
software users, the vast majority of software users did not
even bother to discuss these costs in their financial state-
ments. The few that did are included here, but this sample
may be highly skewed. Many companies that did not mention
software costs may very well have capitalized these costs
and buried them somewhere in the balance sheet. However, we
have' no way to find out their software accounting policy
other than by sending them a questionnaire (see Chapter 6).
The information provided in the remainder of this chap-
ter is somewhat meaningful because it reveals the software
accounting policies of some software user companies that
have published their software accounting policies. Account-
ants who must write the financial statement footnotes for
their companies will be able to borrow from the wording used
by these companies. No attempt should be made to discern
any patterns from this data, however, because it is far from
complete. It is being offered here for informational pur-
poses only.
-215-
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SUMMARY
Of the 65 companies that disclosed their software
accounting policies, 16 capi tali ze at least some software
construction costs and 21 companies expense at least some of
these costs. Many companies did not disclose their treat-
ment of software construction costs.
At least two companies capitalize their enhancement
costs, while at least seven companies expense such costs.
All 24 companies that disclosed their accounting policy for
purchased software capi tali ze these costs. Fifteen com-
panies stated that certain software costs were capitalized
without specifying whether these costs were for software
construction, enhancements or software purchases.
No attempt was made to compare the data gathered in this
chapter wi th that gathered by the software user question-
naire (Chapter 6) because such a compar ison would not be
meaningful and could be misleading. The f6otnote disclosures
are incomplete because many companies did not break down
their software expenditures by category (construction costs,
enhancements, and purchased software). Furthermore, the
small sample (65 out of 4,197 possible) may not be represen-
tative of public software user companies.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE SOFTWARE USER QUESTIONNAIRE
-2)4-
INTRODUCTION
Upon completing the literature search and the personal
interviews, it was determined that additional information
regarding software user accounting policies should be
gathered. A review panel was selected to determine which
questions should be included in the questionnaire. The
review panel was drawn from the NAA's Management Accounting
Practices Committee and its Subcommittee on MAP Statement
promulgation, as well as members of AICPA's Software Task
Force (see Appendix M). Some interviewees and other selected
members of the NAA also agreed to serve on the review panel.
The internal user questionnaire questions were reviewed by
47 panel members for accuracy, completeness and relevance.
The sample for the internal user questionnaire was ran-
domly selected from the Fortune 1000 and spociaLty lists.
Four hundred fifty questionnaires (see Appendix G), cover
letters addressed to the controller, and prepaid envelopes
were mailed. There were 216 usable responses, for a response
rate of 48 percent. This chapter summarizes the mail ques-
tionnaire responses.
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Preliminary Discussion
The principal objective of the questionnaire was to
derive an informed view of current practice in accounting
for software at a more detailed level than that relating
simply to capitalizing or expensing. In particular, there
was included an attempt to ascertain rather more clearly the
extent to which accounting procedures relating to software
costs were motivated by principle or accounting convenience
or bottom-line considerations. The need to know more about
the actualities of the current situation as a crucial input
to the developing debate on software accounting meant that
the informational requirement had to take precedence over the
interpretive element. Consequently, the questions addressed
to the issue of "why" rather than "how" are tentative and
simplistic. The results accruing to them constitute not so
much the foundations for finished conclusions about account-
ing motivations as the opening of a door to further research
in this area.
Generally, those parts of the questionnaire directed to
the question of how firms account for software substantially
agree wi th the impressions der ived from the study of pub-
lished financial statements. Those parts of the question-
naire directed to the question of why firms account in the
-236-
way that they do yield more ambiguous results. A much more
detailed enquiry will be necessary to clarify such methodo-
logical issues as: do the responses reflect considered opin-
ions or rather justifications of mere reactive posi tions?
Do the responses represent conclusions of individual experi-
ence or are they mere (and perhaps unconscious) regurgita-
tions of arguments read in journals or heard in conferences?
yet, notwithstanding these and similar (other) weaknesses,
in the data here presented, the overall impression gained is
that the accounting procedures employed are at best naive
interpretations of unrefined accounting dogma, and at worst
determined by expediency. Such expediency may be der ived
from consideration of the raw costs of accounting systems or
from perceived (but so far as the author can tell, untested)
pressures for bottom-line results. These matters are con-
sidered in more detail in the review comments on each ques-
tion and the answer thereto.
In Chapters 2 and 3 an attempt was made to determine
whether any relationship existed between size of company and
software accounting policy. (See Tables 2.2 and 3.3.) Such
an attempt seemed reasonable because the sample of software
vendor companies included a fair number of small, medium-
size and large companies. However, no attempt has been made
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to determine whether such a relationship existed for soft-
ware user companies, because the companies in this sample
ranged from very large to gigantic, and it is likely that
they all have sophisticated accounting systems. Furthermore,
the software user company sample included only public com-
panies, so there is less likelihood of finding the striking
differences in accounting policy that might have existed if
the sample had also included private companies.
Chapter 2 also made an attempt to determine whether any
relationship existed between field of operation and software
accounting policy (see Table 2.1). However, in that sample,
a wide variety of fields of operation existed. In the soft-
ware user group, only two broadly-defined fields of operation
existed in any quantity, namely, manufacturing and financial
services. Several other groups were only sparsely repre-
sented, so it was deemed that a presentation similar to that
given in Chapter 2 was not warranted and would not be mean-
ingful.
The Questions and Responses
The following few pages list the questions included in
the software user questionnaire and the responses received
to those questions.
-2J8-
Question No. l: What amortization method and time period
range are used for financial statement purposes to amortize:
(1) purchased/leased: (a) systems software, (b) applications
software; (2) internally developed: Ca) systems software,
Cb) applications software?
This question was asked in order to obtain basic infor-
mation regarding the company's software accounting policy,
and to see whether the responses of the software user com-
panies were similar to those of the software vendors.
-239-
TABLE 6.1
AMORTIZATION METHODS
QUESTION 1 - SOfTWARE USERS
Purchased Internall~ Constructed ForSystems Applications Systems ApplicationsSoftware Software Software SoftwareAmortization Method _L ~ _!_ ~ _!_ _!_ _!_ _!_
None. All such costs are
expenaed 72 33.3' 82 38.0' 193 89.4~ 191 88.4~
Straight-line method 130 60.2 124 57.4 20 9.3 22 10.2
Sum of the years digits
method 3 1.4 2 0.9
Declining balance method 4 1.9 3 1.4
Other 7 _2_4 5 __b1. 3 ~ 3 ~Total 216 216 216 216
Percent of firms
expensing software JJ.3~ 38.~ 89.4~ 88.4~
Percent of firms
capitalizing software 66.7 62.0 10.6 11.6
for those firms that capitslize
software, the various amortiza-
tion methods are used with the
following frequencies:
Straight-line method DO 90.'" 124 92.5~ 20 B7.~ 22 B8.~
Sum of the years digits
method , 2.1 2 1.5
Declining balance method 4 2.8 , 2.2
Other 7 ~ 5 ---.hI , 13.0 , 12.0144 134 ....u... -'2..
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Table 6.1 shows that two companies in three (66.7%) cap-
italize purchased systems software and about the same per-
centage (62.0%) capitalize purchased applications software.
The number of firms that capitalize internally constructed
systems and applications software is much lower, 10.6 per-
cent and 11.6 percent, respectively. For those companies
that capitalize software, about 90 percent use the straight-
line method of amortization. Table 6.2 reveals that about
90 percent of capitalized software costs are amortized over
five years or less. These findings support the preliminary
interview findings and the NAARS footnote disclosures (Chap-
ter 5). Software vendors capitalized software purchased for
internal use 66% of the time, whereas software constructed
for internal use was capitalized in only 6% of the cases
(see Chapter 3, Table 3.1).
Some companies gave multiple responses to Question 1.
Others did not respond to some portions of the question. A
few companies mentioned that software costing less than some
threshold amount is expensed, and software costing more than
that amount is capitalized. The threshold amounts mentioned
ranged from $20,000 to $2 million. Several companies amor-
tize systems software over the life of the hardware. A few
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amortize software that is "bundled" with the hardware and
expense software that is not.
Question No.2: What costs are capitalized for internally
developed software?
This question was also asked in order to obtain basic,
yet specific information regarding the company's software
accounting policy, and to see whether the responses of the
software user companies were similar to those of the soft-
ware vendors.
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TABLE 6.3
CATEGORIES OF CAPITALIZED COSTS FOR
INTERNALLY CONSTRUCTED SOFTWARE
QUESTION 2 - SOFTWARE USERS
Category of
Capitalized Cost
Number of
Companies Capitalizing
Systems Applications
Software Software
Feasibility costs (and
other costs incurred
prior to design costs
in the software
product life cycle) 7 12
Design costs 22 24
Coding costs 18 22
Testing costs 21 22
Support costs 10 12
Service costs 8 8
Other 13 14
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As was true of software vendors, the categories of in-
ternally constructed software cost of software users that
tend to be capitalized most frequently are design, coding
and testing costs. Table 6.3 shows the breakdown by cate-
gory. This finding supports the tentative evidence gathered
in the course of the personal interviews, and is similar to
the treatment accorded by software vendor companies (see
Chapter 3, Table 3.6).
Question No.3: For compilers, system control programs and
other software that is an integral part of the hardware, the
software is: (a) expensed; (b) amortized over the same
period as the hardware; (c) amortized over a shorter period
than the hardware; (d) other (Specify).
This question was inserted at the insistence of two mem-
bers of the advisory panel. Its relevance to the research
can at best only be that it offers evidence on another
dimension of software accounting.
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TABLE 6.4
ACCOUNTING TREATMENT OF SOFTWARE
THAT IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE HARDWARE
QUESTION 3 - SOFTWARE USERS
Total Responses
Number of
Responses Percentage
60 36.1%
83 50.0
11 6.6
12 7.2
166
Expensed
Amortized over the same period as
the hardware
Amortized over a shorter period
than the hardware
Other
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For compilers, system control programs and other soft-
ware that is an integral part of the hardware, the software
is most often amortized over the same period as the hardware
(50.0%) or expensed (36.1%). (See Table 6.4). A few (6.6%)
use a shorter period. The remainder (7.2%) amortize over
three to five years or over the lease term.
Where amortization is involved, there appears to be, in
many cases, a degree of expediency in the choice of amorti-
zation period in that there does not seem to be any obvious
reason to anticipate that a system program should last as
long as its related hardware. Systems are modified and/or
hardware can be replaced. On the other hand, we can specu-
late that any other amortization period is likely to be an
equally arbitrary choice. The author is unaware of any mor-
tality tables for computer software!
Question No.4: Software maintenance and enhancement costs
are: (a> expensed as incurred; (b> amortized over the re-
maining life of the original program; (c) assigned its own
life and amortized over years using the
method of amortization; (d) other (Specify>.
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This question was asked in order to determine, first of
all, whether maintenance and enhancement costs were expensed
or capitalized, and secondly, what amortization life and
method are used. Based on the responses, it could also be
determined whether different treatment was accorded enhance-
ment costs than maintenance costs.
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TABLE 6.5
ACCOUNTING TREATMENT OF SOFTWARE MAINTENANCE
AND ENHANCEMENT COSTS
QUESTION 4 - SOFTWARE USERS
Maintenance Enhancement
Nuni>er of Nuni>er of
ResE!onses Percentage ResE!onses Percentage
Expensed 8S incurred 155 93.4~ 129 78.7~
Amortized over the
remaining life of the
original program 2 1.2 21 12.8
Assigned its own life and
amortized over years
using the __ method of
amortization 6 3.6 11 6.7
Other 3 1.8 3 1.8
Firms not responding· 50 52
Totals l!i lli
.The instructions at the beginning of the Questionnaire directed
respondents to skip Questions 1 through 7 if all software costs are
expensed. Assuming that all nonresponding firms expense maintenance
and enhancement cost,
Expense as incurred
Capitalize and amortize
205
11
94.9~
5.1
181
~
lli
83.8~
16.2
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Table 6.5 shows that the vast majority of companies
expense maintenance (94.9%) and enhancement costs (83.8%) as
incurred.
Question No.5: During the amortization period, are there
periodic financial reviews or checkpoints to determine the
need for write-offs of assets?
During the course of the interviews, several executives
mentioned that part of their company's control system in-
cluded a series of checkpoints along and beyond the software
development cycle to determine whether certain expenditures
had continuing expected economic benefit. If it was deter-
mined that they did not, whatever costs had been accumulated
were then expensed. These executives sometimes asked the
interviewer whether any other interviewees had mentioned
their policies in this regard, and if so, what their poli-
cies were.
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TABLE 6.6
PERIODIC FINANCIAL REVIEW POLICY
QUESTION 5 - SOFTWARE USERS
Number of
Responses Percentage
Yes 90 62.5%
No 54 37.5
Firms not responding
Total
72
216-
Note: Most of the firms not responding probably expense
software costs.
-251-:
Five-eighths of the firms responding to this question
have periodic financial reviews or checkpoints during the
amortization period to determine the need for a write-off of
assets. Many firms did not respond to this question because
they expense rather than capi tali ze software costs. (See
Table 6.6.)
Question No.6: Software costs appear ing on the balance
sheet represent what percent of total assets?
This question is identical to Question No. 3 of Chapter
3. It was asked in order to determine how material software
assets are as a percentage of total assets.
TABLE 6.7
SOFTWARE COSTS APPEARING ON BALANCE SHEET
AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ASSETS
QUESTION 6 - SOFTWARE USERS
Number of Percent Cumulative
Percent of Total Assets Companies of Total Percentage
0 - 4.9% 141 97.9% 97.9%
5.0 - 9.9 2 1.4 99.3
10.0 or more 1 0.7 100.0
Total 144
-2.52-
Table 6.7 shows that virtually all of the companies sur-
veyed have negligible software costs appearing on the b~l-
ance sheet. If materiality is defined as 5 percent of total
assets, then only three companies out of 144 (2.1%) have a
material amount of software costs on the balance sheet. If
materiality is 10 percent of total assets, then only one
company (0.7%) has a material amount of software costs.
That company reported software assets totaling 20 percent of
total assets. Responses to the vendor questionnaire on this
same point revealed a higher percentage, which is to be
expected, since vendors are in the business of creating and
marketing software (see Chapter 3, Table 3.5). The only
companies included in this table are the ones that capitalize
at least some software costs. Companies expensing all soft-
ware costs were excluded.
Question No.7: Software costs that are not expensed are
capitalized because: (a) the matching concept; (b) an asset
has been created; (c) capitalization improves our ability to
raise capital; (d) capitalization improves net income and
EPSi (e) other (Specify).
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This question was asked in order to determine the rea-
so~) for choosing the software policy. The listed possi-
bilities were chosen because these listed reasons were the
ones that kept being given during the course of the inter-
views. However, space was provided to add other reasons,
which made the question both directed and open-ended.
TABLE 6.8
REASONS FOR CAPITALIZATION OF SOFTWARE COSTS
QUESTION 7 - SOFTWARE USERS
Reason Number of Responses
The matching concept 82
An asset has been created 62
Capitalization improves our
ability to raise capital 3
Capitalization improves net
income and EPS 3
20Other
Notes
(1) Some companies did not respond.
(2) Some companies gave more than one response.
-254-
The two most frequently mentioned reasons for capital-
izing software are because of the matching concept and the
belief that an asset has been created. (See Table 6.8.)
Other reasons included:
1. Enhancement of net income, EPS and ability to raise
capital:
2. Software is accounted for in the same manner as
hardware because of bundling or otherwise:
3. Compatibility with tax treatment: IRS requires it;
4. Purchased software costs are readily identifiable;
5. The licensing agreement spans more than one
accounting period.
The view of software vendors on this point were similar (see
Chapter 3, Table 3.8).
The lack of depth in this question (and that of question
number 8> and the consequent ambiguous quality of the
answers was acknowledged in the opening review of this chap-
ter. Nevertheless, it is argued that the following tenta-
tive impressions arise:
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I. A seemingly unquestioning adherence to a basic axiom
of accounting dogma, namely the matching principle, contains
little of reasoned analysis based on undeniably sound prin-
ciple. The basic concept of the matching of income and
expenditure in a common period is reasonable enough, though
even to this, adherence of cash flow accounting or event
accounting would take exception. However, it is in the
transfer from concept to application that the greatest dif-
ficulties of measurement and valuation lie, as the contro-
versy concerning inflation accounting will testify (see
Robert W. Mcgee, Accounting for Inflation, Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1981).
II. Equally, the mere belief "that an asset has been
created" can scarcely be defined as a principled argument.
But of course the brevity of the statement may not do jus-
tice to the underlying belief.
III. Of the five supplementary reasons, expediency is
clearly the motivation for reason no. 4. Reason nos. 2 and
4 clearly relate to ease and economy in accounting. Reason
nos. 1 and 3 clearly relate to demands for bottom line
accounting (and it would be interesting to know what tests
had been applied or proof obtained by those advancing them).
Reason no. 3 also shows ignorance of the tax law, because
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the IRS does not require that the treatment for tax and
financial accounting reporting purposes (see Tables 3.24,
3.25, 3.26 for software vendors; and Questions 15 and 16 of
this chapter and Tables 6.15 and 6.16 for software users).
Only reason no. 5 has any significant element of principled
argument and even this has a naive air about it.
Question No.8: Software accounting costs that are not
capitalized are expensed because: (a) such costs are con-
sidered research and development; (b) uncertainty as to
realization makes expensing prudent; (c) R&D cost elements
are not easily separated from non-R&D costs t so all costs
are expensed; (d) our CPA firm strongly recommends that such
costs be expensed. Management is of the opinion that cer-
tain software costs should be capitalized; (e) they are im-
material in amount; (f) they are expensed for tax purposes,
and we want to use the same accounting method per tax and
book whenever possible; (g) other (Specify).
This question was also asked in order to determine the
reasons behind the accounting policy. The reasons listed
were included because these were the most frequently given
reasons given during the interviews. However, space was
provided to give other reasons as well, and several respon-
dents took advantage of this opportunity.
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TABLE 6.9
REASONS FOR EXPENSING SOFTWARE COSTS
QUESTION 8 - SOFTWARE USERS
Reason Number of Responses
Uncertainty as to realization
makes expensing prudent
They are immaterial in amount.
They are expensed for tax
purposes, and we want to use
the same accounting method
per tax and book whenever
possible
Such costs are considered
research and development
R&D cost elements are not
easily separated from non-
R&D costs, so all costs
are expensed
Our CPA firm strongly recommends
that such costs be expensed.
Management is of the opinion
that certain software costs
should be capitalized
Other
Notes
(1) Some companies did not respond.
(2) Some companies gave more than one response.
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75
72
54
32
28
4
26
The most frequently given reasons for expensing rather
than capitalizing software are listed in Table 6.9. Other
reasons included:
1. Software maintenance costs are period costs:
2. The realization period is short1
3. Expensing is conservative1
4. Software is a cost of doing business;
5. The on-going expense would be about equal to the
amortization;
6. It is difficult to measure the cost of internally
constructed software, so it is expensed;
7. Costs incurred subsequent to the implementation of
the system that do not extend to its useful life
are expensed;
8. Useful life is difficult to estimate, so software
costs are expensed.
Software vendors had similar reasons for expensing software
(see Chapter 3, Table 3.9).
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Respondents who answered "a" or "b" could have a soft-
ware accounting policy based either on expediency or princi-
pIe, depending on whether their decision was reasoned or
not. Reasons "c", "d", "en and "fH are clearly based on
expediency, which lends additional credence to the hypothe-
sis that software accounting policy is based to a great
extent on expendiency rather than reasoned principle.
Of the eight supplementary reasons given, reasons 1, 2,
4, 5, 6 and 8 are clearly based on expediency. Reason no. 3
pays lip service to the principle of conservatism. Reason
no. 7 accords software a treatment that is similar to other
maintenance or repair expenditures, and may be based, in
part at least, on reasoned accounting principle.
Question No.9: How are (purchased and internally devel-
oped) software costs reflected on the balance sheet?
This question was included in order to shed some light
on how companies classify their software on the balance
sheet. Ouring the interviews it was discovered that com-
panies are not consistent in their classification, and it
was hoped that the responses received to this question would
uncover the frequency with which the various possibilities
were chosen in practice.
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About one company in three does not include purchased
systems software (36.8%) or purchased applications software
(36.7%) on the balance sheet. (See Table 6.10.) For those
companies that do include purchased software on the balance
sheet, it is most often included in fixed assets, with other
noncurrent assets as the second choice.
More than four companies out of five do not include
internally constructed systems software (83.2%) or applica-
tions software (82.1%) on the balance sheet. For those that
do, the most frequent inclusions are either as other non-
current assets or as fixed assets. User responses differ
slightly from those of vendors (see Table 3.4).
Question No. 10: If software is leased, are the accounting
rules for capital leasing considered when determining how to
account for the software cost?
This question was included at the request of several
panel members, apparently because their companies were
struggling with the question of whether software leasing is
subject to the leasing rules.
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TABLE 6.11
ACCOUNTING FOR LEASED SOFTWARE
QUESTION 10 - SOFTWARE USERS
Category
Number of
Responses Per<?entage
75 41.4%
29 16.0
65 35.9
12 6.6
35
216
Yes, as a matter of corporate
policy
Yes, if the cost is more than
a certain dollar amount
No
Other
No response
Total
-26]-
For leased software, the majority of companies (57.4%)
consider the accounting rules for capital leasing either as
a matter of corporate policy (41.4%) or in cases where the
cost is more than a certain dollar amount (16.0%). (See
Table 6.11.> For those companies that checked "other," the
most frequently given comments were:
1. We don't lease software; not applicable.
2. None are of a capital nature.
3. Only if tied to leased hardware.
Response to this question also reveals a certain amount
of expediency is involved.
Question No. 11: Do you think the accounting treatment for
purchased software should be different than the accounting
treatment for comparable internally developed software?
This question was asked in order to determine whether,
in the minds of accounting executives, purchased software
should be accorded a different accounting treatment than
comparable internally developed software. Responses re-
ceived might shed some light on whether a company's rea-
soning was based on expediency or reasoned principle.
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TABLE 6.12
ACCOUNTING TREATMENT OF SOFTWARE COSTS
QUESTION 11 - SOFTWARE USERS
Number of
Responses Percentage
Yes
No
No opinion
Firms giving two responses
67
123
27
_Q)
216
30.9%
56.7
12.4
When asked whether the accounting treatment for pur-
chased software should be different than the accounting
treatment for comparable internally constructed software,
the majority of software users (56.7%) said "no," which
corresponds closely with the percentage of software vendors
(56.2%) "no" responses (see Chapter 3, Table 3 .15) • About
three companies in ten (30.9%) felt that the accounting
treatments should be different. The most frequently given
reasons (see Table 6.12) were:
Same Treatment
1. The utility of the software, whether purchased or con-
structed internally, is the same. They both provide the
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same result. The method of acquisition should not dic-
tate accounting treatment.
2. An asset is created whether it is purchased or con-
structed internally.
3. If comparable software exists, it may still be of econo-
mic benefit to construct the 'sof t.ware internally. Why
penalize a company by requiring a different accounting
treatment?
4. If comparable software exists, internally constructed
software probably is not a R&D effort.
5. Leads to skewed decisions for make/buy analysis when
user has budget constraints. Implies internally con-
structed software is substantially uncertain as to suc-
cess of effort, which is not consistent with business
assumptions in project authorization.
6. Consistency.
7. Software is software.
8. All software should be expensed at time of purchase or
as internally constructed.
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9. The decision to capitalize any costs should be based on
whether the costs represent a bona fide asset and meet a
recoverability test.
10. The matching principle would require that costs be asso-
ciated with benefits regardless of how procured.
Different Treatment
1. Purchased software has a fixed life payout evaluation.
Internally constructed software is related to basic
operations without a finite cost or benefit.
2. As a practical matter, a determination between system
development costs and ongoing system utilization and
R&D costs is not worthwhile to split out for the
amounts involved.
3. Expensing internally constructed software provides a
legitimate means to reduce taxable income as well as the
tax liability.
4. The cost of purchased software is readily determinable.
It is more difficult to measure the cost of internally
constructed software.
5. Guidelines need to be developed to address the control
and maintenance of internally constructed software.
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6. Internally constructed software is an R&D expenditure.
7. Differences in matching costs and benefits.
8. The record keeping necessary for internally constructed
software would be extensive and probably not adhered to.
9. Internal costs for constructing software (salaries of
systems personnel) are part of the ongoing costs of the
systems department.
10. The effort required to identify cost for internally
constructed software exceeds the value to the financial
statements obtained by capitalization.
11. Because of the subjectivity involved, capitalization of
the costs of internally constructed software could lead
to abuses in order to improve reported net income.
12. Purchased software, to be saleable, must demonstrate its
utility through numerous successful implementations.
Internally constructed software is inherently more
risky, and consequently the prospects of asset realiza-
tion are much less certain.
13. Purchased software has a one-time cost. Internally
constructed software has several costs involved, such as
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salaries, supplies, computer time, etc., for an undeter-
mined amount of time. The expense of the internal soft-
ware should be recognized over the period of time it
took to construct it.
14. Internally constructed software costs are mainly person-
nel costs. Personnel costs are not capitalized unless
they become significant.
It must at once be concluded that there is a greater
appearance of principled ·argument here than
when considering the issue of "capitalize v.
was evidenced
expense." It
is interesting to note the apparent conflict between the
responses received to Question No. 1 (see Table 6.1), in
which a good number of companies elected to expense devel-
oped software and capitalize purchased software, and the
response to Question No. 11 (see Table 6.12).
However, a closer perusal reveals that most of the rea-
sons advanced, for the most part, are still arguments of
expediency, but with a gloss (veneer) of reasoned argument
in support or definition of the expedient. Indeed, numbers
2, 6, 7 and 8 in the reasons for the "same" treatment, and
numbers 6, 9 and 14 of those advanced in support of "differ-
ent" accounting treatment are merely unsupported assertions
rather than arguments. Numbers 2, 4, 7, 8 and 10 of the
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reasons advanced for "different" treatment are essentially
arguments of expediency (re: "cost of costing"). Numbers 3
and 5 in the "same" treatment arguments and numbers 3 and 11
in the "different" treatment reasons clearly have their ori-
gins in "bottom line" considerations. Some element of prin-
ciple character izes the remaining half dozen reasons, and
numbers 1 and 9 of the reasons advanced for the "same"
treatment and numbers 12 and 13 of the reasons advanced for
"different" treatment especially create an impression that
not all firms select their software accounting procedures
without due req.ar d for conceptual considerations. The
majority impression, however, is one of arbitrary selection.
Question No. 12: What impact, if any, has the SEC software
moratorium had on your company?
The moratorium applies only to software intended for
sale, so it was expected that its effect on software user
companies would be minimal. The responses to this question
confirmed that assumption. Virtually none of the responding
companies indicated that the moratorium had any impact on
their company. One company indicated that the moratoriurn
helped them to establish accounting guidelines. Another
said that it caused them to defer the internal capitaliza-
tion issue. A third company said it caused them to review
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practices. Another said that it may influence the capital
budgeting decision in 1984. A few companies were unaware of
any moratorium.
Question No. 13: On which categories of software costs is
the investment tax credit or R&D tax credit taken?
This question was asked in order to determine the com-
pany's tax policy and the frequency with which tax credits
were taken in practice. It was also wondered whether soft-
ware users' tax policies were similar to those of software
vendors (Chapter 3).
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TABLE 6.13
INVESTMENT CREDIT AND R&D CREDIT
QUESTION 13 - SOFTWARE USERS
Investment Tax Credit R&D Tax Credit
Number of Number of
Category Responses Percentage* Responses Percentage*
Internally constructed systems
software 5 2.3~ 77 35.6~
Internally constructed applications
software 7 3.2 80 37.0
Purchased systems software 97 44.9 23 10.6
Purchased applications software 90 41. 7 23 10.6
* Percentages are computed based on 216 responses. Companies not responding to this
question are assumed to have not taken a tax credit.
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Table 6.13 summarizes the response to question 13, which
shows that about four companies in ten take the investment
tax credit on purchased systems (44.9%) and applications
(41.7%) software, and a much smaller percentage take the
credit for internally constructed systems (2.3%) and appli-
cations (3.2%) software. The vendor responses to a similar
question provided a different response (see Chapter 3, Table
3.23). The Internal Revenue Service treats software as in-
tangible and therefore not eligible for the investment tax
credit unless the software is bundled with the hardware.
However, at least one court case has held that magnetic
computer tapes are tangible property qualifying for the
investment tax credit.
About one company in three takes the R&D tax credit
for internally constructed systems (35.6%) and applications
(37.0%) software, and a much smaller percentage of respon-
dents take the credit for purchased systems (10.6%) and
applications (10.6%) software. Software vendors, on the
other hand, took the R&D credit as follows: internally
developed software intended for sale (72.7%) and internal
use (34.1%); purchased software intended for resale (11.4%)
and internal use (6.8%) (see Chapter 3, Table 3.23). An in-
depth summary of the research credit as it relates to soft-
ware can be found in Chapter 14.
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Question No. 14: How is software classified: Ca) for fede-
ral tax purposes; Cb) for state sales/use tax purposes; (c)
for personal property tax purposes?
This question was asked to determine what treatment was
being given in practice, and to determine whether classifi-
cation differed .based on tax advantages to be received as
a result of the classification method chosen. Responses
showed that the classification chosen did in fact reflect
tax advantage a good part of the time.
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TABLE 6.14
ClASSIFICATION OF SOFTWARE FOR TAX PURPOSES
QUESTION 14 - SOFTWARE USERS
For federal tax purposes
Tangible IntangibleNumber of Number ofResponses Percentage Responses Percentage
91 51.4~ 86 48.6~
73 43.5 95 56.5
43 29.1 lOS 70.9
For state sales/use tax purposes
For personal property tax purposes
Notes
(1) Many companies did not respond to this question.
(2) Some companies gave more than one response for some categories.
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Table 6.14 shows the responses to the question "How is
software classified for federal, sales/use and property tax
purposes?" The Internal Revenue Service classifies software
as intangible unless it is bundled with hardware, so it may
be inferred that a large portion of the 51.4 percent of
respondents that classify software as tangible do so because
it is bundled with hardware. However, some companies may
classify separately priced software as tangible in order to
take advantage of the investment tax credit. Furthermore,
at least one court case has ruled that the full value of
magnetic tapes is eligible for the investment tax credit.
For vendor response to this question, see Chapter 3, Table
3.27.
For sales, use and property tax purposes, software is
classified as tangible or intangible based on statutory or
case law. Tangible property is generally subject to tax,
whereas intangible property generally is not. For sales/use
tax, the respondents were about evenly divided between
tangible (43.5%) and intangible (56.5%) treatment. Companies
doing business in several states may have checked both
responses, since the classification differs by state. Issues
relating to the sales, use and property taxation of software
are discussed in Chapter 13. The Data processing Management
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Association position on software taxation is given in
Appendix E.
For personal property tax purposes, the vast rnajority
(70.9%) classify software as intangible, which seems to be
in conflict with the responses given to the sales/use tax
question. Another complicating factor is that some states
classify ncanned" software as tangible and "customn software
as intangible.
A compar ison of the vendor responses to the software
user responses reveals that vendors are far more likely to
classify software as intangible for both federal and state
purposes than are software users (Table 3.27), possibly
because vendors have more to gain by doing so than users.
Question No. 15: Is the same software item ever: (a) capi-
tall zed for flnanclal statement purposes and expensed for
tax purposes: (b) capitalized for tax purposes and expensed
for financial statement purposes?
This question was asked in order to determine the extent
to which companies used different software accounting poli-
cies for book and tax purposes. Adopting the same treatment
would tend to reflect either principled reasonjn~or expedi-
ency, whereas adopting different policies would tend to
reflect bottom-line concerns.
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TABLE 6.15
COlipariaon of iax and rinancial Stat... nt
Tre.t ..nt of Softwa,. Coat.
Que.tion 15 - Softwar. U••ra
Nueiber of
Re!pO!!!e. Percentage
A. Capitalized for financial
statement purposes and
expensed for tax purposes?
Yes 22 lO.5~
No IB7 89.5
F"irllsnot responding 7
216=
B. Capitalized for tax purposes
and expensed for financial
statement purposes?
Yes 16 7. 7~
No 191 92.3
F"irlllsnot responding 2
216=
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The vast majority of companies treat software expendi-
tures the same for tax and financial statement purposes.
(See Table 6.15.) For those companies which give different
treatments, the primary reasons given were:
Reasons for Capitalizing for Financial
Statement Purposes and Expensing for Tax Purposes
1. Foreign tax regulations must be considered for multina-
tional corporations.
2. Costs incurred for company personnel are expensed for
tax, capitalized for book. Capitalization of these
expenses is not accepted under IRS guidelines.
3. High cost of a single large applications project.
4. Impact on reported net income and EPS.
s. Cash flow and EPS.
6. The cost of certain major, multi~year projects are
capitalized for financial statement purposes because
they are material to the sponsoring organization. Such
costs are expensed for tax purposes because they are not
material on a companywide basis.
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7. Aside from software bundled with hardware, only major
systems, i.e., those costing in excess of $2 million,
are capitalized for books. Policy is to generally
expense all systems for tax and not request permission
to capitalize. For tax, systems are only capitalized as
a result of IRS audits or if bundled with hardware.
8. Only internally constructed software is treated differ-
ently for book and tax. The company is a cash bas is
taxpayer.
9. For tax purposes, Section 174 permits deduction of these
expenditures. For financial statement purposes, these
expenditures have continuing benefit.
10. Inteinally constructed software is being capitalized on
the financial statements, but is being expensed on the
tax return to be consistent with Rev. Proc. 69-21.
For vendor response to this question, see Chapter 3, Table
3.25.
Reasons for Capitalizing for Tax Purposes
and Expensing for Financial Statement Purposes
1. Financial accounting procedures treat purchased software
costs as iterns of expense unless circumstances ar ise
involving significant software purchase costs. Tax
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accounting procedures treat purchased software costs as
capitalized items the cost of which is to be recovered
by amortization d~ductions ratably over a period of five
years, as per Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303.
2. Occasional large expenditures for purchased software are
expensed for financial statement purposes to reflect
conservative accounting and are capitalized for tax pur-
poses to demonstrate the matching concept.
3. Capitalization is required for tax purposes.
4. Systems are capitalized as a result of IRS audits or if
bundled with hardware.
5. IRS regulations require capitalization.
6. All software is capitalized for tax purposes. Software
expenditures less than a specified threshold amount are
expensed for financial statement purposes.
For vendor response to this question, see Chapter 3, Table
3.25.
Bottom-line considerations seem to be present for rea-
sons 1, 4, 5, 7, 9 under expensing for tax purposes and rea-
son 4 under capitalizing for tax purposes. Expediency
considerations seem to be present for reasons 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
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6, 7, 8 under expensing for tax purposes and reasons 1, 2,
3, 4, 5 and 6 under capitalizing for tax purposes. Only
reason 10 under expensing for tax purposes seem to be based
on principle, and even that reason is suspect.
Question No. 16: If software is capitalized for both finan-
cial statement and tax purposes, are the amortization method
and time period used the same?
This question was asked in order to determine whether
the amortization period for both financial reporting and tax
reporting were the same. Prior to 1981, the response would
have probably almost always been "the same" because tax law
generally forbid the use of different useful lives for tax
and financial reporting. However, with the advent of ACRS
depreciation (see Chapter 14), different useful lives became
much more common. Companies that classify software as tan-
gible for federal tax purposes would probably use ACRS de-
preciation (an accelerated method having a shorter useful
life than that used for financial statement purposes) for
software that was placed in service after 1980 (when ACRS
became effective). Classifying software as intangible would
probably result in using the straight-line method over the
same time period for financial and tax purposes. It is en-
tirely possible that companies could use the ACRS method for
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some software and the financial statement method for other
software, because the tax treatment depends on when the
software was placed in service.
TABLE 6.16
COMPARISON OF AMORTIZATION METHOD AND
TIME PERIOD FOR FIN~NCIAL STATEMENT
AND TAX PURPOSES
QUESTION 16 - SOFTWARE USERS
Number of
Responses Percentage
Yes
No
Firms not responding
110
28
78
216
79.7%
20.3
Table 6.16 shows that the vast majority (79.7%) of firms
responding to this question use the same amortization method
and time period for capitalized software for tax and finan-
cial reporting purposes. Where a different amortization
method or time period are used, reasons given were:
1. ACRS is used for tax purposes.
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2. Tax treatment is non-GAAP and is chosen to maximize tax
benefits.
3. Company policy is to amortize purchased software over
three years, while for tax purposes it is amortized over
sixty months as required.
4. Company policy is to use the straight-line method for
financial reporting and an accelerated method for tax
purposes.
5. Tax law specifies straight-line amortization method.
For vendor response to this question, see Chapter 3, Table
3.26. A discussion of depreciation as it relates to soft-
ware is given in Chapter 14.
Question No. 17: What impact, if any, will the proposed
Treasury Regulations on research and experimental expendi-
tures, if adopted, have on your company with respect to
software?
This question was asked in order to determine whether a
company's research and development efforts are affected by
tax policy. The research credit is clearly an attempt to
encourage companies to expend more resources in certain re-
search and development areas and many people argue that
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using tax credits to influence corporate investment is in-
effective. The response received to this question lends
support to that argument.
Many respondents did not feel that the proposed Treasury
Regulations on research and experimental expenditures would
have a significant effect on their company. (These regula-
tions are discussed in Chapter 14.> The following comments
were made:
1. While the planned projects would continue, some of the
cost justification for various current and future pro-
jects would be weakened.
2. We might back off on our position that it is tangible
personal property; we might not take the investment tax
credit.
3. The proposed regulation will have an unfavorable impact
since costs of constructing computer software are not
considered Sec. 174 expenses unless the program involves
significant risks that it cannot be written.
4. Impact would be adverse, as it would restrict software
available for the R&D credit.
5. It will keep us from claiming an R&D credit.
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6. Our company could not claim R&D credits. This could
affect policies on acquisition method; project profita-
bility results.
Many respondents left this question blank. Others an-
swered nnone". The above six responses were the only ones
that had any other comments.
Question No. IBA: If your primary business is manufacturing
or transportation, annual sales for the most recent fiscal
year were: Ca) more than $1 billion; Cb) $500 million to $1
billion; (c) less than $500 million.
Question No. laB: If your primary business is financial
services or a public utility, assets at the end of the most
recent fiscal year were: Ca) more than $5 billion; Cb) $5
billion or less.
When this questionnaire was being constructed it was
thought that a comparison of software accounting policies
between large and small companies and between manufacturing
and financial service companies would be made. However,
upon further consideration, it was determined that, because
the sample consisted of all large companies, such a compari-
son as to size would not be meaningful, because all members
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of the sample were large. Furthermore, a comparison of pol-
icies based on type of company would not be meaningful
because there were an insufficient number of categories to
make meaningful comparisons.
TABLE 6.17
COMPANY PROFILE
QUESTION 18 - SOFTWARE USERS
Number of
Res{2onses Percentage
A. If your primary business is
manufacturing or transporta-
tion, annual sales for the
most recent fiscal year were:
More than $1 billion 95 48.0%
$500 million to $1 billion 38 19.2
Less than $500 million 9 4.5
B. If your primary business is
financial services or a public
utility, assets at the end of
the most recent fiscal year
were:
More than $5 billion 18 9.1
$5 billion or less 38 19.2
Companies not responding 18
216
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Table 6.17 shows that nearly half (48.0%) of the respon-
dents were manufacturing or transportation companies wi th
annual sales in excess of $1 billion, with the remainder
divided among smaller manufacturing and transportation com-
panies (23.7%), financial service companies and public uti-
lities (28.3%).
Question No. 19: Do you consider your company to be pri-
marily involved in: (a) manufacturing; Cb) financial ser-
vices; Cc) other services; (d) transportation; (e) public
utility; (f) other (Specify)?
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TABLE 6.18
TYPE OF COMPANY
QUESTION 19 - SOFTWARE USERS
Number of
Responses Percentage
Manufacturing 141 66.2%
Financial Services 54 25.4
Other Services 3 1.4
Transportation
Public Utility
Other 15 7.0
Companies not responding 3
216-
Most respondents were primarily involved in manufac-
turing (66.2%), followed by financial services (25.4%),
other (7.0%) and other services (1.4%). (See Table 6.18.)
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CHAPTER SEVEN
SUMMARY OF PART ONE
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In Chapter one we reviewed the origins of software accounting
and the problems that have developed over the years, especially since
1969, when IBM changed tts accounting policy and started stating its
software prices separately from those of its hardware. In that same
year, the Internal Service issued its first pronouncement on software.
Only three years after IBM made this move, state courts began
deciding cases on the sales, use and property taxation of software.
Soon after, the federal courts started to hear cases on the
qualification of computer software for the investment tax credit.
Previously, cases had decided on the applicability of the investment
tax credit to movies and records, two areas that relate closely to
software, and two areas that had been discussed in detail by the state
courts. The analogy between computer software and movies and
records soon began creeping into the accounting llterature, and it was
advocated that software be accorded the same treatment as movies
and records.
It was painted out that several pronouncements of the Financial
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Accounting Standards Board address the software accounting issue to
some extent, but that these pronouncements are unclear and
incomplete. In response to this lack of clarity and completeness,
ADAPSOissued its own Exposure Draft on the subject, which led to
the formation of an AICPA Task Force to study the matter further,
which, in tum, led to the placing of this toptctas it relates to the sale
or lease of software, at least) on the FASBagenda. The current rules
were then summarized, and the author's preliminary views were
stated.
Upon review of the literature and observing that more data was
needed in order to make a determination as to what software
accounting policy should be, it was decided that data should be
gathered from publlshed r tnenctal sources and from manufacturers
and users of computer software. Chapter 2 consisted of a NAARSdata
base search of the financial statements of companies in the software
industry in order to determine their software accounting coheres,
which are revealed either in the financial statement footnotes or in
the body of the financial statements themselves. From an analysis of
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this data, a trend began to emerge. It seemed that software vendor
companies tended to capitalize purchased software and expense
enhancement costs and internally developed software. This penchant
for having different treatments for purchased and developed software
also emerged from the interviews that were conducted prior to
mailing of the questionnaires. At first glance, there tended to be no
relationship between company size or field of operation and software
accounting policy. A question was raised as to whether a company's
software accounting pol1cy was based, in part at least, on expediency,
or whether it was based on reasoned accounting principle.
Chapter 3 reported the results of the survey that was mailed to
software vending company executives. The information gathered in
this survey provided additional proof that software vendors have
different accounting policies for purchased software than they do for
internally developed software. The reasons given for the different
treatment provided a strong indication that many software accounting
policies are based on expediency rather than reasoned accounting
principles. The responses also revealed a bit of oottorn-t ine concern,
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which was reflected in the software accounting policy. Further
evidence was obtained that seemed to indicate that there is no
relationship between size or field of operation and software
accounting policy, which confirmed the preliminary view obtained in
Chapter 2.
The responses also provided a further mdtcat ion, first raised in
the interviews, that a software company's software accounting policy
may have an effect on its ability to raise capital, and may have an
effect on growth. Data on the classification of software as tangible
or intangible was also gathered, as was data on the frequency with
which software companies take advantage of the investment and
research tax credits.
Chapter 4 attempted to reconcile the prellminary views stated in
Chapter 2 with the data gathered and reported in Chapter 3. A number
of things became more clear at this ooint, It became evident that
software companies tend to expense software construct ion costs and
tend to capitalize the costs of purchasing software. It also became
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apparent that capitalized software costs are slotted in different
places on the balance sheet by different companies. Companies also
had a variety of methods for capitalizing software construction
costs. Some companies capitalized only coding and testing costs, and
some companies also capitalized some or most design costs as well.
The evidence became increasingly strong that many companies base
their software accounting policy on expediency or bottom-line
considerations(short-term self-interest) or a combination of the two,
although lip service may often be paid to generally accepted
accounting principles.
The possibility of tax ignorance also emerged to a degree, because
it seemed that companies were not ful1y using the tax laws to
advantage, or were even formulating their software accounting
policies on the erroneous belief that financial and tax accounting
methods had to be the same. From the quest ions asked in the
questionnaire it was not possible to determine the extent of this
apparent tax ignorance, although there was a strong indication that it
existed to some extent. There was an indication that companies
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classify software as tangible or intangible based on best tax
advantage, although the extent to which tax law affected
classification could not be determined.
Chapter 5 examined footnote disclosure of the few software user
companies that reveal their software accounting policy in their
financial statements. Because the number of companies revealing
their software accounting policies is so small in comparison to the
total population, it could be that these companies have larger
expenditures for software than the average public software user
company, so their accounting policy for software may not be wholly
indicative of all software users. However, additional evidence did
emerge that software users tend to capitalize purchased software
costs and tend to expense enhancement costs and software
construction costs. Because the financial statements did not
breakdown the software costs into their cost components, not many
additional inferences could be made regarding their software
accounting policies.
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Chapter 6 summarized the data that was gathered in the
questionnaire that was maned to executives of software user
companies. The principal objective of the questionnaire was to derive
an informed view of current practice in accounting for software at a
more detailed level than that relating simply to capitalizing or
expensing. In particular, there was included an attempt to ascertain
rather more clearly the extent to which accounting procedures
relating to software costs were motivated by principle or accounting
convenience or bottom-Itne considerations. The need to know more
about the actualities of the current situation as a crucial input to the
developing debate on software accounting meant that the
informational requirement had to take precedence over the
interpretive element. Consequently, the questions addressed to the
issue of "why" rather than "how" are tentative and simplistic. The
results accruing to them constitute not so much the foundattons for
finished conclusions about accounting motivations as the opening of a
door to further research in this area.
Information was gathered as to the extent of capitalization and
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the depreciation methods used to depreciate cepttauzed software.
The reasons given for ceottaltztnq or expensing software costs
seemed to match closely those reasons given by software vending
company executives, namely, that the software accounting policy
chosen was often chosen for reasons of expediency, or bottom-line
constderattons, or both.
The responses to the questionnaire provided further evidence that
software user companies have different accounting policies for
purchased and developed software. Developed software costs tend to
be expensed, whereas purchased software costs tend to be
capitalized. Information was also obtained on the tax treatment
companies give to their software expenditures, and it was determined
that software user companies have a somewhat different approach to
software taxat ion than do software vendors, although this difference
could be caused by industry considerations.
As a result of the information obtained by the interviews with
software vending company executives and the data gathered in their
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questionnaire responses, it became clear that, for a substantial
number of executives at least, software accounting policy has an
effect on the ability to raise capital, and it may also have an effect
on the company's stock price. In order to gather further information
on this concern, it was decided that commercial lending officers and
financial analysts should be contacted in order to obtain their views.
Part II of this thesis explores this area of concern and reports on the
results obtained.
NOTE TO CHAPTER 7
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FASB HEARINGS ON SOFTWARE ACCOUNTING
SInce tnrs tnests was researched and wrItten, the FInancIal
AccountIng Standards Board held Hear1ngs 1n response to 1ts Exposure
Draft ("Accounting for the Costs of Computer Software to Be Sold,
Leased, or OtherwIse Marketed," August 31, 1984). These HearIngs
were held at the Waldorf AstorIa In New York C1ty on May 2 and 3,
1985. More than thIrty tnctvtouats, representing various segments of
the software Industry, public and prIvate accountIng testified at the
HearIng.
These Hearings afford a first vIew of relevant professional
reactions to the sort of views put forward In trns part of the tnests
These reactions are reported here, not so much In a sotrtt of research,
as the recording of an important step in the debate on software
accountIng and because of their tntrtnstc Interest.
The Exposure Draft, Issued August 31, 1984, came about because
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of a perceived lack of guidance on the topic of software accounting.
At present, the majority of companies expense the costs of
constructing computer software, but two-thirds of the companies
surveyed as a part of this study capitalize purchased software. In
August. 1983, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued a
moratorium on the capitalization of certain computer software,
pending a rul ing by the FASB.
FASBStatement No.2, "Accounting for Research and Development
Costs," requires that research and development costs be expensed as
incurred unless an alternative future use exists. FASB Interpretation
No.6, "Applicability of FASBStatement No.2 to Computer Software,"
states that not all software costs are to be considered research and
development costs. FASB Technical Bulletin No. 79-2, "Computer
Software Costs," states that software costs not classified as
research and development costs are not necessarily trwentortaote or
deferrable. APB Opinion No. 17, "Intangible Assets," states that
intangibles acquired from others should be recorded as assets and
amortized using the straight-line method unless some other method
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is more appropriate. The Opinion also states that the cost of
developing intangibles that are not specifically identifiable should be
expensed as incurred. This Opinion does not address the issue of how
to account for internally developed identifiable intangibles.
Furthermore, the classification of software as tangible or intangible
has not been clearly determined. Some courts and statutes classify
software as tangible property for sales, use or property tax purposes;
other courts and statutes classify software as intangible. The
investment tax credit, which is avai lable only for tangible property,
may sometimes be taken for software expenditures.
IruLlssues
One of the baste issues discussed was whether computer
software costs should be treated l1ke assets, capitalized, and placed
on the balance sheet, or whether these costs more closely represent
expenses, which belong on the income statement. Those favoring
expense treatment argued that the useful l1fe of software ts d1ff1cult
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to predict and is short in any event, and should be expensed in order to
be consistent with prevailing industry practice. Another. argument
was that the costs involved are immaterial or difficult to measure,
and should be expensed for reasons of expediency. Some expense
proponents viewed software expenditures as research and
deveIopment.
Those favoring capitalization viewed software as an asset and
argued that the matching concept would be violated unless software
expenditures were amortized over their expected useful life.
Capitalization was seen to be conceptually more in keeping with
reality, and the prevailing industry practice of expensing software
costs was held to be an incorrect treatment of an expenditure that
has all the attributes of an asset.
~Options
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Those who testIfied generally chose one of the following three
accounting treatments for software expenditures:
1. Expense all software costs. ThIs vIew Is In keepIng wIth prevailIng
practIce, and Is the vIew espoused by the American ElectroniCS
Assoc1at1on and the Financial Analysts Federation.
2. caattauze codIng and testIng costs and expense cetan desIgn
expend1tures, wh1ch are viewed as research and development costs.
ThIS view Is espoused by the Financial Accounting Standards Board
In Its Exposure Draft.
3. capttauze coding, testing and detail deSign costs. ThIs view Is held
by the AccountIng Standards Executive CommIttee of the AICPA, the
Assoctatton of Data Processing Service Organlzatlons(ADAPSO) and
the National Assoctatton of Accountants.
V1ews !lLPart1clpants
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Of those testifying at the Hearing, about one-third favored
expens1ng all software costs and two-thirds preferred some form of
caattauzatton More than 80 percent of those test1fy1ng opposed the
Exposure Draft posttton, either because they favored expensing or
because they thought detail des1gn costs Should also be caottauzec
However, these stattsttcs should not be considered as tndtcattve of
the total accounting and software company population. It Is a
well-known fact that the individuals who testify at FAS6 Hearings
tend to be representatives of large companies and the 61g-8 CPA
firms. Smaller companies and smaller CPA firms do not have the
resources or experts to send to FASB Hearings, so testimony tends to
be skewed In favor of the larger groups. This problem has been
plaguing the FAS6 since Its inception, and the FASB does attempt to
counter this bias by going out of Its way to obtain the views of the
smal1er companies and firms.
Ih.e...Software Industry View
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The various segments of the software tncustrv were well
represented In one of the more Oynamlc presentations of the first Oay
of testimony. Lawrence J. Schoenberg. Chairman of AGS Computers
and Chairman of the Financial Pract1ces Comm1ttee of ADAPSO,
argued In favor of capitalizing coding, testing anc detan design costs.
ADAPSO represents more than 750 companies 1nvarious segments of
the software incustrv, incluOing eight of the top ten tndecenoent
software companies. and was one of the early proponents of a
standard on software accounting. He stated that this anoroacn Is
conceptually sound and Increases period to period comparabl1lty.
C1tlng an NAA study, he also menttoned that Inabll1ty to caottauze
software reduces a company's ability to obtain Oebt.
MSA. one of the world's leaOlng tndeoenoent suppliers of
aopucattons software packages, also testified In favor of
capitalizing codtnc, testIng and detail desIgn costs. Due to the
predominant industry practice of expensing software construct ion
costs, 1t was potntec out that the current earnings of many software
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companies are penalized, because constructton costs tn the current
year often result in revenue m future years. MSA disagreed wtth the
FASS's classification of detail destgn costs as research and
development activities. Detail program design was viewed as part of
the implementation of a product plan and not an actual planning
activity. It was also held that the capitalization of construction
costs should cease and the amortization of such costs should begin
when the product is deliverable rather than, as the Exposure Draft
proposes, when the product is available to be sold, leased or
otherwise marketed.
Informatics General Corporation, another large software
company, was of the opinion that software construction costs,
including oetan design costs, should be capitaltzed, and that
expensing a11software construction costs is undesirable because it
results in accounting for dissimilar events as if they were the same.
rtobtx Partners viewed detatt design costs as being inseparable from
coding and testing, which should be capitalized. Tesseract
Corporation also believed that detail design costs should be recorded
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as production costs rather than as research and development, since
the research and development type of tasks are complete when the
product design work has been completed. In addition, cetan program
design and coding are tasks that are often performed simultaneously,
and establishing a ooucy which states that one part of the function is
not capitalizable and the other part is, would create inconsistencies
in appheat ion and report jng between companies.
First Financial Management Corporation, a $40 mi1l1on publicly
held company, was of the opinion that the expensing of detail program
design and the capitalization of coding Is inherently inconsistent. The
cetai I program design was viewed as a part of the coding process,
which should be capitalized. The program design was likened to the
blueprint or architectural drawing of what will be constructed.
Designs for a bui Iding or manufacturing faciJity used in the
production of revenues would be capitalized and, in FFMC'sview, the
costs incurred for detail design should be accorded similar treatment.
Gesco Corporation pointed out that, in its experience, detai 1
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program design costs are generally incurred after technological
feasibllity has been assured. It further argued in favor of allowing
professional judqment to determine whether certain costs fall within
the definition of research and development or construction. Boole &
Babbage, Inc., another publicly traded software company, bel ieved
that detail program design costs may, in some cases, be virtually
indistinguishable from the coding process, which should be
capltaltzed It was also stated that enhancement costs should be
added to the original product costs and the combined amount should be
amortized over the remaining product life.
Although many of the testifying software companies favored
capitalizing coding, testing and detail design costs, a few favored the
FASB oositlon, except for some minor issues. One such company was
IBM, which believed that the FASBshould not be specific in defining a
method of amortization. The proposed method is too rigid and
difficult to administer and does not provide a reasonable rnatcntnq of
revenues and expenses. According to the IBM definition, coding and
testing involve producing program instructions to carry out the
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requirements described in the detail program design and the
verification of the program instructions.
Infodata Systems, rnc., a pubhc company, has been capitaHzing
costs since 1980, but bel1eves the FASBExposure Draft as written is
too liberal in its interpretation of what costs should be capitalized.
Intermetrics, a software company headquartered in Massachusetts, is
of the opinion that the proposed Statement is likely to require
companies to incur additional costs and increase the complexity of
accounting treatment for software costs as well as increase
potent ial abuses, but basically supports the Exposure Draft.
A substantial number of software company representatives
oppose any capitalization of software costs. One of the more vocal
opponents of capitalization is the American Electronics Association,
which represents more than 2700 companies encompassing all
segments of the electronics industry. The AEA took the position that
all software development costs, including the costs of developing a
product master, should be expensed as incurred in accordance with
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FASB Statement No. 2 on research and development. One reason for
this posit ion is that, in its view, the software development process
is very similar to other product development processes. Also, the risk
and uncertainty of software development is similar to other types of
product development and the proposed benefits of the Exposure Draft
are outweighed by the costs of implementation. Furthermore,
application of the Exposure Draft would entail Subjective and
inconsistent judgments, resulting in financial statements with
reduced credibil ity and usefulness. It is interesting to note that the
AEA and ADAPSO,while claiming to represent the same constituency,
have positions that are diametrically opposed.
Cul1inet Software, inc., a leading independent supplier of
packaged computer software products to the IBMand IBM-compatible
mainframe markets, also favored expensing all software costs.
Because of the risks inherent in successfully developing a marketab Ie
product, it is CulJinet's bellef that, in a majority of instances,
recoverability will be established at a point far into the development
process. Consequently, the amount of capita 11zabIe costs wi 11be so
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insignificant as to make capitalization unwarranted. In its view, the
software industry is in an environment where uncertainty is high and
where financial accounting pronouncements should be applied
conservatively. To do otherwise would not be in the best interest of
software companies, the industry and users of financial statements.
Culllnet also believes thatintemally developed software should
not be accounted for on the same basis as purchased software. The
issue of accounting for a purchased product differently than an
intemally developed product is common to all industries, it was
pointed out. Furthermore, a product that is purchased is the result of
an arm's length market determined price. Recoverabllity is much less
subjective for a purchased product because many of the uncertainties
regarding product development have been resolved.
Hewlett Packard Company also favored expensing all software
costs, and expressed concern that the FASB was not fully aware of
the underlying business and economic realities of the software issue.
It was perceived that the Exposure Draft creates an artificial
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distinction which would result in the capttauzatton of highly
speculative or "sort: costs on the balance sheet. It was also thought
that deferring the recognition of coding and testing costs would not
result in providing meaningful information to financial statement
users because the recovereotltty of the development costs of any
given software project is uncertain and unverifiable, and
capitalization and amortization would be applied tnconststenuv.
Lotus Development Corporation, which went from a start-up
operation to a $100 million company in two years, also favored
expensing all software costs. Lotus felt that the proposed Standard
would not represent the best interests of the software industry or
the investor community because comparability and consistency of
financial information among software companies would be adversely
affected and the requirements surrounding recoverability of
capital ized costs and risk are very subjective. Furthermore, the
industry would incur significant costs to implement the proposed
standard and the costs would far exceed the benefits derived.
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Creative Management Systems, Inc., a telecommunications
software firm, also favored expensing. The view was expressed that
manufacturing tends to be capital intensive and lends itself to
cepttaltzatton, whereas software development is labor intensive and
does not lend itself to cepttaltzatton Uncertainty of accurately
estimating the life of a software product also makes expensing
prudent. For an example, the company Cited the video software game
Pong. which required thousands of hours of design. coding and testing
to complete. When first introduced, the product's life and popularity
seemed llmitless. In less than one year, better and more
technologically advanced programs had been introduced, resulting in
11tt 1e if any demand for Pong.
Digital Equipment Corporation favored the expensing of all
internally developed software, but favored treating purchased
software 1ike other intangible assets. The Exposure Draft was
opposed because of the risks of adverse effects on the quality of
financial information inherent in software capitalization. It was also
thought that the cost of implementing the proposed rule would be
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excessive and that relevance and reliability problems would be caused
due to the dependent relationship between hardware and software.
The John Fluke Manufacturing Company,a leading manufacturer of
test and measurement equipment, disagreed with the definition of
production process. Fluke testified that the costs of creating a
working model of a software product, or a combined
hardware/software product, should be expensed as incurred, and that
software development is not a cut and dried process. Design, coding
and testing are intertwined and virtually impossible to separate, and
attempting to do so would be a nightmare.
North Star Ventures, Inc. .was of the opinion that the ultimate
recoverabi lity of the costs associated with the development of a
software product is so uncertain at any point in time that
capitahzing those associated costs would seriously distort
period-to-period and company-to-company comparisons which
financial statements are purported to provide. Society for Visual
Education, Inc., a developer of filmstrips, read-along books and
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microcomputer software for school chlldren, stated that there are
many types of software being published, each wtth Its own
development procedures, and it ts these varying procedures that make
the proposed Statement unworkable ln soctetvs segment of the
industry. It was felt that monitoring recoverabiHty would be
extremely difficult. Software programs are frequently sold as
adjuncts to texts, workbooks, games, filmstrips, audio cassettes and
other audiovisual materials, and establlshing what portion of the sale
is attributable to the software disk itself would be a mathematical
nightmare. It was thought that the best treatment would be to
expense all software costs as incurred.
View Df_1he_AccQuntjng ProfeSSion
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The vtews of the accountIng proresston were also mixed The
AccountIng Standards Executive Comm1ttee(AcSEC) of the AICPA
publ1shed an Issues Paper call1ng for the capitalization of cetau
design, coding and testing costs, a view that Is somewhat at odds
w1th the proposed Statement. AcSECagreed wrtn the FASBExposure
Draft treatment of recoverab111ty and arnorttzatton, and concurred
with the FASB view that purchased software to be sold, leased or
otherwise marketed should be ceottauzec on the same basis as
software produced Internally. AcSECwas of the opinion that cetatt
program design costs should be caottauzec if recoverablllty has been
estaousnec. and disagreed with the FASB's tentative conclusion that
cetan program design Is similar to the research and development
activity described in FASB Statement NO.2. Detail program design
was viewed as a lower level programm1ng acttvtty and that It Is
generally an Implementation, rather than a planning, activ1ty. If detal1
program deSign activity is necessary to establish technological
reasiottttv. Its costs Should be Charged to reseercn and development
as incurred; if it is not, its costs should be capitalized if the
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recoverabi1,ty criteria are met. Several changesto the glossary were
also recommended.
Francis J. O'Brien, testifying for the accounting firm of Arthur
Young,supported the thrust of the proposedStatement, but stated
that a significant portion of the costs of detail program desJgnare
capital tzaole, and urged the Board to changeits conclusion on that
point. He stated that the decision as to whether software activities
are research and development should be made by determining the
objective of the activities. Basedon the firm's experience, in most
cases detail program design is part of the implementation and
production of a software product, not a "design"activity as the term
is generally understood and used in Statement No.2. It is not the
objective of detail program design to establish technological
teastbt lity, and, in most cases, it should not be concludedthat the
costs of detail programdesignare researchanddevelopmentcosts. He
also commented that the final Statement should not require
straight-line amortization. For some longer llved products,
significant sales are not expected in the first year or so, and
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requiring stratqnt-Itne amortization in such cases could cause
distortion. He recommended that the ratio of current revenues to total
anticipated revenues be used instead.
Bernard Doyle, Management Accounting Practices Committee
Chairman (of the NAA) andManager-Corporate Accounting Services for
General Electric testified for the National Association of
Accountants, as did Allen H. Seed, III, Chairman of the MAP
Subcommittee on Statement Promulgation and Sentor Consultant for
Arthur D. little, Inc. The National Association of Accountants, while
stating that detail design, coding and testing costs of software
intended for sale or lease should be capitalized, said that the FASB
Statement should also address software intended for internal use,
since there is currently no standard that addresses this very
important topic.
On March 71 1985, the NAA sent the FASB its Issues Paper
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entitled Accounting For Software Used InternaJJy, which outlines
NAA's position. The NAA position was developed over a period of more
than two years and involved much research. Executives of both
software vendor and user companies were interviewed, and
questionnaires were mailed to these groups as well as financial
analysts and bankers. Based on this research, the NAA concluded that
the process and types of costs incurred for developing software are
stmtler for both internal use and for sale or lease. Certain costs are
essentially research and development while others are not. If a
company intends to develop software to establish a better accounting
system, the process is likely to be sirnuer to developing a software
package to sell to its customers. For example, assume a company is
considering establlshing a fuJI on-line computer system that wi 11
result in inventory entering into the system when the raw material is
received, maintaining accounting control throughout the cycle, and
utumateiv generating the sales invoice when the manufactured goods
are shipped. The company must decide that the project is worthwhlle
and attainable. In doing so, management is like1y to apply criteria
stmner to those set forth in the Exposure Draft for assessing
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recoverability of software to be developed for sale.
Several accounting firms that test1f1ed either agreed with the
basic FASB posit ion or favored expenstng all software costs. Price
Waterhouse testified that costs incurred after the detal1 program
design stage should be ellgible for capital1zatlon, whereas all costs
incurred prior thereto should be expensed. Touche Ross & Co.
supported the conceptual foundation for the Board's requirements for
accounting for the development and production of software, but
expressed concerns about the difficulty of determining the
recoverability of the costs of developing most new computer
software products to justify capitalization. It was belteved that,
because of market uncertainty, the application of the FASB criteria
would result in expensing the costs of most new computer software
products now in development. However, enhancements of existtng
successful products are more likely to satisfy the capttal1zat ton
criteria. Capitalization should not be precluded tn those few
circumstances in which a company 1s able to demonstrate
recoverabll ity of a new product.
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The fact that many software products have short useful ltves
raises cost/benefit considerations regarding cepttaltzatton, and
Touche Ross Questioned the usefulness of capitalizing costs of
software products with useful lives of less than two years. A
recommendation was also made that the Board further clarify the
distinction between maintenance and enhancements. The Touche Ross
view is that the maintenance definition should focus on error
correction and routine changes and additions, wht1e the enhancement
definition should focus on improvements that either extend product
llfe or add new functionallty to the existing software product.
Ernst & Whinney favored expensing all software costs because
the capitalization criteria Jack sufficient objectivity to permit
reasonably consistent application of the proposed Standard In
practice. Also, the current industry practice favors expensing, and
changing methods would be costly. Furthermore, the software
environment is rapidly changing due to technology and intense
competition, resulting in high volatility and unpredictabl1ity, which
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brings mto question the recoverabi1tty of many software products.
Coopers & Lybrand agreed with the Board view that
cepttattzatton has merit, but was concerned that the practical
problems inherent in implementing this concept may not have been
adequately considered and could prevent a final Statement from
achieving the desired objectives of increased comparability and
re levance. Issue was taken with the Exposure Draft approach, wh1ch
would result in an accounting distinction between detail program
design activities and coding activities. The recoverabillty of some
types of software products can general1y be established before the
detatl program design is completed, and it would seem arbitrary to
exclude certain costs from capitalization just because they are
similar to costs considered research and development under FASBNo.
2. From a conceptual standpoint it was felt that costs should be
cepitahzeo if they meet the definition of an asset regardless of the
nature of the activity involved.
The Financial Executives Institute supported the Exposure Draft,
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with minor exceptions. It was bel1eved that the proposed Standard
would have a positive effect on the industry and the users of financial
statements and would be broad enoughto recognize the diversity that
exists in the industry. It was also thought that research and
development and production activities are usually distinct and
identifiable activities and that design Is research and development,
while coding and testing are not. It was also thought that
recoverab1l1ty can be predicted with a reasonable degree of certainty.
I.he...flnanclaJ Analysts' Y1e.w.
Several representatives of the financial analyst community also
testified. The views expressed by these representatives were every
bit as diverse as those expressed by the software Industry and
accountants. Paine Webber MitchelJ Hutchins Inc. favored
capitalization firstly because it Is the correct approach to take, and
secondly because the asset value of software is not currently being
reflected In today's stock prices. A third reason was that, as a result
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of discussion with clients, it was perceived that financial statement
readers can understand and support cepttaltzatten once the hysteria
has been stripped away.
Hambrecht & Quist testified in opposition to the Exposure Draft.
According to the firm's estimate, close to 50 percent of what is now
classified by software companies as research and development would
quaHfy for capitalization under the proposed standard. Although this
change could potentially have a very positive effect on earnings, the
potential effect cannot be quantified because of the lingering
ambiguity over what type of software development should be
considered recoverable. It was felt that the proposed rules are
jeopardized by their own vagueness.
Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., while recognizing that developed
software products are among the principal operating assets which
vendors of such products have, opposes caottauzanon of software
development expenses because of a lack of an operable definition
regarding what costs may be capitalized. Investors would be better
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served by maintenance of the status quo rather than face the
potential for inconsistent application of the proposed rules.
Morgan Stanley also favored expensing all software costs
because adoption of the proposed standard would result in a greater
divergence in practices. Capitalization of software costs also
conflicts with current tax law treatment, in MorganStanley's opinion.
Finally, the practical value of applying the proposed standard is
Questionable, and the costs associated with its implementatton were
thought to far outweigh the benefits to be gained.
The Financial Analysts Federation also favored expensing all
software costs because the economic llfe and revenue projections for
a new product must be deemed highly unpredictable. Furthermore, the
classtrtcatton of software development costs is highly subjective and
arbitrary, and such arbitrariness may lead to potential abuses. The
principle of conservatism should govern.
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Software User Company VIews
Only two software user companies testified at the hear1ngs. ITT.
a company which uses and also sells software, testtf1ed in favor of
capitalizing coding, testing and detail program design. Tests of
.
recoverabllity and feasibility were thought to be considered and
decided before the detail design phase of the software construction
process. General Motors found the Exposure Draft to be acceptable as
written.
Summary
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If one statement can bemadeabout the hearIngs, It would be that
consensus was not achIeved.Members of the software Industry cannot
agree on whIch method best accounts for software constructIon costs.
Some favor expensIng wh11eothers favor some form of caottauzatton
The account1ng ororesston and financIal analysts are also sent
Although only two software companIes testIfIed at the hearIngs. an
anatysts of tnetr comment letters reveals that thIs group Is also
split. Whatever method Is chosen, a substant lal number of software
companies, accountants, fInancIal analysts and software user
compantes wrn be ctssansned
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CHAPTER EIGHT
PRIOR STUDIES OF THE EFFECT OF CERTAIN ACCOUNTING
POLICIES ON BANK LENDING DECISIONS AND STOCK PRICE
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BACKGROUND
During the course of the interviews, several Interviewees
expressed the view that the tnabil1ty to place software costs on the
balance sheet would adversely affect a software firm's abllity to
raise capital. This feeling was reinforced by the responses received
to the questionnaire that was sent to software vendor companies. In
that questionnaire (see Chapter 3), 36.4 percent of privately held
software companies and 17.0 percent of the public companies
surveyed agreed that the inabtl ity to include software costs on the
balance sheet adversely affects the abil1ty to raise capttel (QuestIon
No. 12)
A small minority of prlvate( 10.87C)and publlc(9.8X) companies
thought that the Inab111ty to Include software costs on the balance
sheet would adversely affect the Interest rate their company must
pay to obtain caplta1(Questlon No, l:n A large number of
prlvate(51.4~) and publlc(33.3X) companies believed that If all
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software development costs were expensed rather than capttauzed,
the level of these expenditures for software companies would have to
be much lower; companies would be forced to put a cap on Investment
in new product programs in order to reflect good earntngs
performance to shareholders(Questlon No. 14). A significant number
of private(4S.9~) and publlc(31.4~) companies also beHeved that If
2111software costs were expensed rather than capttalrzeo, the once of
their company's stock, if publ icly traded, would be adversely
affected(Question No. 15). A minority of prlvate(32.41U and
public( 16.0~) companies thought that If all software development
costs were expensed rather than capital tzec, their company's
long-term growth would be adversely affected(Question No. 16).
The view that accounting polley affects a company's stock price
or the abl1lty to ratse debt caottai has been exoressec a number of
times In the literature. In 1965, J. L. O'Donnell 'examtnec the once
earnIngs ratto trend of 37 public uttlttles for the perIOd 1949
throught 1961, and ceterrrnnec that accounting polley can affect
stock price. His second study2 produced the same result. On the other
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hand, Edward L. Summers studied the effect of Investment tax credit,
interperiod tax allocation, and funds flow statements of stock prices
in the airline industry and found no statistically significant tmpact.3
George J. Staubus, in studying the association between several
accounting variables and stock price, found that investors found
income before depreciation to be more useful than Income after
depreciat ion:~
An experimental study conducted by R. E.Jensen5 concluded that
variations in depreciation and inventory account mg ooucies affected
analysts' opinions. W. J. Bruns, Jr., concluded6 that Inventory ooucv
does not affect pricing, advertising and orocuctron oecrsions. The
three studies that T. R. Dyckman conducted reached conf net Ing
results. His first study7 concluded that variations In Inventory
methods can influence financial statement readers, a conclusron that
is diametrically opposed to that reached by Bruns. Dyckman's second
study6 concluded that inventory method does not tnf luence
decision-making, but his third stUdy9 reached the opposite conclusion
Dopuch and Ronen,10using students for finanCial statement readers,
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concluded that inventory pollcy does 1nfluence readers of financial
statements. Mlynarczyk's study 11 comparing the flow-through and
deferred method of tax accounting reached the same conclusion. Falk
and Ophir found that investors react both to the content and form of
disclosure.12
Beaver and Dukes'3 studied the relationship between
depreciation methods and securities prices and concluded that the
market is efficient. Their sample consisted of 54 comperues that
used acceIerated deprecIat ion methods for tax report Ing and the
straight-line method for financial reporting for 1963 through 1967.
The study examined four forms of earnings variables: (A) earnIngs
avattaole for common stockholders deflated by the book value of
common equity at the beginning of the period; (6) undef lated earnings
available for common stockholders; (C) the first differences In sertes
(A); and (0) the first differences in series (8). The study concluded
that there is a significant relationship (beyond the 0.01 level)
between unexpected earnings changes and unexpected price changes,
which is apparent in a wide variety of models and across a wide range
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of changes. The evidence Is consistent with an efficient market and
Inconsistent with a narrow, naive treatment of accounting numbers.
The findings in fgavor of market efficiency were, In the authors'
opinion, important for two reasons(p. 557): "First, although
considerable evidence supports market effiCiency In general, there
are few tests of market efftciency with respect to account ing data,
The efficient market hypothesis is convincing largely because of the
volume and conststencv of empirical evidence supporting it across a
variety of contexts. Hence, It Is Important to document market
efficiency with respect to accounting data as well. Second, the
findings are important because of the widespread belief In market
inefficiency with respect to accounting data," They go on to say(p
558) that: "The findings are important because they are consistent
with the hypothesis that the market adjusts for cross sect tonal
differences in depreciation methods when setting the eQulllbrtum
prices of securities. It directly confronts the hypothesis of an
Inefficient market, which Impl ies that the price-earnings rat los
before adjustment would be the same."
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In another study, 14 Dukes examined the effects of expensing
research and development costs on secur1ty prices and reached a
similar conclusion, namely, that reported earnings are systemattcally
adjusted before they are impounded into securtty prices, whIch
supports the efficient market hypothesis.
Prior to the issuance of FASBNo.2 on research and development
costs, companies could either capitalize or expense R&Dcosts. After
FASB No.2, companies had to expense R&D costs as Incurred A
similar situation now exists for software construcucn costs At
present there is no rule, so companies can either caottanze or
expense software construction costs. The FASBnow has a tOPICon Its
agenda that might require companies to use only one method
Software construction has been likened to R&D expenditures, which
might or might not have future benefit, so it might be reasonable to
assume that the market might react the same way toward a change tn
software accounting poltcy as it did to the change in account Ing for
R&Dcosts. The Dukes study found(p. 184) that the security prices for
the firms in the study reflected adjustments to reported earnings In
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estimating permanent earnings consistent with the hypothesis that
R&Dgenerates future benefits for the firm. In other words, investors
treat R&Dcosts 1Ike assets even though these costs must be expensed
as incurred. The sample consisted of 41 firms In the chemicals,
electronics and drug industries, and 11 firms that were classified as
"other". All firms were required to have securittes price histories
from January, 1959 through June, 1968 and to have reported R&D
expenditures somewhere in the annual report for the period 1955
through 1967.
There have been at least three major studies dealing with the
effect of accounting policies on bank lending decisions. In 1970, T N.
Jain conducted a study 15 of the effects of tax account Ing methods on
bank lending decisions. In that study, financial data for two
companies were sent to 110 lending officers at large banks. The hIgh
response rate of 67 percent (74 responses) was due, In part, to the
fact that most of the bankers were also contacted personally, and a
follow-up letter was sent to the remainder. The financial data for
the two companies was identical in all respects except for the
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method of accounting for income taxes; one company used
comprehensive allocation and one used partial allocation. The study
found that the method of accounting for Income taxes does Influence
lending decisions.
The second study 16 was conducted by A. A. El-Arabl In 1977. In
this study, two sets of financial statements were prepared for two
hypothetical firms. The data for both sets of financial statements
were identical except for the accounting principles used. One set
used the FIFO method of inventory valuation and the straiqnt-une
depreciation method. The second used LIFO and the sum of the years
digits method. The sample consisted of two groups of banks. Group
one consisted of 332 banks (of which 37 percent responded) and was
sent the FIFO/straight-line data. Group two consisted of 331 banks
(of which 32 percent responded) and was sent the lIFO/SYD data. The
study found that the accounting principles used did affect the lending
decision.
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The third study was conducted by M.M. El-Maksy.17 In thts study,
1,050 loan officers from 240 banks were dtvtded into seven groups.
Responses were received from 267 lenders representing 143 banks.
The first group received financial data containing no FASB No. 33
information. Eachof the treatment groups received one piece of FASB
No. 33 data (either constant dollar, current cost, or both) which was
either presented in the notes to the financial statements or on the
face of the income statement and notes. The stUdy found that lending
decisions for the control group were not significantly different
statistically than those for the treatment groups, although lending
decisions for the treatment groups were less favorable than those for
the control groups in 94 percent of the cases. The groups recervinq
constant dollar data made lending decisions that were not
significantly different statistically from those decisions made by
lenders who received current cost data.
A principal objective of financial statements is to provide
information relevant to the decision needs of creditors and lnvestors.
It therefore seems appropriate to investigate whether and to what
338
extent a given method of software accounting might impact upon the
abi llty and terms of raising capital. Chapter 9 summarizes the
questionnaire responses received from commercial lending officers
using a methodology siml1ar to that used by EI-Arabl and El-Maksy. In
those studies, different sets of financial data were sent to different
groups of bankers. Chapter 10 summarizes the questionnaire
responses received from commercial lending officers USing a
methodology strntlar to that used by Jain. In that study, two sets or
financial statement data were sent to the same group of bank lendIng
officers. Chapter 11 summarizes the qoesttonnatre responses
received from financial analysts using a methodology similar to that
used by Jensen.
Unfortunately, the response rates to these questionnaire surveys
was too low to permit a rigorous, in depth statistical analysis
Nevertheless, it ts felt that there is a sufficient body of response to
have some valid information content relevant to our purpose The
fo11owing results and discussion are offered tn a spirit of
illumination rather than proof.
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CHAPTER NINE 
RESULTS OF THE FIRST COMMERCIAL 
LENDING OFFICER SURVEY 
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BACKGROUND 
In the initial stages of this study, telephone inter-
views were conducted with more 
representing several facets of 
Eighteen individuals representing 
than twenty individuals 
the software industry. 
seven software manufac-
turers and internal users were interviewed personally on 
company premises. A questionnaire survey was also mailed to 
executives of software manufacturing companies. Information 
obtained from the interviews and mail survey revealed that a 
significant number of software company executives were of 
the opinion that the inabili ty to reflect software expen-
di tures on the balance sheet adversely affected their abi-
lity to raise debt or equity capital. 
To test the validity of this view, two separate surveys, 
employing different research methodologies, were constructed 
and mailed to different groups of commercial lending offi-
cers. A third survey was mailed to financial analysts. 
The basic methodology of the commercial lending officer 
surveys was to send to each participant financial data 
relating to one or both of two hypothetical software vendor 
companies, and to seek their reactions to principal 
questions about whether they would be prepared to lend to 
those companies, and subsidiary questions as to what con-
J4J 
straints they would place on any such loan. The two com-
panies were identical in all respects save that one capita-
lized software expenditures, whereas the other expensed 
them. In what follows, the reader may find it convenient to 
remember that "Campbell Company" stands for "Capitalizing 
Company", whereas "Edwards Company" stands for "Expensing 
Company". 
A common objective of this approach is to test for any 
difference between what recipients have elsewhere said they 
would or would not do, and what they actually do do when 
confronted with a good simulation (c.f. Abdel-khalik 
referenced in note No.1). In the present case, the test is 
partly of this nature, but is more oriented toward seeking 
confirmation of software vendors' expressed fears that 
supplier of capital would have their decisions influenced by 
the accounting method adopted. 
The methodology is not without its problems. Suppliers 
of capital such as bank lending officers may well state that 
their decisions are not influenced by mere accounting poli-
cies and such may indeed be their intent, especially when 
confronted by a situation where they are explicitly made 
aware that what is under test is a difference in accounting 
treatment. (Indeed, one respondent to Questionnaire No. 2 
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(Chapter 10) described it as "an insult to his 
intelligence"). One banker who did not return the survey 
telephoned the National Association of Accountants (the sur-
veys were mailed under NAA letterhead) to say that he felt 
the questionnaire was an insult to his intelligence. To 
paraphrase his comment: "Who do they think they're kidding? 
Anyone who gave different responses didn't read the 
material." 
This problem can be avoided by sending the data of just 
one company to each respondent. However, this procedure is 
open to the objection that two different populations are 
being sampled. Therefore, in Questionnaire No. 2 (Chapter 
10), the data on both companies was sent to a further sample 
of bank lending officers. The results of the two question-
naires were compared where relevant, and the results found 
to be very similar. The two questionnaires were not iden-
tical. The data given in Questionnaire No. 1 was very 
detailed, and responses indicated that bank lending officers 
in a significant number of cases based their answers on 
general bank loan cr iter ia (capi tal structure, qual i ty of 
receivables, etc.) rather than the specifics of an organiza-
tion operating in the software industry. In Questionnaire 
No.2, therefore, the information was presented in a more 
summarized form, and this did seem to improve the attention 
given to software related specifics (though that may equally 
have reflected a more overtly comparative situation). 
Accordingly, although the results of the two questionnaires 
are nowhere significantly different, they cannot be regarded 
as being unquestionably mutually consistent. 
THE FIRST COMMERCIAL LENDING OFFICER SURVEY 
Two questionnaires and related financial data were 
mailed to two separate groups of commercial lending 
officers,l chosen from banks having at least $500 million in 
assets. Data for Campbell Corporation, a company that 
capi tal i zes software. costs wi th net income of $2,552,107, 
$2,213,154 and $903,131 for 1982, 1981 and 1980, respec-
tively, was sent to 174 commercial lending officers. 
Campbell Corporation is a real, publicly held software com-
pany. The financial data sent was authentic. Only the com-
pany name was changed. 
Data for Edwards Corporation was sent to 174 other 
commercial lending officers. The only difference between 
Edwards and Campbell was that Edwards expenses all software 
costs. Edwards had a $2,103,000 net loss in 1982 and net 
income of $498,000 and $301,000 in 1981 and 1980, respec-
tively. 
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Twenty responses were received for Campbell and thirty 
for Edwards, for response rates of 11.5% and 17.2%, respec-
tively. Responses to the individual questions are sum-
marized below. 
Question One: How large a line of credit would your 
bank be willing to grant to this company? 
TABLE 9.lA 
Question One Summary 
CamEbell 
Number of 
ResEonses 
5 
1 
1 
I 
2 
3 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
Total 20 
--
Mean 
Median 
Mode 
CorEoration 
Amount 
$ -0-
750K-1M 
1M 
I-2M 
2M 
3M 
3.5M 
4.5M 
5M 
7M 
7.5M 
Standard Deviation 
(S.D. ) 
Coefficient of Variance (Mean) 
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Edwards 
Number of 
Responses 
17 
1 
I 
1 
1 
6 
I 
1 
1 
30 
Campbell 
$ 2,794,000 
2,500,000 
° 2,509,000 
0.899 
CorEoration 
Amount 
$ -0-
1M 
3-6M 
4M 
4.5M 
5M 
6M 
10M 
1O-15M 
Edwards 
$ 2,417,000 
o 
o 
3,345,000 
1,384 
The difference in sample means is not significant at the 
20 percent level using the student-t distribution. See the 
appendix to this chapter for computations. 
Table 9.1A includes 5 cases of -no loan- for Campbell 
and 17 cases of "no loan" for Edwards. It was expected that 
bankers would, on average, grant a larger loan to Campbell 
than to Edwards, but the results indicate no statistical 
difference at the 20 percent level. The average loan to 
Campbell ($2,794,000), however, is slightly larger than the 
average loan to Edwards ($2,417,000). 
Table 9.lA summar i zes the responses. Twenty-five per-
cent of the commercial -lending officers responding to the 
Campbell questionnaire would not grant a line of credit, 
compared with 57 percent of those responding to Edwards. 
For those who would grant a line of credit, the amounts 
ranged as high as $7.5 million for Campbell and $15 million 
for Edwards. The student t-test determined that the respon-
ses received from the two groups was not statistically dif-
ferent at the 20 percent level, even though the reject rate 
f or Edwards (57 percen t ) was more than twice tha t for 
Campbell (25 percent). 
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TABLE 9.1B 
Question One Summary 
CamEbe11 
Number of 
ResEonses 
1 
1 
1 
2 
3 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
Total 15 
Mean 
Median 
Mode 
CorEoration 
Amount 
$ 7S0K-1M 
1M 
I-2M 
2M 
3M 
3.SM 
4.5M 
SM 
7M 
7.SM 
Standard Deviation 
(S.D. ) 
Coefficient of Variance(Mean) 
Edwards 
Number of 
ResEonses 
1 
1 
1 
1 
6 
1 
1 
1 
13 
Campbell 
$ 3,725,000 
3,000,000 
3,000,000 
2,399,000 
0.644 
CorEoration 
Amount 
$ 1M 
3-6M 
4M 
4-SM 
SM 
6M 
10M 
1O-15M 
Edwards 
$ 5,577,000 
5,000,000 
5,000,000 
4,331,000 
0.777 
The difference in sample means is significant at the 20 
percent level. 
In Table 9.1B, the -no loan- responses have been de-
1eted. We can now determine what the average loan to 
Campbell and Edwards will be, given that a loan will be 
granted. 
It was expected that bankers would be more likely to 
grant a larger loan to Campbell, but just the opposite 
proved to be t,he case. If a loan were granted at all, 
bankers would tend to loan $3,725,000 to Campbell and 
$5,577,000 to Edwards, a difference that is significant at 
the 20 percent level. However, only 13 bankers would lend 
to Edwards, and 2 of the 13 bankers would lend $10 million 
or more, so the average is somewhat skewed. The standard 
deviation for Edwards, moreover, is nearly twice that for 
Campbell. 
Question Two: If your bank would not approve a line of 
credit for this company, please indicate why the application 
would be denied. 
The banks denying Campbell's application responded as 
follows: 
1. "Too many questions raised in financial state-
ments, i. e., purpose of 1 ine (to replace other bank?), 
carry receivables, carry proprietary software costs? We 
also question the quality of the financial statements: 
there is no cash/funds flow, no reconc i lement of net 
worth, no amortization of property and equipment on the 
income statement, capitalized leases do not appear to be 
on the balance sheet and write-off of computer costs (in 
4-6 years) does not appear to be taking place on P & L." 
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2. "All needs appear to be permanent financing. 
It is impossible to determine if a line can be repaid by 
the liquidation of short term assets." 
3. "Concerns: leverage, vulnerability of main 
product line in competitive environment; bulk of assets 
(computers and software) could become obsolete rapidly." 
4. "The application would be denied until further 
information concerning the following could be obtained: 
an accounts receivable aging, projections indicating 
future profitability, capital expenditures, and the 
direction of the company. This would include projected 
income statements and balance sheets. We would also need 
a recent inter im statement and a sources and uses of 
funds statement dated December 31, 1982." 
of 
5. 
$20 
"Interest expense on bonds will be 11 percent 
mill ion, or $2.2 million, which would entirely 
deplete earnings based on 1982 figures." 
The banks denying Edward's application responded as 
follows: 
1. "Prior to my bank venturing a decision regard-
ing this company's ability to receive from us a line of 
3.51 
credit and/or a term loan, more in-depth analysis would 
need to be made. Certainly, we would wish to view pro 
forma balance sheets (five years) and income statements 
(five years). The pro formas would aid us in obtaining 
some insight into the company' s future financial needs 
and management objectives. 
The tremendous sales growth that the company 
has enjoyed during the past five years has certainly 
been a contributing force in the company's need for 
external funds. The pro formas that the bank would 
require would aid us in determining how much of the 
external funds would be needed to support the increased 
recei vables and inventory (short term), and how much 
external funds would be needed to support the increase 
in fixed assets (long term). 
If the company's projections reveal a continu-
ation of the rapid sales growth, we could conclude that 
repayment of a portion of the external funds would not 
be repaid until the rate of sales growth declines. Of 
course, those funds that will support the receivables 
and inventory will be considered to be self-liquidating. 
We would request a break out of the G & A 
expenses so as to better calculate the company's G & A 
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We would request a break out of the G & A 
expenses so as to better calculate the company's G & A 
trends. Depreciation expense is needed to better analyze 
the company's cash flow and to calculate more revealing 
ratios. 
The company's sales growth and interest expen-
ses were very important in the decline of profitability 
for the Edwards Corporation. Next year, the servic ing 
of the debenture, interest and sinking fund will add 
additional strain to profitability." 
2. "There is a significant increase in long term 
subordinated convertible debt with sinking fund require-
ments of Sl.5 million. Long term debt should provide a 
sufficient operating fund for the near term. There is 
no explanation for the loss other than increased cost of 
goods sold." 
3. "The company is not generating sufficient cash 
to support its current financing costs." 
4. "(a) Nature of business, (b) operating defi-
ciencies: (c) risk of upcoming year; (d) uncertain 
nature of accounts receivable, operating expenses, 
payable and subord ina t ion convert ible debentures; (e) 
increasing international business. 
J5J 
5. "In general, we do not make loans without 
first hand knowledge and assessment of management. In 
particular, it is not clear what the purpose of the line 
would be given their present abundance of cash 
resources." 
6. "(a) Severe operating loss due to excessive 
increases in expenses: (b) insufficient financial data 
regarding expenses: (c) heavy current and long-term 
credi t obligations: (d) no knowledge of management and 
its ability: (e) no interim financial data for any por-
tion of 1983." 
7. "(a) Revenue recognition methods: (b) product 
is subject to obsolescence without warning." 
8. " (a) The investment in the building is too 
much for the company to carry (interest plus deprecia-
tion): (b) the three year life on computers used until 
1981 was too long and the company has not shown an 
operating profit since the change." 
9. "(a) Insufficient information: (b) source and 
application of funds statement for 1982 was not given: 
(c) value or potential future income in program library 
354 
being developed, market penetration and permanence for 
one to five years1 (d) this company is highly leveraged, 
and if present liquidity is used, there will be no place 
to go except lender financial losses with no valuable 
assets to liquidate." 
10. "The company is unable to generate operating 
prof it. Cash flow is inadequate. Speculation is com-
pany having to discount below costs to meet competition." 
11. " (a) Downward trend in savings: (b) no clear 
source of repayment 1 (c) no evident secondary source of 
repayment: (d) a $6 million revolver is already in 
place." 
12. "There is a question as to the qual i ty of 
recei vables. An ag ing schedule would be helpful. The 
line of business makes the company a high risk venture." 
13. "The company is insolvent based on the times 
interest earned ratio. It is also highly leveraged. 
Decl ining prof i tabil i ty and insuf f ic ient cash flow add 
to this credi t risk. The company also has future debt 
obligations that would further deter their abili ty to 
service their debt." 
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14. "Ca) Volatile industry; Cb) weak operating 
earnings; (c) excessive fixed asset expansion for a com-
pany that does not have excess cash to allocate to fixed 
assets and the nature of which does not require 
ownership of land and buildings. The company can 
operate from leased facilities; (d) the company incurred 
operating losses that will be compounded by the interest 
expense on the additional debt; Ce) evidence of unsound 
judgment on the part of management." 
15. "Ca) Existing $6 million line of credit, (b) 
deteriorating profits; (c) receivables collection." 
16. "Account receivable turnover is slow (over 100 
days). With an operating loss experienced in 1982, the 
company could be running into a si tuation of evergreen 
credit." 
It is difficult to summarize or contrast these quotes 
with any degree of precision. However, the answers very 
roughly and imprecisely can be seen to fall into one of two 
categories, namely, those which seem to focus on or derive 
from specific consideration of the impact upon the firm of 
either being in the software business or materially engaged 
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in R&D type expenditures which imply significent outlays 
·with uncertain returns ("specific" responses) and those 
which seem to derive from a banker's general review of more 
obviously traditional signals derived from the financial 
statements, such as capital structure, the quality of 
receivables, etc. ("general" responses). The "specific" 
responses themselves seem to be more sharply focused on 
either the overall business risk posture of the firm (the 
nature of the assets, the possibility of expense recovery) 
or on the quality of the earnings (interest cover, capital 
redemption and so on). Some responses seem to fall into 
more than one of these categories and some of the responses 
are flatly, mutually contradictory. (Vide response No. 3 
and response No. 5 in the answers to the Edwards 
application). Nevertheless, by placing responses into more 
than one category where necessary, the responses might be 
analyzed as follows: 
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TABLE 9.2 
Summary of Responses To 
Question No. 2 
Campbell 
Respondents 
Answers Addressed To 
Specific General 
Capital Quality of 
Risk Earnings Structure Receivables General 
2 3 1 1 2 
3 4 
4 
Edwards 
Respondents 
Answers Addressed To 
Specific General 
Capital Quality of 
Risk Earnings Structure Receivables General 
4 1 2 4 1 
7 3 11 12 5 
9 6 13 15 6 
12 7 15 16 8 
13 8 
14 9 
10 
13 
14 
15 
Notes: (a) "specific" = "comments appearing to derive from speci-
f ic notice of impact of being in software business. " 
(b) Responses may be analyzed under more than one 
heading. 
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The most obvious impression is the impact that is caused 
by the reduction in the quality of earnings when software 
costs are expensed. Too much should not be made of this, 
however, because the discussion of responses to the similar 
question of Questionnaire No. 2 will particularly note the 
recognition accorded by bank lending officers to the more 
"conservative" orientation of accounting processes at 
Edwards. The "specific" responses of Campbell relate more 
to the doubts of lending officers about the overall risk 
posture of the company. The second material impression must 
be the number of "general" queries raised in reaction to the 
Edwards statements. It seems a not unreasonable speculation 
that this general concern of the Edwards financial condition 
was triggered by the apparently poor quality of earnings. 
The overall impression is that the Edwards respondents were 
more widely concerned about the financial condition of 
"their" company than were the Campbell respondents, and this 
was borne out in Questionnaire No. 2 by respondents with 
access to both companies. 
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Question Three: What rate of interest would you charge 
(For an unsecured line of credit*) 
TABLE 9.3 
Question Three Summary 
CamEbell CorEoration Edwards CorEoration 
Number of Number of 
ResEonses Rate ResEonses Rate 
5 0 16 0 
1 11.00 1 11.00 
1 11.25 4 12.00 
1 11.58 1 12.63 
2 12.00 1 12.75 
1 12.22 1 12.78 
1 12.50 1 13.16 
1 12.78 4 13.33 
1 13.00 1 15.00 
1 13.06 
1 13.16 
2 13.33 
1 13.53 
1 13.75 
Totals 20 30 
-- --
*The interest rate given was adjusted to take into 
account any compensating balance that would be required. 
The prime rate was 11 percent at the time the questionnaire 
was mailed, and the rate did not change until after all 
responses had been received. 
Mean 
Median 
Mode 
Standard 
Statistics - Excluding Zero Values 
Deviation 
CamEbe11 
12.57 
12.78 
12.00 and 13.33 12.00 
0.85 
(S.D. ) 
Coefficient of Variance (Mean) 0.068 
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Edwards 
12.76 
12.76 
and 13.33 
0.96 
0.075 
The difference in sample means is not significant at the 
20 percent level. 
Table 9.3 summarizes the response to this question. 
Interest rates have been adjusted to take compensating 
balances into account. There was not a significant dif-
ference (at the 20 percent level) between the rate charged 
Campbell and that charged to Edwards. This finding concurs 
with that found in the Jain study.2 (However, see Chapter 
10. ) 
Question Four: What additional terms would you impose? 
The response to this question varied widely, but 
included in the following items: 
1. compensating balance ranging from 5-15 per-
cent, and/or a commitment fee ranging from 1/8 percent 
of 1/2 percent. 
2. credi t 1 ine granted up to 60-75 percent of 
accounts receivable~ receive account receivable aging 
schedule monthly. 
3. loan secured by inventory or other assets ~ 
security agreement on property, equipment and/or receiv-
ables. 
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4. quarterly financial data; 90 day review. 
5. convert line to term loan with 3-5 year payout. 
6. annual cleanup with zero balance for 30-60 
days. 
7. restrictions on capital expenditures, lease 
obligations, working capital, dividends, additional 
debt, bonuses, officers' salaries, changes in ownership. 
8. require owner guarantee, approval of subordi-
nated debt holders, key insurance. 
In is virtually impossible to summarize meaningfully 
such a wide range of responses. There is no impression of 
any strength that the additional terms imposed upon Edwards 
would be more than those 'imposed upon Campbell. The infor-
mation content to this question can be categorized as little 
more than "interesting supplementary detail." 
Question Five: If, instead of a line of credit, the 
company had applied for a $2,000,000, five year loan, would 
your bank grant the loan? 
Table 9.4 summarizes the responses to this question. 
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TABLE 9.4 
Question Five Summary 
Cam,Ebell Cor,Eoration Edwards Cor,Eoration 
Number of Number of 
Responses Percentage Responses Percentage 
Yes 10 50% 9 30% 
No 10 50% 21 70% 
Totals 20 30 
The difference is significant at the 20 percent level 
(see appendix), which leads us to conclude that bankers 
would be more willing to grant a loan to Campbell than to 
Edwards. 
Question Six: Do you consider this loan to be extremely 
risky, risky, marginal, safe or extremely safe? 
TABLE 9.5A 
Question Six Summary 
CamEbell CorEoration Edwards CorEoration 
Do you consider Number of Number of 
this loan to be: Responses Percentage Responses Percentage 
Extremely risky 2 10% 7 23% 
Risky 4 20 12 40 
Marginal 5 25 9 30 
Safe 9 45 2 7 
Extremely safe 0 0 0 0 
Totals 20 30 
A further analysis and discussion of this question 
appears below. 
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TABLE 9.5B 
Question Six'Summary 
Campbell Edwards 
Cor:eoration Cor:eoration 
Number of Number of 
Points Responses Points Responses Points 
Extremely risky 5 2 10 7 35 
Risky 4 4 16 12 48 
Marginal 3 5 15 9 27 
Safe 2 9 18 2 4 
Extremely safe 1 0 0 0 0 
20 59 30 114 
-- --
Weighted Average 2.95 3.80 
Marginal Risky 
Median Marginal Risky 
Mode Safe Risky 
Standard Deviation 1.05 0.89 
Coefficient of Variance 0.36 0.23 
Table 9.5 shows that bankers tneded to view a loan to 
Edwards as more risky than one to Campbell. The difference 
is significant at the 1 percent level. 
The responses to the similar question in Questionnaire 
No.2 (Chapter 10) gave very closely similar results, a 
moderately comforting result in view of the arbitrary 
assignment of the points weighting to each classification. 
A number of other weighting schemes were tested, but all 
gave much the same sort of result. 
Question Seven: If your bank would not approve this 
term loan, please indicate why the application would be 
denied. 
The responses to this question were similar to those 
given for Question Two. 
Question Eight: What rate of interest would you charge 
for the term loan?* 
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TABLE 9.6 
Question Eight Summary 
CamEbe11 CorEoration Edwards CorEoration 
Number of Number of 
ResEonses Percentage ResEonses Percentage 
10 0 21 0 
1 11.75 2 12.00 
2 12.11 1 12.50 
3 13.33 2 13.33 
1 13.50 1 13.68 
1 13.61 1 13.89 
1 13.89 2 15.29 
1 14.69 
Totals 20 30 
*The interest rate given was adjusted to take into account any 
compensating balance that would be required. The prime rate 
was 11 percent at the time the questionnaire was mailed, and 
the rate did not change until after all responses had been 
received. 
Statistics -Excluding zero values 
CamEbe11 Edwards 
Mean 13.16 13.47 
Median 13.33 13.33 
Mode 13.33 12 and 13.33 
and 15.29 
Standard Deviation 0.91 1.23 
(S.D. ) 
Coefficient of Variance (Mean) 0.07 0.09 
Not significant at the 20% level. 
Table 9.6 summarizes the respon~es to this question. 
The average interest rate charged to Campbell is 13.165 per-
cent, compared to 13.473 percent for Edwards. Although the 
rate charged Edwards is somewhat higher than that charged 
Campbell, the difference is not significant at the 20 per-
cent level. 3 
Question Nine: What compensating balance would be 
required? 
Of the ten banks that would grant a term loan to Campbell, 
eight would require a compensating balance, ranging from 5 to 20 
percent and averaging 9.7 percent. Of the nine banks that would 
lend to Edwards, six would require a compensating balance, 
ranging from 5 to 15 percent and averaging 10.6 percent. 
There is an impression of a more onerous demand on 
Edwards, but the difference is not very significant. 
Question Ten: What restrictions on working capital 
would be imposed? 
Of the ten bankers that would lend to Campbell, three 
would require a minimum of $10 million in working capital 
and one would require $5 million. One bank would require 
that the current level ($10,614,400) be maintained. Others 
would require a current ratio of 1.5:1 to 2.1:1 or a working 
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capital/asset ratio of 18 percent or a working 
capital/revenue ratio of 35 percent. One bank would place 
no restrictions on working capital. Responses for the 
Edwards Corporation were similar. Tables 9.7 and 9.8 pro-
vide a more detailed breakdown of the responses for both 
companies. 
Question Eleven: How much additional debt would the 
company be permitted to incur? 
Five of the ten Campbell responses would not allow addi-
tional long-term debt without bank approval. Two banks 
would allow an additional $1 million; one bank would allow 
an additional $5 million. Two banks would require a 
debt/worth ratio of 2.0:1. 
Of the nine Edwards responses, six would not permit 
additional debt. One bank would not place a restriction on 
additional debt. Another would allow $2.5 million for each 
of the next five years. One would require a 3.0:1 
debt/worth ratio. 
Question Twelve: What is the maximum annual dividend 
that could be paid? 
Four of the ten Campbell responses would not permit any 
dividends. One bank would impose no restrictions on divi-
dends. Other respondents would allow dividends ranging from 
10 to 50 percent of net income or cash flow. 
Four of the nine Edwards responses would not permit 
dividends. Two others would permit dividends up to 25 per-
cent of earnings. One would require a debt/worth ratio of 
2.5:1. 
Question Thirteen: What additional terms would you 
impose? 
Most bankers would impose additional terms for both 
Campbell and Edwards. The additional terms are summarized in 
Tables 9.7 and 9.8. 
Again it is difficult to arrive at any summary index of 
"restrictions' for comparison between the two companies. 
The material does not even lend itself to the rough and 
ready analysis model of question No.2. The general 
impressions are that: 
a. The working capital constraints placed on Edwards 
are marginally tighter. 
b. The constraints placed on raising additional debt 
are marginally easier for Campbell. 
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c. There is little, if any, difference between the 
constraints imposed upon dividend payment by the two 
companies. 
d. The terms of anyone of the additional restrictions 
placed upon Edwards are not more onerous than those 
of the same sort of restriction placed upon 
Campbell; but there is a wide range of other re-
strictions placed upon Edwards. 
So that overall, the impression is of a slightly more 
constrained set of conditions placed upon' a loan to Edwards, 
but not very significantly more. This may be contrasted 
with the responses to the more generalized form of this 
question in Questionnaire No.2 (Chapter 10), where the more 
restrictive environment of a loan to Edwards is much more 
clearly emphasized. 
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Bank 
No. 
1 
2 
4 
s 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Question 10 
Working Capital 
$5 mi llion 
iii ni IIUII 
$10 lllillion 
iii nilllum 
$10 million 
minimum 
Not to go below 
current levels 
($10.6M) 
Working capital 
aa a percentage 
of assets should 
be l18intained at 
18,. 
Current ratio 
1.5:1, working 
capital )5~ 
of revenues 
$10 IIi 1110n 
lllinimum 
Maintain current 
ratio (2.2:1) 
No reatriction 
Hini_um current 
ratio 2.0:1 
Tabla 9.7 
Banks Approving a TerM loan for 
Campbell Corporation 
Summary of Restrictions 
Question 11 
Addi ti onal Debt 
$5 mi llion 
No long term debt 
of IIOre than $I 
million without 
bank approval 
None without 
permi sSion, 
including addi-
tional leases 
None without 
bank approval 
Debt to worth 
ratio should not 
exceed 2.0 in 
1983, 1.8 in 
1984, 1.7 in 1985 
and should con-
tinue to i~rove 
over the 5 year 
period 
Debt to worth not 
to exceed 2.0:1, 
no addi tional 
long-term debt 
without approval 
Up to $1 lIIi Ilion 
IIIOre, depending 
on use and need 
None 
Depends on purpose 
and ratio trends 
None 
Question 12 
Maximum Annual Dividend 
None 
No response 
None without permission 
None without bank 
approval 
10,. of net profit after 
taxes 
10,. of net cash flow 
from operations after 
long-term debt service 
None 
30: net after tax 
No restrictions 
SO~ of net income 
J?2 
Question 13 
Additional Terms 
Term loan agreement with 
uBual covenants. 
Liability to stockholders 
equity ratio not more 
than 1.B:l; No capital 
expe~ditures in excess 
of $1 lIillion or pur-
chase of treasury stock 
without bank approval. 
Negative pledge on 
asaets, no change in 
management, limit capi-
tal expenditures and 
lease commitments. 
Net worth and liquidity 
teats. 
Secured by fixed assets. 
No net increase to fixed 
assets; courseware 
construction costs net 
balance maintained at 
4S~ (or less) of annual 
dollar aales rate; Quar-
terly financials. 
No dividends or outside 
debt financing without 
prior approval. Not to 
be used for working 
capital. 
None slated. 
Should be secured, 
~aranty of 20,. 
stockholders, loan 
agreement, key Insurance 
if necessary. 
None stated. 
Bank 
~ 
1 
2 
3 
Ouestion 10 
Working Capital 
Required quick 
ratio 1.7S:1, 
current ratio 
2.00:1 
Minimum current 
ratio of 2:1 and 
working capital 
minimum $10 
IIlillion 
1.2 current 
ratio, S8 million 
rn.i nimum 
$7 IIIi 1110n 
ali n1 IIIUII 
Table 9.8 
Banks Approving a Term Loan for 
Edwards Corporation 
Summary of Restrictions 
!i.Jestion 11 
Addi ti onal Debt 
None 
None wi thout 
approval 
None 
No other senior 
debtor capital 
leases wi thout 
prior bank 
approval 
Ouestion 12 
Maximum Annual Dividend 
None 
None 
One year after 
profitable operations, 
25: of after-tax 
earnings 
None, without prior 
bank approval 
373 
!i.Jestion 13 
Additional Terms 
Security agreements on 
property and equipment, 
accounts receivable; $2 
million guarantee of 
payment. 
Profitability wi thin a 
predetermined tillle 
frame, actual perfor-
mance tracking closely 
to projected, 1118x.illum 
leverage, negative 
pledge on assets, no 
other debt, dividends, 
no treasury stock 
purchases, no asset 
dispositions or mergers 
or acquisition unless 
prior approval given. 
Limit capital expen-
ditures; leverage cove-
nants-step up over 
courae of loan; earnings 
recapture. 
Net worth floor of $11 
million; no capital 
expenditures above a 
certain amount without 
approval; security, 
possibly, if no good 
evidence of turnaround. 
Bank 
~ 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Question 10 
Working Capital 
Haintain 1.75:1 
current ratio 
$7 mi 11ion 
minimum 
1.75:1 current 
ratio 
$5 mi 11ion 
minimum 
Secured by fixed 
assets with an 
BO~ advance 
1. 75: 1 current 
ratio 
$7.5 million 
minimum 
T~le 9.8 
-Banks Approving a Term Loan for 
Edwards Corporation 
Summary of Restrictions 
Question 11 
Addi tional Debt 
None without 
bank approval 
No restriction 
stated 
$2.5 mi lli on each 
year for next 5 
yeara 
ItJst mai ntain 
debt/worth ratio 
of 3.00:1 
No addi tional 
debt without 
bank approval 
other than normal 
trade payables 
Queation 12 
Maximum Annual Dividend 
Dependent on earnings 
and cash now 
No restriction stated 
25: of earnings 
Allowed if debt/worth 
ratio remains 2.5:1 
or below 
None 
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Question 13 
Additional Terms 
No borrowings from other 
aources, no pledging of 
any assets, minimum 
working capital ratio, 
maximum debt/worth 
ratio, Quarterly finan-
cial statements. 
At the end of 2 years, 
if the company has not 
returned to profitable 
operations, the bank 
would reserve the right 
to restructure debt 
repayment. 
Maximum debt/worth fatio 
of 2.00:1. 
None stated. 
Security agreements on 
accounts receivables, 
all machinery, equip-
ment, furniture, fix-
tures, 2nd lien on all 
previously encumbered 
fixed asaets; restric-
tive covenant a on capi-
t.al account.s. 
Question Fourteen: The bank's total assets are: 
More than $5 billion 
$5 billion or less 
Campbell 
5 
15 
20 
Edwards 
4 
26 
30 
A correlation between bank size and other questionnaire 
responses was not made due to the small sample size. 4 
Question Fifteen: The person completing this guestion-
naire has had years experience in a loan department. 
Campbell Edwards 
Two or less 9 9 
More than two, less 
than five 0 3 
Five to ten 8 11 
More than ten 2 6 
No response 1 1 
20 30 
A correlation between years of loan experience and other 
questionnaire responses was not made due to the small sample 
size. 5 
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Question Sixteen: The person completing this question-
naire is a(n): 
Cam[2bell Edwards 
Senior or executive vice 
president or other 
senior officer 0 4 
Vice president, secretary 
or treasurer 5 11 
Assistant vice president 
or other assistant 
officer 12 13 
Not an officer 3 2 
20 30 
A correlation between title and other questionnaire 
responses was not made due to the small sample size. 6 
Question Seventeen: The office where this questionnaire 
is being completed is located in the: 
Cam[2bell Edwards 
Northeast 1 8 
South 10 9 
North Central 6 8 
West 2 4 
No response 1 1 
20 30 
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A correlation between geographic location and other 
questionnaire responses was not made due to the small sample 
size. 7 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Companies that do not capitalize software costs find it 
more difficult to raise debt capital than companies that do 
capitalize such costs. This fact was brought to the 
author's attention during the course of the interviews with 
executives from software vending companies, and was rein-
forced by the responses received on the software vendor 
questionnaire, which revealed that a substantial proportion 
of software vendor company executives feel that not capita-
lizing software costs hinders their ability to raise debt 
capital. Furthermore, the response to question six of the 
banker questionnaire (Campbell/Edwards) indicated that bank 
lending officers view a loan to a company that expenses 
software costs as significantly more risky than a loan to a 
company that capitalizes software costs. 
Although not significant at the 20 percent level, some 
of the responses to the other questions in the banker 
questionnaire lead in the same direction. Seventeen of 
thirty (57%) lending officers would not grant a line of cre-
dit to Edwards, compared to five out of twenty (25%) for 
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Campbell. Question two revealed that one of the main reasons 
for the hesitancy to lend was the weak operating performance 
of Edwards, which several banks mentioned as a reason for 
not lending to Edwards, while none of the bankers that 
received the Campbell questionnaire gave poor operating per-
formance as a reason for not granting a line of credit to 
Campbell. Due the company's software accounting policy, 
Campbell showed 1982 net income of $2,552,107, compared with 
a 1982 loss of $2,103,000 for Edwards. 
For those banks that would lend to Campbell or Edwards, 
the rate of interest charged, although not significant at 
the 20 percent level, is higher for Edwards than for 
Campbell. 
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Campbell Edwards 
Q-3 Interest rate charged 
for a line of credit 12.566% 12.760% 
Q-8 Interest rate charged 
for a term loan 13.165 13.473 
When asked whether the bank would grant a $2 million term 
loan, half of the Campbell bankers responded that they would, 
compared to 30 percent for Edwards. 
The interviews and questionnaire responses point to one con-
clusion: a company that capitalizes software costs will find it 
easier to raise debt capital than will a company that expenses 
these costs. 
The response$to Question No. 5 confirm this view, as do 
the responses to some of the other questions in this 
questionnaire. Furthermore, fewer restrictions will be 
placed on a company that capitalizes software than on one 
that expenses software costs. Perhaps a higher interest 
rate would be charged to a company that expenses software 
costs, but this view was not proved conclusively in this 
chapter (but see Chapter 10 for a different result). 
See Chapter 10, where similar questions were asked to a 
different group of bankers, using a different approach. 
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FOOTNOTES 
lA similar methodology was employed by A. A. El-Arabi, 
"The Effects of Accounting Alternatives on Lending Decisions 
of Commercial Bankers. n Ph.D. dissertation, the Louisiana 
State Uni versi ty and Agr icul tural and Mechanical College, 
1977.. Also see Mostafa M. El-Maksy, "A Theoretical and 
Empirical Investigation of the Effects of FASB Statement 
No. 33 on Lending Decisions." Ph.D. dissertation, City 
University of New York, 1983, where a slightly different 
methodology was employed. Also see A. Rashad Abdel-Khal ik, 
The Economic Effects on Lessees of FASB Statement No. 13, 
Accounting For Leases (Stamford: FASB, 1981). 
2Jain, op. cit., p. 271. Jain also found no difference 
between groups for compensating balances, minimum working 
capital, maximum additional debt, maximum dividends or maxi-
mum officers salaries. 
3Ibid. 
4The Ei-Arabi study found that bank size was not a signi-
ficant factor in the lending decision. 
5The EI-Maksy and EI-Arabi studies found that experience 
is not a significant factor in the loan decision-making pro-
cess. 
6The EI-Arabi study found that rank was a signif icant 
factor in the lending decision. However, EI-Maksy found 
that sex and membership in a banking association were not 
significant factors. 
7The El-Arabi and EI-Maksy studies both found that the 
bank's geographic location is not a signif icant factor in 
the lending decision. EI-Maksy also found that the amount 
of time spent responding to the questionnaire was not 
significant. 
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CHAPTER 9 
APPENDIX 
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Note: The principal statistical test employed is the student-t 
test. However, a weakness of this test is that it assumes a normal 
distribution (it is a parametric test). As a precautionary measure, I 
decided to use a nonparametric test (Mann-Whitney) as well, just in 
case the distribution is not normal. (The EI-Maksy study also used the 
student-t and Mann-Whitney tests) 
parametrjc Testing(Assumes a Norma) Distribution) 
The student-t distribution may be used to test the significance 
of differences in sample means for small samples. The formula is as 
follows(Freund & Wi 11 iams, Modern Busjness Statistics, 
Prentice-Hall, p. 240): 
t = 
x + 
n1 
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Where x, and x2 and the means, n, and n2 are the sample sizes and 5, 
and 52 are the standard deviations. 
TABLE 9...1.A How large a line of credit would you grant? 
Using the student-t test with the data in Table 9.1 A, we can 
determine whether the difference in sample mean is significant. This 
table summarizes responses to the question: "How large a I ine of 
credit would your bank be willing to grant?" Where the response given 
was a range, the interval mid-point was chosen. For example, the 
$3-6 million range in the Edwards response has been taken as $4.5 
million. 
Campbell Edwards 
XI = 2.794 x2 OK 2.417 
n = 20 1 n = 30 2 
51 • 2.509 52· 3.345 
Degrees of freedom = nl + n2 - 2 = 20 + 30 - 2 = 48 
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2.794 - 2.417 t- ____________________________ __ 
( 19)(2.509)2 + (29)(3.345)2 ~ 
-----2-0--+ -3-0----2--- y 20 + 30 
• 0.43 
Conclusion: Since the t-score is less than 1.960, the difference is 
not significant at the 5 percent level. The difference is not 
significant at the 20 percent level either, as the t-score is not 
greater than 1.282. 
Nonparametrjc Testjng (Does Not Assume a Normal 
Distribution) 
The Mann-Whitney test is a nonparametric test that can be used to 
determine whether two underlying populations are centered 
differently. (Thomas H. and Ronald J. Wonnacott, Introductory 
Statistics for Business and EconomiCS, 2nd ed., Wiley/Hamilton. 
1977, p. 481; Charles T. Clark and Lawrence L. Schkade, Statistical 
384 
Methods for Busjness Decisions, South-Western Publlshing Company, 
1969, p. 445). 
Arranging the Table 9.1A data in rank order results in the following: 
Table 9.9 
Mann-Whi tney Test Applied to Table 9.1 A 
Rank Ass i gned 
Array of to 
Sample Values Company BanK Values of Mix C 
0 C 11.5 11.5 
0 C 11.5 11.5 
0 C 11.5 11.5 
0 C 11.5 11.5 
0 C 11.5 11.5 
0 E 11.5 
0 E 11.5 
0 E 11.5 
0 E 11.5 
0 E 11.5 
0 E 11.5 
0 E 11.5 
0 E 11.5 
0 E 11.5 
0 E 11.5 
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Rank Assigned 
Array of to 
Sample Values Company Rank Values of Mix C 
0 E 11.5 
0 E 11.5 
0 E 11.5 
0 E 11.5 
0 E 11.5 
0 E 11.5 
0 E 11.5 
0.875M C 23.0 23.0 
1. OM C 24.5 25.5 
loOM E 24.5 
1.5M C 26.0 26.0 
2.0M C 27.5 27.5 
2.0M C 27.5 27.5 
3.0M C 30.0 30.0 
3.0M C 30.0 30.0 
3.0M C 30.0 30.0 
3.5M C 32.0 32.0 
4. OM E 33.0 
4.5M C 35.0 35.0 
4.5M E 35.0 
4.5M E 35.0 
5.0M C 40.5 40.5 
S.OM C 40.5 40.5 
5.0M E 40.5 
5.OM E 40.5 
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Rank. Ass i gned 
Array of to 
Sample values Compaoy Bank Values of Mjx C 
S.OM E 40.5 
S.OM E 40.5 
5.0M E 40.5 
S.OM E 40.5 
6.0M E 45.0 
7.0M C 46.5 46.5 
7.0M C 46.5 46.5 
7.5M C 48.0 48.0 
10.OM E 49.0 
12.5M E 50.0 
R = 1 565.0 
0 , = Campbe)) sample size = 20 
02 = Edwards sample size = 30 
R, = total of the raoks assigoed to Campbell 
H,(oull hypothesis): Uc • UE 
0 , (°2 + 1) 
U • 0,02 + - R, 
2 
20(30 + 1 ) 
= (20)(30) + - 565.1 
2 
= 345 
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n,n2 (20)(30) 
x(U) = __ = 
5 -u 
2 2 
= 300 
(20)(30)(20 + 30 + 1) 
= 
20 
= 39.1 
U - x(U) 345 - 300 
Z= ___ = ___ _ 
= 1.15 
Su 39.1 
Conclus1on: 51nce Z = 1.15, H,lS rejected at the 75 percent 
level( 1.15 S.DJ In other words, there is a 75 percent chance that 
Campbell and Edwards have different sample means. 
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As can be readily seen from Table 9.9, the data is very 
"unbalanced", both samples exhibiting long "tails". We can expect the 
means to be poor estimators. A rough test of their efficiency is the 
"coefficient of variation" (standard deviation/mean) where a high 
value might (not will) imply that the mean is not an efficient 
estimator. The efficiency of the mean in such case may be improved 
by a systematic removal of outliers (extreme values of the sample 
data) though at a price of losing data which might have information 
content (e.g. it may be dangerous to remove out I ier data in financial 
distress prediction studies because maybe extreme values of some 
variables are signals of approaching distress). In the present case it 
simply is not known whether extreme values have information 
content. Living with the risk of that is the price that must be paid for 
improvement of the data distribution. It indicates that results will 
have to be evaluated with extra caution. 
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Using the full di~tribution (Table 9.1A) gives: 
Number of observat IOns 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Coefficient of varianre(SO/Mean) 
Campbell 
20 
$2.79M 
$2.S1M 
0.90 
Edwards 
30 
$2.42M 
$3.34M 
1.38 
with the standar<l deviations calculated on (n - 1) observations to 
correct for small s.lmple size. The coefficient of variation of the 
Edwards samp le is too high for comfort. 
The Best Easy Sy~;tematic (BES) estimator adjustment (Wonnacott, 
p. 193) is applied to the sample data to eliminate the effects of 
outliers. In a sample with an even number of observations, the 
estimator is computt'd as the average of the four observations which 
fall: (1) at the (nl 4H h point in the distribution, rounding upwards if 
necessary; (2) at tht' (n/2)th pOint; (3) at the [(n/2) + 1 ]th pOint; and 
(4) at the [(3n/4) + 11th pOint, rounding down if necessary. 
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For a distribution of 20 observations we therefore use the 5th, 
10th, 11th and 16th observations. For Campbell, we have: 
BES-1/4(0+2+3+5) -2.5 
For a distribution of 30 observations we use the 8th, 15th, 16th 
and 23rd observations. For the Edwards sample, we have: 
BE 5 - 1 /4(0 + 0 + 0 + 5) '"' 1. 25 
Computation of the standard deviation around the BES estimator is 
not well-defined theoretically. The options appear to be either to use 
the four observations upon which the estimator is based (which is 
consistent, but ignores a great deal of potential information content); 
or to use all the observations within the range of observations 
spanned by the BES computation, namely, the 5th to 16th inclusive, or 
12 observations for Campbell, and the 8th to 23rd inclusive, or 16 
observations for Edwards (which makes better use of the available 
data but is less consistent with an estimator based on only 4 
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observations). Given our ignorance about the underlying populations 
of lending officer reactions. we will try both approaches and consider 
the results carefully. 
Using the BES estimator gives: 
CamCbell Edwards 
Number of observat ions: 
For average 4 4 
In range 12 16 
BES estimator 2.5M 1.25M 
Standard deviation around BES: 
On mean observations 2.08 2.50 
On average observat ions 1.50 2.24 
Coefficient of variance on BES: 
On average observations 0.83 1.67 
On range observat ions 0.67 1.49 
The standard deviations are calculated on (n - 1) observations. The 
coefficients of variance are improved for Campbell but not greatly so 
for Edwards. We can expect inconclusive results whichever estimator, 
mean or BES. is used. 
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Table 9.1 B How large aline of credit would you charge? 
Student-tCparametric) .te.s.t 
Applying the student-t test to the data in Table 9.1 B, we get the 
following: 
Campbell Edwards 
x, = 3.725 x2 = 5.577 
n = 15 1 n = 13 2 
51 = 2.399 52 = 4.331 
Degrees of freedom = n, + n2 - 2 = 15 + 13 - 2 = 26 
3.725 - 5.577 t- ______________________________ _ 
J (14)(2.399)2 + (12)(4.331 )2 x 15 + 13 - 2 
- - 1.426 
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+ 
15 13 
Conclusion: Since the t-score is greater than 1.315, the 
difference 15 significant at the 20 percent level. 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Applying the Mann-Whitney(nonparametric) test to the data in 
Table 9.1 B results in the following: 
Table 9.10 
Mann-Whitney Test Applied to Table 9.1 B 
Rank Ass i gned 
Array of to 
Sarncle Y:al!Je~ CQrnCaD~ Rank Y:a]!Je~ Qf tli~ C 
.875M C 1 1 
1. OM C 2.5 2.5 
1. OM E 2.5 
I.5M C 4 4 
2.0M C 5.5 5.5 
2.OM C 5.5 5.5 
3.OM C 8 8 
3.0M C 8 8 
3.OM C 8 8 
3.5M C 10 10 
4. OM E 1 I 
4.5M C 13 13 
4.5M E 13 
4.5M E 13 
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Rank Assigned 
Array of to 
Sample Values Company Rank Values of Mix C 
5.0M C 18.5 18.5 
5.0M C 18.1 18.5 
5.0M E 18.5 
5.0M E 18.5 
5.0M E 18.5 
5.0M E 18.5 
5.0M E 18.5 
5.0M E 18.5 
6.0M E 23 
7.0M C 24.5 24.5 
7.0M C 24.5 24.5 
7.5M C 26 26 
10.0M E 27 
12.5M E 28 
R '" 1 177.5 
n, = Campbell sample size = 15 
n2 - Edwards sample size'" 13 
R, = total of the ranks assigned to Campbell = 177.5 
H,(null hypothesis): Uc • UE 
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2 
.. 117.5 
- R 1 
x(U) = __ = ___ = 97.5 
2 2 
S - :: U 
n1 15 
= 19.4 
U - x(U) 117.5 - 97.5 
zs __ _ 
.. 1.03 
19.4 
Conclusion: Since Z .. 1.03, H, is rejected at the 69.7 percent 
level( 1.03 SO). In other words there is nearly a 7 out of 10 chance 
that the Campbe 11 and Edwards means are not the same. 
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The BES test was not performed on this data because of its 
unre I iabi I ity. 
Table 9..l What rate of interest would you charge? 
Camcbell Edwards 
x, =12.57 x2 = 12.76 
n = 15 1 n = 14 2 
S, = 0.85 S2 = 0.96 
Degrees of freedom = n, + n2 - 2 = 15 + 14 - 2 = 27 
12.57 - 12.76 t- __________________________ __ 
(14)(0.85)2 + (13)(0.96)2 
+ 
15 + 14 - 2 15 14 
• 0.56 
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Conclusion: Since the t-score is not greater than 1.314, the 
difference is not significant at the 20 percent level. 
Mann-Wh j tney(nooDaram e trj c) .t.e..s..t 
Applying the Mann-Whitney test to the data in Table 9.3, after 
eliminating "0" values, results in the following: 
Table 9.11 
Mann-Whitney Test Applied to Table 9.3 
Array of 
Samo]e ~a]ues CQmoaD~ 
11.00 C 
11.00 E 
11.25 C 
11.58 C 
12.00 C 
12.00 C 
12.00 E 
12.00 E 
12.00 E 
12.00 E 
12.22 C 
12.50 C 
Bank 
1.5 
1.5 
3 
4 
7.5 
7.5 
7.5 
7.5 
7.5 
7.5 
1 1 
12 
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Rank Assigned 
to 
Values of Mjx C 
1.5 
3 
4 
7.5 
7.5 
11 
12 
Rank Assigned 
Array of to 
Sample Values CQmpan~ Bank Values Qf Mix C 
12.63 E 13 
12.75 E 14 
12.78 C 15.5 15.5 
12.78 E 15.5 
13.00 C 17 17 
13.06 C 18 18 
13.16 C 19.5 19.5 
13.16 E 19.5 
13.33 C 23.5 23.5 
13.33 C 23.5 23.5 
13.33 E 23.5 
13.33 E 23.5 
13.33 E 23.5 
13.33 E 23.5 
13.53 C 27 27 
13.75 E 28 
15.00 E 29 
R = 1 190.5 
n1 = Campbell sample size = 15 
n2 = Edwards sample size = 14 
Rl = total of the ranks assigned to Campbell = 190.5 
H1(null hypothesis); Uc = UE 
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2 
- 132 
n t n2 ( 1 5)( 1 4) 
x(U) = __ = __ _ 
2 2 
5 -u 
- 20.49 
nt 
- R t 
= 105 
U - x(U) 132 - 105 
z .. __ _ .. 
20.49 
(15)(14)(15+ 14+ 1) 
-
15 
.. 1.32 
Conclusion: Since Z • 1.32. H, is rejected at the 81.3 percent level 
(1.32 So). In other words, there 15 a better than 80 percent chance 
that the Campbe 11 and Edwards means are not the same. 
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Table 9..!t Would your bank grant a loan? 
Assigning a value of "1" for a "yes" response and "0" for a "no" 
response J the means for Campbell and Edwards are 0.5 and 0.3 J 
respect ive ly. 
Campbell Edwards 
x, = 0.5 x2 ... 0.3 
n = 20 1 n = 30 2 
S, .. 0.51 S2 .. 0.47 
Degrees of freedom = n, + n2 - 2 = 20 + 30 - 2 = 48 
401 
t-test 
0.5 - 0.3 t= _____________________________ __ 
( 19)(0.51 )2 + (29)(0.47)2 
+ 
20 + 30 - 2 20 30 
• 1.429 
ConclUSlon: Since the t-score is greater than 1.282, the difference 
is significant at the 20 percent level. 
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Mann-Whjtney(nonparametrjc) 1.e.s1 
Applying the Mann-Whitney test to the data In Table 9.4 results in the 
following: 
Table 9.12 
Mann-Whitney Test Applied to Table 9.4 
Rank Assigned 
Array of to 
Sample Values Company Rank Values of Mjx C 
0 C 16 16 
0 C 16 16 
0 C 16 16 
0 C 16 16 
0 C 16 16 
0 C 16 16 
0 C 16 16 
0 C 16 16 
0 C 16 16 
0 C 16 16 
0 C 16 16 
0 E 16 
0 E 16 
0 E 16 
0 E 16 
0 E 16 
0 E 16 
0 E 16 
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Rank Assigned 
Array of to 
Sample Values Company Bank values of Mix C 
0 E 16 
0 E 16 
0 E 16 
0 E 16 
0 E 16 
0 E 16 
0 E 16 
0 E 16 
0 E 16 
0 E 16 
0 E 16 
0 E 16 
0 E 16 
0 E 16 
1 C 41 41 
1 C 41 41 
1 C 41 41 
C 41 41 
C 41 41 
C 41 41 
C 41 41 
C 41 41 
C 41 41 
C 41 41 
E 41 
E 41 
E 41 
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Rank Ass i gned 
Array of to 
Sample Values CQmpan~ Rank Values Qf Mjx C 
1 E 41 
1 E 41 
1 E 41 
1 E 41 
1 E 41 
E 41 
R -1 570 
n, = CampbeJJ sample size = 20 
n2 = Edwards sample size = 30 
R, = total of the ranks assigned to Campbell = 570 
U=n , n2 +---- - R 1 
2 
= 340 
x{U) - __ - ____ '" 300 
2 2 
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5 = u 
= 39.12 
U - x(U) 
Z= __ _ 
= 
(20)(30)(20 + 30 + 1) 
= 
n1 20 
340 - 300 
= 1.02 
39.12 
Concluslon: Since Z = 1.02, HI is rejected at the 69 percent level 
(1.02 SD). In other words, there is about a 70 percent chance that the 
Campbell and Edwards means are not equal. 
406 
Table ~ How risky is the loan? 
Campbell Edwards 
X, = 2.95 x2 = 3.80 
n = 20 I n = 30 2 
5, - 1.05 52· 0.89 
Degrees of freedom = n, + n2 - 2 = 20 + 30 - 2 = 48 
t-test 
2.95 - 3.80 t- __________________________ __ 
( 19)( 1.05)2 .., (29)(0.899 
20 .., 30 - 2 
- 3.07 
f11 
'l 20 "'30 
Conclusion: Since the t-score is greater than 2.576, the difference 
is significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Mann-Wh j tney(nonparame trj c) .tes.t 
Applying the Mann-Whitney test to the data in Table 9.56 results 1n 
the following: 
Table 9.13 
Mann-Whitney Test Applted to Table 9.56 
Rank Assigned 
Array of to 
Samele ~alues CQmea[)~ Rank ~alues Qf tli~ C 
2 C 6 6 
2 C 6 6 
2 C 6 6 
2 C 6 6 
2 C 6 6 
2 C 6 6 
2 C 6 6 
2 C 6 6 
2 C 6 6 
2 E 6 
2 E 6 
3 C 18.5 18.5 
3 C 18.5 18.5 
3 C 18.5 18.5 
3 C 18.5 18.5 
3 C 18.5 18.5 
3 E 18.5 
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Rank Assigned 
Array of to 
Samcle ~alues COmcaD¥ Rank ~alues of t1i~ C 
3 E 18.5 
3 E 18.5 
3 E 18.5 
3 E 18.5 
3 E 18.5 
3 E 18.5 
3 E 18.5 
3 E 18.5 
4 C 33.5 33.5 
4 C 33.5 33.5 
4 C 33.5 33.5 
4 C 33.5 33.5 
4 E 33.5 
4 E 33.5 
4 E 33.5 
4 E 33.5 
4 E 33.5 
4 E 33.5 
4 E 33.5 
4 E 33.5 
4 E 33.5 
4 E 33.5 
4 E 33.5 
4 E 33.5 
5 C 46 45 
5 C 45 45 
5 E 46 
5 E 46 
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Rank Assigned 
to Array of 
Sample values 
9 
Company RanK values of Mix C 
t ~ 
5 E 46 
5 E 46 
5 E 46 
5 E 46 
R, - 372.5 
n, = Campbell sample size = 20 
n2 z: Edwards sample size • 30 
R, = total of the ranks assigned to Campbell = 372.5 
U=n , n2 +---- - R 1 
2 
= 537.5 
n, n2 (20)(30) 
x(U) = __ = ___ = 300 
2 2 
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5 = u 
= 39.12 
U - x(U) 
Z= __ _ 
= 
(20)(30)(20 + 30 + 1) 
= 
20 
537.5 - 300 
= 6.07 
39.12 
Conclusion: Since Z = 6.07, H, is rejected at the 99.99 percent level 
(6.07 SD). In other words, it is almost certain that the Campbell and 
Edwards means are not equal. 
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Table ~ What rate of interest would you charge? 
Campbell Edwards 
x, -13.16 x2 • 13.47 
n = 10 1 n = 9 2 
5, = 0.91 52 = 1.23 
Degrees of freedom = n, + n2 - 2 = 10+ 9 - 2 = 17 
t-test 
13.16 - 13.47 t= __________________________ __ 
(9)(0.91)2 + (8)( 1.23)2 Ml 
___ x _+_ 
10 + 9 - 2 10 9 
- 0.63 
Conclusion: 5ince the t-score is not greater than 1.333, the 
difference 1s not significant at the 20 percent level. 
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Mann-Wbjtney(nonparametrjcl 1.e.a1 
Applying the Mann-Whitney test to the data in Table 9.6, after 
excluding "0" responses, results in the following: 
Table 9.14 
Mann-Whitney Test Applled to Table 9.6 
Rank Assigned 
Array of to 
Sample values Company Bank values of Mix C 
11.75 C 1 
12.00 E 2.5 
12.00 E 2.5 
12.11 C 4.5 4.5 
12.11 C 4.5 4.5 
12.50 E 6 
13.33 C 9 9 
13.33 C 9 9 
13.33 C 9 9 
13.33 E 9 
13.33 E 9 
13.50 C 12 12 
13.61 C 13 13 
13.68 E 14 
13.89 C 15.5 15.5 
Rank Assigned 
413 
to Array of 
Sample Values Compa~y Ra.oK Yalues of Mix C 
13.89 
14.69 
15.29 
15.29 
E 15.5 
C 17 
E 18 
E 19 
01 = Campbell sample size = 10 
02 .. Edwards sample size .. 9 
17 
R, - 94.5 
R, = total of the ranks assigned to Campbell = 94.5 
, 
H,(null hypothesis): Uc = UE 
UCO , 0 2 +----
2 
= 45.5 
01 02 ( 10)(9) 
- R 1 
x(U) = __ = ___ =45 
2 2 
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S = u 
= 13.42 
U - x(U) 
Z= __ _ 
= 
= 
n, 
45.5 - 45 
= 0.04 
13.42 
Conclusion: Since Z = 0.04, H, is accepted. 
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( 1 0 )( 9)( I 0 + 9 + 1) 
10 
CHAPTER TEN 
RESULTS OF THE SECOND COMMERCIAL 
LENDING OFFICER SURVEY 
416 
METHODOLOGY 
The sample for this survey consisted of 1,002 commercial 
lending off icers, obtained randomly from a population of 
5,700. The list was purchased from a company that sells 
mailing lists. Five data packets were returned as undeli-
verable. Sixty-seven usable responses were received, for a 
response ratio of 6.7 percent. The material sent to commer-
cial lending officers includedl a cover letter, question-
naire, postpaid return envelope, modified annual reports for 
both Campbell Corporation and Edwards Corporation, an 
accounts receivable aging schedule for both companies and a 
listing of certain key financial ratios 2 for both companies. 
One of the def ic ienc ies of us ing the research methodo-
logy employed in this chapter is that some bankers may state 
that their decisions to lend or not to lend is not 
influenced by a company I s accounting policy, whereas their 
actual lending decisions may be so influenced. This defi-
ciency can be avoided by sending different data to two dif-
ferent groups of bankers, as was done in Chapter 9. 
, 
However, this approach may also be criticized because the 
samples surveyed are different, a criticism that can be 
overcome by sending data for both companies to the same 
sample, as was done in the present chapter. 
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FINDINGS 
TABLE 10.1 
Bankers Favoring Campbell and Edwards 
Number of 
Responses Percentage 
Bankers favoring Campbell 41 61.2% 
Bankers favoring Edwards 7 10.4 
Campbell and Edwards treated 
equally--no reason given 11 16.4 
Campbell and Edwards treated 
equally because accounting 
policy should not affect 
the lending decision 8 12.0 
Total responses 67 
--
Responses could be subdivided into four distinct cate-
gories. Of the sixty-seven usable responses received, 
forty-one (61.2%) favored Campbell Corporation over Edwards 
Corporation,3 seven (10.4%) favored Edwards; eleven (16.4%) 
would treat the companies equally, but did not give any 
reason for similar treatment; and eight (12.0%) would treat 
the companies equally, because a company's software 
accounting policy would not influence their lending deci-
sion. These subdivisions are summarized in Table 10.1. 
418 
Question No.1: Would your bank grant the loan? 
TABLE 10.2 
Question One Summary 
CamEbell Edwards 
Number of Number of 
Responses Percentage Responses Percentage 
Yes 41 63.1% 20 29.9% 
No 24 36.9 47 70.1 
65 100.0% 67 100.0% 
Using the student-t distribution, it was found that the 
sample meaons were significantly different at the 1% level 
(see appendix). A similar question was posed to a different 
group of bankers in Chapter 9 Question No.5). Responses to 
that question were found to be significantly different at 
the 20% level. 
The response to Question No.1, summarized in Table 10.2, 
revealed that 41 bankers (63.1%) would grant the loan to 
Campbell, but only 20 bankers (29.9%) would do so for 
Edwards. Twenty-four of 65 bankers responding to this 
question (36.9%) would not grant the loan to Campbell, com-
pared to seven out of ten (70.1%) who would deny a loan 
419 
request by Edwards. Responses to this question were found 
to be significantly different at the 1% level. See 
Appendix to Chapter 10. Also see Table 9.4, where a 
similar question was asked, and similar responses were 
received. 
Question No.2: What interest rate would you charge? 
TABLE lO.3A 
Question Two Summary 
Number of 
Responses Percentage 
Lower rate for Campbell 12 44.4% 
Lower rate for Edwards 1 3.7 
Same rate for both 14 51.9 
27 100 % 
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TABLE 10.3B 
Question Two Summary 
Cam12be11 Edwards 
Rate Charged Number of Number of 
Prime Plus Responses percentage Responses percentage 
0 % 1 2.2% - % 
0.5 14 30.4 6 20.7 
1.0 16 34.8 7 24.1 
1.5 4 8.7 5 17.2 
2.0 9 19.6 4 13.8 
2.5 1 2.2 3 10.3 
3.0 1 2.2 
3.5 1 3.4 
4.0 3 10.3 
46 29 
Weighted 
Average Rate Prime plus 1.1% Prime plus 1.7% 
Median Rate Prime plus 1.0% Prime plus 1.5% 
Mode Prime plus 1.0% Prime plus 1.0% 
Standard Deviation 0.665 1.096 
Coefficient of Variance 0.60 .64 
Significant at the 1% level. 
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As is summarized in Tables lO.3A and lO.3B, bankers 
tend to charge a lower rate of interest for Campbell. This 
difference is significant at the 1% level. A similar 
question was asked in Chapter 9 (Question Nos. 3 and 8), 
where it was revealed that there was no significant dif-
ference in responses at the 20% level. When the question 
was asked to the second group of bankers, 12 of 27 bankers 
would give Campbell a lower rate than Edwards (44.4%), and 
only one banker (3.7%) would give Edwards a lwer rate. 
Rates var ied from pr ime to pr ime pI us four points. The 
average rate for Campbell was prime plus 1.1%; for Edwards 
it was prime plus 1.7%. The standard deviation and coef-
ficient of variance were also higher for Edwards than for 
Campbell. The median rates were prime plus 1.)% and prime 
plus 1.5% for Campbell and Edwards, respectively. 
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Question No.3: How would you rate this loan for each 
corporation? 
TABLE 10.4A 
Question Three Summary 
Cam12bell Edwards 
Number of Number of 
Responses Percentage Responses Percentage 
Extremely risky 3 4.6% 17 27.4% 
Risky 17 26.2 26 41.9 
Marginal 22 33.8 13 21.0 
Safe 23 35.4 6 9.7 
Extremely safe 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Totals 65 62 
--
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TABLE 10.4B 
Question Three Summary 
CamEbell Edwards 
Number of Number of 
Points Responses Points ResEonses Points 
Extremely risky 5 3 15 17 85 
Risky 4 17 68 26 104 
Marginal 3 22 66 13 39 
Safe 2 23 46 6 12 
Extremely safe 1 0 0 0 0 
65 195 62 240 
Weighted Average 3.00 3.87 
Marginal Risky 
Median Marginal Risky 
Mode Safe Risky 
Standard Deviation 0.90 0.93 
Coefficient of variance 0.30 0.24 
Significant at the 1% level. 
Responses, as summarized in Tables 10,4 A and 10.4B, 
indicate that a loan to Campbell was generally regarded as 
safer than a loan to Edwards Corporation. Only 3 bankers 
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(4~6%) rated a loan to Campbell as extremely risky, compared 
to 17 bankers (27.4%) who classified the Edwards loan as 
extremely risky. Seventeen bankers (26.2%) rated a loan to 
Campbell as being risky, compared to 26 bankers (41.9%) who 
gave a similar rating to Edwards. Twenty-two bankers 
(33.8%) rated Campbell as marginal, compared to 13 bankers 
(21.0%) for Edwards. Twenty-three bankers (35.4%) rated 
Campbell as safe, compared to 6 bankers (9.7%) who rated 
Edwards as safe. No bankers rated either Campbell or 
Edwards as safe. The average response indicated that a loan 
to Campbell would be considered marginal, whereas a loan to 
Edwards would be cons ide red risky. These differences in 
response proved to be sign if icant at the 1 % level. When a 
similar question was asked in the first survey (Question No. 
6, Table 9.5B), a 1% significance level was also found, in 
favor of Campbell. 
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Question No.4: On a sale of 0% - 100%, what are the 
chances that the corporation will default on the loan if 
made to: Campbell? Edwards? 
TABLE 10.SA 
Question Four Summary 
Lower percentage chance 
of default for Campbell 
Lower percentage chance 
of default for Edwards 
Same chance of default 
for Campbell and Edwards 
Number of 
Responses 
426 
38 
6 
19 
63 
Percentage 
60.3% 
9.5 
30.2 
TABLE 10.5B 
Question Four Summary 
CamEbe11 Edwards 
Percentage 
Chance of Number of Number of 
Default ResEonses Percentage Responses Percentage 
0 10% 29 46.8% 16 25.8% 
11 20 9 14.5 4 6.5 
21 30 6 9.7 2 3.2 
31 40 5 8.1 5 8.1 
41 50 6 9.7 7 11.3 
51 60 1 1.6 5 8.1 
61 70 3 4.8 5 8.1 
71 80 1 1.6 9 14.5 
81 90 0 5 8.1 
91 - 100 2 3.2 4 6.5 
62 100.0% 62 100.0% 
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TABLE 10.5C 
Question Four Summary 
CamEbell 
Approximate 
percentage 
Chance of Number of 
Default ResEonses 
5 
15 
25 
35 
45 
55 
65 
75 
85 
95 
Weighted Average 
Chance of Default 
29 
9 
6 
5 
6 
1 
3 
1 
0 
2 
62 
Median Chance of Default 
Mode Chance of Default 
Standard Deviation 
Coefficient of Variance 
Significant at the 1% level. 
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points 
145 
135 
150 
175 
270 
55 
195 
75 
0 
190 
1,390 
22.4% 
15% 
5% 
22.2% 
0.99 
Edwards 
Number of 
Responses Points 
16 80 
4 60 
2 50 
5 175 
7 315 
5 275 
5 325 
9 675 
5 425 
4 380 
62 2,760 
44.5% 
45% 
5% 
31.1% 
0.70 
As is summarized in Tables 105.A, Band C, bankers 
thought that a loan to Campbell had less chance of default 
than one to Edwards. This difference was significant at the 
1% level. Thirty-eight of 63 bankers (60.3%) indicated that 
they thought a loan to Campbell would have a lower chance of 
default. only 6 bankers (9.5%) thought that a loan to 
Edwards 
thought 
safe to 
panies 
would be safer. Of the 19 bankers ( 30 • 2% ) who 
the loans stood an equal chance of defaul t, it is 
assume that some of these bankers treated the com-
equally because, in their view, accounting policy 
does not make a difference. The average chance of default 
for Campbell was 22.4%, about half that for Edwards (44.5%) 
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Question No.5: If your bank granted a loan to both 
campbell and Edwards, would lending terms be (a) more 
restrictive for Campbell than for Edwards: (b) less 
restrictive for Campbell than for Edwards: or (c) equally 
restrictive? 
TABLE 10.6 
Question Five Summary 
More restrictive for 
Campbell than for Edwards 
Less restrictive for 
Campbell than for Edwards 
Equally restrictive 
Number of 
Responses 
4 
28 
31 
63 
Percentage 
6.3% 
44.4 
49.2 
The responses revealed that 4 bankers (6.3%) would have 
more restrictive terms for Campbell than for Edwards, com-
pared to 28 bankers (44.4%) who would have less restrictive 
terms for Campbell than for Edwards. Of the 31 bankers 
(49.2%) who would have equally restrictive terms, it is safe 
to assume that a number of these bankers chose equal treat-
ment because, in the ir view, account ing pol icy does not 
matter. 
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Ques t ion No.6: For purposes of this guestion only, 
assume that your bank had only $5 million available to 
lend. How much would be lent to: Campbell? Edwards? 
TABLE 10.7 
Question Six Summary 
Number of 
Responses Percentage 
Bankers who would lend more 
to Campbell 33 55.0% 
Bankers who would lend more 
to Edwards 6 10.0 
Bankers who would lend the 
same amount to both 
companies 21 35.0 
60 100.0% 
The responses, summarized in Table 10.7, show that a 
majority of bankers (33 out of 60, or 55%) would lend more 
to Campbell. Only 6 bankers (10%) would lend more to 
Edwards. Twenty-one bankers (35%) would lend both companies 
equal amounts. From this response, it appears clear that 
Campbell stands a better chance to obtain debt capital than 
does Edwards. 
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Question No.7: If, instead of a term loan, Campbell 
and Edwards each applied for an unsecured line of credit, 
what is the maximum line your bank would be willing to 
grant to Campbell? Edwards? 
TABLE 10.8A 
Question Seven Summary 
Number of 
Responses Percentage 
Bankers who would grant a 
larger line to Campbell 29 50.0% 
Bankers who would grant a 
larger line to Edwards 2 3.4 
Bankers who would grant the 
same line of credit to 
Campbell and Edwards 27 46.6 
58 100.0% 
4J2 
TABLE 10.8B 
Question Seven Summary 
Number of 
Responses Percentage 
Bankers granting a line of 
credit to both Campbell 
and Edwards 21 36.2% 
Bankers granting a line of 
credit to Campbell but 
not to Edwards 19 32.8 
Bankers granti.ng a line of 
credit to Edwards but 
not to Campbell 0 0 
Bankers not granting a 
line of credit either to 
Campbell or Edwards 18 31.0 
58 
As is summarized in Tables 10.8A and 10.88, half of the 
bankers (29 out of 58, or 50%) would grant a larger line to 
Campbell; only 2 bankers (3.4%) would grant a larger line to 
Edwards. This response provides further evidence that a 
company that capitalizes software costs stands a far better 
chance to obtain debt capital than does an expensing 
company. 
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Question No.8: -If your bank would treat applications 
by Campbell and Edwards differently, please indicate the 
reasons for the different treatments. Feel free to use more 
space if needed.-
Table 10.9 
Question Eight Summary 
Banks Favoring Campbell 
Answers Addressed To 
Specific 
Risk 
2 
4 
6 
9 
10 
14 
Earnings 
1 
5 
6 
7 
8 
10 
11 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Banks Favoring Edwards 
Answers Addressed To 
Specific 
Risk Earnings 
3 
General 
Capital Quality of 
Structure Receivables General 
2 
7 
10 
11 
13 
14 
General 
Capital 
structure 
Quality of 
Receivables 
3 
12 
Conser-
vatism 
1 
2 
3 
4 
A similar question was 'asked in Chapter 9 (see Table 
9.2), and a simi lar response was rece i ved. Bankers who 
favored Campbell tended to do so because of Campbell's 
apparently superior earnings and capi tal structure as well 
as reduced risk. Bankers favoring Edwards did so because of 
a more conservative accounting policy. Bankers who had no 
preference apparently bel ieve that account i ng pol icy makes 
no difference. I wonder whether their responses would be 
h different had they been included in the first sample (Capter 
• 
9) instead. Individual responses are given below. 
Banks Favoring Campbell 
Banks favoring Campbell Corporation cited the following 
reasons: 
1. "Campbell obviously has much better control of 
operating costs and has taken steps to position 
itself for the future." 
2. "Edwards ratios in debt to worth are disturbing and 
his situation is deteriorating by the years indi-
cated. The Edwards situation should indicate addi-
tional caution." 
3. II Both loans are marg i nal and should not be made." 
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4. "I would work toward securing both credits. Edwards 
would have to be secured in order to extend the 
credit; however, with negative cash flow it still 
would be a questionable credit." 
5. "The Edwards statement would need additional explan-
a t ion to cred i t commi t tees because of the pol icy 
of expensing rather than capitalizing software 
development costs, causing higher variation of earn-
ings and a loss in the most recent fiscal year." 
6. "Campbell has had two profit years in excess of 52 
million. Edwards performance is very marginal. 
Edwards would be incapable of repaYing the loan 
from earnings." 
7. "Edwards' loss and deficit net worth would preclude 
our helping them." 
8. "If lent, both loans would have to be secured. We 
would need more information on the reasons for 
Edwards' loss." 
9. "I would have to recommend declining the loan 
request for both companies based on the following 
reasons: 
These 
(1) The highly speculative use of funds. 
(2) The research and development nature 
of operations. 
( 3) The five year unamort i zed term of 
loan. 
(4) The unsecured status. 
(5) Declining TNW trend and increasing 
leverage. 
( 6 ) Declining 
posted by 
profit margins and loss 
the Edwards Corpora t ion. 
(7) Concentration of net worth in fixed 
assets. 
companies ... could poss ibly be serviced by 
asset-based lending if they would agree to loans 
against a formula based on accounts receivable. 
Righ t now, Edwards Corporation does not have the 
cash flow to service the debt in a single payment 
sum and while Campbell Corporation does show suf-
ficient cash flow, they are looking at a five year 
term before repayment and who's to say what cash 
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flow would be like at the end of five years ••• ? 
Another option· for the bank, if we were to lend to 
Campbe 11 Corporation, would be to lend aga i nst an 
escrow account establ ished wi th our trust depart-
ment, into which amortization expense is deposited, 
i nves ted for add i t ional income, and then used to 
repay our loan at the end of the five-year term." 
10. "Because of the $6 million unsecured line, addi-
tional unsecured money would be hard to obtain. 
Edwards would only be granted on a secured bas is. 
Treatment would be different because of the expen-
ses, profits, capital and other ratios." 
11. "Difference in net worth, debt to worth, all profit-
ability ratios, ability to service, repayment 
requested." 
12. "Trends look much better for Campbell." 
13. "Campbe 11 appears to have bet ter 1 iqu id i ty than 
Edwards at present and would be more able to ser-
vice long term debt." 
14. "Profitability and debt position of Campbell make 
it the much more des irable loan. Edwards debt 
position makes them more susceptible to rate risk." 
4)8 
15. "Management of operating costs in an expanding 
market appears to be handled much better by Campbell 
than Edwards. 
Campbell." 
Generated cash flow more evident by 
16. "These credits would scare the hell out of upper 
management. My bank would not consider the loan 
request on unsecured terms." (This respondent 
would grant a loan to Campbell but not Edwards.) 
17. "Campbell is profitable and has positive cash flow 
to serv ice debt. Edwards is unprof i table, cash 
flow does not service current charges, and expenses 
are rising faster than sales on a percentage basis." 
Banks Favoring Edwards 
Banks favoring Edwards Corporation gave the following 
reasons: 
1. "Different methods of accounting for computer soft-
ware and educational courseware construction costs." 
2. "Companies are identical except that Edwards is 
more conservative. I assume the IRS accepts both 
capitalization and direct expense." 
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3. "Due to the nature of software industry, expensing 
as incurred is mQre prudent." 
4. "In today's ever-changing software business Edwards' 
policy of charging existing software costs to 
operations results in a more conservative financial 
presentation rather than capitalizing them as does 
Campbell." 
Banks Treating Campbell and Edwards Equally 
Bankers treating both companies equally cited the following 
reasons: 
1. "I do not make loans based only on financial state-
ments and, therefore, cannot def in i t i ve ly answer 
the questions. I would weigh each statement the 
same in my decision but would trust information 
from Edwards more than that from Campbell." 
2. "Edwards uses a more conservative approach to 
recording the software costs by expensing rather 
than capitalizing. This, however, is still not 
enough to grant Edwards the loan instead of Camp-
be 11. Both loans are risky due to the na ture of 
the equipment and the uncertainty of its market-
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ability. Neither company in our opinion deserves 
unsecured credit." 
3. "No different. Different accounting for construc-
t ion costs creates the impress ion that Campbe 11 
earns a profit when the construction cost puts it 
into a loss position. Rapid growth and expansion a 
mixed bless ing. Would require marketable securi ty 
to both borrowers." 
4. II Generally the same. Balance sheets on ly re f lect 
d i f ferent handl i ng of sof tware. Campbe 11 may find 
more credit available due to statement looks, 
thereby weakening current financial strength." 
5. "Would treat both requests the same as the only 
difference between the two appears to be accounting 
treatment of software. Not enough information to 
decline or approve loan. To do properly your 
questionnaire takes more time than is proper to 
request. This could make any results invalid." 
6. "Although Campbell Corporation's financial state-
ments might appear more favorable at first glance, 
a n experienced loan or credi t of f icer will recog-
nize the differences in the two companies' finan-
cial statements are due to the decision that (1) 
441 
accounting treatment for Campbell Corporation and 
another accounting treatment for Edwards Corpora-
tion." 
7. "No difference--same basic economic facts--merely 
different accounting presentations." 
Question 9: The bank's total assets are: 
More than $5 billion 
$5 billion or less 
TABLE 10.IOA 
Question Nine Summary 
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Number of. 
Responses 
13 
53 
66 
Percentage 
19.7% 
80.3 
100.0% 
TABLE 10.10B 
Bank Preference By Size 
Bankers favoring Campbell 
Bankers favoring Edwards 
Bankers treating Campbell 
and Edwards equal1y--no 
reason given 
Bankers treating Campbell 
and Edwards equally because 
accounting policy should 
not affect the lending 
decision 
Banks having assets of 
More than $5 billion 
$5 billion or less 
9 32 
1 6 
2 9 
1 6 
13 53 
Most bankers were employed by banks having assets of 
less than $5 billion. 
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Question No. 10: The person completing this guestion-
naire has had years experience in a loan department. 
TABLE 10.11 
Question Ten Summary 
Number of 
Years Experience Responses Percentage 
0 to 3 11 17.2% 
3+ to 6 19 29.7 
6+ to 10 17 26.6 
10+ to 15 8 12.5 
15+ to 25 7 10.9 
More than 25 2 3.1 
64 100.0% 
--
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Question No. 11: The person completing this guest ion-
naire is a (n): 
TABLE 10.12 
Question Eleven Summary 
Senior or executive vice 
president or other senior 
officer 
vice president, secretary 
or treasurer 
Assistant vice president 
or other assistant officer 
Not an officer 
Number of 
Responses 
5 
20 
34 
8 
67 
Percentage 
7.5% 
29.9 
50.7 
11.9 
Question No. 12: The office where this questionnaire is 
being completed is located in the: 
TABLE 10.13 
Question Twelve Summary 
Number of 
Responses percentage 
Northeast 20 31. 7% 
South 13 20.6 
North Central 23 36.5 
west 7 11.1 
63 
Summary 
Data gathered in this survey tends to confirm the preli-
minary information obtained in the course of the interviews, 
vendor questionnaire and first banker questionnaire respon-
sese Software vending companies that capitalize software 
costs tend to find it easier to obtain bank loans than do 
companies that expense software costs. 
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Table 10.14 
Comparison of Chapter 9 and Chapter 10 Responses 
Question 
Number 
9.1 
9.1 
9.3 
9.5 
9.6 
9.8 
10.1 
Question 
How large a line of credit 
would your bank be willing 
to grant to this company? 
(Table 9.1A-inc1uded zero 
loans) 
How large a line of credit 
would your bank be willing 
to grant to this company? 
(Table 9.lB-Exc1udes zero 
loans) 
What rate of interest would 
you charge (for an unsecured 
line of credit? (Table 9.3) 
If, instead of a line of 
credit, the company had 
applied for a $2 million, 5 
year loan, would your bank 
grant the loan? (Table 9.4) 
How risky is this loan? 
(Table 9.5B) 
What rate of interest would 
you charge for the term loan? 
(Table 9.6) 
Would your bank grant the 
loan? (Table 10.2) 
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Significance 
Not significant 
at 20% level. 
Significant at 
20% level, in 
favor of 
Edwards. 
Not significant 
at 20% level. 
Significant at 
20% level, in 
favor of 
Campbell. 
Significant at 
1% level, in 
favor of 
Campbell. 
Not significant 
at the 20% 
level. 
Significant at 
the 1% level, in 
favor of 
Campbell. 
Table 10.14 (Continued) 
Comparison of Chapter 9 and Chapter 10 Responses 
Question 
Number 
10.2 
10.3 
10.4 
Question 
What interest rate would you 
charge (Table 10.3B) 
How risky is this loan? 
(Table 10.4B) 
What are the chances that the 
corporation will default 
on the loan? (Table lO.5C) 
Significance 
Significant at 
1% level, in 
favor of 
Campbell. 
Significant at 
1% level, in 
favor of 
Campbell. 
Significant at 
1% level, in 
favor of 
Campbell. 
Table 10.14 summarizes some of the responses received 
from both bank lending officer surveys. In the first survey 
(Chapter 9), the line of credit granted to Edwards seems to 
be signif icantly larger than that granted to Campbell, if 
all "no loan" situations are excluded (Table 9.lB). 
However, this result might be a distortion, because many 
companies would not grant a loan to Edwards. 
The interest rate charged to both companies appeared to 
be about the same in the first survey (Tables 9.3 and 9.6), 
but was significantly less for Campbell than for Edwards in 
the second survey (Table 10.2). Both surveys revealed that 
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bankers regarded a loan to Campbell as a significantly safer 
loan than one to Edwards (Tables 9.5B and 10.4B). 
The next chapter examines the effect of software 
accounting policy on stock price. 
CHAPTER 10 
APPENDIX 
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In Chapter 9, the student-t(parametric) and Mann-Whitney 
(nonparametric) tests were used to measure differences between two 
samples. The data analyzed in Chapter 10 were gathered from a 
single sample, so the statistical tests used in Chapter 9 are not 
appropriate for Chapter 10. The two statistical tests chosen for this 
chapter are the t-test(parametric - and different than the student-t 
test used in the previous chapter) and the sign (nonparametric) test, 
which are suitable for analyzing single, small samples. (Wonnacott, 
pp. 210 and 472; Clark and Schkade, pp. 396 and 472). Because both a 
parametric and nonparametric test are employed, no assumptions had 
to be made as to whether or not the distribution was normal. 
decided against using the Best Easy Systematic(BES) estimator due to 
its unreliability and statistical impurity. Again, the principal 
statistiC employed was parametriC (t-test). The (nonparametric) sign 
test was employed just to be on the safe side. 
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Table .uu Bankers favoring Campbell and Edwards 
The data in Table 10.1 were arrived at by reviewing each 
Questionnaire response to determine whether the individual 
respondents favored one company over the other. I t was found that the 
bankers favored Campbel1 over Edwards by about 6 to 1 (61.2~ 
compared to 1 0.4~). 
t-test (parametric) 
Where: X· 0.754 (sample mean) 
s· 0.339 
n· 67 
U .. 0.5 (expected mean, assuming indifference) 
d.f. (degrees of freedom) '" n - 1 .. 66 
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Assigned values: 1 for bankers favoring Campbell 
o for bankers favoring Edwards 
0.5 for bankers expressing no preference 
H1(null hypothesis): X = U 
(X-u>F' 
t= _____ _ 
5 
(0.754 - 0.5) j66 
= = 6.09 
0.339 
Sign Test (nonparametric) 
The sign test is so called because it uses plus and minus signs 
for data rather than numbers. Differences are considered, but not 
magnitudes of differences. Bankers who preferred Campbell were 
assigned a plus (+) and bankers who preferred Edwards were assigned 
a minus (-). Bankers having no preference were ignored, as is required 
for the sign test. 
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HI (null hypothes1s): Pc = PE 
Where: n - 48 (number of observat ions) 
r = 41 (number of bankers preferring Campbell) 
p • 0.5 (expected probabllity) 
5 = /np(l - p) = J (48)(0.5)( 1 - 0.5) = 3.464 
E(r) = np = (48)(0.5) = 24 
r - 0.5 - E(r) 41 - 0.5 - 24 
Z - = • 4.76 
5 3.464 
Conclusion: There is a 99.99 percent chance that the hypothesis 
should be re jected. 
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Table l.O2 Would your bank grant the loan? 
Table 10.2 summarizes the responses to the quest ion "Would your 
bank grant a loan to Campbell or Edwards?" Not all bankers answered 
for both Campbell and Edwards. By reviewing the individual responses, 
the following could be determined: 
A. Number of bankers granting a loan to both 
Campbell and Edwards 17 
B. Number of bankers granting a loan to 
Campbell but not to Edwards 24 
C. Number of bankers granting a loan to 
Edwards but not to Campbe 11 2 
D. Number of bankers grant ing a loan to 
neither Campbell nor Edwards 23 
66 
Because not all bankers responded to both parts of the question 
(65 responded to Campbell, compared to 67 for Edwards) , the sample 
sizes are different, and the t-test used above is not appropriate. 
However, the t-test for two samples can be used, since we are 
dealing wah a single population. 
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t= ____________________________ __ 
(n - 1)5 2 + (n - 1)5 2 1 I 2 2 
Where x, and x2 are the means, n, and n2 are the sample sizes and 
5, and 52 are the standard deviations. 
Assigning a value of "I" for a "yes" response and "0" for a "no" 
response, the means for Campbell and Edwards are 0.63 and 0.30, 
respect ive ly. 
Campbell Edwards 
x, = 0.63 x2 = 0.30 
n = 65 1 n = 67 2 
5, = 0.48 52 = 0.46 
Degrees of freedom = 65 + 67 - 2 = 130 
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0.63 - 0.30 
t= ______________________________ _ 
(64)(0.48)2 + (66)(0.46)2 
x + 
65 + 67 - 2 65 67 
= 4. 125 
Conclusion:. Reject HI' The t-score is greater than 2.576, so the 
difference is significant at the 1 percent level. 
Sign il5.t 
The sign test can also be used to test for significance. Given that a 
plus (+) Is assigned When a banker would grant a loan to Campbell but 
not to Edwards (Category B responses), and a minus( -) is assigned 
when a banker would grant a loan to Edwards but not to Campbell 
(Category C) (Categories A and 0 are ignored for the sign test), the 
following result 1s obtained: 
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HI (null hypothesis): Pc = PE 
Where: n· 26 (number of observations) 
r" 24 (number of bankers preferring Campbell) 
p = 0.5 (expected probability) 
5" jnp( 1 - p) • )(26)(0.5)( 1 - 0.5) '" 2.55 
E(r) • np - (26)(0.5) - 13 
r - 0.5 - E(r) 24 - 0.5 - 13 
z· .. • 4.12 
5 2.55 
Conclusion: Reject H1. There is a 99.99 percent chance that the 
hypothesis should be rejected. 
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Table J O,3A What interest rate would be charged? 
I f values of 30, 10 and 20 were assigned for bankers favoring 
Campbell, Edwards or neither, respectively, one would expect the 
mean to be 20 if no overall preference were expressed. However, such 
was not the case. Bankers preferred Campbell over Edwards by 12 to 1 
(44.4~ to 3. 7~). 
t-test (parametric) 
Where: X;; 24(sample mean) 
5'" 5.6 
n - 27 
U = 20 (expected mean, assuming indifference) 
dJ. (degrees of freedom) • n - 1 • 26 
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H,(null hypothesis): X = U 
t = 
(24 - 20) ./26 
- ________ - 3.64 
5.6 
Conclusl0n: Reject H,. There is a 99 percent chance that the 
hypothesis should be rejected. 
Sign Test (nonparametrjc) 
Given that a plus( +) is assigned when a banker grants a lower 
interest rate to Campbell than to Edwards, and a minus(-) is assigned 
when Edwards gets a lower rate (the 14 "same rate" cases are ignored 
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in the sign test), the fol1owlngresult is obtained: 
Hl (null hypothesis): Pc = PE 
Where: n - 13 (number of observat ions) 
r - 12 (number of bankers preferring Campbell) 
p • 0.5 (expected probabi I ity) 
5 = j np( 1 - p) = J( 13)(0.5)( 1 - 0.5) = 1.8 
E(r) = np '" ( 13)(0.5) ... 6.5 
r - 0.5 - E(r) 
z- _____ -
5 
12 - 0.5 - 6.5 
1.8 
- 2.78 
ConcJusion: With a Z-score of 2.78, there is a 99.7 percent 
chance that the hypothesis should be rejected. 
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TabJe J 036 What rate of interest would you charge? 
t-test 
Not all bankers answered this question for both Campbell and 
Edwards. The sample sizes are different, so the t-test for two 
samples is used. 
Campbe)) 
n = 46 1 
S1 = 0.665 
Degrees of freedom .. 46 + 29 - 2 • 73 
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Edwards 
n = 29 2 
1.1 -1.7 
t= ________________________________ ___ 
(45)(0.665)2 + (28)( 1.096)2 
)( + 
46 + 29 - 2 46 29 
= 3.16 
Conclusion: Reject H,. The t-score 1S greater than 2.576, so the 
d1fference 1s s1gn1f1cant at the 1 percent level. 
E...DlstrlbutJoo 
The F dIstrIbutIon can be used to test the slgnHlcance of 
dIfferences 1n two samp Ie varIances (Clark and SChkade, p. 465). 
G1ven that: 
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Campbell Edwards 
n • 46 , n • 29 2 
5, = 0.665 52 = 1.096 
d.f. = 45 d.f. = 28 
n,5,2/(n, - 1) (46)(0.665)2/(46 - 1) 
F= = 
0.452 
= 
---
1.244 
Where the result is less than one, the reciprocal is used, so: 
1.244 
F - - 2.752 
0.452 
Conclusion: The difference is significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 10 4B How risky is this loan? 
t-test 
The sample sizes are different, so the t-test for two samples is 
used. 
Campbell Edwards 
Xl = 3.00 x2 = 3.87 
n = 65 , n = 52 2 
5, = 0.90 52 = 0.93 
Degrees of freedom = 55 + 52 - 2 .. 125 
3.00 - 3.87 
t= ______________________________ _ 
(64)(0.90)2 + (61 )(0.93)2 
X + 
65 + 62 - 2 65 62 
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- 5.44 
Conclusion: Reject H1. The t-score is greater than 2.576. so the 
difference is significant at the 1 percent level. A similar question 
was posed to a different group of bankers in Chapter 9 and a similar 
finding was made (See Table 9.4B). 
Wj ]coxon Matched-pajrs Signed-Ranks I.e.s.t. 
The Wi lcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test is nonparametric 
and is more powerful than the sign test because it gives more weight 
to a large difference than to a small one. It considers both the sign of 
the difference within pairs of observations and the magnitude of that 
difference. (Clark and Schkade. p. 443) 
Table 10.4B assigns weights to the various categories. By going 
back to the original data, comparing individual banker responses and 
llsting only those responses where the respondent expressed a 
pref erence, we have: 
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Table 10.15 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test Appl1ed To 
Table 10.48 Data 
Respondent Point Rank Wi th Less 
Number Difference Rank FreQuent Sign 
1 2 -29.0 
2 2 -29.0 
3 2 -29.0 
4 3 -38.0 
5 1 -11.5 
6 I ncomp Jete Response 
7 1 -11.5 
8 No Difference 
9 2 -29.0 
10 1 -11.5 
1 1 2 -29.0 
12 2 -29.0 
13 1 -11.5 
14 1 -11.5 
15 3 -38.0 
Respondent Point Rank With Less 
Number Djfference RanK FreQuent Sjgn 
16 2 -29.0 
17 2 -29.0 
18 3 -38.0 
19 3 -38.0 
20 1 -11.5 
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21" 1 -11.5 
22 2 -29.0 
23 2 -29.0 
24 Incomplete Response 
25 1 -11.5 
26 1 + 11.5 11.5 
27 3 -38.0 
28 2 -29.0 
29 2 +29.0 29.0 
30 No Difference 
31 + 11.5 11.5 
32 + 11.5 11.5 
33 + 11.5 11.5 
34 No Difference 
35 No Difference 
36 No Difference 
37 No Difference 
38 Incomplete Response 
39 No D i ff erence 
40 No D i ff erence 
41 No Difference 
42 No Difference 
43 Incomplete Response 
44 No Difference 
45 Incomplete Response 
Respondent Point Rank With Less 
Number Djfference Rank Frequent Sjgn 
46 No Difference 
47 1 -11.5 
48 No Difference 
49 Incomplete Response 
50 1 -11.5 
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51 No Difference 
52 No Difference 
53 No Di ff erence 
54 1 -11.5 
55 -11.5 
56 No Difference 
57 No Difference 
58 1 + 11.5 11.5 
59 No Difference 
60 1 -11.5 
61 1 -11.5 
62 2 -29.0 
63 -11.5 
64 No Difference 
65 No Difference 
66 -11.5 
67 -11.5 
T= 86.5 
The point difference was determined by subtracting the rank 
assigned to Edwards from that assigned to Campbell, in absolute 
terms. For example, the first banker ranked Campbell marginal (3 
points) and Edwards extremely risky (5 pOints), for a difference of 2, 
in absolute terms. The "rank" column has a negative sign because the 
result is negative when the Edwards score (5) is subtracted from the 
Campbell score (3). There were 22 responses having a 1 point 
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difference, 13 responses with a 2 point difference, and 5 responses 
with a 3 point difference. Respondents having no preference were 
eliminated (as is required for this test), as were incomplete 
responses. 
n - 40 T - 86.5 
5 = T 
n(n + 1) (40)(41 ) 
• 
4 4 
n(n + 1)(2n + 1) 
24 
T-UT 86.5-410 
Z= __ _ 
= 
• 410 
(40)(41 )(81) 
-
24 
= - 4.35 
• 74.4 
Concluslon: The difference is significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 10 SA Chance of default. 
If values of 30, 10 and 20 were assigned for bankers favoring 
Campbell, Edwards or neither, respectively, one would expect the 
mean to be 20 if no overall preference were expressed. However, such 
was not the case. Bankers preferred Campbell over Edwards by 38 to 
6, or better than 6 to I. 
t-test (parametrjc) 
Where: X· 2S(sample mean) 
5" 6.64 
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n - 63 
U .. 20 (expected mean, assuming indifference) 
d.f. (degrees of freedom) .. n - 1 .. 62 
H1(null hypothesis): X = U 
(X-U)F 
t- _____ _ 
= 
5 
(25 - 20) j62 
6.64 
= 5.93 
Conclusion: Reject HI' There is a 99 percent chance that the 
hypothesis should be rejected. 
Sign Test (oonparametric) 
Given that a plus(+) is assigned when a banker prefers Campbell 
and a minus( -) is assigned when Edwards is preferred (the 19 "same 
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chance" cases are ignored in the sign test), the following result is 
obtained: 
Hl (null hypothesis): Pc = PE 
Where: n· 44 (number of observations) 
r = 38 (number of bankers preferring Campbell) 
p - 0.5 (expected probability) 
5" jnp( 1 - p) .. )(44)(0.5)( 1 - 0.5) - 3.32 
E(r) = np = (44)(0.5) .. 22 
r - p - E(r) 38 - 0.5 - 22 
z- - ____ _ 
- 4.67 
5 3.32 
Conclusion: Reject H1. With a Z-score of 4.67, there 1s a 99 
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percent chance that the hypothesis should be rejected. 
Table.lil...6 lending restrictions. 
I f values of 30, 10 and 20 were assigned for bankers favoring 
Campbell, Edwards or neither, respectively, one would expect the 
mean to be 20 if no overall preference were expressed. However, such 
was not the case. Bankers preferred Campbell over Edwards by 28 to 
4, or 7 to 1. 
t-test (parametric} 
Where: X = 24(sample mean) 
474 
5 - 6.03 
n = 63 
U - 20 (expected mean, assuming indifference) 
dJ. (degrees of freedom) - n - 1 - 62 
H1(null hypothesis): X = U 
(X-U)~ 
t- _____ _ 
5 
(24- 20) fo 
- ________ - 5.22 
6.03 
Conclusion: Reject H1. There is a 99 percent chance that the 
hypothesis should be rejected. 
Sign Test (nonparametric) 
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Given that a plus(+) is assigned when a banker prefers Campbell 
and a minus( -) is assigned when Edwards is preferred (the 31 "equally 
restrictive" cases are ignored in the sign test), the following result 
is obtained: 
HI (null hypothesis): Pc = PE 
Where: n = 32 (number of observations) 
r" 28 (number of bankers preferring Campbell) 
p .. 0.5 (expected probabi 1 ity) 
s - /np( 1 - p) - '/(32)(0.5)( 1 - 0.5) - 2.83 
E(r) • np • (32)(0.5) - 16 
r - p - E(r) 28 - 0.5 - 16 
Z= = ____ _ 
= 4.06 
S .2.'33 
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Conclusion: Reject H1. With a Z-score of 4.06, there is a 99 
percent chance that the hypothesis should be rejected. 
Table J..Q.Z Amount lent. 
If values of 30, 10 and 20 were assigned for bankers favoring 
Campbell, Edwards or neither, respectively, one would expect the 
mean to be 20 if no overall preference were expressed. However, such 
was not the case. Bankers preferred Campbell over Edwards by 33 to 
6, or 5.5 to 1. 
t-test (parametric) 
Where: X· 2S(sample mean) 
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S = 6.7 
n" 60 
U - 20 (expected mean, assuming indifference) 
d.f. (degrees of freedom) = n - 1 = 59 
H,(nul1 hypothesis): X = U 
t = 
= 
(X-U)~ 
S 
(25-20) F 
6.7 
.. 5.73 
Conclusion: Reject H" There 1S a 99 percent chance that the 
hypothesis should be rejected. 
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Sign Test (nooparametrjcl 
Given that a plus(+) is assigned when a banker prefers Campbell 
and a minus( -) is assigned when Edwards is preferred (the 21 "same 
amount" cases are ignored in the sign test), the following result is 
obtained: 
H1 (null hypothesis): Pc = PE 
Where: n = 39 (number of observations) 
r • 33 (number of bankers preferring Campbell) 
p = 0.5 (expected probabi I ity) 
5 - /np( 1 - p) - j(39)(0.5)(1 - 0.5) - 3.12 
E(r) = np • (39)(0.5) - 19.5 
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r - p - E(r) 33 - 0.5 - 19.5 
Z- _____ • ., 4.17 
5 3.12 
Conclusion: Reject Ht . Wah a Z-score of 4. 17, there is a 99 
percent chance that the hypothesis should be rejected. 
Table 10 8A Size of line of credit. 
I f values of 30, 10 and 20 were assigned for bankers favoring 
CampbeJJ, Edwards or neither, respectively, one would expect the 
mean to be 20 if no overall preference were expressed. However, such 
was not the case. Bankers preferred Campbell over Edwards by 29 to 
2, or 14.5 to 1. 
t-test (parametric) 
Where: X - 2S(sample mean) 
J.f71.1 
5" 5.65 
n· 58 
U - 20 (expected mean, assuming indifference) 
d.f. (degrees of freedom) = n - 1 = 57 
Ht(null hypothesis): X = U 
(X-U~ 
t= _____ _ 
5 
(25 - 20) fo 
= ________ = 6.68 
5.65 
Conclusion: Reject H,. There is a 99 percent chance that the 
hypothesis should be rejected. 
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Sign Test (nonparametric) 
Given that a plus(+) 1S assigned when a banker prefer's Campbell 
and a minus(-) is assigned when Edwards is preferred (the 27 "same 
line" cases are ignored in the sign test), the fo 110w1ng result is 
obtained: 
H, (null hypothesis): Pc = PE 
Where: n = 31 (number of observat lOns) 
r = 29 (number of bankers preferring Campbell) 
p = 0.5 (expected probability) 
5 =/ np(l - p) = J (31 )(0.5)( 1 - 0.5) = 2.78 
ECr) = np = C31 )(0.5) = 15.5 
r - p - E(r) 29 - 0.5 - 15.5 
Z = _____ = ____ _ 
= 4.68 
5 2.78 
Conclusion: ReJect H l' With a Z-score of 4.68, there lS a 99 
percent chance that the hypothesis should be rejected. 
i-J71.3 
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
RESULTS OF THE FINANCIAL ANALYSTS SURVEY 
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In order to determine whether software accounting 
pol icy has an effect on stock price, a questionnaire was 
sent to 803 financial analysts. Two hundred ninety-seven 
names were purchased from the Financial Analysts Federation 
and consisted of financial analysts that specialize in the 
computer or software industry. The remaining 506 analysts 
were chosen at random from a listing of financial analysts 
that are members of the New York City chapter of the 
Financial Analysts Federation. 
were returned as undeliverable. 
Forty-eight data packets 
Fifteen usable responses 
were received, for a response rate of about 2 
percent. Each analyst received the financial data for both 
Campbell Corporation and Edwards Corporation, a listing of 
ratios, a questionnaire, cover letter and postpaid return 
envelope. 
Of the fifteen usable responses received, five favored 
Campbell, four favored Edwards, one had mixed feelings, and 
five analysts treated Campbell and Edwards equally. The 
background information needed to complete the questionnaire 
was as follows: l 
liThe two fictitious companies to be compared in this 
study are Campbell Corporation and Edwards Corporation. 
The setting of the study is as follows: Suppose you are 
to consult an individual investor, named George Madison, 
481 
with respect to his personal investment portfolio. Mr. 
Madison is a vice president of a large manllfacturing 
corporation and is a resident of your city. He is 
acquainted with Andrew Monroe, the president of Campbell 
Corporation and Lyndon Adams, the president of Edwards 
Corporation. Mr. Madison confronts you with an annual 
report for each of these companies and asks you to com-
pare them as investment alternatives. Mr. Madison is 32 
years old, single, and in excellent health. His salary 
provides more than enough income for his present needs. 
He has $50,000 in cash which he desires to invest in 
common stocks, preferably stocks which appear likely to 
have substantial price growth over the next five to ten 
years." 
Question No.1: If Mr. Madison wants to allocate $30,000 
between these two investment alternatives, what proportions 
would you recommend for each common stock offering? (The 
percentage allocable to Campbell and Edwards is supposed to 
total 100%). (See Table 11.1) 
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TABLE 11.1 
Question One 
Percentage of $30,000 allocated to Campbell and Edwards 
Respondent Campbell Edwards 
1 0% 0% 
2 80 20 
3 70 30 
4 
5 75 25 
6 0 100 
7 25 75 
8 25 75 
9 0 100 
10 0 100 
11 
12 50 50 
13 50 50 
14 50 50 
15 50 50 
Number of 
Responses Percentage 
More to Campbell 3 23.1% 
More to Edwards 5 38.5 
Same amount to each 5 38.5 
13 
-
48) 
Three of 13 respondents (23.1%) would allocate more 
money to Campbell, five (38.5%) would allocate more to 
Edwards and five (38.5%) would allocate the same percentage 
to each company. 
Ouestion No.2: "Given only the information provided to 
you, what value or price per share would you place on the 
common stock of these two companies at their annual report 
dates?"2 (See Table 11.2) 
TABLE 11. 2 
Question Two 
Price Per Share 
Respondent Campbell Edwards 
Mean 
Median 
Mode 
Range 
Higher price 
Higher price 
1 $ 7.00 
2 5.50 
3 20.00 
4 10.00 
5 8.00 
6 5.00 
7 10.00 
8 1.00 
9 10.00 
10 31.00 
11 
12 5.00 
13 10.00 
14 4.00 
15 
$ 9.73 
8.00 
10.00 
$1.00-$31.00=$30.00 
$ 3.00 
1.50 
10.00 
10.00 
3.00 
7.50 
12.00 
2.50 
6.00 
19.00 
5.00 
10.00 
. 4.00 
$ 7.19 
6.00 
10.00 
$1.50-$19.00=$17.50 
Number of 
Responses Percentage 
for Campbell 6 46.2% 
for Edwards 3 23.1 
Same price for both 4 30.8 
13 
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Of the 13 analysts responding to this question, six 
(46.2%) would assign a higher price to Campbell stock than 
to that of Edwards, three ( 23.1 % ) would ass ign a higher 
price for Edwards stock, and four (30.8%) would assign the 
same price to each stock. The mean and median price for 
Campbell stock were both higher than those for Edwards. The 
most commonly ass igned pr ice for each stock was $10. The 
range between high and low price was greater for Campbell 
($30) than for Edwards ($17.50). 
Question No.3: Do you consider an. investment in 
Campbell Corporation stock to be: (a) extremely risky, (b) 
risky, (c) marginal, (d) safe, or (e) extremely safe? 
Quest ion No.4: Do you consider an investment in 
Edwards Corporation stock to be: (a) extremely risky, (b) 
risky, (c) marginal, (d) safe, or (e) estremely safe? (See 
Table 11. 3) 
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Extremely risky 
Risky 
Marginal 
Safe 
Extremely safe 
Extremely risky 
Risky 
Marginal 
safe 
Extremely safe 
weighted Average 
TABLE 11.3 
Questions Three and Four 
Points 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
CamEbell 
Number of 
ResEonses % 
5 35.7% 
6 42.9 
2 14.3 
1 7.1 
0 
14 
Number of 
ResEonses Points 
5 25 
6 24 
2 6 
1 2 
0 
14 57 
4.07 
Number of 
Responses 
Campbell is more risky 5 
Edwards is more risiy 4 
Both are equally risky 5 
14 
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Edwards 
Number of 
ResEonses % 
3 21.4% 
7 50.0 
3 21.4 
1 7.1 
0 
14 
--
Number of 
ResEonses Points 
3 15 
7 28 
3 9 
1 2 
0 
14 54 
--
3.86 
Percentage 
35.7% 
28.6 
35.7 
This question asked the respondent to rank an investment 
in Campbell and Edwards stock according to risk. The 
majority of respondents rated an investment in Campbell to 
be either extremely risky (35.7%) or risky (42.9%). Most 
analysts also considered an investment in Edwards to be 
either extremely risky (21.4%) or risky (50.0%). If point 
values are assigned for degrees of risk, Campbell (4.07) is 
found to be slightly more risky than Edwards (3.86). More 
than one-third of the respondents (35.7%) rated Campbell as 
riskier than Edwards, or just as risky (35.7%). A somewhat 
smaller group (28.6%) thought Edwards to be toe risk ier 
investment. 
Question No.5: Which company will experience more 
growth over the next five years? (See Table 11.4) 
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TABLE 11.4 
Question Five 
Number of 
Responses Percentage 
Campbell 3 20.0% 
Edwards 2 13.3 
Equal growth 5 33.3 
No opinion 5 33.3 
15 
Three respondents (20.0%) thought Campbell would 
experience more rapid growth than Edwards over the next five 
years. Two analysts (13.3%) thought Edwards would grow 
faster. An equal number of analysts either thought the com-
panies would experience equal growth (33.3%) or had no opi-
nion (33.3%). 
Question No. 6 Please state the reasons for your 
answers to the first five questions. Feel free to use more 
space if needed. 
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When asked to state reasons for the answers given to the 
first five questions, the analysts favoring Campbell 
Corporation said: 
1. "Wh i le Edwards sales have grown cons iderable, its 
margins indicate poor management, its cash flow has 
gone negative and it has already borrowed more than 
its worth. Campbell is in better control of its 
expenses and has some positive trends with decent 
rates of return, even though it is leveraged." 
2. "While little information is given as to the state 
of the art of either company, its place in the 
software industry and/or other pertinent management 
factors, this questionnaire appears to me to be 
constructed around whether I would invest in a com-
puter software company which ei ther expenses or 
capitalizes R&D construction costs. This has not 
been resolved yet by the SEC or ADAPSO. However, 
based on the pauc i ty of data presented, I st i 11 
favor Campbell Corpora tion for its long-term sol-
vency as well as leverage factors plus software." 
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3. "Looks like same company with different accounting 
( Comserv? ) • Hard to ass ign value wi thou t know ing 
details of "construction costs"--for example, will 
there continue to be 30% of revenues in next couple 
of years? However, 
value Campbell at 
showing 'profits'." 
the stock market would probably 
a higher price since it is 
4. "Since an 'investment' (specula t ion would be more 
accurate) must be made, prudence dictates that the 
great bulk of the money ought to be applied to the 
'safest' equity, 
not all is lost. 
Campbell. If Edwards grows more, 
Earnings are better than no earn-
ings. In the absence of earnings, book value must 
suffice as a basis for pricing; this is the basis 
behind Question 2 (S8 for Campbell, $3 for Edwards). 
In the absence of a satisfactory asset base, the 
only predicate for investment is least risk (P-E) 
or pure guesswork; so much for Ouestions 3 and 
4 (Campbell--risky; Edwards--extremely risky). 
Answer to Question 5 (no opinion) implies strongly 
that there is no satisfactory basis for projection 
of growth." 
Analysts preferring Edwards Corporation had the following 
comments: 
1. "Difference 
expensing 
( Edwards) • 
turns on 
software 
capitalizing 
development 
(Campbell) or 
and purchases 
Write-off understates earnings initially since it 
ignores the investment aspect. Later earnings are 
overstated since development costs were charged 
earlier. 
Edwards will be worth higher PiE since no surprise 
write-off of unsuccessful products and company 
likely more soberly view--so easier to finance 
growth. 
Both companies are making heavy up-front software 
R&D investments--somewhat masking a profitable 
business. Needs analyses of sales and profits 
generated by earlier software R&D expenditures for 
evaluation of both companies." 
2. II Cap i tal i za t ion of software expense at Campbe 11 
Corpora t ion lowers qual i ty of reported earn i ng s. 
Any changes (short-term) in technology could sub-
ject Campbell to write-offs. Also, debt ratios are 
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high given poor quality of earnings. Both companies 
are small and subject to large company competition." 
3. "It remains to be seen whether the cost increase 
incurred to buy revenue increases in 1983 will 
prove profitable. That will require (a) strong 
further revenue growth and/or (b) abil i ty to cut 
cost without impairing revenue and (c) ability to 
maintain existing business. For each company I 
judge underlying earnings may roughly be $2.50. I 
give Edwards a lOX mUltiple and Campbell a 4X 
because Edwards' cost capitalization increases risk 
and dampens upward earnings response if things go 
well. If either software product is unique, and is 
going to be a barn burner, these financials don't 
show it." 
4. "Questions 1 through 4 reflect Campbell earnings 
being overstated while Edwards understated--but 
Wall Street pricing reflecting current reported EPS. 
This questionnaire is 
development capitalization 
incredibly stupid--the 
issue deserves a more 
intelligent consideration by the accounting and 
investment communities!" 
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One analyst's response was mixed. Although 100% of 
investment funds (Question 1) would be allocated to Edwards, 
Campbell's stock ($31) is valued higher than Edwards ($19). 
Campbell is considered to be an extremely risky investment, 
whereas an investment in Edwards is considered safe. 
Campbell is expected to experience more growth over the next 
five years. The follow i ng reasons were given for these 
responses: 
Question 1 (Allocate 100% to Edwards) 
"While Campbell appears to be growing more rapidly 
and has stronger profitability ratios, its account-
ing is responsible for jazzing up the numbers vis a 
vis Edwards. Like many companies in the software 
group (CMSV, AAC) Campbell's financials are built 
on a house of cards." 
ouestion 2 (Stock price--Campbell S3l~ Edwards $19) 
"Because i nves tors do not d i scr im i na te regard ing 
quality of earnings, Campbell's record appears more 
sol id. Thus, I have arb i trar i ly ass igned a value 
to Campbell of five times revenues which is how the 
market values similar companies. I have accorded a 
lower valuat ion--three times revenues to Edwards. 
Likewise, investors using some factor of book value 
to value the investment would start off on a higher 
base with Campbell, whose book value would include 
$15 million in software plus education construction 
costs as assets, whereas Edwards books none." 
Questions 3 & 4 (Campbell-extremely risky; Edwards-safe) 
"For reasons highlighted in Question 1 and Question 
2 above, I consider Campbell's accounting to fly in 
the face of conservatism, which oftentimes catches 
up wi th compan ies. I fee 1 the low qual i ty of its 
earnings impairs its suitability as an investment, 
especially when one is looking out five to ten 
years. It could be suitable for a short-term trader 
with a six month time horizon." 
Question 5 (Campbell will experience more growth) 
"In the early stages of product development, 
Campbell will be deferring more of its costs, while 
Edwards wi 11 be expens ing its costs. There fore, 
Campbell will appear to have more rapid earnings 
growth." 
Genera 1 Comment: II Do not agree wi th Campbe 11' s method 
of accounting for what it calls 'computer software 
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and educational courseware construction costs.' 
Construct ion impl ies product developmen t, not 
enhancements, and I question the suitability under 
FASB No.2 in deferring these costs." 
Some analysts trea ted both companies equally. 
comments were as follows: 
Their 
1. "Companies are the same except for accounting 
treatment of computer software and education course-
ware construction costs." 
"Riskier than Edwards because more aggressive 
accounting, but this issue is being debated--
amortization and capitalization may more clearly 
portray match of income vs. expense but is more 
open to abuse." 
2. "Obviously the two companies are the same except 
for the accounting treatment of software develop-
ment cost. The accounting treatment has little 
bearing on the fundamental worth of a company. The 
two are of equal but low value. Both are risky, 
unprofitable and unseasoned." 
3. "These companies are identical as to business and 
their potential growth rates. The financial state-
ments are identical except that Edwards writes off 
its courseware construction costs and Campbell 
amortizes them. For most investors this is mis-
leading but for evaluation purposes both companies 
must be valued using comparative accounting methods. 
While Edwards accounting is more conservative than 
Campbell's, both companies should have the same 
stock price." 
4 .. "Obviously the same compa:'ly using different 
accounting rules." 
5. .. You are ask i ng ques t ions abou t an industry that 
defies analysis on basis of accounting. As an 
advisor, given risk assumption of Mr. Madison, r'd 
suggest buying both." 
Several analysts returned the questionnaires blank, or 
with minor notations. Comments centered around the fact 
that filling out the questionnaire would take too long to 
fill out. 
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Question No.7: Do you consider yourself to be a spe-
cialist in the software industry? (See Table 11.5) 
Yes 
No 
TABLE 11.5 
Question Seven 
Number of 
Responses 
8 
7 
15 
Percentage 
53.3% 
46.7 
100.0% 
Eight of the fifteen respondents (53.3%) considered them-
selves to be specialists in the software industry. 
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SUMMARY 
The response rate was too low to conduct any kind of 
meaningful. statistical analysis. However, the fact that 8 
out of 13 analysts would treat the companies differently is 
signif icant. Furthermore, of the 5 analysts that would 
accord both companies the same treatment, their responses 
indicate that one reason for identical treatment was because 
they subscribe to the efficient market hypothesis, which 
states that accounting policy does not make a difference. 
The Jensen study, which used a research methodology that was 
almost identical to the one used in this chapter, concluded 
that the accounting policy chosen does influence analysts' 
decisions. 
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FOOTNOTES 
lA similar approach was used in Robert E. Jensen's doc-
toral dissertation at Stanford University. That study 
investigated relationships between (a) security evaluation 
and portfolio selection· and (b) alternative inventory 
valuation and depreciation methods in financial reporting. 
See Robert E. Jensen, "An Experimental Design for Study of 
Effects of Accounting Variations in Decision Making," 
Journal of Accounting Research, Autumn, 1966, 224-238. The 
questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix J. 
2The financial information in the Appendix K for Campbell 
Corporation (1981-1983) is actually the financial data for 
Comserv Corporation for 1980-1982. The dates were changed 
for purposes of this study to make the financials appear 
more current. The f i nanc ia Is for Edwards Corporation for 
1981-1983 actually reflect what Comserv Corporation's finan-
cials for 1980-1982 would have looked like if Comserv had 
expensed all software costs as incurred. Comserv's actual 
stock price for 1982 fluctuated between $11.50 and $19.75. 
For 1981, it fluctuated between $9.17 and $16.00. 
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CHAPTER 12 
AN INTRODUCTION TO PART III 
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Part III addresses issues relating to software taxation, both at 
the federal and state levels. This aspect of software accounting was 
first revealed to me during the course of the interviews conducted 
with execut ives of software vendor and user companies. A literature 
search later revealed that most of what has been written on software 
accounting in recent years has been on the tax aspects of the subject. 
Prior to the Burns and Peterson article that appeared in the April, 
1982 issue of The Journal of Accountancy, the literature addressed 
software taxation issues almost exclusively. The interviews 
conducted with corporate executives led me to seek out and Interview 
a number of attorneys specializing in software taxatIon. Such 
experts were not difficult to find; their names kept appearing in the 
llterature, and their names were listed in the telephone directory. 
A number of tax aspects remain in a state of f lux. At the state 
level, software that is sold or leased might trigger a sales or use tax, 
depending on the state involved, the type of software involved, the 
means used to de I iver the software, and whether the software is 
bundled with hardware. The property tax might be triggered if the 
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software is in the possession of an owner or lessee on the property 
tax date. One of the central issues regarding state taxability revolves 
around whether the software in Question is classified as tangible or 
intangible property. If tangible, a number of states would impose a 
sales, use or property tax on the sale, lease or ownership of the 
software. However, in some states, "canned" or "off the shelf" 
software is considered tangible, whIle "custom" software is 
intangible. Dist inguishing between the two categories can somet imes 
be an exercise in frustration, especially if standard software is 
purchased and then customized to fit user specifications. Another 
complicating factor is the mode of delivery. Software delivered in the 
form of a tape or disk may be considered tangible and therefore 
SUbject to tax, whereas software that is delivered over telephone 
wires may be classified as intangible electrical energy. Most states 
have rules to govern the various possibilities, but the states are in 
confllct. Each state legislature (51 of them, if you include the 
District of Columbia) and state court system has the right to 
establish its own view, and almost all states have exercised this 
right, resulting in many sets of different rules to govern the 
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taxability of software. What may be a taxable event in one state may 
be tax-free in another state, which makes I ife more compl icated for 
corporat ions that engage in multi-state business, but also provides 
numerous tax planning opportunities. As technology advances and 
states cont i nue to search for new sources of tax revenue, the taxat i on 
of software changes on a state by state basis. State courts continue 
to hear cases on software taxation, and the decisions rendered in 
1985 may be different than the decisions the same state court 
rendered ten years ago. State legislatures also continue to change the 
rules, making it difficult for businessmen to plan. 
At the federal level, there are two tax incentives that may apply 
to software expenditures. The investment tax credit may be taken on 
certain software that is bundled with hardware, but at least one 
federal court has held that unbundled software also qualifies for the 
tax credit. To make matters more complicated, there is a movement 
afoot to repeal the investment tax credit, which means that software 
costs will no longer qualify for this credit. The credit for research 
and experimental expenditures may also apply for certain software 
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expenditures, but the rule on this credit has not yet been clarlfied and 
will not be clarified until the end of 1986, at the earliest. 
Furthermore, this credit is due to expire at the end of 1985, but there 
is another movement afoot to extend its expiration deadline. 
With all these fascinating and unsettled aspects of software 
taxation, it was decided that an attempt would be made to uncover 
the current pract ices of software vendor and user com pan i es. In 
order to gather the necessary data, a series of questions were 
included in the questionnaires that were sent to software vendors and 
software users. Responses to these questions were discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 6. Court briefs of the most important cases are 
included in Appendix C. Applicable IRS pronouncements are reproduced 
in Appendix D, which may be referred to when reading the material on 
federal taxation. The DPMA Position Statement on Software Taxation 
is reproduced in Appendix E. Although the material for Part III was 
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written with the professional in mind, much can be learned by lay 
readers as well. An attempt has been made to write in a style that is 
both understandable to the lay reader and sufficiently precise for the 
spec i a 11 st. 
Chapter 13 addresses state software tax issues, that is, sales, 
use and property taxation. The material is assembled in a more or 
less chronological pattern; the earlier cases are discussed before the 
most recent cases. This sequence makes sense, Since the most recent 
cases rely on the precedent of the older cases. (All this sounds so 
historical - the oldest software case was decided in 1972, after 
World War", Korea and Vietnam). The earl ier cases could not rely on 
software case precedent, because there was none, so cases in re lated 
areas, such as fllm-making, the sale of information, the Uniform 
Commercial Code and data processing service bureaus had to be cited 
instead. The most important of these related cases are also 
discussed in this chapter, and are summarized in Appendix C. The last 
portion of the chapter provides a summary of software taxation on a 
state by state basis. 
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Chapter 14 discusses federal tax law relating to software. 
Included in this chapter are discussions of the investment tax credit 
and the credit for research and experimental expenditures. Both areas 
are in a state of fluxJ and the chapter addresses this situat ion. The 
material contained in Appendices C and 0 might profitably be read in 
conjunct ion with this chapterJ as these appendices contain summaries 
of relevant federal cases and a full text of the three IRS 
pronouncements that are on point. Responses to the tax quest ions in 
the software vendor and user questionnaires (Chapters 3 and 6) might 
also be profitably reviewed. 
Chapter 15 provides a summary of Part III J and relates the 
material in this part to the material in Part I. 
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN 
STATE TAXATION OF SOFTWARE 
508 
BACKGROUND 
Prior to mid-1969, State taxation of computer software 
was not an issue. Companies that sold hardware included the 
software at no extra charge. The price of the software was 
nbundled n with that of the hardware. In 1969, IBM became 
the first major hardware manufacturer to state separately 
the price of its hardware and software. l The decision to 
separately state the price of hardware and software was par-
tially in response to anti-trust pressure. 2 As a result of 
IBM's announcement, a new industry developed--that of soft-
ware manufacturing. As of the end of 1983, there are more 
than 4,000 independent manufacturers of software in the 
United States alone. Many of these firms are small in terms 
of revenue, and are privately held, but some software manu-
facturers are publicly owned and are among the Fortune 1000. 
Since the unbundling of software in the late 1960's a 
series of controversies have developed, primarily revolving 
around the issue of whether software is tangible or intangi-
ble for State sales, use, and property tax purposes, as well 
as for federal tax purposes. 3 If software is classified as 
tangible personal property, it is generally subject to State 
sales, use, and property taxation. If intangible, it is 
generally exempt. As of late 1983 thirty-three States assess 
a sales or use tax on prewritten programs and twenty States 
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do so for custom programs. 4 One 'reason for the difference 
in tax treatment is that standardized programs are sometimes 
viewed as a product or "good," whereas custom programming is 
looked upon as a service in some States. 
The advent of the taxation of the sale of software has 
generated much controversy.5 Part of the problem lies in 
the fact that there seems to be more than one acceptable 
definition of "software," and there is no clear-cut line 
that distinguishes a software product or "good" within the 
meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code 6 from a service, or 
even, in some cases, what distinguishes "software" from 
"hardware." We now turn to that issue. 
WHAT IS SOFTWARE? 
In order to analyze the var ious methods of accounting 
for software it might be good to start with a definition of 
software. Unfortunately, no single definition is currently 
undispu tably accepted. Software might be def ined as the 
programs that tell the computer what to do. Or, it might be 
defined as total data processing expenditures less hardware, 
communications and supply costs. Another definition might be 
total data processing personnel costs plus the costs associ-
ated with the purchase or lease of computer programs devel-
oped by outside organizations. Software cost might also 
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include the portion of hardware expenditures that reflect 
the bundled operating system component. Certain end user 
expendi tures might also be included in the def ini tion of 
software costs. 
The most broad definition would be that software includes 
everything that is not hardware, which would include manuals 
and other educational materials as well as personnel training 
program costs and hardware maintenance costs. 7 
Computer hardware is generally thought to consist of the 
physical equipment that actually makes up the computer 
system, such as the central processing unit, input and out-
put devices, and an information storage center. a 
The Computer Dictionary and Handbook has defined soft-
ware as: 
1. "The internal programs or routines pro-
fessionally prepared to simplify programming and 
computer operations .•• 
2. Various programming aids that are fre-
quently supplied by the manufacturers to facilitate 
the purchaser's eff icient operation of the equip-
mente Such software items include var ious 
assemblers, generators, subroutine libraries, 
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as: 
compilers, operating systems, and industry-
application programs."9 
Frank has defined software as: 
" ••. that which could be invoked by hardware ••. 
software includes the design and development of 
computer programs as well as their maintenance. It 
does not include the costs assoc ia ted with 
operations."IO 
The Internal Revenue Service defines computer software 
" ••. all programs or routines used to cause a com-
pu ter to perform a des ired task or set of tasks, 
and the documentation required to describe and 
maintain those programs. Computer programs of all 
classes, for example, operating systems, executive 
systems, monitors, . compilers and translators, 
assembly routines, and utility programs as well as 
application programs are included. 'Computer soft-
ware' does not include procedures which are exter-
nal to computer operations, such as instructions to 
transcription operators and external control pro-
cedures."ll 
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The definition of software promulgated by the National 
Bureau of Standards12 and adopted by the U. S. Bureau of 
Standards13 is: "Computer programs,. procedures, rules, and 
possibly associated documentation concerned with the opera-
tion of a data processing system." 
Several courts and State legislatures have also defined 
software. Some have even made distinctions between systems 
software and applications software. The Supreme Court of 
Tennessee14 has defined a systems (operational) program as 
one that is fundamental to the functioning of the hardware, 
or software that controls the hardware and makes it run. 
of: 
Bryant and Mather lS state that systems software consists 
1. compilers, which are used to translate 
symbolic code into machine language, and which are 
also capable of replacing a series of instructions 
with subroutines; 
2. sorts, which assemble and file items of 
data in a certain sequence or order; and 
3. utility routines, which perform functions 
such as transferring data from one magnetic tape to 
another. 
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Applications software was viewed as performing useful 
tasks, such as employee payrolls or loan amortization 
schedules. 16 Accounts receivable, payable, inventory and 
even home computer command modules, diskette and cassette 
programs would be included under this category. 
The reason for this systems/applications distinction is 
due to tax treatment. Systems software may be regarded as an 
integral part of the hardware, therefore, making it tangible 
b ' , "d" 17 property su Ject to tax 1n some Jur1S 1ct1ons. Applica-
tions software is treated by some jurisdictions as intang-
ible property not subject to taxation. 
Anthony G. Ferraro18 has defined hardware and software 
as follows: 
"Hardware consists of the electronic components 
and mechanical components that comprise a series of 
machines which have the abili ty to interpret and 
follow software instructions to produce a useful 
product. Software consists of programs that are 
used to operate the machine to make the system pro-
duce a des irable result. Hardware cannot perform 
functions for which it was designed without a soft-
ware program. 
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There are two kinds of software, both con-
sisting of tangible instructions. They differ only 
in their intended purpose. One is called "opera-
tional" software, and the other is called "utility" 
or "application" software. Operational systems 
software is the written operating instructions, 
programmed into tape, for the purpose of making a 
computer operational. For example, a computer has 
operational software programs so that it will func-
tion as determined by the design and the engineer-
ing of the particular computer. These same soft-
ware instructions would be furnished to all users 
of that same type of equipment. The expense of 
this basic engineering cost is the same as the 
engineering cost of any other operational program. 
Whether the cost is handled as an engineering 
expense or as a software cost is merely a matter of 
company policy. 
Application or utility software is designed to 
allow the specific user better to utilize the 
equipment. The cost of mater ials and labor to 
develop the systems analyses, systems designs and 
programs are all part of the computer software 
program. This involves endless man-hours whereby 
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these products are outlined, established, debugged 
and tested." 
I th . 1 l' 19 d . n e same Journa , Kar Helnzman escrlbes software 
as follows: 
" 'Software' may be very broadly def ined as a 
collection of instructions of programs (such as 
assemblers, compilers, utility routines, applica-
tion programs and operating systems) which are fed 
into a computer to tell it what to do. There are 
two types of computer programs or procedures 
(software) which must be recognized: 
(1) Those which have to do with the operation 
of a computer, sometimes called basic soft-
ware, system control programs or computer 
operational software ( •.. operational soft-
ware) ; 
(2) Those which have to do with the implemen-
tation of a system, procedures or computer 
applications which are sometimes referred to 
as application programs, product programs, 
custom software services or computer applica-
tion software ( •.• application software)." 
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Some State legislatures 20 have split hairs even further 
by distinguishing an "off the shelf" or "canned n program 
from a "custom" program. A "canned H program is one that is 
sold to several users, whereas a "customized" program is 
written for one user according to that user's specifica-
tions. However, problems of definition can develop when a 
seller of software makes changes in a "canned n program to 
meet the requirements of one particular user. How extensive 
can the changes be before the "canned" program becomes a 
"customized" program? 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board has issued an 
Interpretation 21 and a Technical Bulletin22 on the topic of 
software accounting. Neither publication defines software, 
although they do state that, for accounting purposes, soft-
ware costs need not always be treated as research and 
development costs which must be expensed. Unfortunately, 
neither pronouncement clearly states when "software costs" 
(whatever that term means) can be capitalized and amortized 
for financial accounting purposes. 
With all these conflicting and inconsistent definitions 
of software being offered by various private groups, federal 
agencies, State legislatures, and a multitude of courts, it 
is no wonder that the issue of software has become so com-
plex. And, it appears as though the conflicts involving 
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software will not be resolved at any time in the near 
future. As technology continues to evolve the very nature 
of software will also change. Already a hybrid form called 
"firmware" has evolved, which is separate and distinct from 
both hardware and software. 23 
TANGIBLE v. INTANGIBLE 
The primary issue in software tax cases is tangibility. 
If software is viewed as tangible it is often subject to 
state sales, use and property taxes; if classified as 
intangible, it is often exempt from tax. Several lines of 
legal reasoning have been used to justify classifying soft-
ware as intangible, and therefore exempt from tax. 
The "knowledge" rationale and the "personal service" 
rationale were both used in District of Columbia v. 
Universal Computer Associates,24 the first case to address 
the taxability (and tangibility) of computer software. (See 
Case No. 18 in Appendix C for more detail.) In that case, a 
custom program and a "canned" program were held to be in-
tangible property and therefore not subject to the personal 
property tax. The reasoning was that it was the intangible 
information contained on the cards that was being purchased 
and not the cards themselves. Once the information con-
tained on the cards was transferred into the computer, all 
that remained was the knowledge, which is intangible. 
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Other cases have relied on a similar line of reasoning 
to justify the classification of software as intangible. In 
a Tennessee case,25 it was held that both systems and appli-
cations software are intangible in cases where the tangible 
medium used (card, tape, disk, etc.) is either returned to 
the seller or destroyed. The reasoning is that the property 
purchased is actually intangible knowledge, and the use of a 
tang ible medium to transfer that intangible knowledge is 
"merely incidental to the purchase of the intangible know-
ledge and information stored on the tapes."26 
Other courts have expanded on the knowledge rationale 
first espoused in Universal Computer Associates and Commerce 
Union Bank v. Tidwell (see Case No. 11, Appendix C). The 
"essence of the transaction" test was applied by the Texas 
Supreme Court27 three years after Tidwell. Following the 
reasoning of the District of Columbia Circuit Court and the 
Tennessee Supreme Court, the Texas court held that, where 
the transaction is in essence the purchase of an intangible, 
such as a custom or canned program, the sale is exempt from 
the Texas sales tax, which only appl ies to the sale of 
tangible property. 
The knowledge rationale, as applied in the District of 
Columbia, Tennessee and Texas, classif ies both custom and 
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canned software as intangible~ both systems and applications 
software are so classified. 
The "relative value" test has also been applied to soft-
ware tax cases. 28 This test recognizes software creation to 
be a process involving both tangible and intangible elements. 
Most of the value of a software product is attributable to 
the intellectual content~ the tangible medium used to store 
and transfer this knowledge, cards, a tape or disk, are 
incidental costs. Programs selling for $50,000 might be 
stored on tapes or disks costing under $50, so the purchaser 
of a program is actually buying knowledge rather than a phy-
sical product. 
The "m6de of transmission" test has also been applied in 
a number of cases. 29 This test has a few variations, but 
basically stands for the proposition that, where the know-
ledge can be conveyed from the seller to the buyer without 
the use of a physical medium, such as cards, a tape or disk, 
the transaction involves the sale of intang ible property. 
This transfer can occur, in theory at least, by having the 
seller's programmer give verbal instructions to the buyer's 
computer operator. A more practical approach, and one that 
is often used,30 is to transfer the program from the 
seller's computer to the buyer's computer directly, over 
telephone lines. using this mode of transmission can save 
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$30,000 if the sale of a $500,000 program involves a 6 per-
cent sales tax State, 'provided the sale would otherwise be 
taxable. 3l 
Several courts have made the analogy of software pro-
grams to films and phonograph records. 32 Films and records 
have much in common with computer software but several 
distinctions can be made as well. Most of the value of a 
film or record (or a book, for that matter) is attributable 
to the intellectual and artistic content rather than the 
celluloid, plastic or paper upon which that content is 
recorded. 33 'Buyers of records and film (movie theaters) do 
not consider themselves to be purchasers of celluloid or 
plastic. However, one cri tical distinction is that the 
celluloid upon which the movie is recorded is " ••• a crucial 
artistic element of the motion picture; without film there 
could be no movie."34 
Another distinction that can be made between film and 
software is that the media upon which the computer program 
is recorded (cards, tape, disk, etc.) can be returned to the 
seller or destroyed after the program has been run through 
the computer; it is of no further use or value. Movie film, 
on the other hand, has continuing value after the movie has 
been shown; it can be used again and again. 35 In Tidwell, 
the court also made an analogy between a phonograph record, 
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which is retained by the purchaser after use, and a computer 
tape, which is returned to the seller and is of no further 
use to the purchaser once the program has been run on the 
computer. 36 
Another distinction that has been made between software 
and films, records and books is that the latter three items 
can be used immediately upon purchase, whereas software must 
first be translated into a language that can be understood 
by the computer. 37 Furthermore, the latter three items are 
immediately perceptible to the senses, whereas software, in 
essence, is not. 38 
Another distinction that has been made between software 
and films, records and books is that the software sales or 
licensing agreement often includes periodic updating by the 
seller. Films, records and books, on the other hand, are 
not updated after sale. 39 However, this distinction does 
not apply to the many programs that are not updated after 
sale. 
Courts have also wrestled with the issue of whether the 
sale of computer software constitutes the sale of a product 
or a personal service. This issue is frequently raised in 
service bureau cases,40 although analogies to the Uniform 
Commercial Code4l and the sale of information 42 have also 
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been made. Generally speaking, if software is viewed as 
being a product or "good," it is tangible property subject 
to sales, use and property taxation. If viewed as a ser-
vice, software is intangible and not subject to these taxes. 
Canned programs are more likely to be viewed as products 
than are custom programs, which involve more personal ser-
vice. Software often involves elements of both sales and 
services, and courts have developed several tests to aid in 
making this distinction. One test is whether the transfer 
of property is necessary or merely convenient in order to 
achieve the primary purpose of the transaction. 43 Another 
test is whether the value of the materials is small compared 
to the value of the services. 44 A third test is whether the 
item transferred has value only to the purchaser, as is the 
case when a custom program is acquired, or whether the item 
can be sold to the general public, as is the case wi th 
canned programs. 45 
In the case of canned programs, no services are per-
formed at all; they are sold "off the shelf" as is, and are 
available to the general public. They are conveyed to the 
purchaser using a tangible medium, and there is no question 
that the transfer of the tangible property (cards, tape, 
disk, etc.) is more than merely incidental to the transac-
tion. In contrast, custom programs are different for a par-
ticular customer and are of no value to the general public. 
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The value of the tangible medium is small in comparison with 
the value of the services required to write the custom 
program. 
Before discussing the major cases that have been decided 
in the relatively new area of software taxation, a review of 
the oft-cited cases involving film, the sale of information, 
the Uniform Commercial Code, and computer service bureaus 
should be made, since the same reasoning regarding the 
tangibility and sale versus service issues applies to these 
areas. 
THE FILM CASES 
Film making and software creation have much in common. 
In both cases, the value of the product is der i ved almos t 
entirely from the intellectual effort put forth. The cellu-
loid upon which the film is recorded and the cards, tape or 
disk upon which software is recorded are incidental expenses. 
The purchaser of a film or software product is making the 
purchase for the intellectual content, not for the tangible 
property upon which the film or software is stored. 
Taxpayers have argued that this intangible purchase is not 
subject to the sales, use or property tax. 
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In United Artists Corp. v. Taylor,46 the New York court, 
in holding that the New York City sales tax law applied to 
the lease of a movie film print, said: 
"The transaction which is the subject of the tax 
under review consists of the transfer by the 
distributor to the exhibitor of the possession of 
corporeal property in the form of positive and 
negative prints of photoplays with the license to 
use or exhibit them for a specified time. The 
license to exhibit without the transfer of posses-
sion would be valueless. Together they are one 
transaction and constitute a sale within the defi-
nition of Local Law No. 24." 
In Saenger Realty Corp. v. Grosjean,47 the Louisiana 
Supreme Court held that the operator of a movie theater was 
liable for the Louisiana sales tax and that the measure of 
the tax was the amount paid to the producer for the lease of 
the film print. 
The frequently cited case of Crescent Amusement Co. v. 
carson,48 (see Case No. 16, Appendix C> citing United 
Artists and Saenger Realty, held that the rental or leasing 
of motion picture films is a rental or leasing of tangible 
personal property within the meaning of the Tennessee Sales 
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Tax Law, and that the correct measure of the tax is the 
gross amount of rent paid, not the cost of the physical 
material in the film print. The court stated that: 
"There is scarcely to be found any article suscep-
tible to sale or rent that is not the result of an 
idea, genius, skill and labor applied to a physical 
subs tance • A loaf of bread is the res ul t of the 
skill and labor of the cook who mixed the physical 
ingredients and applied heat at the temperature and 
consistency her judgment dictated. A radio is the 
result of the thought of a genius, or of several 
such persons, combined with the skill and labor of 
trained technicians applied to a tangible mass of 
substance. An automobile is the result of all 
these elements, and of patents, etc.; and so on, ad 
infinitum. If these elements should be separated 
from the finished product and the sales tax applied 
only to the cost of the raw material, the sales tax 
act would, for all practical purposes, be entirely 
destroyed. n49 
In Michael Todd Co. v. County of Los Angeles,50 (see 
Case No. 32, Appendix C) an ad valorem personal property tax 
was assessed against the Michael Todd Company on the film 
negatives of a copyrighted motion picture entitled "Around 
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the World in Eighty Days.n A tax of $105,064.46 was levied, 
based on an es.timated cash value of $1,526,900. Without 
copyright protection, the negatives would have a salvage 
value of $1,000. In a prior case,5l the Caiifornia court 
held that copyrights are not subject to the personal prop-
erty tax. The court held for the County of Los Angeles, 
stating that the value of intangibles can be included in the 
valuation of tangible property. 
In District of Columbia v. Norwood Studios, Inc.,52 (see 
Case No. 17, Appendix C> the issue was whether the sale of a 
motion picture produced under contract for television is the 
sale of personal services or the sale of a product subject 
to the sales tax. Norwood argued unsuccessfully that the 
tangible personal property involved was an inconsequential 
element and was therefore not subject to the sales tax. 53 
The Alabama Supreme Court has held that leased motion 
picture films constitute tangible personal property for 
privilege or license tax purposes. 54 The Arkansas Supreme 
Court held in American Television Co. v. Hervey,55 that a 
levy of a use tax on videotape material used by television 
stations pursuant to license agreements is a tax on tangible 
personal property. That court said: 
"We agree with the state that the right to use 
property cannot be separated from the property 
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itself and the 'right' spoken of by appellant would 
have no value except for the use of the tape or 
film -- the two cannot be separated."56 
The Michigan Appellate Court held that the master film 
negatives used to store printed material are tangible prop-
erty even though the value of the property is in the infor-
mation that is stored and not in the film itself. 57 In 
support of its contention that the master negatives were 
intangible property, University Microfilms cited a line of 
cases holding real estate abstract books58 and computer 
software 59 to be intangible, arguing that its master nega-
tives are analogous to abstract books and software because 
these items are only valuable for the information they con-
tain. 
The federal courts have addressed the film tangibility 
issue from an investment tax credi t perspective. In Walt 
Disney Productions v. United States (Disney 1),60 (see Case 
No. 42, Appendix C) master film negatives, which are used to 
make film prints, were held to be tangible property eligible 
for the investment tax credit. The master negatives, which 
are used to make other products (film prints), were likened 
to a machine which makes other products. 
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In Disney II1,61 (see Case No. 43, Appendix C) the fact 
situation was similar, but the issues were somewhat differ-
ent. In holding that the master film negatives in question 
were tangible property qualifying for the investment tax 
credit, the court also held that the investment tax credit 
taken is not subject to recapture, even though the film 
prints were used predominantly outside the United States for 
the per iod under audit. Treasury Regulation Section 
1.48-l(g)(i) provides that property physically located out-
side the United States during more than 50 percent of the 
year shall be considered used predominantly outside the 
United States, which would m~ke the property ineligible for 
the investment tax credit. However, the master negatives 
(upon which the investment tax credit was claimed) remained 
in the United States throughout 1970. Only the exhibition 
prints left the country, and the investment tax credit was 
not claimed on them. Therefore, no investment tax credi t 
need be recaptured. The court also held that even though 
the property in question may be treated as intangible for 
depreciation purposes, such treatment does not preclude tan-
gible treatment for purposes of the investment tax credit. 
529 
CASES INVOLVING THE SALE OF INFORMATION 
Stock Exchange Data 
In Dun & Bradstreet v. City of New York,62 the New York 
Court of Appeals cons idered the applicabil i ty of a local 
sales tax law in relation to the rendition of professional 
services. The taxpayer was in the business of supplying to 
its subscribers highly confidential information dealing with 
the financial standing of persons engaged in various busi-
nesses. As an incident to this service, each subscriber 
received for his own personal use a reference book at no 
extra charge. 
In ref us ing to allow the City of New York to tax the 
value of this reference book, the court articulated two fac-
tors that have since been used by other courts to distin-
guish tangible personalty from intangibles. First, the 
subscriber was able to make only a limited use of the books. 
Under the subscription contracts, title to the books 
remained in the taxpayer and the subscriber was expressly 
forbidden to share the confidential information contained 
therein with the public. Second, and more important, the 
physical properties of the reference book were merely inci-
dental to the services performed. As explained by the 
court: 
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" ••• The information furnished is of value to the 
subscr ibers and for it they pay, but not for the 
paper upon which the information is conveyed or for 
the reference books which are only guides to assist 
in the rendition of appellant's service. One does 
not think of a telephone company as a seller of 
books to its subscribers. It renders a service to 
make that service efficient, it furnishes its 
subscribers with books containing a list of its 
subscribers with their call numbers. The paper is 
a mere incident; the skilled service is that which 
is required. n63 
The two factors enumerated in this case have been used 
in software tax cases 64 to argue that software is intangible 
and therefore not subject to tax, since (I) the software 
license agreement prohibits the licensee to share the 
program wi th anyone else; (2) the licensor retains ti tIe; 
and (3) the physical medium used (cards, tape, disk, etc.) 
is merely incidental to the service performed. 
However, magazines have been held to be tangible prop-
erty, subject to the retailers' occupation tax unless other-
wise exempt. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that: 
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"The sale of magazines is essentially not different 
from the sale of a loaf of bread, or an automobile. 
While it is true that the utility or value of 
plaintiffs' magazines is in their content and not 
the paper and ink with which they are printed, the 
taxability of the transaction is not determined by 
weighing the value of the intangible properties of 
the item of sale, such as form, organization and 
design, against the value of its tangible proper-
ties, such as weight, size and texture. The test 
is, where tangible personal property is transferred, 
as the parties agree occurs in the transaction here 
involved, whether the transfer is the substance of 
the transaction or merely incidental to a service. 
In selling magazines by subscriptions, plaintiffs 
act as retailers of tangible personal property and 
as such are liable for retailer's occupation tax, 
if not otherwise exempt."65 
Dun & Bradstreet can be distinguished from Time, Inc., 
on the basis of ownership and the nature of the information 
being conveyed. In Dun & Bradstreet, the licensee was paying 
for confidential information that could not easily be 
obtained elsewhere, and the information obtained could not 
be conveyed to others. In Time, Inc., the information could 
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easily be obtained from other sources, including the public 
library, without purchasing the magazine, and ownership 
changed upon purchase. 
In another case,66 Bunker-Ramo (see ,Case No.6, Appendix 
C> provided stock brokers and security dealers with stock 
exchange inf orma tion electronically for a fee. As part of 
the agreement, Bunker-Ramo installed tangible personal prop-
erty to receive the electronic transmissions on the custo-
mer's premises at a cost varying between $6,644 and $16,522. 
Approximately 110 Bunker-Ramo employees were engaged in 
customer servicing and the reception, edi ting, transforma-
tion and preparation of raw data that is eventually trans-
mitted to subscribers. Bunker-Ramo employees make frequent 
visits to subscriber premises to correct errors. 
Bunker-Ramo contended that the transmission of this data 
constitutes a personal service and is therefore not subject 
to the Ohio sales tax. The Tax Commissioner alleged that 
such transmissions constitute the sale of tangible personal 
property subject to the sales tax. 
The Ohio Supreme Court held for the Tax Commissioner. 
Citing American District Telegraph Co. v. porterfield,67 
Randall Park Jockey Club v. peck,68 and Recording Devices, 
Inc. v. Bowers,69 the court stated that Bunker-Ramo's trans-
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actions would be considered sales because they involve the 
transfer of possession and licenses to use tangible personal 
property unless the transactions were found to be personal 
service transactions. 
"An examination of the record indicates that the 
activity which the appellee performs is a completely 
mechanized service transaction. It is not a per-
sonal service transaction in the sense that there 
are no people engaged in serving directly the 
subscribers of appellee. This service is rendered 
automatically by computers, communication lines and 
reception and display instruments.,,7D 
While some services rendered are tailored to the per-
sonal needs of subscribers, the relatively small number of 
people required to oversee, maintain and service the devices 
on the subscribers' premises indicated to the court that 
very little personal service was involved. 
In Quotron Systems, Inc. v. Comptroller of the 
Treasury,7l (see Case No. 33, Appendix C) Quotron provided 
its s ubscr ibers with stock exchange and other inf orma tion 
electronically over leased telephone and telegraph lines 
from its computer in New York. Quotron provided the hard-
ware its customers needed to receive the information. The 
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Comptroller contended that Quotron was providing both a ser-
vice and hardware to its subscribers. Quotron maintained 
that only a service was provided, and that it was Quotron, 
not the subscriber, that was using the hardware. The court 
held that Quotron was not subject to a Maryland use tax on 
that part of its monthly charges which was attributable to 
use of the hardware where the hardware had no utility in and 
of itself to subscribers. 
In its Quotron decision, the Marylanq Supreme Court 
relied on Comptroller of the Treasury v. Chesapeake & 
Potomac Telephone Company,72 which held that a two-step 
analysis should be employed when both services and equipment 
are involved. 
First, the overall function must be characterized by the 
examination of various factors as either a rental or transfer 
of possession, or a service. Secondly, it must be determined 
whether that function is subject to a sales tax. In other 
jur isdictions in which the same or similar questions have 
been considered, the same analysis has been employed. 73 
Courts in other jurisdictions which similarly have examined 
the relationship between equipment and services in charac-
terizing an 
standard. 74 
overall function, 
This standard was 
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have applied a third 
expressed by the Supreme 
Court of III inois in Sn i te v. Department of Revenue as 
follows: 
"If the article sold has no value to the purchaser 
except as a result of services rendered by the ven-
dor and the transfer of the article to the purchaser 
is an actual and necessary part of the service ren-
dered, then the vendor is engaged in the business 
of rendering service and not in the business of 
selling at retail. If the article sold is the sub-
stance of the transaction and the service rendered 
is merely incidental to and an inseparable part of 
the transfer to the purchaser of the article sold, 
then the vendor is engaged in the business of 
selling at retail, and the tax which he pays for 
the privilege of engaging in such business is 
measured by the price which the purchaser pays for 
the article and the service incident thereto. n75 
Credit Information 
In Credi t Bureau of Miami County, Inc. v. Collins, 76 
(see Case No. 15, Appendix C) the taxpayer provided credit 
information to customers both orally and in written form. 
The Ohio Supreme Court held that, in cases where information 
was transferred in written form, the tangible property con-
536 
veyed was an inconsequential element in the transaction, and 
that the true object of the transaction was not the acqui~i­
tion of the taxpayer's property, but rather the services the 
taxpayer provided. 77 
Mailing Lists 
In Fingerhut Products Company v. Commissioner of 
Revenue,78 (see Case No. 20, Appendix C) a direct mail mer-
chandiser of a wide range of products purchased mailing 
lists from a broker. For these labels, Fingerhut p.aid a 
rental fee of $17.50 to $25.00 per thousand names. The 
value of the tangible material upon which the names and 
addresses are printed is approximately eighty cents per 
thousand. 
The Commissioner assessed a tax deficiency on the rental 
of these lists, asserting that the lists constituted tangi-
ble personal property. Fingerhut contended that the essence 
of what it received from the brokers was not a physical list 
of names, but rather a service which supplied highly sophis-
ticated advertising information which was an intangible com-
modity. 
In its unsuccessful argument, Fingerhut maintained that 
its procurement and use of the mailing lists supplied by its 
brokers satisfies both of the criteria established in Dun & 
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Bradstreet v. City of New York,79 which held that where the 
subscriber is able to make only limited use of the property 
and where the value of the physical property is incidental 
compared to the value of the service, the transaction will 
be viewed as the purchase of an intangible service rather 
than a tangible product. In holding the labels to be 
tangible, the court said: 
"We feel that the use of the Cheshire tapes, gummed 
labels •.. is a use of the tang ible property of the 
medium distinct .•• in that the tapes and labels are 
physically separated and attached to the envelopes. 
In such a case, the physical manifestation of the 
property is itself used--not merely the intangible 
. f . ,,80 1n ormat10n. 
In Spencer Gifts, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxa-
tion,8l (see Case No. 36, Appendix C) the opposite conclu-
sion was reached. Spencer extracted the mailing list infor-
mation from a computer tape, which was then promptly returned 
to the vendor. The value of the information acquired far 
exceeded the value of the tape, which was returned. In 
holding that the leasing of computer information is not the 
leasing of tang ible personal property, the court dis tin-
guished Spencer from Fingerhut. In Fingerhut, the physical 
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manifestation of the property itself (tapes and labels) was 
used, whereas in Spencer the information was received in 
incorporeal form. In a more recent case, 82 the New York 
court held that the purchase of mailing lists obtained by 
computer tape constitute the purchase of information rather 
than tangible personal property. However, the purchase of 
information is a taxable event in New York. 83 
Artwork 
Some courts 84 have made an analogy of software and cer-
t~in artwork, since the value of both is attributable pri-
marily to the labor involved and not the tangible property 
upon which the results of the labor are recorded. In 
Washington Times-Herald, Inc. v. District of Columbia,85 the 
newspaper purchased the right to reproduce cartoons from the 
artist. These cartoons were transferred to the newspaper and 
were physically embodied in mats which were then used to 
reproduce the cartoons in the newspaper. In that case, the 
court held that what the newspaper had purchased was the 
right to reproduce the cartoons, and not the material upon 
which the cartoons were impressed. 
"The price was paid for the artists' work, i.e., 
for the right to reproduce the impressions on the 
mats--not for the mats themselves. The newspaper 
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bought the creation of the artist--not the material 
on which it was impressed--and the right to repro-
duce it. Without that right, the comic strips mats 
would be entirely worthless. n86 
A similar result was reached by the Florida court in 
Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Department 
of Revenue, 87 (see Case No. 35, Appendix C) where it was 
held that the sale of artwork that ultimately appears in the 
telephone book yellow pages constitutes the sale of a ser-
vice rather than tangible personal property. The court 
reached its decision after consider ing the following fac-
tors: 
(l) Whether or not the property to be transferred 
as a result of the transaction is already in 
existence or whether it is produced in the 
course of the services rendered: 
(2) The value of the individual effort involved in 
the transaction as compared to the value of 
the property transferred; 
(3) Whether or not it is essential to the transac-
tion that the specific tangible personal pro-
perty is created. 88 
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CASES INVOLVING THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
The Uniform Commercial Code has different rules for 
"goods" and "services." If software is classified as 
"goods," it may be classified as tangible property in some 
states, thereby making the sale of software a taxable event. 
If classified as a service, the transaction may escape tax. 
The Uniform Commercial Code defines "goods" as: 
" ••. all things (including specially manufactured 
goods) which are movable at the time of identifica-
tion to the contract for sale other than the money 
in which the price is to be paid ... "89 
Helvey v. Wabash County REMC 90 (see Case No. 25, Appendix 
C) addressed the issue of whether electr ical energy is a 
"good" or a service. In order to be a "good" under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, the property in question must be 
(1) a thing; (2) existing; and (3) movable, with (2) and (3) 
existing simultaneously. 
qualifies in each respect. 
The court held that electr ic i ty 
Although Helvey was concerned with whether the six year 
statute of limitations (for sale of a service) or the four 
year statute (sale of a "good") applied, the fact that 
electrical energy was classified as a "good" rather than a 
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service is significant, because software is sometimes trans-
ferred over telephone lines, and such transfers could be 
construed as being the transfer of tangible personal prop-
erty subject to sales and use taxation, although several 
courts have suggested that a transfer of software over 
telephone lines is not a taxable event. 91 
In Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corporation,92 
(see Case No.7, Appendix C) the court held that the 
purchase of bundled hardware and software consti tutes the 
purchase of a "good" rather than a service. The acquisition 
did not function properly due to faulty programming and 
Beasley sued for recovery of the purchase price under the 
Uniform Commercial Code. The hardware was virtually useless 
without the software. 
In F & M Schaefer Corporation v. Electronic Data Systems 
Corporation,93 (see Case No. 19, Appendix C) the court held 
software to be tangible for replevin purposes. In another 
case 94 decided at about the same time as F & M Schaefer, the 
New York court held that the purchase of a "turn-key" system 
involving both hardware and software constituted the sale of 
a "good," so that the Uniform Commercial Code's four year 
statute of limitations for breach of contract applies, 
rather than the six year statute for breach involving a ser-
vice. The Tr iangle court (see Case No. 39, Appendix C) 
based its reasoning on North American Leisure Corp. v. A & B 
Duplicators, Ltd. ,95 which held that a contract is for a 
"service A rather than "sale" when service predominates, and 
the sale of items is incidental. In Triangle, the precise 
converse was true. The essence of the contract was for the 
sale of goods. While certain services by Honeywell were 
contemplated, the contract was primarily one for the sale of 
goods. 96 
Chatlos. Systems, Inc. v. National Cash Register Corpora-
. 97 tlon, Inc., (see Case No.8, Appendix C) also involved a 
breach of contract action. Cha tlos purchased a computer 
system involving both hardware and software components from 
NCR.. The system did not function as promised, and Chatlos 
brought an action for breach of warranty. The court held 
the property in question to be a tangible "good," and that 
the Uniform Commercial Code rather than common law contract 
law applied. The transaction was for the sale of goods not-
wi thstanding the incidental service aspects and the lease 
arrangement. 98 On appeal, both parties conceded the appli-
cability of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
CASES INVOLVING DATA PROCESSING SERVICE BUREAUS 
Data processing service bureaus perform functions that 
are not always easy to classify as falling neatly and exclu-
sively into either the product or service category. In an 
early series of Ohio cases,99 (see Case No.1, Appendix C) 
the Ohio Supreme Court quoted an even earlier Arizona case, 
which set forth the following possibilities regarding mixed 
sales of services and property: 
"( 1) The service is the main i tern sold and the 
property sold is incidental thereto and not 
separa tely charged (not a taxable sale as a 
sale of services). 
"(2) The services and property sold can be readily 
separated (one tax exempt and the other 
taxable) • 
"(3) The service sold is incidental to the property 
and not separately charged (taxable in 
gross)."lOO 
The Arizona court, recognizing that the category into 
which a vendor falls is a question of fact to be determined 
in light of all the evidence, stated that: 
"When there is a fixed and ascertainable relation-
ship between the value of the article and the value 
of the service rendered in connection therewith so 
that both may be separately stated, then the vendor 
is engaged in both selling at retail and furnishing 
services and is subject to the tax as to one and 
tax exempt as to the other. Where the property and 
the services are distinct and each is a consequen-
tial element capable of ready separation, it cannot 
be said one is an inconsequential element wi thin 
the exemption provided by the statute. See Rice v. 
Evatt, 144 Ohio St. 483, 59 N.E.2d 927, 157 A.L.R. 
572 (1945).nlOl 
In Accountants Computer Services, raw data was received 
from customers in the form of punch paper tapes or adding 
machine tapes upon which the customer's debits and credits 
are recorded. Accountants then processed the information by 
machine and furnished individual clients with printouts that 
were used by the customer to draft financial statements, 
etc. Data were sorted, classified and rearranged by 
Accountants machine. The court held that this process 
results in the sale of a product rather than a service and, 
as such, is subject to the Ohio sales tax. 
Central Data Systems provided clients with data pro-
cessing, key punching, systems design and programming, and 
contract consulting. In this case, the court determined 
that what was being sold was a service rather than a pro-
duct. Central can be distinguished from Accountants 
because, in Central, the company's professional workers 
applied "thinking" as well as mechanical processing. It was 
the analysis and thinking skills of Central employees that 
was being sold: the data processing machinery and related 
pr intouts were merely used by Central personnel to assist 
them in rendering their personal service. Because the per-
sonal service was the main item contracted for, and the 
resulting printed matter constituted an inconsequential ele-
ment for which no separate charge was made, the court held 
that the sale of the tangible personal property was not sub-
ject to taxation. 
In Jergens, the company contracted wi th A. C. Nielsen 
Company, a market research organization. Nielsen was to 
compile statistical data as well as to provide analysis and 
interpretation of data, and to assist management in making 
marketing dec is ions based on the data provided. As an 
integral part of the service furnished, Nielsen assigned 
account executives to Jergens' account whose duty it was to 
analyze, interpret and present to Jergens' management the 
information developed by Nielsen in a meaningful and useful 
manner. 
The Andrew Jergens Company case represents an even 
clearer example of a transaction involving the sale of a 
service rather than a product. The A. C. Nielsen Company 
was hired to gather, analyze and interpret data, and to 
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assist AJC' s management in making marketing decisions. It 
was clearly the personal service of Nielsen and its staff 
that was contracted for: the tangible personal property that 
was transferred for communication purposes was an inconse-
quential element without separate charge. The entire trans-
action is exempt from the Ohio sales tax. 
In its reasoning, the court cited several other Ohio 
cases l02 where the sales tax was assessed on the entire con-
sideration paid in transactions that involved insignificant 
and inconsequential amounts of personal services. No reduc-
tion was made for the portion of the cbnsideration that was 
attributable to personal services. 
The rationale for not separating the inconsequential 
amount attributable to personal services from the amount 
attributable to tangible personal property is that: (1) 
nearly all transactions are, of necessi ty, mixed transac-
tions involving at least a slight degree of personal ser-
vice, and (2) where this degree of personal service is of 
insignificant consequence, both the practical problem of 
attributing to such service a percentage of the entire con-
sideration paid, and the insignificant effect it would have 
on the amount paid in taxes, make such a distinction 
unreasonable and unnecessary. 
Two years after the above three cases were decided, the 
Ohio Supreme Court was once a9ain called upon to decide a 
computer service bureau case. In Citizens Financial Corp. 
v. Kosydar,103 (see Case No. 10, Appendix C) Citizens pro-
vided both off-line and on-line services to the thrift 
industry. 
In the "off-line" method, the tellers at the customer 
savings and loan manually record the daily deposi ts and 
wi thdrawals, and the recorded transactions are daily deli-
vered to the taxpayer, where the information is converted by 
the computer into "computer legible media." Subsequently, 
taxpayer delivers to the customer a "hard copy pr intout" 
which provides the customer with an accounting journal of 
daily transactions, thus updating the individual account 
records. A fee is charged, based on the number of such 
accounts each customer maintains in the computer. 
The "on-line" method consists of teller use of terminals 
which are located at the tellers' windows. Passbooks are 
placed in the terminals and by means of depression of appro-
priate keys, the transaction (deposit, withdrawal, or loan 
payment) is transmi tted via telephone lines to taxpayer's 
computers. The computers then make the programmed calcula-
tion, printing the transaction on both the customer's pass-
book and upon a printout at the terminal. Subsequently, a 
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hard copy journal of transactions is delivered by taxpayer 
to the cus tomer • 
method. 
A fee is charged, as in the off-line 
The court held both the on-line and off-line transac-
tions to be taxable and not wi thin the personal service 
exemption. As in Accountants Computer Services, Inc. v. 
Kosydar,104 the true object of the transaction was held to 
be the property produced, i.e., the "hard copy printouts" 
rather than a service. In its decision, the Citizens court 
used the criteria as enunciated in Koch v. Kosydarl0 5 to 
determine whether a service transaction existed. 
In his dissent in Citizens, Justice Paul W. Brown, 
pointing to his dissent in United States Shoe Corp. v. 
KOsydar,106 stated that the personal service exception must 
be seriously distorted before it can be construed to impose 
a tax upon a service transaction. He also cited Appendix 
2 - 3.2d of 1 Bigelow, Computer Law Service (1975), State 
Sales and Use Taxes, which indicates that similar transac-
tions would be exempt from the sales tax had they occurred 
in Connecticut, Louisiana, New York, Texas, Virginia, 
Washington, or Wisconsin. 
In a Florida case,107 the Department of Revenue enacted 
a rule construing computer software (punched cards, paper 
tape and typed sheets) to be tangible personal property and 
subject to the sales tax. Nova filed a petition challenging 
the validity of the rule. The Administrative Hearing 
Off icer in that case found that when computer software is 
sold it is the computer information which is transferred, 
and that the magnetic tape or punch cards which contain the 
information are only the means or method of transmitting it 
from the originator to the user. It was further-determined 
that the tangible property (i.e., punch cards) involved in 
the process was an inconsequential element for which no 
separate charges were made, the consequential element being 
intangible property (computer information) which was not 
subject to the sales tax on tangible personal property. The 
conclusion was that Nova and other similar corporations were 
selling services to their customers which were exempt from 
the sales tax. 
In Bullock v. Statistical Tabulating corporation,108 
(see Case No.5, Appendix C) customers brought in raw data, 
i.e., business records, invoices, etc., which Statistical 
Tabulating Corporation then translated into computer read-
able code and transferred onto cards that can be read by the 
customer's computer. Once read, the cards have no further 
use. There is no separate charge to the customers for the 
cards. 
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In holding that the transactions in question constitute 
the sale of services rather than tangible personal property, 
the Texas court used the same test it used in Williams and 
Lee Scouting Service, Inc. v. Calvert,109 which stated that 
if the object or the essence of the sale is not tangible 
personal property but intangible property, then the transac-
tion is not taxable under any definition of "sale." 
In Miami Citizens National Bank & Trust Company v. 
Lindley,110 (see Case No. 31, Appendix C) a bank performed 
data processing for other banks, and furnished its customers 
with a series of reports which reveal considerable informa-
tion for use by the correspondent bank in making informed 
management decisions for future operations. The sales tax 
was assessed only on charges for computer printouts and not 
for programming time. 
In holding the entire transaction to be taxable, the 
court reasoned that the true object of the transactions is 
the receipt of the printed form which contains the computer 
. ddt 111 organlze a a. 
CASES INVOLVING THE SALE OF SOFTWARE 
Cases dealing specif ically wi th the sale of computer 
software are of relatively recent origin. Pr ior to June, 
1969, when IBM began stating separate prices for its 
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software,ll2 the software was acquired'in conjunction with 
the hardware. Shortly after this change in policy, State 
taxing commissions began to tax software as if it were 
tangible property. Soon, the issue of tangibility began to 
be settled in court. 
The first case to address the software tangibility issue 
directly was District of Columbia v. Universal computer 
ASSOC1' ates .113 (S C N 18 ee ase o. , Appendix c.) In this 
case, Universal purchased hardware and software from IBM. 
One set of punched cards was a special tax program developed 
jointly by Universal and IBM and owned outright by 
Universal. The other set of cards was a standard set used 
to run the computer. 
The court ruled that the software portion of the pur-
chase was intangible and was not subject' to the personal 
property tax, and that the portion representing hardware was 
tangible and subject to the tax. The $290,000 purchase 
price was allocated 50 percent to the hardware and 50 per-
cent to the software. 
Since no previously decided case was directly on point, 
other cases dealing with the sales versus service issue were 
examined. The material of the punched cards themselves is 
of insignificant value. It was the knowledge contained in 
the cards that gave them value, and knowledge is intangible. 
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The court likened computer software to the cartoon mats 
involved in Washington Times-Herald v. District of 
Columbia,114 where it was held that cartoon mats which were 
sold by publishing syndicates to individual newspapers were 
not tang ible personal property subject to the Distr ict of 
Columbia sales tax. 
In Universal, the court is of the opinion that the 
knowledge stored on computer cards, tapes or discs is even 
more demonstrably intangible intellectual property than the 
right to reproduce from the cartoonist's drawings involved 
in Washington Times-Herald. 
Universal is distinguished from District of Columbia v. 
Norwood Studios, Inc., 115 which involved the transfer of 
films where the producer of the films retained no interest 
in them and imposed no restriction on their use. The films 
became the property of the purchasers without qualification. 
Because Universal Computer Associates was the first case 
to address the issue of software tang ibili ty, it has been 
cited by many subsequent cases. 
The following year, the California court addressed the 
tangibility issue. In County of Sacramento v. Assessment 
Appeals Board, 116 (see Case No. 14, Appendix C) data pro-
cessing equipment and systems were furnished on a condi-
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tional sales basis to the State of Calif.ornia. The tax 
assessor, in assessing the sales tax liability, valued the 
property at the full contract ·price. The equipment and 
systems in question consisted of both hardware and software 
components. 
The court held that the tax assessor was in error when 
he valued the property at full contract price. The portion 
of the contract price attributable to software represents 
intangible property not subject to the sales tax. 
In another early case,117 Greyhound Computer Corporation 
(see Case No. 24, Appendix C) purchased several computer 
systems where the pr ice of the hardware and software were 
not separately stated. Maryland treated the cost of the 
software as inseparable from that of the hardware and based 
its property tax assessment on aggregate purchase pr ice, 
less depreciation, without allocating the cost of the soft-
ware package between tangible property acquired and services 
to be rendered. The court held that it was error not to 
allocate the purchase price between the tangible and intang-
ible components, 
proceedings. ll8 
and remanded the case for further 
In 1976, the tangibility issue was decided in Tennessee, 
in the frequently cited case of Commerce Union Bank v. 
Tidwell. ll9 In this case, Commerce Union Bank purchased 
software for use in its business. The Commissioner of 
Revenue (Tidwell) assessed a tax deficiency, alleging that 
the transfer was one of tangible personal property subject 
to the Tennessee sales tax. 
The bank alleged that while the intellectual processes 
may be embodied in tangible and physical material, such as 
punch cards and magnetic tapes, the logic or intelligence of 
the program is an intangible property right, and it is this 
intang ible property right which is acquired when computer 
software is purchased or leased. 
Tidwell viewed the purchase of software as analogous to 
the purchase of a phonograph record or the purchase or lease 
of a motion picture film. He argued that the present case 
is governed by Crescent Amusement Co. v. Carson,120 (see 
Case No. 16, Appendix C) where a tax was levied on the ren-
tal of motion picture films. 
In holding software to be intangible, the court rejected 
Tidwell's argument that software is similar to a motion pic-
ture film. Whereas, without a film there would be no movie, 
magnetic tapes and cards are not a crucial element of soft-
ware. The whole of computer software could be transmitted 
orally or electronically without any tangible manifestations 
of transmission. Whereas, a product is created in the case 
of a film or phonograph record, there is no product in the 
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case of software. What is created and sold is information 
and the magnetic tapes which contain this information are 
only a method of transmi tting these intellectual creations 
from the original to the user. It is merely incidental that 
these intangibles are transmitted by way of a tangible reel 
of tape that is not even retained by the user. Furthermore, 
Tennessee did not attempt to tax computer programs purchased 
by the bank which were transmi tted to its computers from 
outside the State by way of telephone lines. That method 
was deemed to constitute the purchase of intangible personal 
property. The pr inc iple is the same; only the method of 
transmitting the information is different. 
Another difference between software and phonograph 
records is the fact that, when the information is trans-
ferred from the tape to the computer, the tape is no longer 
of any value to the user; and it is not retained in the 
possession of the user. The information on the tape, unlike 
the phonograph record, is not complete and ready to be used 
at the time of its purchase. It must be translated into a 
language understood by the computer. Once this information 
has been translated and introduced into the computer and the 
tapes returned or the punch cards destroyed, what actually 
remains in the computer is intang ible knowledge; this is 
what was purchased, not the magnetic tapes or the punch 
cards. 121 
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Transfer of tangible personal property under these cir-
cumstances is merely incidental to the purchase of the 
intangible knowledge and information stored on the tapes. l22 
The year after Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell was 
decided in Tennessee, the Alabama Supreme Court reached a 
similar conclusion in a case having a similar fact pattern. 
In State of Alabama v. Central Computer Services, Inc.,l23 
(see Case No. 37, Appendix C) Central Computer Services, 
Inc. licensed certain software programs for a 99 year term. 
Upon receipt of the software, Central extracted the infor-
rna tion con tained on the magnetic tapes and punched cards, 
and transferred the programs to magnetic discs. The tapes 
were then returned to the lessor and the cards were thrown 
away. The Alabama State Department of Revenue assessed a 
use tax of $13,519.91 against Central for its purchase of 
the programs. Central alleged the programs were intangible 
property and therefore not subject to the use tax. 
In holding for Central, the court ruled that what was 
purchased by Central was the information or knowledge which 
went into the development of the eight programs and not the 
magnetic tapes and punched cards themselves. The magnetic 
tapes and punched cards were merely the means by which this 
information or knowledge was transferred. 
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The State contended that the magnetic tapes and punched 
caids are a necessary, integral part of the computer program 
and that because these items are tangible, there was a 
purchase of taxable tangible personal property by Central. 
In its argument, the State cited Boswell v. Paramount 
Television Sales, Inc. 124 (See Case No.4, Appendix C.) In 
that case, the court held that the leasing of movie films 
and tapes by Paramount to television stations in Alabama 
involved the leas ing of tang ible personal property rather 
than an intangible right to publish as Paramount argued. 
The court in Central distinguished the magnetic tapes 
and punched cards from the movie films. In Boswell, the 
court noted that the right to publish or broadcast the 
motion picture was physically inseparable from the movie 
film its elf • The physical presence of the movie film is 
essential to broadcasting the intangible artistic efforts of 
the actors. 
However, in Central, the physical presence of magnetic 
tapes and punched cards is not essential to the transmittal 
of the desired information from its creator to Central. 
This information can also be telephoned to the computer or 
brought into Alabama in the mind of an employee of the 
lessor. 
558 
In its summary, the court said that: 
" .•• we find in the present case that there is an 
incidental physical commingling of the intangible 
information sought by Central Computer Services and 
the tangible magnetic tapes and punched cards them-
selves. We therefore hold that the essence of this 
transaction was the purchase of nontaxable 
intangible information."125 
Texas, which first addressed the software tax issue in 
1977 in Bullock v. Statistical Tabulating Corp.,l26 addressed 
the issue a second time in 1979 in First National Bank of 
Fort Worth v. Bullock. l27 (See Case No. 21, Appendix C.) 
In the 1979 case, the bank purchased several standardized or 
"canned" programs which enabled its computer to perform 
deposit and lending functions and process general account-
ing. The software was contained on magnetic tapes, but the 
information could have been transmitted by keypunch cards, 
telephone or various other methods. 
The Texas law places a tax on a sale of tangible per-
sonal property. Tangible personal property is defined as 
"personal property which may be seen, weighed, measured, 
felt or touched, or which is in any other manner perceptible 
to the senses."128 To determine whether a sale is of 
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tangible or intangible property, the courts apply the 
"essence of the transaction" test. 129 If the object or 
essence of the sale is intangible property, then the trans-
action is not taxable. An important factor to be considered 
in arriving at this determination is the fact that the 
desired information could have been transferred in several 
different ways.130 
In Statistical Tabulating, the court held that processed 
data contained in a coded computer card was an intangible 
and not taxable. In Williams and Lee Scouting, statistical 
data on oil and gas well production was compiled and mailed 
to subscr ibers in pr inted reports each week. The sale was 
not taxed. The purchasers in both Williams and Lee Scouting 
and Statistical Tabulating were desirous of something beyond 
the tangible object involved in the transaction. Unlike a 
phonograph record or filmstrip when the information on the 
tape, in the present case, is transferred to the computer, 
the tape is no longer of any value or importance to the 
user. 13l 
Bullock contended that this case is distinguishable from 
Statistical Tabulating in that the software in the latter 
case was "customized," because it was developed specially 
for the purchaser. The tapes in the present case are 
"canned" programs, since they are standard i terns sold to 
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numerous customers with only slight modifications to conform 
to each purchaser's use. The service characteristic is pre-
sent only with "customized" programs, according to Bullock. 
The court did not agree with Bullock's argument that 
only "customized" programs should be exempt from the sales 
tax. The test in each case is not whether the product is 
"customized" or "canned," but whether the object of the sale 
is tangible personal property.132 In Williams and Lee 
Scouting, the weekly report of oil and gas data was a 
"canned" pUblication in that the same information was mailed 
to many subscribers. 
The Texas court held that the programs in question were 
intangible and not subject to the sales tax. 
Two years after the First National Bank of Fort Worth v. 
Bullock was dec ided in Texas, the III inois Supreme Court 
heard a similar case and reached the same conclusion as the 
Texas court. In First National Bank of Springfield v. 
Department of Revenue,133 (see Case No. 22, Appendix C) the 
issue was whether the sale of applicational programs (as 
opposed to operational programs) constitutes the sale of 
tangible personal property subject to the Illinois use tax, 
where the data is contained on magnetic tape. As was the 
case in Fort Worth, the bank in Springfield purchased com-
puter programs that were delivered on magnetic tape, 
although other means of delivery were also possible. 
Upon delivery, the information was removed from the 
tapes and stored elsewhere, at which point the tapes could 
either be used again or discarded. 
The bank contended that the magnetic tapes in question 
here constituted intangible personal property, because they 
were, in essence, merely a means of conveying programming 
instructions and that software primarily represents intan-
gible services and not tangible goods. The Department, on 
the contrary, contended that the physical qualities of the 
tapes predominate over the information contained on them. 
The Department compared the tapes to films, phonograph 
records and books. All three examples, the Department 
argued, represent the physical manifestation of intangible 
ideas and artistic achievement, yet all three are taxable as 
tangible personal property.l34 
The Illinois court held that the software in question 
was intangible. The Illinois court previously held that 
where a service of skill was rendered in the manufacture of 
a special milling machine for the particular and exclusive 
use of a purchaser, the sale of the product was not taxable 
where it was merely incidental to the service. 135 The 
instant case is of· a similar vein. The plaintiff bank 
purchased, in substance, the means of programming its com-
puter so that it could perform functions the bank needed to 
have performed. The bank did not desire to spend the money 
or time to formulate the programs through its own data pro-
cessing staff. Therefore, it purchased instruction programs 
from other sources. It simply happened that, for the sake 
of convenience and easy handling, the programs were recorded 
on magnetic tapes. The tapes were certainly not the only 
medium through which the information could be transferred. 
In this way, the tapes differ from a movie film, a phono-
graph record or a book, whereby the media used are the only 
practicable ways of preserving those articles. 
Thus, while those articles and the tapes are similar in 
that they physically represent the transfer of ideas or 
artistic processes, a more s ignif icant distinction is that 
those articles are inseparable from the ideas or processes, 
whereas computer programs are separable from the tapes. Not 
only may software information be conveyed any number of 
ways, but it may even be copied off of the tapes and stored, 
using another medium. In short, it is not the tapes which 
are the substance of the transaction, it is the informa-
tion. l36 
The court held that the sale of computer software in 
this instance is, in substance, the transfer of intangible 
personal property and, as such, is not taxable under the 
Illinois Use Tax Act. 137 
Soon after the First National Bank of Springfield case 
was decided in Illinois, a case having a similar fact pat-
tern was heard across the border in Missour i . In James v. 
TRES Computer Service, Inc.,138 (see Case No. 28, Appendix 
C) the issue was whether the sale of "canned" software is a 
taxable event. In holding software to be intangible and not 
subject to the Missouri use tax, the court based its deci-
sion on the decisions reached in Alabama, Tennessee, Texas, 
Illinois, the District of Columbia, and Wisconsin. 139 
1983--A TURNING POINT OR AN ABERRATION? 
A long line of cases in a number of states, going back 
as far as 1972, have ruled almost uniformly that software is 
intangible for state sales, use and property tax purposes. 
The "knowledge" rationale has been used, as have the 
"essence of the transaction" and several other tests. 
Software has been compared to and distinguished from films, 
records and books, all of which have been held to be 
tangible. 
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In 1983, two court cases -dec ided one day apart, have 
flown in the face of this long line of precedent. In 
Comptroller of the Treasury v. Equitable Trust Company,140 
(see Case No. 12, Appendix C) the issue was whether the pur-
chase of a "canned" or "off the shelf" program on magnetic 
tape constitutes a transaction upon which sales tax can be 
assessed. 
Equi table entered into several license agreements 
whereby it obtained the nontransferable and nonexclusive 
right to use several programs in perpetuity. 
remained with the licensor. 
Legal title 
The Comptroller alleged that these transactions consti-
tute transactions involving tangible personal property, 
namely, magnetic tapes which had been enhanced in value by 
the copies of the programs coded thereon, and are subject to 
sales tax. In its amicus brief, the Data Processing 
Management Association (DPMA) contended that the transac-
tions were licenses to use the programs, and that such 
licenses are a form of intangible property. Equitable con-
tended that the predominant purpose or essence of the trans-
action governs classification of the sale as involving 
either tangible or intangible property. In the transfer of 
computer programs via magnetic tape, the purpose is to 
obtain the program, an intangible, and not the tangible 
tape. In taking this position, Equi table is supported by 
the overwhelming numerical majority of reported cases 
applying tax statutes restricted to tangible personal prop-
erty. 
In holding for the Comptroller, the court held that 
Equitable acquired tangible personal property, namely, 
magnetic tapes which had been enhanced in value by the 
copies of the programs coded thereon. The licenses do not 
grant intangible rights from the proprietors to Equitable, 
but simply erect contractual limitations on the use which 
Equi table might otherwise make of the sta tutor ily unpro-
tected program copies it acquired. l4l 
Equitable's principal argument is that the court should 
conceptually sever the program copy contained on the magnetic 
tape from the tangible tape itself. The argument is that 
the transaction should be viewed as operating on two levels, 
one the transfer of intangible knowledge or information and, 
the other, the delivery of a tangible tape. To have a 
scalpel for this legal surgery, it would be necessary to 
adopt as part of Maryland sales tax law a principle that the 
buyer's predominant purpose for a transaction controls the 
classification of the acquisition as either tangible or 
intangible. 
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Quotron Systems v. Comptroller,142 (see Case No. 33, 
Appendix c> recognized a predomi-nant purpose test as one of 
several factors in determining use tax applicability to the 
type of transaction presented there. That taxpayer under-
took concurrently to render two types of interrelated per-
formances. One was to maintain and continuously to update a 
computerized data bank of economic information, such as the 
selling prices of securities, which its customers could 
randomly access through remote terminals. The other was to 
install Quotron-owned hardware, including the remote ter-
minals, on customers' premises for their use in requesting 
and receiving electronic transmissions of the economic data. 
In Quotron, the court held tha t the first analytical step 
was to characterize the performance as a single, overall 
function, either rental of equipment or the provision of 
services. 143 The dominant purpose was to obtain services 
and not to rent hardware. Based on that factor, on the tax-
payer's retention of control over the hardware, and on the 
fact that Quotron's hardware could not be obtained without 
subscribing to the service, the court concluded that the 
transaction was the provision of services. 144 This approach 
is quite similar to that which the court used to determine 
whether a contract of sale is one for goods or for services 
under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, where the 
performance involves both. l45 
The rule of Quotron has been implicitly applied in 
Equitable on an aspect which is not disputed by Equitable. 
In addition to providing program copies on tape, each licen-
sor agreed to furnish certain installation services. One 
licensor also contracted to furnish a limited amount of 
training within the fixed contract price. 
The "dominant purpose" test of whether the property in 
question is being purchased for its own sake or for the 
(intangible) information contained therein can also be 
applied, by analogy, to books, motion picture films, video 
display discs, phonorecords and music tapes. In sales of 
these items, the purchaser's dominant purpose ordinarily is 
to obtain the knowledge, information or data thereby con-
veyed. While the book is in human readable form, the other 
media are machine readable. A purchase of any of these 
information conveying media is within the imposition of the 
sales tax as tangible personal property. Such transactions 
escape taxation only if there is an applicable statutory 
exclusion or exemption. These analogies, however, have been 
argued to other courts which have held that tape copies of 
programs are intangible. 
The court in Equitable rejected the reasoning of the 
long line of cases that hold taped copies to be intangible 
because of alleged misconceptions in the technological 
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underpinnings of these decisions, and because of the 
apparent departures in reasoning from that usually applied 
in sales tax cases. Secondly, there was a substantial 
question whether the decision that set the course for the 
line of program cases, District of Columbia v. Universal 
Computer Associates, Inc. ,146 is consistent with Maryland 
law. 
Furthermore, a tape containing a copy of a canned 
program does not lose its tangible character, because its 
content is a reproduction of the product of intellectual 
effort, just as the phonorecord does not become intangible, 
because it is a reproduction of the product of artistic 
effort. The price paid for a copy of a canned program 
reflects the cost of developing the program which the 
proprietor hopes to recover, with profit, by spreading the 
cost among its customers. Simply because the canned program 
on tape is much more expensive than the typical phonorecord, 
the program tape is not any less tangible. 
The court stated that Equitable's intangibility argument 
would have merit if the direct input by keyboard, without 
documentation, alternative (a service transaction) or the 
electronic transmission, without documentation, alternative 
(no tangible carrier) is the form of transaction under con-
sideration. But, because a taxable transaction might have 
been structured in a nontaxable form, it does not thereby 
become nontaxab1e. 147 
Finally, Equitable argues that a purchased program "can 
be and was in fact severed and exists apart from the 
tangible transfer medium •••. " However, the copy delivered 
to Equitable does not become severed in any physical sense 
from the tape when the tape is used to structure computer 
memory. 
The Equitable court did not discern any legally signifi-
cant difference for sales tax purposes between the canned 
computer program on magnetic tape and music on a phonograph 
record. As stated in the National Commission on New 
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Final Report at 10 
(1978): "Both recorded music and computer programs are sets 
of information in a form which, when passed over a magne-
tized head, cause minute currents to flow in such a way that 
desired physical work is accomplished." In the case of the 
phonograph record, the sales tax statute in Maryland has 
never been viewed as conceptually severing the copy of the 
performance from the tangible carrier. The court concluded 
that the statute does not sever copies of computer programs 
from the tangible carriers employed in the subject sales. 
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The day after the Equitable case was decided in Maryland, 
the Vermont court issued its ruling on Chittenden Trust Com-
pany v. King. 148 (See Case No.9, Appendix C.) In this 
case, the Department of Taxes (Department) assessed a com-
pensating use tax of $471 against the Chittenden Trust Com-
pany (Bank) for the purchase of a "canned" software tape 
valued at $15,700. The Department classif ied the tape as 
tangible personal property, subject to taxation. The Bank 
contended the tape was intangible and therefore exempt from 
the tax. 
The Bank purchased the program in the form of a magnetic 
tape. The programming information could have been carried 
using several other means, including punch cards, telephone 
lines and personal programming. The fifteen to twenty "man-
years" needed to develop the "off the shelf" program accounts 
for almost its total value, since a blank magnetic tape may 
be purchased for approximately $15. Once the information is 
transferred into the computer's memory, the tape is of neg-
ligible value to the Bank, and may be reused, destroyed or 
returned to its original distributor. 
The court held for the Department. The computer tape 
was held to be tang ible personal property and its sale is 
subject to taxation. In 32 V.S.A. Sec. 970(7), tangible 
personal property is defined as: 
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n ••• personal property which may be seen, weighed, 
measured, felt, touched or in any other manner per-
ceived by the senses and shall include fuel and 
electricity, but shall not include rights and cre-
dits, insurance policies, bills of exchange, stocks 
and bonds and similar evidences of indebtedness or 
ownership." 
In holding that the computer tape was tangible personal 
property, the court noted that the tape could be seen, 
weighed, measured and touched, and is not a right or credit. 
The court rejected the Bank's contention that the "focus of 
the transaction n was the transfer of intang ible knowledge 
and information, rather than the tang ible magnetic tape, 
because the purchase of an "off the shelf" program does not 
involve the sale of personal services, but rather the sale 
of tangible personal property. 
The court also rejected the Bank's attempts to distin-
guish a computer program tape from other taxable personal 
property such as films, videotapes, books, cassettes and 
records. The reasoning was that in each, their value lies 
in their respective abilities to store and later display or 
transmit their contents, and a computer software tape is no 
different. 
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In the final page of its decision, the court stated 
that: 
"It may well be that the Bank could have procured, 
by way of telephone or personal service, the same 
programming information so as to avoid a use tax. 
To base the tax consequences of a transaction on 
how it could have been structured 'would require 
rejection of the established tax principle that a 
transaction is to be given its tax effect in 
accordance with what actually occurred and not in 
accordance with what might have occurred.' Commis-
sioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling 
Co., 417 U.S. 134, 148 (1974). This we will not 
do. The Bank must accept the consequences of its 
choice to purchase the program in the form of a 
tape." 
In Citizens and Southern Systems (C & S), the issue was 
whether a sale of computer software is a sale of "tangible 
personal property" as defined in S.C. Code Ann. Sec. 
12-35-140 (1976) and, therefore, subject to the State's 
sales and use tax. C & S paid a tax of $ 2,376 under pro-
test, and brought an action for recovery, arguing that the 
software in question was intangible and, therefore, not sub-
ject to tax. 
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The South Carolina Code (Sec. 12-35-140) def ines 
tangible personal property as "personal property which may 
be seen, weighed, measured, felt or touched or which is in 
any other manner perceptible to the senses, except notes, 
bonds, mortgages or other evidences of debt and stocks and 
shall include rooms, lodgings or accommodations furnished to 
transients for a consideration." The trial judge held that 
the magnetic tape containing the information in question 
could be seen, weighed, measured, felt, and touched and 
therefore, came within the definition of tangible personal 
property. 
The judge compared the sale of magnetic tapes to a sale 
of books or phonograph records, observing that the convey-
ance of knowledge by a professor to students in a classroom 
would not be subject to tax, but publication in the form of 
a book or phonograph record would be taxable. In assessing 
the tax, the value of the books or records is based upon the 
value of what is contained in them, which is intangible. 
The value of the paper, binding, ink or other material cost 
is not relevant. 
Appellants relied on the long line of cases that dis-
tinguished software from books, records and movies because 
of the separability of the computer program from the magnetic 
tape and the inherent inseparability of the matter contained 
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in a book, on a record, or in a movie from the book, record 
or movie. 
The South Carolina Court agreed with the decision in 
Equitable Trust, which stated, "The taxability of a sale of 
a canned program copy should not turn on whether the buyer 
stores the program in memory. A tax system cannot be admin-
istered dependent upon whether or not, at the time of the 
transaction, the buyer's intent is to store the program con-
tinuously in memory." (464 A.2d 248, 255 (1983» The South 
Carolina Court did not think that the taxability of a sale 
of computer software depends upon the separabili ty of the 
program from the tape. 
Citizens asserted that the instructions could have been 
introduced into the computer through intangible means such 
as by telephone or personal programming, and that the fact 
that transmission was by magnetic tape should not make the 
transaction taxable. On this point, the South Carolina 
Court relied on Chittenden, which held that the bank had to 
accept the consequences of its choice to purchase the com-
puter program in the form of a magnetic tape, finding that 
" .•. to base the tax consequences of a transaction on how it 
could have been structured 'would require rejection of the 
established tax principle that a transaction is to be given 
its tax effect.in accord with what actually occurred and not 
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in accord with what might have occurred.' 
omitted" (465 A.2d 110~, 1102 (1983).) 
CONCLUSION 
(Citation 
It will take some time to determine whether the decisions 
in Equitable, Chi ttenden, and Ci ti zens are aberrations or 
the beginning of a trend. Many state leg islatures have 
statutes that classify canned and custom software either as 
tang ible or in tang i ble , but several s ta tes have not yet 
addressed the tangibility issue as it relates to software. 
As technology advances, some s ta tes may re-examine thei: r 
position on software, and some decisions may be influenced 
by Equitable, Chittenden and Citizens. 
With all the conflicting and inconsistent definitions of 
software being offered by various private groups, federal 
agencies, State legislatures, and a multitude of courts, it 
is no wonder that the issue of software has become so com-
plex. And, it appears that the conflict involving software 
will not be resolved at any time in the near future. As 
technology continues to evolve, the very nature of software 
will also change. 
Thinking through the theoretical arguments to arrive at 
a finely-reasoned solution to the question of whether soft-
ware is tangible or intangible is a useless exercise, espec-
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ially at the feder"al level. Whether software qualifies for 
the investment tax credit (which may soon be eliminated 
anyway, if the recently issued Treasury proposal is adopted) 
is something that will be decided by Congress, and its deci-
sion will not revolve in the slightest around the tangibil-
ity issue. The decision will be based on whether a tax 
incentive should be provided for creators of software, or 
whether providing such a tax incentive would be perceived by 
the voting masses as a tax loophole through which much tax 
revenue would escape. 
Whether the creationof computer software should qualify 
for the research credit will be resolved in the same manner. 
Certain categories of expenditure qualify for the research 
credi t and others do not. Whether a certain expendi ture 
qualifies or not depends on whether Congress, in its omni-
science, deems that a tax incentive should be provided for 
the expenditure. Items are included on the list of eligible 
expenditures based on the influence of special interest 
groups and the projected public reaction to the inclusion of 
such expenditures. The Proposed Regulations on the research 
credit were withdrawn in response to the vehement opposition 
of the software industry, and it is the author I s opinion, 
based on conversations with the people at the Treasury 
Department who are re-writing the Regulations, that no new 
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regulations will be issued prior to the 1986 elections. The 
research credit was due to expire at the end of 1984, and it 
was extended temporarily. Whether it will be extended again 
or whether it will be totally eliminated depends on what pro-
visions are included in the final version of the President's 
tax bill, which may not be passed until 1986, and which will 
certainly undergo substantial changes from the bill he pro-
posed as this thesis is being written. Whether the research 
credit will be extended, altered or eliminated depends 
exclusively on political considerations and not on theoreti-
cally justifiable arguments. 
At the State level, log ical reasoning plays somewha t 
more of a role, at least in cases where the taxability of 
software is resolved by the court and not the legislature. 149 
In cases where software is delivered over telephone wires in 
the form of electrical impulses, it seems logical to classify 
software as intangible, and the courts have classified elec-
trical impulses as intangible (see Helvey, Case No. 25, 
Appendix C). Other courts have alluded to the telephone 
transmission possibility and have also stated that such a 
delivery, if made, would not be a taxable event. On the 
other hand, software delivered in the form a disk or tape or 
other tangible container could reasonably be deemed to be 
tangible, just as a book, which is delivered in the form of 
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bound sheets of paper, is uniformly classified as tangible 
for sales, use and property tax purposes. 
The state courts are not immune from political pressure, 
however. Judges realize that state government is under 
intense pressure to raise revenue in order to pay for a 
myriad of services, and it is not uncommon for a state court 
to render its decision based on whether the decision will 
result in an increase in the amount of tax revenue that finds 
its way into the state coffer. A variety of conflicting 
pressures are brought to bear in dec iding such cases. On 
the one hand, the State Revenue Department may argue that 
failure to classify software as tangible property will 
result in the loss of hundreds of millions in tax revenue 
over the next few years, while, at the same time, the Chamber 
of Commerce is arguing that taxing software sales will force 
software manufacturers out of the state, and will cause them 
to relocate to states that treat software manufacture more 
favorably taxwise. According to a recent news report on 
American television, one of the major reasons why Japanese 
businessmen are moving their high technology companies out 
of California and into Washington State and Vancouver, 
British Columbia, Canada, is because of the more favorable 
tax climate offered in these locations. 
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Debating the tangibility of software for tax purposes, 
while a good intellectual exerc ise, is only an exerc ise. 
While the delivery of software over telephone wires is 
generally considered to be the delivery of intangible prop-
erty, and therefore exempt from tax, and delivery in the 
form of a disk or tape may appear to be the delivery of tan-
gible property (the courts have not always agreed with this 
interpretation), in the end, the classification of software 
as tangible or intangible property will depend on a variety 
of factors that are outside the realm of logic. 
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45 U ' d . n~te A~rcraft Corp. v. O'Connor, 141 Conn. 530, 107 
A.2d 398 (1954); Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Lorenz, 26 Ill.2d 183, 
186 N.E.2d 250 (1962); University Microfilms v. Scio 
Township, 76 Mich. App. 616, 257 N.W.2d 265 (1977), leave to 
appeal denied, 402 Mich. 880 (1978). 
46 273 N.Y. 334, 7 N.E.2d 254 (1937). 
47194 La. 470, 193 So. 710 (1940), appeal dismissed, 310 
U.S. 613, 60 S.Ct. 1089 (1940). Also see Bigsby v. Johnson, 
99 P.2d 268 (1940), rev'd. on ~ different issue, 18 Cal.2d 
860, 118 P.2d 289 (1941); People ex. reI. Walker Engraving 
Corp. v. Graves, 243 App. Div. 652, 276 N.Y.S. 674, 268 N.Y. 
648, 198 N.E. 539 (1939); Voss v. Gray, 70 N.D. 727, 298 
N.W. 1 (1941); Cusick v. Commonwealth, 260 Ky. 204, 84 
S.W.2d 14 (1935); State Tax Commission v. Hopkins, 234 Ala. 
556, 176 So. 210. 
48 187 Tenn. 112, 213 S.W.2d 27 (1948). The appellant 
(Crescent) argued unsuccessfully that the rental of a film 
is a license rather than the transfer of tangible personal 
property. In Burgess Co. v. Ames, 359 Ill. 427, 194 N.E. 
565 (1935), a case cited by appellant, it was held that the 
right to reproduce a musical composition is a license rather 
than a transfer of tangible personal property. Also cited 
were A.B.C. Electrotype Co. v. Ames, 364 Ill. 360, 4 N.E.2d 
476 (1936) and Adair v. Ames, 364 Ill. 342, 4 N.E.2d 481 
(1936), which held that printers and electrotypers, respec-
tively, are engaged in furnishing skill and labor rather 
than tangible personalty in the printed matter produced. 
49 213 S.W.2d 27 at 29. Also see Saverio v. Carson, 186 
Tenn. 166, 208 S.W.2d.1018 (1948). In 1951, the legislature 
changed the result in Crescent by exempting theaters which 
pay the 2 percent privilege tax from operation of the sales 
and use tax. T.C.A. Sec. 67-3013. However, the present 
Tennessee Code (Sec. 67-3002(b» taxes both prewritten and 
custom programs. 
5057 Cal.2d 684, 21 Cal. Rptr. 604, 371 P.2d 340 (1962). 
51 Roehm v. County of Orange, 32 Cal.2d 280, 196 P.2d 550 
(1948). In this case, the court stated that: "Intangible 
values .•. that cannot be separately taxed as property may be 
reflected in the valuation of taxable property. Thus, in 
determining the value of property, assessing authorities may 
take into consideration earnings derived therefrom, which 
may depend upon the possession of intangible rights and 
privileges that are not themselves regarded as a separate 
class of taxable property." 
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52 336 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1964). 
53 1n a prior case decided by this same Circuit Court of 
Appeals (Washington Times-Herald v. District of Columbia, 94 
U.S. App. D.C. 154, 213 F.2d 23 (1954», a different conclu-
sion was reached where "mats" were furnished (but not sold) 
to newspapers for printing comic strips on a one-time basis. 
The court reasoned that the sale of all interests constitu-
tes a sale for sales tax purposes, but the sale of a one-
time right to use property does not. 
54see Boswell v. Paramount Television Sales, Inc., 291 
Ala. 490, 282 So.2d 892 (1973). In its opinion, the Alabama 
court cited United Artists Corp. v. Taylor and Crescent 
Amusement Co. v. Carson. 
55 490 S.W.2d 796 (1973). 
56 Ibid • at 799. 
57u' , , f'l ' h' nlverslty Mlcro 1 ms v. SC10 Towns lp. 
58Bay Trust Co. v. Bay City, 280 Mich. 44, 273 N.W. 437 
(1937); Loomis v. City of Jackson, 130 Mich. 594, 90 N.W. 
328 (1902); Perry v. Big Rapids, 67 Mich. 146, 34 N.W. 530 
(1887); Dart v. woodhouse, 40 Mich. 339, 29 Am. Rep. 544 
(1879). 
59District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Associates, 
Inc.; Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States (see Case No. 
~Appendix C) and Greyhound Computer Corp. v. State 
Department of Assessments and Taxation. 
60 327 F.Supp. 189 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd. as modified, 
480 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1973), 32 AFTR2d 73-509~ Cert. 
denied, 415 U.S. 934, 94 S.Ct. 1451, 39 L.Ed.2d ~(1974). 
As a result of this case, Regulation 1.48-l(F), which treats 
motion picture film negatives as intangible, was declared 
invalid. A few years later, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals agreed with the Disney decision and also held the 
regulation to be invalid. See Texas Instruments, Inc. v. 
United States, 551 F.2d 599, 39 AFTR2d 77-1383 (5th Cir. 
1977). 
When Congress re-enacted the investment tax credit in 
1971, it expressly indicated its agreement with the Disney 
holding that motion pictures and TV films are tangible per-
sonal property eligible for the investment tax credit. See 
S.Rep. No. 92-437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 34, 1971 U.S. Code 
Congo and Adm. News, pp. 1918, 1941 (1971). Furthermore, 
the Tax Reform Act of 1976 added Section 48(K) to the 
Internal Revenue Code, which treats motion picture and TV 
films as tangible personal property eligible for the invest-
ment tax credit. See also Treasury Regulation Section 
7.48-1(a). 
61 549 F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 1977), 39 AFTR2d 77-796. Other 
Ninth Circuit cases involving similar issues have reached 
similar conclusions. See Bin Crosb Productions Inc. v. 
United States, and MCA, Inc. an Un~versa C~ty Stu ~os, 
Inc. v. United States, 588 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1979), 79-1 
USTC 9150. (See Case No.3, Appendix C.) For a sales tax 
case involving the tangibility of master negatives, see 
Simplicity Pattern Company, Inc. v. State Board of Equaliza-
tion, 101 Cal. App.3d 184, 161 Cal. Rptr. 558 (1980). (See 
Case No. 34, Appendix C.) 
62 276 N.Y. 198, 11 N.E.2d 728 (1937). 
N.Y. 205, 11 N.E.2d 731 (1937). 
64See Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 
(Tenn. 1976); Williams and Lee Scouting Service, Inc. v. 
Calvert, 452 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). 
65Time , Inc. v. Hulman, 31 I11.2d 344 at 350 (1964). 
66Bunker-Ramo Corp. v. Porterfield, 21 Ohio St.2d 231, 257 
N.E.2d 365 (1970). 
67 15 Ohio St.2d 92, 238 N.E.2d 782 (1968). 
68162 Ohio St. 245, 122 N.E.2d 787 (1954). 
69 174 Ohio St. 518, 190 N.E.2d 258 (1963). 
70 257 N.E.2d 368 (1970). 
71 287 Md. 178, 411 A.2d 439 (1980). 
72241 Md. 345, 216 A.2d 717 (1966). 
73see Askew v. Bell, 248 So.2d 501 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1971); Spagat v. Mahin, 50 Ill.2d 183, 277 N.E.2d 834 
(1971); J. H. Walters & Co. v. Department of Revenue, 44 
Ill.2d 95, 254 N.E.2d 485 (1969); Dun & Bradstreet v. City 
of New York, 276 N.Y. 198, 11 N.E.2d 728 (1937). See also 
Undercof1er v. Grantham Transfer Co., 114 Ga. App. 868, 152 
590 
S.E.2d 900 (1966); Machinery Moving, Inc. v. Porterfield, 26 
Ohio St.2d 99, "269 N.E.2d 418 (1971). 
74 J. H. Walters & Co. v. Department of Revenue, 44 Il1.2d 
95 at 104-105, 254 N.E.2d 485 at 491 (1969); Community 
Telecasting Service v. Johnson, 220 A.2d 500 at 503 (1966); 
Dun & Bradstreet v. City of New York, 276 N.Y. 198 at 205, 
11 N.E.2d 728 at 731 (1937). 
75 398 Ill. 41, 46, 74 N.E.2d 877, 879-880 (1947). See 
General Data Corp. v. Porterfield, 21 Ohio St.2d 233, 257 
N.E.2d 359 (1970), which involved the installation and use 
of computer equipment used almost exclusively for the disse-
mination of hotel reservation information. (See Case No. 
23, Appendix C.) 
76 50 Ohio St.2d 270, 364 N.E.2d 27 (1977). 
77The holding in this case is based on the reasoning set 
forth in Accountants Computer Services, Inc. v. Kosydar, 35 
Ohio St.2d 120, 298 N.E.2d 519 (1973), discussed below. 
78 258 N.W.2d 606 (Minn. 1977). 
79 276 N.Y. 198, 11 N.E.2d 728 (1937). 
8°258 N.W.2d 610. 
81182 N.J. Super. 179, 440 A.2d 104 (N.J. Tax Ct. 1981). 
Also see Alan Drey Co., Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 67 
A.D.2d 1055, 413 N.Y.S.2d 516, 47 N.Y.2d 708, 418 N.Y.S.2d 
1024, 392 N.E.2d 887 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979). A subsequent 
New York decision (Mertz v. State Tax Commission, 89 A.D.2d 
396, 456 N.Y.S.2d 501 (A.D. 1982» (see Case No. 30, 
Appendix C) concluded that its decision in Alan Drey should 
be construed as holding that the transactions involving com-
puter tapes constituted sales of information, while those 
involving gummed labels constituted sales of tangible per-
sonal property. In New York, the sale of information is a 
taxable event. 
82 Mertz v. State Tax Commission, 89 A.D.2d 396, 456 
N.Y.S.2d 501 (A.D. 1982). (See Case No. 30, Appendix C.) 
83Tax Law, Sec. 1105, subd. (c), par. (1). 
84See Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell and District of 
Columbia v. Universal Computer Associates. 
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85 94 U.S. App. D.C. 154, 213 F.2d 23 (1954). 
86 94 U.S. App. D.C. 155, 213 F.2d 24 (1954). 
87 366 So.2d 30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). 
88The court determined that Southern Bell met all three 
tests. In support of its position, the court cited Askew 
v. Bell, 248 So.2d 501 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971), where the court 
held that a court reporter, who for a fee, records a 
judicial or administrative proceeding, or takes down and 
transcribes testimony, is engaged in rendering a service and 
the transcript which he furnishes to the persons who employ 
him is a mere incident of that service. The Askew court 
held that such a transaction would be subject to sales tax 
only when transcripts are sold to third persons who are not 
parties to the proceeding for which the court reporter was 
engaged. 
The court also cited Nova Computing Services v. Askew, 
D.O.A., Case No. 76-1475: March 1, 1977, which is discussed 
later. 
89Section 2-105(1). For a detailed analysis of this 
aspect of software, see "Computer Programs as Goods Under 
the U.C.C.," 77 Michigan Law Review, April, 1979, 1149-1165. 
90151 Ind. App. 176, 278 N.E.2d 608 (1972). Also see 
Wivagg v. Duguesne Light Co., 73 Pa. D. & C.2d 694 (1975); 
Buckeye Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 38 
Mich. App. 325, 196 N.W.2d 316 (1972). The court in 
Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 
612 (1964) made the analogy of electricity in wires to 
natural gas in pipes. Natural gas has been held to be a 
"good." 
91See Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell; Comptroller of the 
Treasury v. Eguitable Trust Company, 464 A.2d 248 (Md., 
1983); Chittenden Trust Company v. King, 465 A.2d 1100 (vt., 
1983); District of Columbia v. Universal Computer 
Associates; Robert D. Crockett, "Software Taxation: A 
Critical Reevaluation of the Notion of Intangibility," 
Brigham Young University Law Review, 1980, No.4, 859-879; 
Karl K. Heinzman, "Computer Software: Should It Be Treated 
As Tangible property For Ad Valorem Tax?," The Journal of 
Taxation, September, 1972, 184-186. 
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92 361 F.Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd. 493 F.2d 1400 
(3d Cir. 1974). Also see Burroughs Corporation v. Joseph 
Uram Jewelers, Inc., 305 So.2d 215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1974). The Uniform Commercial Code provision relating to 
breach of contract applies only to the sale of "goods," not 
"services." 
93 430 F.Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd. mem., 614 F.2d 
1286 (2d Cir. 1979). If held to be intangible, the computer 
system in question could not have been replevied. 
94Triang1e Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 457 
F.Supp. 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd. on other grounds, 604 
F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979). 
95 468 F.2d 695, 697 (2d Cir. 1972). 
96 . C . f' . 1 See DynamICS orporatlon 0 AmerIca v. Internatlona 
Harvester Co., 429 F.Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
97 479 F.Supp. 738 (D.N.J. 1979), 635 F.2d 1081 (1980). 
98See Atlas Industries, Inc. v. National Cash Register, 
216 Kan. 213, 531 P.2d 41 (1975) and Acme Pump Company, 
Inc. v. National Cash Register, 32 Conn. Sup. 69, 337 A.2d 
672 (C.C.P. 1974). 
99Accountants Computer Services, Inc. v. Kosydar: Central 
Data Systems, Inc. v. Kosydar: and, The Andrew Jergens Co. 
v. Kosydar, all cited as 35 Ohio St.2d 120, 298 N.E.2d 519 
(1973). The three cases involved similar issues and were 
tried simultaneously. 
100Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 
1 Ariz. App. 302, 306, 402 P.2d 423, 427 (1965). 
101Rice v. Evatt falls in the second of the three cate-
gories mentioned above. It involved an optometrist who did 
not separate his charge for professional examination from 
his charge for glasses and other items of personal property 
transferred. Two separate and distinct transactions were 
being performed therein; one, a purely professional service, 
and the other purely a sale of tangible personal property. 
The fact that the two transactions were not billed separ-
ately is of no consequence in determining the taxability of 
the transactions. 
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102 d' , See Recor lng DeVlces v. Bowers, 174 Ohio St. 518, 190 
N.E.2d 258 (1963); Recording Devices v. porterfield, 30 Ohio 
St.2d 208, 283 N.E.2d 626 (1972); Columbus Coated Fabrics v. 
Porterfield, 30 Ohio St.2d 307, 285 N.E.2d 50 (1972); and 
Koch v. Kosydar, 32 Ohio St.2d 74, 290 N.E.2d 847 (1972). 
10343 Ohio St.2d 148, 331 N.E.2d 435 (1975). For an in 
depth analysis of this case, see Michael J. Bayer, "Citizens 
Financial Corporation v. Kosydar: Data processing and the 
Ohio Sales Tax Service Exemption," 6 Capital University Law 
Review, 1977, 663-672. 
104 35 Ohio St.2d 120, 298 N.E.2d 519 (1973). 
105 32 Ohio St.2d 74, 290 N.E.2d 847 (1972). In Koch, the 
court defined a personal service as "an act done personally 
by an individual ... involving either the intellectual or 
manual personal effort of an individual." (32 Ohio St.2d at 
78, 290 N.E.2d at 850). 
106 41 Ohio St.2d 68, 322 N.E.2d 668 (1975). 
107 , , k C Nova Computlng Servlces v. As ew, D.O.A., ase No. 
76-1475: March 1, 1977. 
108549 S.W.2d 166 (Texas 1977). In Janesville Data Center, 
Inc. v. wisconsin Department of Revenue, 84 wis.2d 341, 267 
N.W.2d 656 (1978), an almost identical fact pattern produced 
the same result as in Bullock. In Janesville, customers 
were given a slight discount if they supplied their own 
cards. 
For a contrary result having a similar fact pattern, see 
Intellidata Incorporated v. State Board of Equalization, 139 
Cal. App.3d 594, 188 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1983). (See Case No. 
27, Appendix C.) The California view is that the entire 
transaction may be treated as tangible even though virtually 
all of the value is attributed to an intangible element such 
as intellectual content. This view was used in People v. 
Grazer, 138 Cal. App.2d 274, 291 P.2d 957 (1956) 
(radiologist's X-ray films); Albers v. State Board of 
Equalization, 237 Cal. App.2d 494, 47 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1965) 
(draftsman drawings); Simplicity Pattern Co. v. State Board 
of Equalization, 27 Cal.3d 900, 167 Cal. Rptr. 366, 615 
P.2d 555 (1980) (master audio-visual negatives). 
109 452 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). In Williams and 
Lee Scouting, the court found that the object of the trans-
action for the plaintiff's subscribing customers was the 
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scouting service provided by plaintiff. Current statistical 
data on oil and gas well production was continuously 
gathered in the field by Williams and Lee Scouting Service 
employees. The data was compiled and mailed to subscribing 
customers in regular reports duplicated by offset printing 
at the plaintiff's office. The Comptroller (Calvert) 
attempted to tax the whole transaction because a tangible 
item, the printed report, changed hands. 
For a similar case involving credit·report information, 
see Credit Bureau of Miami County, Inc. v. Collins, 50 Ohio 
St.2d 270, 364 N.E.2d 27 (1977). (See Case No. 15, Appendix 
C. ) 
11050 Ohio St.2d 249, 364 N.E.2d 25 (1977). 
lllIn support of its position, the court cited Accountants 
Computer Services v. Kosydar; Citizens Financial Corp. v. 
Kosydar, 43 Ohio St.2d 148, 331 N.E.2d 435 (1975); Federated 
Department Stores v. Kosydar,.45 Ohio St.2d 1, 340 N.E.2d 
840 (1976); and Lindner Brothers v. Kosydar, 46 Ohio St.2d 
162, 346 N.E.2d 690 (1976). 
l12see Scott R. Schmedel. 
113 465 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
114 94 U.S. App. D.C. 154, 213 F.2d 23 (1954). 
115 118 U.S. App. D.C. 358, 336 F.2d 746 (1964). 
116 32 Cal. App.3d 654, 108 Cal. Rptr. 434 (1973). 
l17Greyhound Computer Corporation v. State Department of 
Assessments and Taxation, 271 Md. 674, 320 A.2d 52 (1974). 
l18For analogies to the film-making industry the court 
cited Michael Todd Co. v. County of Los Angeles and District 
of Columbia v. Norwood Studios, Inc. This analogy was 
challenged in Heinzman, "Computer Software: Should It Be 
Treated As Tangible Property For Ad Valorem Tax?," Journal 
of Taxation, 184, 185-186 (1972). 
119538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976). 
120187 Tenn. 112, 213 S.W.2d 27 (1948). 
l2lsee District of Columbia v. Universal Computer 
Associates, Inc. 
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122 . . d See Wash~ngton T~mes-Heral , Inc. v. District of 
Columbia, 94 U.S. App. D.C. 154, 213 F.2d 23 (1954). There, 
the newspaper had purchased from an artist the right to 
reproduce his cartoons. These cartoons were transferred to 
the newspaper and were physically embodied in mats which 
were then used to reproduce the cartoons in the newspaper. 
In that case the court held that what the newspaper had 
purchased was the right to reproduce the cartoons, and not 
the material upon which the cartoons were impressed. 
In a closely analogous case (Dun & Bradstreet v. City of 
New York), the New York Court of Appeals held that financial 
informational services rendered to clients of Dun & 
Bradstreet were nontaxable even though reference books con-
taining financial information were delivered to subscribers. 
No separate charge was made for the books, and they could 
not be obtained without subscribing to the service. Also, 
in that case, as here, the same service could have been 
rendered without transferring the reference books, but the 
cost of the service would have been much higher. 
The result in this case was subsequently changed by 
Tenn. Code Sec. 67-3002(b), which calls for the sales taxa-
tion of both prewritten and custom programs. 
123 349 So.2d 1160 (1977). This case was a case of first 
impression in Alabama (meaning no case having a similar fact 
pattern had previously been tried in Alabama). The court's 
decision was influenced by Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell 
and District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Associates, 
Inc. Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell held that computer 
software is intangible and therefore not subject to the 
Tennessee sales tax. 
124 291 Ala. 490, 282 So.2d 892 (1973). 
125349 So.2d at 1162. Note: Alabama Rule C28-00l 
presently exempts both prewritten and custom programs from 
sales and use taxation. 
126549 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. 1977). 
127584 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). 
128T ex. Tax - Gen. Ann. art. 20.01(P) (1969). 
l29Bul10ck v. Statistical Tabulating Corp. 
l30Williams and Lee Scouting Service, Inc. v. Calvert. 
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131 State of Alabama v. Central Computer Services, Inc. and 
Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell. 
l32District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Associates, 
Inc. and Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell. 
13385 Ill.2d 84, 421 N.E.2d 175 (1981). 
l34 In its argument, the Department cited Time, Inc. v. 
Hulman, 31 Ill.2d 344 (1964), where the Illinois court 
decided that magazines are tangible personal property and 
that the proceeds from their sale would be subject to the 
retailers' occupation tax were it not for an exclusion 
afforded to newspapers and other materials "such as" 
newsprint. 
l35Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v. Department of Revenue, 
405 Ill. 367 (1950). 
136 See John W. Bryant and Lance R. Mather, "Property 
Taxation of Computer Software," 18 New York Law Forum, 
Summer, 1972, 59-75; reprinted in The Monthly Digest of Tax 
Articles, March, 1973, 31-40. 
1371 f . . . . d . n support 0 1ts pos1t10n, the court c1te: F1rst 
National Bank v. Bullock; Janesville Data Center, Inc. v. 
Wisconsin Department of Revenue; Honeywell Information 
Systems, Inc. v. Maricopa County (see Case No. 26, Appendix 
C); State v. Central Computer Services, Inc.; Commerce Union 
Bank v. Tidwell; District of Columbia v. Universal Computer 
Associates, Inc.: County of Sacramento v. Assessment Appeals 
Board No.2. Also cited was Cal. Revenue & Tax Code Secs. 
995, 995.1 and 995.2 (West. Supp. 1974), which SUbjects 
operational software to property taxation, but exempts 
applicational software. See also Honeywell, Inc. v. 
Lithonia Lighting, Inc., 317 F. SUpp. 406 (N.D. Ga. 1970); 
also, Greyhound Computer Corp. v. State Department of 
Assessments and Taxation, 271 Md. 674, 320 A.2d 52 (1974), 
which held that only so much of software as consists of ser-
vices is intangible and not taxable. 
138642 S.W.2d 347 (Mo. 1982). 
139 State of Alabama v. Central Computer Services, Inc.; 
Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell; Bullock v. Statistical 
Tabulating Corp.: First National Bank of Fort Worth v. 
BUllock; First National Bank of Springfield v. Department of 
Revenue; District of Columbia v. Universal Computer 
Associates, Inc.: Janesville Data Center, Inc. v. Wisconsin 
Department of Revenue. 
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140 464 A.2d 248 (Md., 1983). 
141The analysis set out here is more fully developed in 
"Software and Sales Taxes: The Illusory Intangible," 63 
B.U.L. Rev. 181 (1983). 
142 287 Md. 178, 411 A.2d 439 (1980). 
143 Ibid • 287 Md. at 186, 411 A.2d at 443. 
144Ibid • 287 Md. at 188, 411 A.2d at 444. 
145 See Anthony Pools v. Sheehan, 295 Md. 285, 455 A.2d 434 
(1983); Burton v. Artery Company, 279 Md. 94, 367 A.2d 935 
(1977); Quotron did not say that the dominant purpose of 
obtaining data made the subject of the contract intangible 
because information is intangible. 
146 465 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
l47This form over substance argument was also adopted by 
the court in Chittenden Trust Company v. King, 465 A.2d 1100 
(vt., 1983). 
148 465 A.2d 1100 (Vt., 1983). The Supreme Court of South 
Carolina recently determined that the sale of computer soft-
ware is the sale of tangible personal property. See 
Citizens and Southern Systems, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax 
Commission, Opinion No. 22024 (Filed January 10, 1984). 
149 The pressures that corne to bear on the Congress of the 
United States also come to bear on the State legislatures. 
Pressure groups, plus the need to raise revenue, play major 
roles in the determination of which expenditures should be 
classified as taxable. 
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ADDENDUM 
SALES AND USE TAX STATUS OF 
COMPUTER PROGRAMS BY STATE 
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SALES AND USE TAX STATUS OF ~OMPUTER PROGRAMS BY STATEI 
Code 
E - Exempt Prewritten 
T - Taxed Programs 
Alabama E 
Arizona E 
Arkansas T 
California T2 
Colorado E3 
Connecticut T 
District of E 
Columbia 
Florida E3 ,5 
Georgia T 
Hawaii T 
Idaho T 
Illinois E5 
Indiana E5 
Iowa T 
Kansas T 
Custom 
Programs 
E 
E 
E 
E 
T 
E 
E 
T 
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Authority 
Rule C28-00l 
Rule l5-5-l853(c); 
Rule l5-5-l5l3(c) 
Informal Opinion (1979) 
Cal. Rev. & Tax Code 
§60l0.9; Reg. 1502 
Special Regulation 
Conn. Gen. Stat. 
S12-407(2); Bulletin 13 
District of Columbia 
v. Universal Computer 
Associates, Inc., 
465 F.2d 615 (D.C. 
Circuit 1972) 
Rule l2A-l.32(4) 
Informal Opinion (1982) 
Informal Opinion (1982) 
Regulation 12-2 
86 Ill. Ad. Code 
S130.l935 
Rev. Information 
Bulletin #8 
Rule 18.34 
K.S.A. 79-3603(s) 
Code 
~Exempt Prewritten 
T - Taxed Programs 
Kentucky T 
Louisiana E 
Maine T 
Maryland T 
Massachusetts T 
Michigan T 
Minnesota 
Mississippi T 
Missouri T 
Nebraska E 
Nevada 
New Jersey 
New Mexico T 
New York 
North Carolina 
North Dakota 
custom 
Programs 
T 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
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Authority 
Informal Opinion (1982) 
Ar t • 4 7 : 3 0 l( 6 ) 
Informal Opinion (1982) 
Equitable Trust Company 
v. Comptroller, 464 
A.2d 248 (Md., 1983) 
Reg. 64H. 06 
Maccabees Mutual Life 
Insurance Company v. 
State Department of 
Treasury, 122 Mich. 
App. 660, 332 N.W.2d 
561 (1983) 
Minn. Stat. 
§297A.01(3)(a); 
Reg. 610 
Informal Opinion (1982) 
James v. Tres Computer 
Systems, Inc., 642 
S • W • 2 d 3 4 7 (Mo., 1 98 2 ) 
Rev. Ru1. 1-81-4 
Informal Opinion (1981) 
N.J. Ad. Code 
18:24-25.1 
G.R. Reg. 3(K):2; 
G.R. Reg. 3(F):64 
TSB 1978-(l)(S) 
Informal Opinion (1982) 
Technical Memorandum 
Code 
~Exempt Prewritten 
T - Taxed Programs 
Ohio T 
Oklahoma T 
Pennsylvania T 
Rhode Island T 
South Carolina T 
South Dakota T 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Utah T 
Vermont T 
Virginia T 
Washington T 
West Virginia T 
Wisconsin T 
Wyoming T 
Custom 
Programs 
T11 
?12 
T 
T 
E 
E 
E 
T 
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Authority 
Ohio Rev. Code §5739.01 
Okla. Stat. tit. 68, 
§1354(H) 
Reg. 163 
Reg. - Computers and 
Related Systems 
Reg. 117-174.262; 
Citizens and Southern 
Systems, Inc. v. Tax 
Commission, Supreme 
Court Opinion No. 22024 
(January 10, 1984) 
Reg. 64:06:02:79; 
Reg. 64:06:02:80 
Tenn. Code §67-3002(b) 
Tex. Admin. Code tit. 
34, §3.308 
Informal Opinion (1982) 
Chittenden Trust 
Company v. King, 465 
A.2d 1100 (Vt., 1983) 
Informal Opinion (1981) 
ETB 515.04.155 
Informal Opinion (1982) 
Proposed Rule 11.71 
Wyo. Stat. 
§29-6-404(a)(xiii) 
FOOTNOTES 
lThis listing is designed to provide general information 
only regarding the tax status of computer programs. It is 
not to be construed as determinative of tax liability. Note 
that not all states have taken a formal position with 
respect to the taxability of programs. This list is an 
updated version of a list prepared and copyrighted (1983) by 
Ronald J. Palenski, Associate General Counsel of ADAPSO, and 
is printed here by permission. 
2Assembly Bill 2932, enacted September 22, 1982, 
exempted custom computer programs generally (except basic 
operating programs) whether in human or machine readable 
form. Also exempted were modifications to prewritten 
programs, designed specifically for a single user. 
3Software is generally considered to be intangible so 
long as there is: (a) vendor analysis of user requirements 
or, (b) modification of software to fit a particular 
hardware/software configuration. 
4Custom programs transferred in human-readable form are 
taxed as services rather than as tangible personal property. 
5Computer game cartridges and similar mass distribution 
programs do not qualify for exemption. 
6Custom programs are taxed as services rather than as 
tangible personal property. 
7Custom programs are taxable if sold, leased, or 
licensed in machine-readable form: custom programs are 
exempt if sold, leased, or licensed in human-readable form, 
such as program instructions listed on coding sheets. 
8Effective July 1, 1983, only programs that will require 
vendor modifications to meet the specific requirements of 
the customer will be regarded as intangible property exempt 
from sales and use taxation; otherwise, programs sold 
"off-the-shelf" will be regarded as tangible and subject to 
tax. 
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9Effective August 1, 1983, all prewritten programs are 
subject to sales and use taxation while custom programs are 
not. A custom program is one prepared to the special order 
of the customer and includes specially prepared modifica-
tions to prewritten programs. A program is regarded as 
custom if there is: vendor analysis of user requirements or 
modification of software to fit a particular 
hardware/software configuration. 
lOIn order to preserve the program exemption, charges for 
tangible media (e.g., tapes, cards, etc.) must be separately 
billed and the tax for such applied. 
11Effective July 1, 1983, a variety of computer services, 
including the "designing, selling J leasing, modifying, or 
debugging of specialized or customized computer programs," 
became subject to sales and use taxation in Ohio. 
l2Because of the peculiar wording of the Oklahoma statute 
(referencing both "software" and prewritten programs"), it 
is unclear whether custom programs are taxable or exempt. 
In particular cases, please consult local counsel. 
13 h· t· t d t h t T lS exemp lon ex en seven 0 orne compu er game 
cartridges. 
14 h . h . b Note t at serVlces suc as custom programmlng are su -
ject to the Business and Occupation Tax. 
604 
CHAPTER FOURTEEN 
FEDERAL TAX CREDITS AND DEPRECIATION 
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Introduction 
Tax credits are enacted by Congress to give incentives to 
business and individuals to invest in certain areas to achieve socIal 
or economic goals or to ease the tax burden of certalO taxpayer 
groups. The child and dependent care credit, for example, was enacted 
to provide a tax incentIve for mothers to obtain employment rather 
than remain on welfare (the dole), therefore becomlOg taxpayers 
rather than tax charges. The rehabilitation credit was enacted to 
encourage landlords to invest in and improve certain types of rental 
property in order to clean up the slums and lOcrease the number and 
quality of low income rental properties. The targeted jobs credit was 
enacted to provide an incentive for employers to hire and train 
chronically unemployed and unskilled workers who would otherWIse 
remain tax charges. The employee stock ownership plan(ESOP) credit 
was enacted to provide employers with an incentive to adopt a certalO 
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type of employee pension plan. Energy tax credits were enacted to 
provide individuals and businesses with an added incentive to invest 
in energy-saving equipment and insulat ion. The earned income credit 
provides low income individuals with an extra tax break that is not 
available to moderate or high income individuals. The tax credit for 
the elderly provides a similar tax break for the elderly. The political 
campaign contributions credit provides an incentive for taxpayers to 
contribute to the political party or candidate of their choice. 
The two tax credits discussed in this chapter are the investment 
tax credit and the credit for research and experimental expenditures. 
The investment tax credit was first enacted in 1962 by President 
Kennedy and, with minor exceptions, has been a significant flscal 
policy tool ever since. The investment tax credit provides a tax 
incentive for businessmen to invest in certain types of bUSiness 
property in the hope that such investment will expand the economy 
and employment by some multiple of the investment. The investment 
tax credit has been suspended, repealed, reinstated and reinacted 
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numerous tlmes slnce lts inception in 1962, and the tax act currently 
being discussed in Congress, if enacted in its present form, would 
make additional changes. An example of how the investment tax credit 
is computed is given later in this chapter. 
The credit for research and experimental expenditures was 
enacted to provide a tax Incent ive for businesses to invest more funds 
in research and development in certain target areas in order to expand 
employment and advance technology. The credit is avai lable for 
expenditures made after June 30, 1981 and before January 1, 1986. 
An example of the credit for research and experimental expenditures 
is given later in this chapter. 
All of the above-mentioned tax credits are granted at the federal 
level. State tax credits for some of the above-mentioned items may 
also eXIst, but are not dIscussed here because of their relatIve 
insignificance and irrelevance. The investment tax credit may be 
taken on bundled software and, according to one federal court(see 
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Texas Instr"umentsl Case No. 381 Appendix C)I may also be taken on 
software that is not bundled. The credit for research and 
experimental expenditures may be taken for certain software 
expendituresl but which expenditures qualify for this credit and 
which do not has not yet been clearly stated. The Proposed Treasury 
Regulations dealing specifically with the treatment of software for 
research and experimental credit purposes were withdrawn due to the 
strong opposltion of the software industry, and new regulations will 
not be issued prior to the 1986 electIon. (The Internal Revenue 
Service is working on drafting proposed regulations that, if adopted, 
would classify software as intangible and therefore ineligible for the 
investment tax credit. See Federal Registerl Volume 491 No l • 33 1 
Thursday, February 161 1984, 5939-5941.) 
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INVESTMENT I.M.CREDIT 
Computer hardware Qualifies for the investment tax credit,1 and 
so may computer software in certain instances. Revenue Procedure 
69-21 (see appendix 0 for full text of IRS pronouncements) addresses 
the software issue.2 It defines computer software to include: 
..... all programs or routines used to cause a computer to 
perform a desired task or set of tasks, and the documentation 
required to describe and maintam those programs. Computer 
programs of all classes, for example, operating systems, 
execut ive systems, monitors, compilers, and translators, 
assembly routines, and utility programs as well as application 
programs are included. 'Computer software' does not include 
procedures which are external to computer operations, such as 
instructions to transcription operators and external control 
procedures ... 
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This revenue procedure specifically permits a taxpayer 
consistently either to expense software development costs or 
amortize them over five years or lessJ as is done for research and 
experimental expenditures.3 Purchased software costs that are 
included in the price of hardware and are not separately stated and 
are treated as tangible may be amortized over five years or less. 
Software that is leased for use in a trade or business may be 
deducted from taxable income in accordance with Regulation 
1.162-11. An Internal Revenue Service Revenue Ruling4 allows the 
investment credit to be taken for software where the cost of the 
software is included in the cost of the hardware. Where software 
development costs have been expensed in prior years and the taxpayer 
capitalizes software costs incurred for a new software project, such 
change is considered to be a change in accounting method requiring 
IRS approval.S 
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The IRS treats software that is separately priced as intangible 
property, and therefore not qualifying for the investment tax credit. 
Many state courts also treat software as intangible for sales, use and 
property tax purposes.6 
However, three recently decided state tax cases held that 
software is tangible for sales7 and use8 tax purposes. These three 
decisions are diametrically opposed to the weight of Judicial 
precedent. (see Chapter 13). 
At least one case 9 has held software to be tangible for criminal 
law purposes. In that case, a Texas man stole some computer 
programs from his employer and claimed that he had committed petty 
larceny rather than grand larceny because the only tangible property 
he stole was the paper the programs were printed on, which had a 
value of less than $50. The court disagreed, holding that the 
programs had a value in excess of the paper upon which they were 
printed, and were tangible property for purposes of the criminal 
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statute. 
In Computer Sciences Corporation v. Commissioner,10 computer 
software was held to be intangible for collapsible corporation 1! 
purposes (see Case No. 13, Appendix C). (A collapsible corporation is 
formed and availed of for the sole purpose of tax avoidance. It is 
formed at the beginning of a venture and is 1 iQuidated short ly before 
the venture reaches fruition, resulting in substantial tax benefits 
that would not be permitted if the corporation remamed in existence). 
In that case, Computax, a wholly owned subsidiary of Computer 
Sciences Corporat ion, owned a program for the computer preparat ion 
of income tax returns. The IRS contended that a collapsible 
corporat ion had been set up with the intent of avoiding taxes. 
Computer SCiences Corporation claimed that property manufactured, 
constructed or produced (such as the Computax program) by a taxpayer 
was not intended to apply to intangible property of any type, and even 
if the section were intended to refer to intangIble property, no such 
intangible property was produced since all that the company produced 
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and developed for transfer to Computax was "knowhow" and goodwill 
which is not "property." 
Other court cases have addressed the tangibility issue for motion 
picture fllm negatives and software. Films and records have much In 
common with computer software but several distinct ions can be made 
as well. Most of the value of a film or record (or a book, for that 
matter) is attributable to the intellectual and artistic content rather 
than the celluloid, plastlc or paper upon WhlCh that content is 
recorded. Buyers of records and film (movie theaters) do not conslder 
themselves to be purchasers of celluloid or plastiC. However, one 
critical distinction is that the celluloid upon which the movie is 
recorded is a crucial element of the motion picture. 
Another distinction that can be made between film and software 
is that the media upon which the computer program is recorded 
(cards, tape, diSk, etc.) can be returned to the seller or destroyed 
after the program has been run through the computer; it is of no 
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further use or value. Movie film, on the other hand, has continuing 
value after the movie has been shown; it can be used again and again. 
A third dist inction that can be made between software and fi lms, 
records and books is that the latter three items can be used 
immediately upon purchase, whereas software must first be 
translated into a language that can be understood by the computer. 
Furthermore, the latter three items are immediately perceptible to 
the senses, whereas software, in essence, is not. 
A fourth distinction that has been made between software and 
films, records and books is that the software sales or lIcensing 
agreement often includes periodic updating by the seller. Films, 
records and books, on the other hand, are not updated after sale. 
However, this dist inct ion does not apply to the many programs that 
are not updated after sa Ie. 
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In the first series of Walt Disney cases 12 (See Case Nos. 42 and 
43, Appendix C), the issues were whether motion picture film 
negatives were tangible personal property for federal tax purposes, 
and whether motion picture film negatives qualify for the investment 
tax credit. These cases were discussed in Chapter 13. The 
commissioner contended that the negatives were not tangible 
personal property within the meaning of IRe Section 48 (a) (1) (A) and 
that they did not have a useful 1 ife of eIght years, and could, 
therefore, not qualify for the investment tax credit. 
Fi 1m negat ives are used to make prints, which are copyrighted and 
exnibited in theaters or on television. The negatives are not 
copyrighted. The CommisslOner argued that all labor and production 
costs of the negat ives be attributed to the copyrighted prints. 
The court held for Walt Disney Productions. Motion picture film 
negatives were held to be tangible personal property (notwithstanding 
Reg. 1.48-1 (0, which the court held to be invalid) and the negatives in 
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Question had a useful llfe sufficiently long to Qualify for the 
investment credit. Film negatives, llke production machinery, are 
standardized units of depreciable property which Disney uses to 
produce other products, the positive prints. The attribution of all the 
value of the film to the copyrlght, like the attribution of all the value 
of a machin"e used in production to a patent eventually procured on it 
is unwarranted. The district court held that the master motion 
picture film negatives in Question produced in 1962, and used in the 
film manufacturing process were tangible personal property within 
the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, that they had a 
useful life of more than eIght years, that they were depreciable, and 
that they were eligible for the investment tax credit. 
Another Disney case (see Case No. 43, Appendix C) also addressed 
the film negatIve tangibility issue. 13 In this case, Walt Disney 
Product ions sued for a tax refund, claiming the investment tax credit 
under 26 U.S.c. Sections 38, 46-50 (1970) for the cost of fourteen 
film negatives produced in 1970. The district court granted the 
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refund and the government appealed. 
Disney sought the investment tax credit for the production costs 
of the master negative which is used to produce positive prints. In 
calculating the investment credit, Disney claimed all the capitalized 
costs necessary to produce the master negative. These costs include 
preparing a script from a story, bullding sets, hiring and rehearsmg 
talent, and editing the original film negatives and "m1xmg" the audio 
(dialogue, music and sound effects) tapes to produce the cut-picture 
negative and magnetiC master sound tape. Disney did not claim the 
costs incurred in producing the negatives and did not cla1m as 
investment credit property the origmal or edited dialogue, mUS1C or 
sound effect tapes, although the expense for those items was claimed 
in computing the production costs of the master negative. 
The depreciable base included the capitalized costs of producing 
answer prints, including the costs of the optical sound negatives but 
not including the costs of the intermediate printing articles. The 
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income-forecast method was used to depreciate each film title} a 
method that is generally used to depreciate intangible personal 
property. 
On its 1970 tax return, Disney claimed an investment tax credit 
equal to seven percent of its alleged qualified investment in the 
master negatives produced during that taxable year. The 
Commissioner disallowed the investment tax credit on the ground 
that Disney's production costs were investments in intangible 
property, a copyright-protected motion picture. The government 
mamtained that, while a master negative includes tangible items 
such as film stock and tapes, these tangible "things" have no separate 
identities or depreciation bases for tax purposes apart from the 
photoplay and intangible rights included in the finished product. The 
master negatives at issue in this case are the same type of property 
that the court previously characterized as qualifying for the 
investment tax credit in Disney I and Disney II. 
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Crosby, Sussex aand MCA addressed this same issue. 14 (see Case 
No.3, Appendix C). 
FACTS: The companies in question produced fi lms which were shown 
at movie theaters, by the networks or by individual 
television stations. The process involved in the manufacture 
of these films consisted of three steps. In step one, the 
audio and video portions were recorded and edited separately 
and then combined to form the master negatives. Step two 
involved the making of various intermediate or secondary 
fllm and tape articles from the master negatlVes. The fmal 
step involved the actual manufacture of the release prmts. 
These combine the audio and video portions onto a single 
property, which are then shown at movie theaters, by 
te levision networks, or by individual television networks, or 
by individual television stat ions. The release prints are 
generally struck from the different intermediate articles 
contained within step two. 
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The plaintiffs contended that the expenditures incurred in steps 
one and two qualify for the investment tax credit. The government 
contented that: (1) only step one expenditures qualify for the 
investment tax credit; (2) if predominant use is outside the United 
States, then the expenditures do not qual ify for the investment tax 
credit even though the master negatives remained within the United 
States for more than 50 percent of the year in question; (3) 
predominant use should depend on the source of income, whIch 
approach adopted by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, or, alternatively, 
predominant use should be determined by the manufacturing role of 
the asset. 
The court held for Crosby, Sussex and MCA. In order to qualify for 
the investment tax credit, the property in question must be Section 
38 property, which was defined to include all tangible personal 
property, with certain specific exceptions (for property used to 
furnish lodging, property used by tax-exempt organizations, property 
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used by governmental units, and property used predommantly outside 
of the United States). Property is classHied as Section 38 property if, 
in the opinion of Congress, such property is thought to assist in 
expanding employment or gross national product in a socially 
beneficial way. The property also had to have at least an elght year 
life (this rule has since been modified several times). The Tax 
Reform Act of 1976 refined the manner in which the investment 
credit was to be applied to movie and television films (P.L. 94-455 
Sec. 804) by making specific rules for determining predominant use 
and useful life of films. 
In its holding, the court in Crosby, Sussex and MeA stated that: 
"There is no rational reason why a distinction should be drawn 
between the printing articles in step -lor step -2. and a 
taxpayer's entitlement to the investment credit. It would 
frustrate the statutory purpose of the investment credit which 
was found in the Disney cases to cover the motion picture and 
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television industry, to arbitrarily attribute the production 
costs to only the master negatives (step It 1), and not allow the 
credit for the intermediate printing articles (step lt2).NI5 
In Texas Instruments. Inc. v. United States. '6(see Case No. 38, 
Appendix C) the court addressed the issue of whether computer tapes, 
including the value of the data contained therein, are considered to be 
tangible personal property for investment tax credit and depreciatlOn 
purposes. 
During 1968 and 1969, a subsidiary of Texas Instruments was 
engaged in the business of collecting, processing and selling or 
licensing offshore seismic information to various customers who in 
turn used that information to explore for oil and gas. While the 
information was furnished to the customer in picture form depicting 
the contours of the earth's different strata, the actual collection and 
editing process involved a complicated computer process. 
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Seismic data were transmitted by electronic impulses and 
transcribed onto magnetic computer tapes know as "field" tapes. 
From these field tapes a "final" or "output" tape was produced, from 
which the pictures were produced. 
When a customer placed an order for the information, he received 
a copy of the original picture produced by the process, a map locating 
the pOints where the sound waves were introduced into the earth and 
a report outlining the conditions under which the tests were 
conducted. The Texas Instruments subsidiary company retained all 
field and output tapes as well as the original analog film 
Information furnished on the picture to customers was lIcensed on a 
nonexclusive basiS. Customers were generally not permitted to make 
the data available to others. 
Costs incurred in 1968 and 1969 were in excess of $3,000,000, 
and were deducted by the taxpayer as ordinary and necessary business 
expenses. The Internal Revenue Service disallowed these deductions 
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and determined that the costs should be capital ized and amort ized 
over a seven year period. Texas Instruments did not dispute this 
determination, but insisted that it was entitled to an investment tax 
credit and to use the double-declining balance method of deprecIation 
on the total capitalized costs of the field tapes, output tapes and 
analog films. The IRS contended that these tax benefits are 
applicable only to the cost of the raw tape and film itself, not to the 
full cost of producing the tapes and film. 
At the distrIct court level 17 the government's posit Ion was 
sustained on two grounds. First, when a taxpayer p laces into service 
tangible personal property that he produced himself, the Investment 
tax credit may be taken only for the costs of the tangible inputs used. 
Labor and other intangible costs must be excluded. Since Texas 
Instruments failed to allocate its costs between the tangible and 
intangible inputs, no investment tax credit may be claimed. Second, 
the costs incurred in producing and processing the seismic data on the 
tapes and ftlm did not constitute making an investment in tangible 
625 
property, but rather intangible information. 
At the Appellate Court level, the government conceded that the 
district court's analysis on the first ground was erroneous, but sought 
to sustain the district court's jUdgment on the second ground, argUing 
that if the capital asset in which the taxpayer's costs are invested is 
essentially intangible, then all costs of acquiring or producing that 
asset constitute the basis of an intangible asset and the investment 
tax credit and the double declining balance method of depreciation are 
unavailable. 
The Appellate Court held for Texas Instruments. Treasury 
Regulation Section 1.48-1(F) states that: 
"Intangible property, such as patents, copyrights, and 
subscription lists, does not qualify as section 38 property. The 
cost of intangible property, in the case of a patent or copyright, 
includes all costs of purchasing or producing the item patented 
or copyrighted. Thus, in the case of a mot ion picture or 
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television film or tape, the cost of the intangible property 
includes manuscript and screenplay costs. the cost of wardrobe 
and set design. the salaries of cameramen, actors, directors. 
etc., and all other costs properly includible in the basis of such 
film or tape." 
Treasury regulations are ordinarily entitled to considerable 
welght in construing the statutory language. However, the court 
pOinted out that the Ninth Circuit had previously ruled the regulation 
to be invalid as applied to film,18 and the present court stated its 
agreement with the Ninth Circuit's decision. When Congress 
reenacted the investment tax credit in 1971, it expressly mdicated 
its agreement with the Disney holding that motion pictures and 
te levision fi lms are tangible personal property, el igible for the 
investment credit. 19 Furthermore, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 added 
Section 48 (k) to the Internal Revenue Code, and treats motion picture 
and television films as tangible personal property eligible for the 
investment tax credit.20 
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In Texas Instruments. the court held that the property in Question 
is tangible personal property and, therefore, Qualified for the 
investment tax credit and for the use of the double declining balance 
method of depreciation. For investment tax credit and depreciation 
purposes, the basis of tangible tapes and films on which the taxpayer 
recorded seismiC data includes the cost of collecting the data and 
recording it on the raw tapes and films. 
RULES FOR THE INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT 
Qual1Tylng property 
In order to Qualify for the investment tax credit, the property 
must be Section 38 property.21 Section 38 property includes property 
that 1s: 
1. Depreciable as recovery property under the accelerated cost 
recovery system (ACRS), or as nonrecovery property, and 
2. Tangible personal property, other than as air cond1tion1ng or 
heating unit, or 
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3. Other tangible property, except buildings or their structural 
components, used as an integral part of manufacturing, 
product ion, or extract ion, etc., and 
4. Placed in service during the year in a trade or business or 
for the production of income, and 
5. Used primarily in the United States. 
Computer hardware and bundled software qualify for the credit. 
One court22 has ruled that unbundled software also qualifies. 
Property is considered placed in service in the earlier of: 
1. The tax year in which the period for depreciatlOn for the 
property begins, or 
2. The tax year in which the property is placed in a condition or 
state of readiness and avai labiJ ity for service. 
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Part i a lly Depree i ab 1 e Property 
If a depreciation deduction is allowed for only a part of the 
property placed in service during the year only that part of the 
property for which depreciation is allowable qualifies for the credIt. 
Example: A computer is used 80 percent for business and 20 
percent for personal purposes. Only 80 percent of the 
computer's basis (or cost) qualifies for the credit. 
Recovery Property23 
Recovery property is tangible depreciable property placed in 
service after 1980 that is not excluded property. Generally, it 
includes new or used property acquired after 1980 for use in a trade 
or business or for the production of income. Property acquired and 
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used for any purpose before 1981 1S not recovery property. Recovery 
property is depreciated under ACRS. The section 179 expense 
deduction can be elected only for recovery property. 
Nonrecovery Property 
Nonrecovery property lS also tanglble depreclable property. It 
must have a useful life of at least three years. It includes property 
that does not qua Ii fy for ACRS, such as property p I aced in serv 1 ce 
before 1981, and property a taxpayer elects to exclude from ACRS. 
Tangible personal property is property (not real estate) that can 
be seen and touched. 
equipment and computers. 
Principal examples lnclude machlnery, 
Land and land improvements, such as bui ldings and other 
permanent structures and their components, do not qualify. 
Air-conditioning or space-heating units that are placed in service 
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after September 1978 are not included unless the units are acquired 
under a contract that was binding on and after October I, 1978. 
Buildings, swimming pools, paved parking areas, wharves and docks, 
bridges and fences, and similar property are not tangible personal 
property. 
All business property, other than structural components, that is 
contained in or attached to a building is tangible personal property 
Local law does not determine whether property is tangible personal 
property. Some property that is tangible personal property under 
local law may not qualify for investment credit. Some property that 
is real property under local law, such as fixtures, can qualify for 
investment credit.24 Assets such as grocery store counters, printing 
presses, and neon and other signs normally qualify as tangible 
personal property. A car or truck used in business also qualifies. 
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Leased Property 
Property that is leased rather than purchased Qualifies for the 
investment credit if the owner elects to pass the credit to the leases 
and if the property is considered qualifying new property both to the 
lessor and lessee. A lessor cannot pass the credit to the lessee25 
Al10wable Credit 
The amount of investment in qualifying property that is eligible 
for the mvestment credit depends on the class of property for 
recovery property under ACRS or on the useful life of nonrecovery 
property. Used property is sUbject to a limitation. The amount of 
credit allowable against the tax in any year is limited, but any 
excesses may be carried back or carried over. 
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The credit allowable is the sum of the investment credit 
carryovers, plus the current year's regular investment credit, plus the 
current year's business energy credit, plus investment credit 
carrybacks to the current year.26 The regular investment credit is ten 
percent of the investment eligible for the credit.27 
The regular investment credit is 1 imited to tax 1 jabi I ity or the 
amount of the tax in excess of $25,000, whichever is less.28 
Examp Je One: Tax 1 iabi I ity for 1983, before credits, is 
$100,000. The maximum lnvestment credit 1S 
$88,750, determined as follows: 
Tax liability before credit 
Less 
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$100,000 
25,000 
$ 75,000 
Example Two: Tax liability for 1983, before credits, is 
$21,463. The maximum investment tax credit that 
can be taken is $21,463, the amount of the tax 
liabllity. 
For married persons filing separate returns, each spouse figures 
the limit separately. The regular credit is limited for each spouse to 
the lesser of the income tax liability, as adjusted, shown on that 
spouse's separate Form 3468, or to $12,500 plus 85 percent of the tax 
that is more than $'2,500. However, if one spouse has no qual Hying 
investment or no unused credit, the spouse having the investment or. 
unused credit may use the entire $25,000 plus 85 percent of the tax 
that is more than $25,00029 
A controlled group of corporations may annually divide the 
$25,000 among its members in any way the members choose.30 
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Amount Ellgible 
The amount of the investment in qual ifying property that is 
eligible for the credit depends on the class of property for recovery 
property under ACRS or on the useful Ii f e of nonrecovery property . 
The useful life is determined at the time the property is placed in 
service. 
Recovery Property 
I f the sect ion 179 expense deduct ion is elected, the investment In 
qualifying recovery property is first reduced by that amount.31 
F or recovery property that is three-year class property, 60 
percent of the investment (after reduction by the section 179 expense 
deduct lOn, 1f elected) is eligible for the credit. All of the investment 
(after reduction for the section 179 expense deduction, if elected) 
that is five-year class or ten-year class property is eligible for the 
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credit. Most property placed in service after 1980 will be recovery 
property. If the property does not Qualify as recovery property, it 
may Qual ify as nonrecovery property. 
Example One: A company purchased cC.'I1puter equipment for 
$18,000 in 1984. The property Qualifles as three-year recovery 
property, and the company elects the Section 179 expense deduction. 
The allowable investment tax credit would be $630, determined as 
follows: 
Cost 
Less Sec. 179 expense deduct ion 
Amount Qualifying for the credit 
(60% of $10,500) 
Multiplied by tax credit percentage 
I nvestment tax credit 
637 
$18,000 
7,500 
$10,500 
$ 6,300 
10% 
$ 630 
For three year property, the basis remaining after the Section 179 
deduction must be reduced by 40 percent. The allowable investment 
tax credit is 10 percent of the remainder. 
Example Two: A company purchases computer equipment for 
$25,000 in 1986. The property qualifies as five-year recovery 
property, and the company elects the Sect i on 1 79 expense deduct lOn. 
The allowable investment tax credit would be $1,500, determined as 
fo llows: 
Cost 
Less Sec. 179 expense deduct ion 
Multiplied by tax credit percentage 
I nvestment tax credi t 
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$25,000 
10,000 
$15,000 
10% 
$ , .500 
No 40 percent reduction need be made for property other than 
three-year recovery property.32 
Nonrecovery Property 
Property with a useful life of less than three years is not eligible 
for the credit. Only one-thIrd of the investment in qualifymg 
property with a useful life of at least three years but less than fIve 
years is eligible for the credit. 
Two-thirds of the amount invested is eligible for the credit if tile 
property has a useful life of at least five years but less than seven 
years. The full Investment is e llgib Ie for the credit if the property 
has a useful life of at least seven years.33 
Example: A company acquires nonrecovery property qualIfying for 
the investment tax credit for $12,000. 
(a) If the property had a useful life of at least three years but less 
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than five years, the amount of the allowable investment tax 
credit would be $400 ($12,000 x 33 1/3% x 10%). 
(b) If the property had a useful life of at least fIve years but less 
than seven years, the amount of the allowable investment tax 
credit would be $800 ( 12,000 x 66 2/3% x 10%) 
(c) I f the property had a useful I ife of at least seven years, the 
amount of the allowable investment tax credit would be $1,200 
($12,000 x 100% x 10%). 
Basis Reduction 
Beginning after 1982, the basis of the property upon wt'nch 
investment tax credit is taken must be reduced by 50 percent of the 
allowable investment tax credit.34 However, this adjustment can be 
ignored if the taxpayer elects to take an investment tax credit that is 
two percentage pOints lower than the amount that would otherwise be 
avai lable.35 
640 
ExamD le One: Five year recovery property is acquired in 1983 at 
a cost of $40,000. The allowable investment tax credit is $4,000, 
determined as follows: 
Cost 
Multiplied by tax credit 
I nvestment tax credi t 
$40,000 
10~ 
$ 4.000 
The basis of the property for depreciation must be reduced by 50 
percent of the investment credit. 
Cost 
Less 50~ of $4,000 
Depreciable basis 
$40,000 
2,000 
$38.000 
Example Two: Five year recovery property is acquired in 1983 
at a cost of $40,000. The company elects to take an investment 
credit that is two percentage points less than the maximum allowable 
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in order to prevent the property's depreciable basis from being 
reduced. The investment tax credit taken will be $3,200. 
Cost $40,000 
Mult1plied by tax credit percentage 8% 
$ 3,200 
Depreciable basis $40,000 
Investment Tax Credit and Depreciation 
Example: Assume that software is acquired on January 5, 1983 
and that ther Acce lerated Cost Recovery System 
depreciation table for 5 years is used. Taxable income 
before depreciation is $3,000,000 for each of the five 
years, and the tax rate is 40%. The investment tax 
credit and depreciation computations for each of the 
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five years would be computed as follows: 
ACRS Five Year Depreciation Table 
Applicable Tax Rate 40~ 
Year Percentage ITC 10% 
1 15% Placed in service 
2 22 after 1982 (1-5-83) 
3 21 
4 21 
5 21 
FIrst Year (year placed in service) 
ITC $100,000 cost x 10~ = $10,000 ITC 
Basis of property 
Less: 112 I TC 
Adjusted basis 
Taxable income before depr. 
Depr. expense($95,000 x 15%) 
Taxable Income after depr. 
Tax(40:Po) $1,194,300 
Less: ITC 10,000 
Net Income 
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$ 100,000. 
5,000. 
95,000. 
$3,000,000. 
14,250. 
2,985,750. 
1,184,300. 
$1,801.450. 
Secend Year 
Taxable income before depr. 
Depr. expense($95,OOO x 22~) 
Taxab Ie inceme after depreciat ien 
Tax (40%) 
Net inceme 
Years 3, 4 and 5 
Taxable inceme befere depr. 
Depr. expense ($95,000 x 21 %) 
Taxab Ie inceme after depr. 
Tax (40%) 
Net inceme 
Used Property Limitation 
$3,000,000. 
20,900. 
$2,979,100. 
1.191.640. 
$1,787,460. 
$3,000,000. 
19,950. 
2,980,050. 
1.192,020. 
$1,788,030. 
The cest of used property that may be considered in investment 
tax credit calculatiens is limited to $125,000 a year for property 
placed in servIce in tax years 1982, 1983, .or 1984, and $150,000 per 
year thereafter.36 
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Example: A calendar year taxpayer acquires computer equipment 
qualifying as five year recovery property in 1985 at a cost of 
$400,000. Of this amount, $170,000 represents used property. The 
amount of the purchase that is eligible for the investment tax credit 
is $380,000 ($230,000 new property and $150,000 used property). 
At Risk Limitation 
The investment tax credit may only be taken on the amount of 
qualified property that is at risk.37 The at-risk limit applies to new 
or used property qualifying for the investment credit that was placed 
in service after February 18, 1981, in most activities carried on as a 
trade or business or for the production of income. In computing the 
investment credit for property covered by the limit, the basis of the 
property for the purpose of the qualified investment in the property 
cannot exceed the amount at risk for that property at the end of the 
tax year in which the property is placed in service. A taxpayer is 
considered at risk for property to the extent of the total cash paid, 
the unadjusted basis of property given up, and certain amounts 
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borrowed to acquire the property, 1f the taxpayer is personally llable 
for the repayments, or if the borrowings are secured by property 
other than property used in the activity. 
Unused (redi t (arrybacks and Carryovers38 
An unused credit exists if the sum of the investment credit 
carryovers to the tax year plus the credit allowable for the tax year 
is more than the 1 imit, discussed earl ier. The unused credit to the 
extent it is from the credit allowable for this tax year, may be 
carried back to the three prior tax years, and the balance st i 11 unused 
in those years may be carried over to the 15 following tax years. The 
unused credit must be used in the earliest of these years and is used 
to the extent allowed as a carryback to a prior year or as a carryover 
to a I ater year. 
Carryback rule. An unused credit carried back to a prior tax 
year is used to the extent that the limit for the prior year is more 
than the sum of: 
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1. The investment credit carryovers to that year, plus 
2. The credit earned for the year, plus 
3. The investment credit carrybacks from years prior to the 
year from which the credit is being carried. 
Example: A calendar year taxpayer has $3,000 of unused 
investment credits for 1985 avai lable as a 
carryback to 1982. His income tax for 1982 was 
$2,500, the investment credit for 1982 was 
$1,000, and the unused credit carryback from 1984 
was $1,000. The unused credits for 1985 that can 
be used in 1982 are 1 imited to $500, the amount 
that the 1982 income tax ($2,,500) is more than 
the sum of the 1982 investment credit ($l,OOO) 
plus the 1984 investment credit carryback 
($1,000 ). 
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Carryover rule. An unused credit carried over to 1985 is used 
before a credit for 1985 to the extent the unused credit is not more 
than the limit. Credits earned for 1985 are then used in the amount 
that the limit is more than the carryovers from 1984 and prior years. 
Example: A calendar year taxpayer has an investment credit of 
$1,200 for 1985. His income tax is $1,500 for 1985, 
and there is $500 of investment credit earned carried 
over from 1984. The unused credit from 1984 is first 
used to the extent of the 1985 tax. Then the 1985 
credit is used to the extent of the excess $1,000 
($1,500 - $500). 
Investment Credit Recapture39 
I f property upon which the investment tax credit was claimed in a 
prior year is disposed of, some or all of the credit may have to be 
recaptured. For recapture on recovery property, the credit recaptured 
is computed by multiplying a recapture percentage by the origmal 
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investment credit taken. The result of this computation is the 
amount of the recapture. The following table provides percentages 
for figuring the recapture of investment credit. 
Recovery property 
dlsposed of or ceasing 
to qualify wlthin 
First full year 
Second full year 
Third full year 
Fourth full year 
Fifth full year 
The recapture percentage: 
For 5, 10 For 
or 15 year 3 year 
property property 
100 100 
80 66 
60 33 
40 0 
20 0 
If nonrecovery property is disposed of or ceases to be qualifymg 
property before the end of the estlmated useful1ife used in computmg 
the credit, some of the credit may have to be recaptured. Nonrecovery 
property 1S property placed in service before 1981 or property placed 
in service after 1980 that does not qualify for ACRS. The credit must 
be recomputed using an applicable percentage based on the actual 
useful life instead of the estimated useful life used or1gmally in 
computmg the investment eligible for the credit. 
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F or both recovery and nonrecovery property, the amount of unused 
credits carried back or carried over to any other tax year that is 
affected by the decrease in the credit allowed due to recapture must 
be computed. The credit must be recomputed based on the actual 
amount of time the property was in service. If the recomputed credit 
is less than the credit that actually decreased the tax l1abl1lty for 
the year the asset was placed in service as well as for any carryback 
or carryover year, the tax must be increased, in the year of dlsposal, 
by the excess of the credit allowed for all affected years over the 
recomputed credit. 
Example One: In May, 1981, two new machines were purchased 
for $6,000 and $5,000. The machines are five-year 
recovery property. The 1981 tax return showed an 
investment credit of $1,100, agamst an income tax 
liability, as adjusted, of $1,500. In December, 
'982 the $6,000 machine was sold. 
Since the machine was sold within the second full 
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year after it was placed in service, $480 (80ro of 
$600) of the original investment credit must be 
recaptured. The allowable investment credit is 
only $120, and $600 was origmally taken (10% of 
$6,000), so the tax liabllity increase by $480 
Example Two: On September 1, 1979, three new machines were 
acquired at a cost of $2,000" $3,000 and $5,000, 
respect ive ly. Each machine had an est imated 
useful llfe of ten years, and each was placed in 
service immediately. In the 1979 tax return, tne 
full $1,000 tax credit (10% of $10,000) was 
claimed against a tax of $1,300. 
On October 1, 1982, tne macnme cost mg $3,000 
was sold. Since that machine was neld more tnan 
three years but less tnan five years, tne 
recomputed investment eligible for the credit is 
$1,000 (1/3 of $3,000) and the recomputed credit 
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for that machine is $100 ( 10% of $1,000). The tax 
I iabil ity resulting from the sale of the machine 
increases by $200, the excess of the $300 
originally claimed (10% of $3,000) over the 
recomputed $100 (10% of $1,000) allowable. 
Example Three:The facts are the same as in Example 2, except 
that the income tax for 1979 was only $ 100. 
There was no income tax for 1976-1978, but there 
was a $500 tax each year for 1980 and 1981. The 
original credit for 1979 ($1,000) was claimed as 
follows: $100 for 1979; $500 for 1980; and $400 
for 1981. 
Had the actual instead of the estimated useful 11fe 
been used, the investment e 1 igib Ie for the credit 
would have been $8,000, and the credit for 1979 
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would have been $800. The amount that must be 
added to the 1982 tax, the $200 excess of the 
credit claimed over the recomputed credit, is 
determined as follows: 
Credit Recomputed Excess 
Year Allowed Credit Credit 
1979 $ 100 $ 100 $ -0-
1980 500 500 -0-
1981 400 200 200 
$ 1,000 $ 800 $ 200 
Example Four: The facts are the same as in Example 3, except 
that in February 1982, a new machine Quallfymg 
as five-year recovery property costing $10,000 
was placed in service. The income tax for 1982 
is $900. The excess for 1982 of the credit 
earned over the tax, $ 1 00 ($1,000 - $900), is an 
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Year 
1979 
1980 
1981 
unused credit carryback to 1979. 
If the actual instead of estimated useful life had 
been used, the investment credit for 1979 would 
have been $800. The amount carried to 1980 is 
$800 ($700 carried over from 1979 and $100 
carried back from 1982). The amount carrIed to 
1981 is $300 (200 carryover from 1980 and $100 
carryback from 1982). The amount that must be 
added to the 1982 tax, the $100 excess of the 
credit claimed over the recomputed credit, is 
determined as fol1ows: 
Credit Recomputed Exces 
Allowed Credit Credit 
$ 100 $ 100 $ -0-
500 500 -0-
400 300 100 
$1,000 $ 900 $ 100 
------- ------ ------
------- ------ ------
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THE RESEARCH CREDIT 
As a general rule, business expenditures to develop or create an 
asset which has a useful life that extends beyond the current taxable 
year, such as expenditures to develop a new consumer product or to 
improve a production process, must normally be capitalized and 
cannot be deducted in the year paid or incurred. Such product 
development costs are usually recovered only on disposition or 
abandonment of the asset, or through depreciation or amortization 
deductions taken over the useful life of the asset. 
Internal Revenue Code Section 174, however, permits a taxpayer to 
elect special tax accounting methods for certam research or 
experimental expenditures which are paid or incurred during the 
taxable year in connection with the taxpayer's trade or bus mess. 
Under Section 174, a taxpayer may elect to deduct currently the 
amount of qualIfied research or experimental expenditures or to 
deduct these expenditures ratably over the useful life of the property 
or a period of Slxty months, whichever, is less. A taxpayer may 
choose either method of deduction treatment so long as he is 
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consistent. Furthermore, this special method of tax accounting for 
research or experimental expenditures does not have to be consistent 
with the method the taxpayer uses to compute his income in keeping 
his books. Thus, a taxpayer may, for tax purposes, elect to deduct 
currently the amount of research or experimental expenditures even if 
such expenses are treated as capItal account charges or deferred 
expenses on the taxpayer's books or financial statements. Sect Ion 
174 does not specifically define the "research or experImental 
expenditures" eligible for deduction elections although accompanying 
regulations define the term to mean "research and development costs 
in the experimental or laboratory sense." 
5mce 1969, the Internal Revenue Service has taken the position 
that taxpayers may treat costs incurred in developing new or 
improved computer software In a manner simi lar to costs incurred in 
product development, generally, which are deductible under Section 
174. As a result, many computer services companies have elected to 
treat the1r software R &0 expenses under Section 174 and either 
deduct those expenses currently, or where it appears more 
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advantageous from a tax standpoint, amortize those expenses over 
five years or less. The Internal Revenue Service has not, however, 
ever expressly stated that software development costs are within the 
scope of "qual ified research" under Section 174. 
The research credit is designed to encourage businesses to 
increase the amounts they spend on research and experimental 
activities. The credit is equal to 25 percent of the increase m 
research expenses for the year over average research expenses durmg 
an earlier base period 40 The research credit can be taken for 
research expenditures incurred after June 30, 1981 and before 
January 1, 198641 
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A CONTROVERSY 
In 1981, concerned over the decllne of this nation's research and 
development activities and the reluctance of many businesses to 
expand significantly their research investment absent tax incentIves, 
Congress enacted a credit for increased research and experimental 
expenditures. The new credit (as set forth in new Code section 44 F), 
gives a direct reduction in bottom line tax liability for incremental 
increases in Qualified research expenses; that is, the excess of 
qua Ii fying current year expenses over average base period expenses.42 
This credit equals 25 percent of the excess (if any) of the taxable 
year over the taxpayer's average Qualified research expenses In a base 
period (one year, two years, or three years). 
On January 21, 1983, the Treasury Department proposed 
regulations43 that, if adopted, would provide guidance for the 
implementation of Section 44F. Due to public outcry, the proposed 
regulations have been recalled for further drafting. As drafted, the 
proposed regulations would have set separate and more strIct 
standards for software development than for other research 
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activities. This stricter standard would have precluded software 
expenditures from qualifying for the research credit unless the 
software project was virtually guaranteed to fail from the start, 
because operational feasibility of a program must be seriously in 
doubt before costs of development could be considered for the 
research credit. The costs associated with generating programs using 
standard programming techniques would not qualify for the credit. 
As stated in the proposed regulat ions, the costs of generat mg 
programs using standard programming techniques would not qualify 
for the research credit even if such costs are part of a project that 
otherwise qualifies for the credit. For example, the research costs 
associated with developing a cure for arthritis would qualify for the 
research credit, but any software costs aSSOCiated with the project 
would not qualify if standard programming techniques were employed. 
Setting a separate and higher standard for software is a radical 
departure from current practice, and one that violates congressional 
intent. 
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Congressional Intent 
When Congress passed P.L. 97-34, it was with the intent that 
computer software development costs would Qualify for the research 
credit. Accordmg to Senator Robert Dole (R-KS): 
..... wages incurred in developing new or. significantly improved 
computer software and which presently may be treated 1n a manner 
similar to section 174 research or expenmental expenditures are 
intended to Qualify for the new research credit, provIded they also 
meet the reQulrements of new sect ion 44F which are added to the 
requirements of sect ion 174, and provided they are not sUbject to the 
speclf Ie exc luslOns of sect IOn 44F.44 
The House Ways and Means Committee indicated a slmi Jar mtent. 
..... expenditures which otherwise would Qualify for the new credit 
are not to be disqualified solely because such costs are mcurred 1n 
developing computer software, rather than in developing hardware.,,45 
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Treasury Department Misinterpretation 
By draft ing regulations that set a separate and stricter standard 
for software development than for other research activities, the 
Treasury has miSinterpreted congressional intent.46 Sections 174 and 
44F have a common definition of "research," However, certain 
research expendItures that Qualify for the Section 174 deductlOn 
election do not Qualify for the research credit. For example, research 
expenditures may Qualify under trade or business,47 but these same 
research expenditures will not Quallfy for the research credit unless 
paId or lncurred In carrying on a trade or business of the taxpayer46 
Futhermore, expenditures lncurred to conduct research outsIde the 
Umted States may Qualify for deduction under Section 174, but do not 
QualIfy for the research credit. 49 In addition, expenditures that do 
not Qualify for deduction under Sectlon 174 are not eligible for the 
research credi t.50 
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The Internal Revenue Service has gone on record51 as stating that 
the proposed regulations52 are in accord with congressional intent, as 
that intent is recorded by the Staff of Joint Committee on Taxation.53 
Staff explanations do not constitute official legislative history, but 
are sometimes used as persuasive authority.54 However, in this 
instance the Staff has clearly mIsconstrued congressional intent. 
The Staff explanation was drawn from two principal sources, the 
House Ways and Means Committee Report55 and the Senate Finance 
Committee Report.56 These reports addressed separate and different 
research credit propsosals. Portions of both reports were eventually 
incorporated into the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 ("ERT A");57 
but only after amendment and a series of compromises. 
The original House proposal58 contained a definition of "research" 
that was derived from the Financial Accounting Standards Board's 
definition of "research and development."59 However, the FASB 
definition was not intended to be controlling for purposes of the 
research credit.60 The House Ways and Means definition, which was 
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not adopted, did not contain any cross reference to Section 174 
"research and experimental expenditures" in the definition of 
"qualified" research. Congress preferred broader language to a 
detailed definition and adopted the Senate version instead. 
Originally, the Senate proposal addressed only wage expenditures, but 
other costs were subsequently addressed. In the version that was 
finally adopted by Congress, "qualified research" was given the same 
general meaning as "research or experimental" in Section 174.61 
Because the Senate version was adopted, the Ways and Means 
def lnit ion should not receive much weight; the House Ways and Means 
Committee intended to have software costs included in qualified 
research expenditures, and the Committee stated specifically that 
such costs should be included62 
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The Ways and Means Committee clearly intended that software 
deve lopment costs Qual ify for the credit, and expl iCit ly recognized 
that certain software development costs may be treated like costs 
incurred for product development, which generally are subject to the 
Section 174 deduction election.63 The difficulty that exists with the 
Ways and Means interpretation of the nature and extent of software 
development cost treatment under Section 174 can be attributed more 
to a lack of understanding about the sUbject than to any directive 
narrowing the scope of the Section. 
When drafting its report, the Staff of the Joint Committee on 
Taxation Included language from the Ways and Means Committee 
report, but rejected the more detailed definition of research, 
apparently failing to realize that this language was no longer a direct 
reflection of Congressional intent. Using the Ways and Means 
Committee language was inappropriate and results in an inaccurate 
reflection of Congressional intent. As worded, it appears that 
Congress intended to have a separate and more strict standard for 
664 
computer software development than for other items qualifying for 
the credit when, in fact, the intent was to apply the same standard. 
Relying on this language, the Internal Revenue Service is 
inappropriately proposing to set a separate and more strict standard 
for software development than for other research and development 
act ivit ies.64 The only specific research and deve loprnent act ivity 
discussed in detail in the proposed regulations is software 
deve lopment. As drafted, most software development costs do not 
meet the e I igibi I ity requirements for "research and experimental 
expenditures" and therefore do not qualify for the research credlt. In 
the past, computer software has not been subjected to a stricter 
standard; this proposal therefore reflects a major shift in poliCY with 
respect to the treatment of software development costs. 
Whether an activity qualifies as research or experimental is a 
Question of fact, to be determined by the facts and circumstances In 
each case. The Proposed Regulation's statement65 that "generally the 
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costs of developing computer software are not research or 
experimental expenditures within the meaning of Section 174" is 
overbroad and does not take particular situations into account. 
Furthermore, computer software development costs have been 
afforded tax deduction treatment under Section 174 since 1969, 
because "the costs of developing software ... in many respects so 
clearly resemble the kind of research and experImental expenditures 
that fall within the purview of Section 174.,,66 This qualification has 
been reinforced by subsequent Internal Revenue Service rulings.67 
The Proposed Regulation goes on to say that "however, the term 
'research or experimental expenditures,' as used in SectlOn 174, 
includes the programming costs paid or incurred for new or 
sIgnificantly improved computer software." The term "new or 
significantly improved" applies only to software and not to any other 
research and development activity. Under the present law, it is not 
necessary to develop "new or significantly improved computer 
software" in order for the costs to qualify as research and 
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development expenditures. The "newness" or "significance" of an 
improvement has nothing to do with "costs incident to the 
development of an experimental or pilot model, a plant process, a 
product, a formula, or similar property, and the improvement of 
already existing property" as is required under present regulatlOns. 58 
The regulation is too restrictive as far as denying research 
expendi ture treatment for programs ·invo Iving standard or we II-known 
programming techniques. No examples are given of nonstandard or 
unknown programmmg techniques. It may well be that all of the 
programmmg techniques that can be developed have been developed. 
By the same token, all possible chemistry techniques may have 
already been developed. Programming is, however, only one part of 
the development of software. The proposed regulation seeks to 
exclude software development just because one component part IS not 
new and mnovat lVe. The same requirement is not imposed on research 
and development activity aImed at other products and processes, and 
there IS no justification for it in the activity of software 
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development. 
QUAL I FY I N6 RESEARCH69 
Not all research Qualifies for the credit. In general, it must be the 
k md of research for which taxpayers are allowed to deduct or 
amortize their expenses under other provisions of the tax law. That 
is, the credit applies only to research and development in the 
experimental or laboratory sense. 
However, the credit can only be taken for research that IS 
performed or paid for in carrying on a trade or business70 Such 
activities might include developing or improving a product, a 
formula, an mvention, a plant process, an experimental or pilot model, 
or somethmg sImilar. 
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The credit cannot be taken for any of the following activities?1 
(1) Research performed outside the United States. 
(2) Research in the social sciences or humanities. 
(3) Research funded or financed by someone else whether under a 
contract of grant or in some other way. 
(4) The ordmary testing or inspection of materials or products for 
quality control. 
(5) Market and consumer research. 
(6) Advertising or promotIon expenses. 
(7) Management studies and efficiency surveys. 
(8) Research to fmd and evaluate mineral deposits, including gas 
and oi 1. 
Patents 
Obtaining a patent, including making and protecting a patent 
applicatIOn, is treated as "research" that qualifies for the credit. 
However, acquiring someone else's patent, or someone else's 
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production or process, does not Qualify for the credit. 
RESEARCH EXPENSES 
Only directly attributable costs of employee wages, supplies, 
payments to others and contract research expenses Qua Ii fy for the 
credit.72 If an expense does not fall into one of these categories, or 
if it is not for Qualified research, it cannot be used when computing 
the credi t. 
Example: The company employs five staff programmer/analysts 
who work on research and deve lopment-type proJects. 
A senior programmer/analyst supervises their work, 
and a secretary types their reports and letters, and 
answers the telephone. The wages of all seven 
employees can be included when computing the credit. 
However, no part of the wages paid to the employees 
who prepare salary checks for the staff, who arrange 
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loans for the research or who clean the bui lding each 
day can be used to compute the credit. 
When computing the credit, the cost of any supplies used in the 
research can be included.73 All tangible property used in the research 
is considered supplies, except: 
a. Land and improvements to land, and 
b. Depreciable property. 
Depreciable property can never be treated as supplies. Whether 
the deprecIation deduction or an expense deduction can be taken on 
the property makes no difference. 
On Iy 65 percent of contract research expenses can be included in 
the computation of the credit.74 A contract research expense IS one 
that is paid or incurred for research that is performed by someone 
else, and is distinguished from Uin house" research. 
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BASIC RESEARCH 
A corporation can treat certain payments it makes for basic 
research as contract research expenses. Thus, a corporat Ion can 
Include 65 percent of certain amounts It provides for basic research 
(subject to the prepayment rule) when computing the research credit. 
This Is In add1tlon to any other expense It has for qual1fying 
research?5 
"Basic research" means any original investigation to advance 
scient Hie knowledge not having a speCific commerc ial obJect ive. 
However. basic research done outside the United States and research 
done in the social sciences or humanities are not Included.76 
Only corporations can compute the credit on expenses for basic 
research. I ndivlduals and unincorporated businesses cannot take a 
credit for any payments they make for baSic research. In addition, the 
credit on basic research expenses does not apply to: 
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( 1) A subchapter 5 corporat ion, 
(2) A personal holding company, or 
(3) A corporation in which the principal business is performing 
services. 
To be eligible for the credit, a payment for basic research must be 
made under a written research agreement with a qualifying 
organizat ion, entered into prior to the performance of the basic 
research. Three kinds of organizations qualify?' 
(1) A public or non-profit institution of higher educatIOn, such as 
a college, university, or vocational school. 
(2) A tax-exempt organization, other than a private foundation, 
that is organized and operated primarily to carry out scientific 
research. 
(3) A fund that chooses to qualify. 
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Funds: To be an organization to which a corporation can make 
payments for basic research that are eligible for the research credit, 
a fund that chooses to qualify must meet all four of the following 
requirements:78 
(I) It must be organized and operated exclusively to make gr'ants 
for basic research to public or non-profit institutions of higher 
educat ion--that is, to colleges, univers it ies, vocat lona I 
schools, and Similar Institutions. 
(2) It must be tax-exempt. 
(3) It cannot be a private foundation. 
(4) It must be set up and maintained by an organization that is 
itself tax-exempt and not a private foundation. This 
organization must have been in existence before July 10, 1981. 
If a fund meets all four of these reqUirements, it can choose to be 
a qualifying organization. After it makes this chOice, the payments a 
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corporation makes to it will be el1gible for the research credit 
(sub ject to the prepayment lim itation). 
Another effect of the choice is that the fund will be treated as a 
private foundation for tax purposes, even though it is not one 
otherwise. However, the fund will not have to pay the excise tax that 
app 1 ies to investment income of private foundat ions. 
Mak ing the Choice 
To choose to be treated as a Qualified organization, a fund must 
send a statement to the Internal Revenue Service center where it 
files its annual return, and must comply with the requirements 
outlined in Section 44F (e) (4). 
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COMPUTING THE CREDIT 
The amount of credit allowable for a tax year is 25 percent of the 
amount by which the qualified research expenses for the year exceed 
the average Qualified research expenses for an earlier base period. If 
the Qualified research expenses for the year are not more than the 
average Qua Ii f ied research expenses duri ng the base peri od, there wi 11 
be no credit.79 
Example: In the previous three years, a corporation has incurred 
Qual ified research expenses of $3,000,000, 
$4,000,000 and $5,300,000. Qualified research 
expenses for the current year total $5,600,000. The 
allowable research credit for the current year is 
$375,000, determined as follows: 
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Qualified Research Expenditures 
First year 
Second year 
Third year 
Base peri od average 
Fourth year 
Less: Base period average 
Amount eligible for res. credit 
Research credit (25~) 
$3,000,000 
4,000,000 
5,300,000 
$12.300.000 
$4.100.000 
$5,600,000 
4.100.000 
$1,500,000 
$375.000 
Base Period. To compute research expenses for the base per1od, 
only those amounts that would qualify for the credit if spent in the 
current tax year can be used. These expenses include every type of 
expense that was discussed earlier: wages, supplies, payments to 
others, 65 percent of contract research expenses and, for certain 
corporat ions, 65 percent of the payments made for basic research. 
Generally, the base period is the last three tax years prlOr to the year 
for which the credit is computed. BO 
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New businesses: I f the company did not exist during a part of 
the base period, the company is treated as if it were in business but 
had no research expenses during that time period. 
Fifty percent limitation: When computing the credit on 
qualified research expenses for the year, the base period research 
expenses must first be subtracted. However, the base period research 
expense cannot be less than fifty percent of the research expenses for 
the year.81 If they are less than fifty percent, an amount that 1S at 
least fifty percent must be substituted. In other words, the credit is 
restricted to one-half of the research expenses that qualify for tne 
credit each year. This limit applies every year, even if there were no 
research expenses during the base period. It app I 1es to all 
businesses, including new ones. 
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Example: A calendar year corporation commences business on 
January 1, 1982. I t has $30,000 in research expenses 
that qualify for the credit in 1982, $30,000 in 1983 
and $300,000 in 1984. The base period for computing 
the credit for 1984 is the preceding three years, 1981, 
1982 and 1983. The actual base period research 
expenses are $20,000, the average of the expenses for 
1981 ($0), 1982 ($30,000) and 1983 ($30,000). 
Because $20,000 is less than 50 percent of the 
research expenses for 1984 ($300,000), the base 
period research expense figure used to compute the 
credit must be at least $150,000 (50 percent of 
$300,000). I n other words, the credit can be computed 
on no more than half of the $300,000. The maximum 
credit for the 1984 wi 11 be $37,500 (25 percent of 
$150,000). 
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Short tax years. For tax years of less than twelve months, the 
qualified research expenses for that year are determined on an annual 
basis.82 
Using the credit 
The credit is used to reduce, dollar for dollar, the amount of tax 
that must be paid. However, there are limits on the amount of the 
credit that can be claimed each year. If a portion of the credit cannot 
be used in the year earned, it can generally be carried back or forward 
and used to reduce taxes in other years. 
limitations 
The amount of research credit taken in any tax year cannot be more 
than the income tax liability for that year. However, for purposes of 
computing this limitation, most other taxes, including the corporate 
minimum and alternative minimum tax, accumulated earnings tax and 
personal holding company tax should not be included. Before USing the 
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research credit to reduce tax llabi1ity, most other credits must first 
be taken into account.83 
Pass through Iimit.84A special limit applies if the credit that 
was earned by the business is taken on the taxpayer's tax return. This 
limitation can occur if the taxpayer is a: 
(1) Sole proprietor. 
(2) Partner. 
(3) Shareholder is a Subchapter S corporation, or 
(4) Beneficiary of an estate or trust. 
Partnerships, Subchapter 5 corporations, and estates and trusts 
pass through the credits they earn to theIr partners, shareholders and 
beneficiaries. 
To compute the llmitation, first determine how much of the 
income tax liability is due to the portion of taxable income that 
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comes from the business that earned the credit. The credit cannot be 
taken for more than this amount of tax. This amount is then compared 
to the amount that was computed to be the tax liability limitation. 
The smaller of the two is the maximum amount of research credit 
that can be taken for the year. 
Carrybacks and carryovers.8S If a portion or all of the 
research credit cannot be used because of these limitations, the part 
not used in the current year can be carried back three years and 
carried forward fifteen years, and subtracted from the tax In those 
years. Thus, a taxpayer may be able to claim a refund of all or part of 
the taxes paid in the prior three years. The credit must fIrst be 
carried back to the earliest of the last three tax years, even if the 
research credit was not in effect that year. If it is not all used up in 
that year, the remainder is next carried to the second earl iest tax 
year and so on. Any remaining credit is then carried forward to future 
tax years. The credit can be carried forward for fifteen years or until 
it is all used up, whichever comes first. 
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If, because of a carryover or carryback, research credits from 
more than one year are used in the same year, they must be used in 
the following order: 
( 1) First, the credit earned in that year must be used. 
(2) Next, the credits being carried to that year must be used, 
beginning with the one from the earliest year. 
The total amount of the credit taken in a single year, including 
carryovers and carrybacks, cannot be more than the tax liabIlity 
limitation or the passthrough limitation for that year. 
BUSI NESS UNDER COMMON CONTROL 86 
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Generally, the research credit for a group of trades or businesses 
under common control is computed as if the group were a single 
business. One credit is computed for the entire group and then 
divided among the members. The division is based on each member's 
share of the total increase in the group's research expenses. 
The rules used to decide whether the trade or business is under 
common control for computing the research credit are the same as the 
rules that are used to decide if there is common control for 
comput ing the targeted Job credit. (Another tax credit used to 
provide an incentive to hire and train chronically unemployed 
indIviduals). A business can be under common control with one or 
more other businesses whether it is a corporation, a partnership, a 
so Ie proprietorship, an estate, or a trust. 
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Computing the credit. If the trade or business is under common 
control, the following steps are taken to compute the research credit: 
(1) Add up the research expenses for the tax year for all members 
of the contro lIed group. 
(2) Add UP the base period research· expenses for all members of 
the group. 
(3) Subtract (2) from (1). The result is the increase in the entire 
group's research expenses. 
(4) Compute the credit for the group. This will be 25 percent of 
the dIfference in step (3). However, if the amount from step 
(2) is less than 50 percent of the amount from step (1), the 
group's credit is 25 percent of an amount equal to one half of 
(1). 
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(5) DivIde the group credit from step (4) among the members of the 
group based on each member's share of the amount from step 
( I). 
Example: Alpha Company has two subsidiaries, Beta Enterprises 
and De I ta Manufacturing. The following tab Ie shows the base 
perIod research expenses and the research expenses that Qualify 
for the credit during the current tax year for each company. 
Base Current 
perIod year Increase 
Company (average) expenses (decrease) 
Alpha $60.000 $120,000 $60.000 
Beta 30.000 20.000 (10.000) 
Delta 40,000 70,000 30,000 
$130,000 $210,000 $80.000 
The group's total increase in research expenses is $80.000 
($60,000 Increase by Alpha plus $30,000 increase by Delta minus 
$10,000 decrease by Beta). Therefore, the group's allowable credit IS 
$20,000 (25 percent of $80.000). Only Alpha and De Ita actually 
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1ncrease the1r research expenses, so all of the group's credit 1S 
divided between them. Because Beta's expenses did not increase, it 
cannot share in the credit. The individual increases by Alpha and 
Delta total $90,000. Therefore, Alpha claims 60/90 of the total 
credit ($13,333) and Delta claims 30/90 {$6,667}. 
PASSTHROUGH ENTITIES 
A Subchapter S corporation divides its credit among its 
shareholders at the end of its tax year. The shareholders then claim 
theIr shares of the credit on their own income tax returns. 
Estates and trusts divide the credit among themselves and their 
benefICIaries. The division is made in the same way that the division 
is made for income. Partnerships must divide their allowable credIt 
among the partners. 
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ACQUISITIONS AND DISPOSITIONS 
If, after June 30, 1980, a business or part of a business is 
acquired or dIsposed of, special rules must be used to determine the 
research credit. These rules do not apply if there is only a transfer of 
some assets used in a trade or business. The part of the business that 
is transferred must be at least large enough to be operated as a 
vIable business. 
Acquisitions.87 If a business or portion of a business is 
acqUIred, then for purposes of computing the credit for a tax year 
endmg after the date of acquisit ion, the amount of research expenses 
for the perIod before the acquisition must be increased. The previous 
owner's research expenses that are attributable to the part of the 
business acquired must be added. This adjustment is made when 
comput mg both base period research expenses and researCh expenses 
f or the current year. 
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Dispositions.88 If a portion of the trade or business is disposed 
of, then for purposes of computing the credit for a tax year ending 
after the date of disposition, the amount counted as research 
expenses for the period before the transfer must be decreased. The 
portion of the research expenses that are attributable to the disposal 
must be subtracted. However, this decrease can be made only if the 
new owner is given the information needed to make the increase 
dIscussed in the previous paragraph. 
I f this decrease is made and the new owner is reimbursed for 
research performed for the previous owner withm three tax years 
following the year of disposition, some or all of this decrease must 
be added back. If this reimbursement is made, a taxpayer may 
increase the Qualified research expenses for the base period for the 
tax year when the reimbursement is made. The smaller of the 
following amounts must be added back: 
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(1) The amount of the original decrease made for the base period; 
or 
(2) The amount of the reimbursement multiplied by the number of 
years in the base period. 
This rule applies only when computing the base period research 
expenses for the year of the reimbursement and only if the 
reImbursement is made within three years of the transfer. 
The adjustment required by thIS rule must be made even If another 
member of the controlled group reimburses the new owner, and even 
if another member of the new owner's controlled group is the one 
relmbursed. 
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HOW TO TAKE THE CREDIT 
Form 6765, Credit for Increasing Research Activlties, may be used 
to determine the credit. The form may be attached to the income tax 
return. In addition to flling Form 6765, Subchapter 5 corporations, 
estates, trusts and partnerships must also complete Schedule K-l to 
show how the credit was divided among their shareholders, 
beneficiaries or partners. 
A Note on DepreCiation 
DepreciatlOn 15 an almost bottomless topic that has a bottom made 
of shlftlng sand. Almost every tax act that has been passed in recent 
years has addressed the topic of depreCiation, and the tax act 
currently under considerat1on W11l in all likelihood make some 
Changes to the current rules as well. However. a few pOints should be 
made at this time, because depreciation rules have an effect on 
software account mg. 
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In 1981, a major change took place in the method of computing 
depreciation for tax purposes. With the passage of the Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERT A) the matching concept, as applied to 
depreciatIOn for tax purposes, was thrown out the window. Buildings 
which might still be depreciated over forty or fifty years for 
finanCIal accountmg purposes (the matching principle still applIes for 
fmancial accounting purposes) could now be written off over fifteen 
years using an accelerated method for tax purposes. As a result of 
this legislatlOn, a deferred tax account had to be established for many 
companies that previously used the same metl"lod of deprecIatIon for 
both book and tax purposes. This new depreclation rule, cal1ed tile 
Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS),89 has since been modifIed 
by passage of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibi I ity Act of 1982 
(TEFRA), which decreased somewllat the acceleration percentage that 
cou J d be used. 
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Prior to the passage of ERTA, a taxpayer had to estimate the 
useful life of each depreciable asset and then argue with the IRS that 
the lives chosen were proper under the circumstances, unless the 
taxpayer elected to use the asset depreciat ion range (ADR) system 
instead, in which case the useful tax lives of a wide variety of assets 
are listed.90 Making this election would eliminate arguments but 
would also lock the taxpayer into a tax life that may be too 
conservat ive. As a result, many taxpayers decided not to make the 
election to be governed by the ADR rules. 
With the passsage of ERTA the tax 1 ives of persona1 property were 
arbitrarily set at either three, five or ten years,91 depending on 
category. Real property now has a tax life of fifteen years. The tax 
I ives under ERT A are frequent Iy shorter than the tax 1 ives under the 
old method where useful economiC life was a consideration. For 
example, computer hardware has a tax life of either three or fIve 
years, whereas the ADR midpoint life is six years, with a lower and 
upper range of five and seven years, respect lve ly.92 
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Which computer equipment qualifies under the three year categoryl 
and which qualifies under the five year category, is not entirely clear. 
ApparentlYI computer equipment "used in connection with" research 
and experimentation qual tries as three year recovery property. But 
computer equipment used in this category for only a portion of total 
available time might not qualify for three year treatment. If "used 
predominantly,,93 for research and experimentation, the equipment 
would have to be used for such purposes more than 50 percent of the 
time in order to qualify for three year treatment. But jf 
"substantially all the use" 94 is for research and experimentation, 
such use must be 80 percent or more of total use. Does the phrase 
"used in connection with" mean for "substantially all the use" or only 
for "used predominantly?" The interpretation chosen will determine 
whether computer equipment used for research and experimentatIon 
for a portion of total available time will qualify as three year or five 
year recovery property. The Final Regulations will in all likelihood 
clarify this issue, but not before the end of 1986. 
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CHAPTER 15 
SUMMARY OF PART III 
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Part III addressed issues relating to software taxation, both at 
the federal and state levels. This aspect of software accounting was 
first revealed to me during the course of the interviews conducted 
with executives of software vendor and user companies. A literature 
search later revealed that most of what had been written on software 
account ing prior to 1983 had been on the tax aspects of the sUbject. 
The interviews conducted with corporate executives led me to seek 
out and interview a number of attorneys who special ize in software 
tax litigation and consulting. 
Pract ically every tax aspect of software account Ing remains in a 
state of flux. At the state level, software that is sold or leased might 
trlgger a sales or use tax, depending on the state involved, the means 
used to deliver the software, and whether the software is bundled 
with hardware. Djstrjct of Columbia V Universal Computer 
Assoclates, decided in 1972(see Case No. 18, Appendix C), was the 
first case to be decided in the area of software taxat ion. That court 
held that software is intangible, and therefore not subject to the 
District of Columbia personal property tax. A long list of 
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subsequently decided state court cases have used this case as 
precedent. These subsequently decided cases have ruled (uniformly, 
until 1983) that software is 1ntangible for sales, use and property tax 
purposes, and is therefore not subject to state taxation. Canned, or 
off the shelf software may be'viewed as having a somewhat different 
nature than custom software. Off the shelf software may at times be 
viewed as a product rather than a service, and some state 
legislatures have passed legislation that classlfies off the shelf 
software as tangible, and therefore SUbject to the sales, use or 
property tax. Custom software, on the other hand, is often viewed 
both by the state courts and state legislatures as providing a servIce 
rather than a product, which makes the software taxfree. 
The interviews conducted in Part I, as well as the Questionnaires 
that were sent to software vendors and users (Chapters 3 and 6) shed 
additional light on software claSSification and taxation policies in 
practice. The interviews and responses to the questionnaires revealed 
that many companies classify the same software as tangible for 
federal tax purposes (so that it will Quallfy for the investment tax 
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credit) and intangible for state tax purposes, so that 1t w1ll not be 
taxed for state purposes. Some vendors dehver software over 
telephone lines in order to avoid the state sales or use tax. A long list 
of court cases support this view, which holds that software delivered 
in the form of electrical impulses is intangible, but software 
delivered in the form of a disk or tape ts tangible. Interestingly 
enough, financial accounting theory (Part I) does not really address 
the issue of tangibility. The interviews and questionnaire responses 
1n Part I revealed that corporate controllers and chief financial 
officers are not really sure of how to classify software. Some 
companies include software expenditures in the property, plant and 
equipment section of the balance sheet, along with other tangible 
property. But many other companies place these expenditures in the 
"Other Assee or intangible section of the balance sheet. However, the 
vast majority of companies place the cost of developing software 1n 
the income statement as an expense. Such expenditures are not listed 
as assets at a11. 
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In 1983, a few cases were decided in the state courts which run 
counter to the previous 10 years of judicial precedent. These courts 
held that software is tangible and therefore subject to state taxation. 
In at least one of these cases the judge stated that the software 
would have been intangible if it had been delivered over the telephone, 
an observation that, if picked up by software vending companies, 
might lead to a change in their method of software delivery. It would 
be interesting to send another questionnaire to vendors to see how 
this deCision has influenced their mode of delivery. 
It is too early to tell what effect the 1983 deciSions will have on 
the state taxation of software, but it is reasonable to assume that 
these cases will be cited by state revenue departments in subsequent 
software tax litigation. Most states have rules to govern the various 
possibilities, but the states are in conflict. Each state legislature and 
state court system has the right to establish its view, and almost all 
states have exercised this right, resulting in many sets of different 
rules to govern the taxability of software. What may be taxable in 
one state may be taxfree in another state, which makes life more 
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comphcated for corporations that engage in mult1-state business, but 
also provides numerous tax planning opportunities. As technology 
advances and states continue to search for new sources of tax 
revenue, the taxation of software changes on a state by state basis. 
State courts continue to hear cases on software taxation, and the 
decisions rendered in the future may be different than the deciSions 
the same state court rendered in the past. State legislatures also 
continue to change the rules, making it difficult for bUSinessmen to 
plan. 
At the federal level, there are two tax lnventives that may apply 
to software expenditures. The investment tax credit may be taken on 
certain software that is bundled with hardware (see Appendix D). At 
least one federal court (see Texas Instruments, Inc y Unjted States, 
Case No. 38, Appendix C) has held that unbundled software also 
Qualifies for the investment tax credit. The interviews with software 
vendors and users revealed that a great many supposedly 
knowledgeable accountants are unaware of this case, which came as a 
surprise. The case was decided in 1977, so they cannot use newness 
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as an excuse. One possible explanation for this ignorance might be the 
fact that chief accounting officers tend not to be knowledgeable in 
tax matters, but generally rose through the ranks in the finanCial or 
managerial accounting areas instead. But this explanation does not 
excuse the companies' tax experts, who should be aware of this case. 
For software user companies, the amount of software that potentially 
Qualifies for the investment tax credit is miniscule compared to the 
amounts that are spent for property, plant and equipment, so it could 
be that many companies overlook software expenditures when 
computing the amount of investment tax credit to which they are 
entitled. Or it could be that software expenditures are expensed for 
book purposes, which might make them difficult for the tax 
accountant to trace. However, a great many companies do take the 
investment tax credit on at least some software, so it cannot be said 
that none of the companies take the credit. To make matters more 
interesting, there is a movement afoot in congress to repeal the 
investment tax credit provision, so this whole topic may soon become 
interesting only for historical purposes. 
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The other possible federal tax benefit is the credit for research 
and experimental expenditures. However, the rules for this credtt are 
extremely obscure at present, and will in all likel1hood not be 
clarified until after the 1986 election. Regulations were drafted that, 
if adopted in final form, would have placed a greater burden on 
software expenditures than on other types of research and 
experimentation expenditures. When the proposed regulations were 
publlshed, a tremendous protest was launched by software vending 
companies. As a result of this public outcry, the regulations were 
withdrawn for further drafting. The questionnaire responses in 
Chapters 3 and 6 revealed that many companies do take the credit for 
research and experimentat ion on at least some software. 
The tax aspects of software accounting are discussed throughout 
this theSiS. Chapters 3 and 6 reveal the software tax pol1cies of 
vendors and users. Court case briefs of the most important cases are 
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included in Appendix C. Applicable Internal Revenue Service 
pronouncements are reproduced in Appendix D. The DPMA Position 
Statement on Software Taxation is reproduced in Appendix E. 
Chapter 13 addresses state software tax issues such as sales, 
use and property taxation. The material for this chapter is assembled 
in a more or less chronological pattern. The earlter cases are 
discussed before the most recent cases. This sequence makes sense, 
since the most recent cases rely on the precedent that was 
established in the older cases. The first software tax case was 
decided in 1972. The first software tax cases could not rely on 
precedent because there was none, so cases in other, related areas 
such as film-making, the sale of information, the Uniform 
Commercial Code and data processing service bureaus had to be Cited 
instead. The final portion of the chapter provides a summary of 
software taxation on a state by state basis. 
711 
Chapter 14 discusses federal tax law relating to software. 
Included in this chapter are discussions of the investment tax credit 
and the credlt for research and experimental expenditures, both of 
which will likely be changed somewhat or even repealed in the next 
year or so. 
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PART IV 
CHAPTER 16 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOtt1ENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
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Context in Which the Research Was Undertaken 
Prior to 1969, companies did not account for software at all. 
Either they had none, or the small amount they did have was combined 
with hardware and accounted for as a unit. In June, 1969, all that 
changed, as a result of IBM's deciSion to unbundle. For the f1rst t1me, 
software prices were stated separately from hardware prices. 
For the next few years, accounting for software presented no 
problems because the amounts involved were small, both in absolute 
terms and as a percentage of total assets (or sales). But as more and 
more companies started using computers, and computer usage 
increased, more funds were expended for software, both in absolute 
terms and as a percentage of total expenditures, and accountants 
began to think about how to account for software. 
When this study began, there was no direct or near-relevant 
precedent research. This study is the first to examine software 
accounting. Much as I tried to ftnd other work on this subject, I was 
unable to do so. Almost all of the pre-19B3 ltterature addressed only 
the tax aspects of software accounting, although a number of studies 
addressed related areas, such as fUm-making, record-maktng, 
research and development, bank lending decisions and stock price. So 
there were no guidelines as to what areas of investtgation might be 
found fruitful/fruitless. There was a need to constder a wide range of 
evidence and to seek a wide range of opinions. I endeavoured not to 
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ignore, overlook or omit any major influence; hence, the length and 
modular structure of the thesis as each type of evtdence was 
considered. Hopefully, one outcome of the research will be to provtde 
some guidance to future researchers as to where thetr attentton 
might be most usefully directed. 
The software industry is one which has experienced continuous 
change as its technology develops and new markets are captured. It is 
also a business sector which is characterized by a continual flux tn 
the composition of its membershtp and 1n the organtzattonal 
structures of its members. In such a flu1d situation, and 1n the nature 
of first time studies, research wtll 1nev1tably be incomplete arid 
untimely if a report is to be completed. Such a report must 
necessarily present a static interpretation of a dynamic situation, 
but hopefully it will neverthe1ess define the essential features of the 
industry, and establish the parameters for further research. 
Accounttng procedures are, on the whole, a function of 3 baSic 
influences. Thus, 
ACS • F(P, E, M) 
Where ACS II account Ing control and report Ing systems 
P .. the principles which inform the dlsclpl1ne 
(accounting) 
E .. the expedience of an on-gOing situation 
M .. the manager's perceptions after the nature of the 
situation and the quality of products or servtces 
which it generates 
The prlncip1es are, or perhaps more accurately ought to be, a set 
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of concepts, soundly devised and logically articulated, which form a 
theoretical framework around which schemes of practice can be 
designed. It is a feature of accountancy that tts conceptual 
foundations are less well-founded or articulated than those which 
involve the natural sciences and most other branches of soctal 
sCience. To a signiftcant extent, accounting princtples are recogntzed 
as pragmatic developments founded on the concept of the accounting 
entity, the axioms of prudence and rea11zation, and the practical 
requirements of stewardship reporting. The result ts a degree of 
tmprecision and lack of internal consistency which render it 
imperative that well developed accounttng models are much more than 
naive applications of raw accounting principles. 
Expedjency in accounting systems has as its sole logical base a 
wish to economize in the costs of information provision. Where this 
is aSSOCiated with equal measurement of the value of potent tal 
information, such that an informed cost-value tradeoff is undertaken, 
expedience may have a role to play. Thts may espec1a11y be true 
where considerations of information overload tndtcate that the 
principle of parsimony should be tnvoked. But, it ts not a w1dely 
observed feature of the U.S. 1ndustry that careful measures of such 
tradeoffs or de 11 berate avocat10ns of parsimony obtain. Too often 
expedtency is a symptom for false economy, at best lack Of 
perceptiveness and at worst sheer 1dleness. However, exped1ency can 
also have a Qu1te different interpretation. It may reflect no more and 
no less than an obsession with the "fast buck", the short term view or 
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index of economic performance (the "bottom-line" syndrome which 
figures so largely in so much of U.S. management perceptions), and the 
urge to reduce tax liability. 
Management perceptjons in this context relate to the view which 
management takes of the nature of the operations for which they are 
responsible (capital v. other resource intensive; high or low risk 
oriented; long or short term result cycles, are typical percept ton 
vectors) and the qual1ty of the services or goods produced therefrom 
(high or low market obsolescence rates; occasional or continuous 
ordering environments; customer relationships termtnattng with sale 
vs. after sales relationships of stgnificant tmportance 1n the 
marketing matrix, are typical perception vectors). Whether the 
services or products produced are themselves transferred to the 
customer, or are media whereby customer servfce fs achieved fs 
immaterial to such perceptions, which comprehend both sltuatfons. 
Aggressively or defensively, immediately or over time, management 
wi" express dissatisfaction with and even rejection of any 
accounting control and reporting system which does not to them seem 
to model the situation and its outputs in a manner which conforms to 
their perceptions, and wi" press for system modtftcat1on untl1 it 
does. This, aftera1l, is the basic premise of the contingency theory of 
accounting which is so widely canvassed in contemporary 1ndustrtal 
societies. 
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Cone 1 U5 i on5 
Expenditures incurred in the f11m-making and record industrIes 
have much in common wlth those incurred in the software industry. In 
all cases, the value of the finished product is primarily attributable 
to the labor that was expended to bring the product Into existence 
rather than the amount of material that went tnto the manufacture of 
the product. It is the recorded logical patterns that have value, not 
the material that contains those patterns. AI1 three products (films, 
records and software) have projected economIc Jives and income 
streams that could conceivably exceed one accounting pertod, which 
would seem to make capitalization prudent. The fact that the medium 
on which the program is stored (disk, tape, etc.) may be discarded may 
be offered as further evidence that the value Is in the informatton 
rather than the physical medium being used to store the Information. 
Because the manufacture of computer software has so much In 
common with the manufacture of records and f1Jms, It would seem 
logical that the accounting treatment for all three Items should be 
Similar in the interest of conSistency. In fact, justifying a different 
treatment for software than for movies and records would seem to be 
difficult indeed. However, the questionnaire responses revealed that 
there is a wide divergence of accounting treatment for software. 
Some companies expense all software expenditures and others 
capitalize. Many companies expense the software they develop 
internally and capitalize nearly identical software that Is purchased. 
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Because the issue of how to account for software is relatively new, 
and because there are no pronouncements that practitioners can turn 
to for gUidance, we can expect to have a variety of different 
accounting methods until authoritative guidance is provided. 
Software vendors and users generally expense internally 
developed software costs and capitalize purchased software. For 
software vendors, there appears to be no consistent substantial 
association between these chosen procedures and either the field of 
operation or company size. 
Companies choose their software accounting policy based on 
expediency rather than reasoned principle. This approach is taken for 
a number of reasons, the primary one being that it is easier and less 
cost ly from a recordkeeping viewpoint to expense rather than 
capitaHze. The accounting profession sees the expensing approach to 
be more conservative, too, and some companies have experienced 
pressure from their Independent auditors to expense rather than 
capitalize software costs. 
Companies that capitalize software costs find it easier to raise 
debt capital than do companies that expense software. There is a 
feeHng among bankers that capitalizing companies are safer than 
expensing companies. 
There IS weak evidence to suggest that a company's stock price 
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may be affected by its software accounting policy, although it is not 
clear whether a capitalizing company will have a higher or lower 
stock price than an expensing company. Financial analysts do perceive 
companies differently based on their software accounting policies. 
Some analysts prefer companies that expense software; others prefer 
companies that capitalize it. 
There is a tendency for companies to classify software as 
tangible for federal tax purposes and intangible for state sales, use 
and property tax purposes. The reason for differing treatment is that 
such an approach reduces taxes. 
Future Deve lopments 
The software industry is evolving on a dally baSis. What was a 
brilliant innovation three years ago has now been discarded for a 
more advanced and efficient product. Software accounting is lagging 
behind the software industry. Software accounting policy evolves 
slowly. Although the software industry came into its own in 1969, 
there still is no comprehensive, all inclusive rule for software 
account ing. 
There is also a two pronged political dimension which has raised 
its head but has not yet been dealt with. The American software 
industry is facing strong foreign competition, and a software 
accounting policy that would help companies raise finance would be 
helpful. But when the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued 
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Statement No. 86, they paid little attention to this issue. The second 
prong involves federal taxation policy. Congress is presently debating 
the tax code, and may soon pass a tax reform act that will affect the 
tax treatment of software. The research credit will likely be 
extended, but its treatment of software is in doubt because congress 
regards software as a relatively minor issue. ,t also seems llkely 
that the investment tax credit will be repealed (temporarily), which 
could adversely affect the software industry. There seems to be 
nothing in the present turmoil over corporate tax legislation that 
yields any clues as to the attitude of future administrations, however 
general. But it can be stated with some assurance that there will be 
a political dimension to the development of generally accepted 
software accounting practices; but it is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to speculate upon the extent and direction of that influence. 
In the meantime, the first signs of the development of an 
accepted practice are vistble--the ADAPSO Exposure Draft and the 
reaction of the FASB, SEC and AICPA; the resulting AICPA project, 
SEC moratorium and NAA Issues Paper; the FASB Exposure Draft, 
public hearings and final Statement No. 86, which addresses only a 
fraction of the software currently being produced. If one were to 
speculate, it would be safe to say that the software accounting issue 
has not been settled. There seems to be some movement toward 
capitalization (Comserv and some commentators are leading the 
charge), which represents a movement away from expediency and 
toward reasoned prtnctple. But the movement has been slow and will 
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likely continue to be so. At present, there is no rule on how to 
account for software used internally. The FASB deliberately ducked 
this issue because they wanted to issue something as soon as 
possible so as to lift the SEC moratorium. Including a discussion of 
internally used software would have slowed the process. Now that the 
pressure is off, the FASB can examine this remaining issue at a more 
leisurely pace. Accounting for software is an issue of recent origin 
(1969), so we are just at the beginning. And the industry continues to 
change rapidly. Accounting policy wiIJ evolve as our knowledge 
increases and as the industry continues to evolve. 
Further Research 
This report has necessarily presented a static Interpretation of a 
dynamic Situation, but hopefulJy it wil1 nevertheless define the 
essential features of the industry, and establfsh the parameters for 
further research. Three sorts of further work would seem to be 
especial1y fruitful. (1) Repl1cations of the present work to widen and 
re-test the empirical data; (2) Ad hoc studies, including case studies, 
of individual issues raise.d in this research, monitoring developments 
and refining conclusions; and (3) Use of different research 
methodologies and models to be appl1ed to the problem of software 
account ing, using both "as is" and "after the eventH approaches. 
There is considerable need for repUcations of the Questionnaires 
used in the present study. This might be useful1y extended to non-U.S. 
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based companies in order to establish an international dimension to 
the enquiry. If the same software vendors and users were polled 
again, different responses might very well be received. A different 
group outside the U.S. might also provide differing responses. A poll 
of bank lending officers might reveal a change of opinion, perhaps 
because they have become more aware of software accounting since 
my survey was conducted (I doubt it, but there is no way of telling, 
short of another study). Non-U.S. bankers might view software 
accounting tn a different light, and a study of their perceptions might 
reveal these differences. Another poll of financial analysts is also 
called for. The l1ght response received in my study seems to reveal 
that these people are unwilling or uninterested in the subject, and 
another study having a larger sample size might prove enlightening. 
Again, inclusion of a non-U.S. group could prove highly interesting, 
since non-U.S. companies seem to be less bottom I ine oriented, at 
least in the short term. 
A study could profitably be conducted using the case study 
approach, perhaps including companies 1n one of the many facets of 
the ever-changing software industry. Large company practices could 
be compared to small company practices. A study of financial 
statement footnotes similar to the ones in Chapters 2 and 5 could 
also be conducted to see whether software vendors and users have 
changed their disclosure policies, or, indeed, to see whether they have 
any disclosure policy at all for software accounting policy. 
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A myriad of studies could be made addressing the tax aspects of 
software, both in the U.S. and elsewhere. A comparative study of 
software tax policies in various countries could be made, although 
such a study might involve some foreign language ability and travel. 
While at the FASB Hearings on software in New York City in May, 
1985, a Frenchman told me that France recently enacted a tax pol icy 
for software, which was strictly for revenue raising purposes and had 
nothing to do with good theory. Perhaps other countries have tax 
policies for software as well. 
Several studies could be conducted just analyzing software 
taxation in the United States. At the federal level, the investment tax 
credit may soon be repealed, and it is interesting to speculate how its 
repeal will affect the growth of the software industry in the United 
States. The Internal Revenue Service continues to insist that 
software is intangible (unless bundled with hardware), but one court 
case has held otherwise. This issue is by no means resolved. The 
credit for research and experimentation is also in a state of flux. The 
proposed regulations were withdrawn for redrafting and will not be 
issued prior to the 1986 election. Congress is presently working on a 
tax proposal that could change the rules in this area, and may in fact 
change the rules before the revised regulations can be issued. The 
effect of these new rules, whatever they are, wt11 undoubtedly have 
an effect on the software industry, and a study could be made to 
determine the effects of these new ruJes. 
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At the state level, each state has its own rules for taxation of 
software. Some states do not tax it at all. Other states tax only off 
the shelf programs. Yet others do not as yet have a rule at all. State 
tax rules can be made either by legislation or by court decision, and it 
is reasonable to expect that the rules discovered in the course of this 
study will not be the same as the rules that will be in effect in three 
to ffve years. A study could be conducted to determine whether any 
trends are developing, and the effect that software taxation has both 
on the software industry and on the location of some of the firms in 
that industry. 
There is some evidence to suggest that some companies are either 
moving out of California or not moving into California in the first 
place because of Cal1fornla's software tax policies. Some former 
California companies have moved north to the states of Washington or 
Oregon, or even to British Columbia In Canada, for tax reasons. Some 
Japanese companies are locating In the Pacific Northwest or British 
Columbia rather than California for the same reason. Some data 
processing companies that specialize In data entry have large 
branches In the West Indies because of taxes and labor costs. A study 
could be conducted to determine the pervasiveness of software 
taxation policies on a company's location or change In location. 
A further and more specifically structured enquiry into the 
cause-effect relationships of software accounting systems is an 
obvious path for future research. Almost certainly it should be a 
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longitudinal study, for the software industry is still in a development 
situation --Le., a situation of change, and those relationships wi 11 
themselves change in reaction to the changes in the industry so that 
pOint-in-time will be of restricted value. 
Furthermore, the Securities and Exchange Commission's 
moratorium(since llfted, upon issuance of FASB Statement No. 86), 
coupled with the opinions of the several regulatory professional 
bodies such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board's Exposure 
Draft and later Statement No. 86 on software intended for sale or 
lease, and the recent Issues Paper of the National Association of 
Accountants on accounting for internally used software will have an 
effect on firm software accounting policy. It is interesting to 
speculate whether software user firms will have a tendency to follow 
the rules of Statement No. 86(which do not apply to software used 
internally) or will follow the rules outlined in NAA's Issues 
Paper(which are not binding, but provide guidance). A study could 
focus on the effects these pronouncements have had on software 
accounting policy. 
It is Hkely that given the growing concern about the accounting 
treatment of software costs which first sparked off the present 
enquiry, there w111 be a sequence of such opinions or position papers 
and It w111 be proper that the changing consequences of these should 
be captured by a specific study. What is ca1Jed for, It Is suggested, 
would be an ex-post study of the impact of an accounting standard or 
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the like on security valuation and beta distributions (risk measures) 
of the type developed by Abdel-khalik and his colleagues in respect to 
"The Economic Effects on Lessees of FASB Statement No. 13, 
Accounting for Leases." 
Studies aimed at explaining the present state of actual practice, 
and to yield insights into preferable SOCial, techntcal and fiscal 
developments would be helpful in understanding WHY things are as 
they are, and is a necessary input to any efficient reformation 
process. A longitudinal study of the actual situation from the 
standpoint of accounting information theory which seeks to determine 
more profound reasons for developing "states of the art" over time is 
an important element in the understanding of the process of change in 
practice. An "ex post" capital study covering both debt and equity 
markets will show the effects of a change tn practice. 
There is indeed much to be learned about accounting for software, 
not only for its own sake (1.e., for its impact upon financial statement 
analysis and consequent investor/lender reactions, its implications 
for systems of corporate taxation at both federal and state level, and 
its consequences for internal management control systems or 
decision making) but also because it is itself a potentially rich case 
study for the examination of the development of a closer relationship 
between theories and concepts of accounting on the one hand and 
practices on the other, which is to say, for a significant increment to 
our understanding of the discipline of accounting itself. 
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INTRODUCTION
If anyone company in the software industry can be
singled out as being an aggressive advocate of software
capitalization, that company is Comserv Corporation.
Although other companies also capitalize certain software
construction costs, Comserv Corporation has been receiving
the lion's share of press coverage.I One reason for all
this attention is due to the effect that capitalization has
had on their financial statements. For example, their
reported profit of $2.2 million in 1981 would have been a $1
million loss had all software construction costs been
expensed. In 1982, the reported $2.5 million profit would
have been a $4 million loss instead.2 A similar reaction
can be expected for any rapidly expanding software company
that capitalizes software construction costs.
Accounting for Software Construction costs3
In 1974 the Financial Accounting Standards Board, estab-
lished certain guidelines for the accounting treatment of
research and development costs. At that time Comserv
reviewed all expenditures to date of this nature with their
auditors, Peat, Harwick & Hitchell. As a result of this
review the various expenditures were classified as research
and development or software construction costs and handled
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accordingly. Research and development costs were expensed
and software construction costs capitalized. Comserv has
followed a consistent practice since then in the accounting
treatment of these types of expenses. The capitalization of
software construction costs has been, and continues to be,
of major importance in the company's strategic, business,
and operations planning.
Comserv Corporation separates its product construction
costs into two major areas--computer software and education
courseware. Costs incurred to enhance, improve and adapt
its Advanced Manufacturing, Accounting and Production System
(AMAPS) software product are capitalized to computer soft-
ware. Similarly, costs incurred to enhance, improve and
adapt its existing education courseware products are capita-
lized to education courseware.
Enhancements include costs to improve the operational
quality, effectiveness, or efficiency of the company's
existing software product, AMAPS, or individual modules of
this product. Enhancements include adding features or func-
tions to the existing product. Each enhancement is covered
by a separate release which is issued to clients with main-
tenance agreements and which updates the company's AMAPS
product available for future licensing. Other examples of
this type of enhancement are a new feature put into the
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existing material control and purchasing module of the AMAPS
product to produce an additional report, and changes in the
material requirements planning module of the AMAPS product
which increased the functional speed of its programs.
Enhancement projects also include upgrading of user documen-
tation for the AMAPS product. This involves clarification,
corrections and additions to the documentation.
Improvements include costs to improve and extend the
functionality of the existing AMAPS software product or
courseware products such as additional modules to AMAPS or
additional education courses that support the AMAPS product.
Examples of projects that come under this category of
improvements include the purchasing module, the cost manage-
ment module and the lot traceability module which were
planned additions to improve the overall AMAPS product.
Improvements also include education courseware materials
such as student kits, instructor kits, and visual aids
packaged for specific classroom courses and workshops on
AMAPS such as the production system, purchasing control,
master production scheduling and standard cost, as well as
video tape courses.
Adaptations include adapting the existing AMAPS product
to different computer system operating environments. Adap-
tations enable the AMAPS product to operate in different IBM
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operating environments which utilize, for example, database
management systems marketed by software vendors other than
IBM (e.g., Cullinane, Software AG, Applied Data Research,
etc.)• They also involve adapting the AMAPS product to
operate on the Wang or Prime minicomputer systems. Other
examples of projects involved in the adaptation of the AMAPS
product include the AMAPS 3000 project, which is adapting
AMAPS to operate on the HP3000 minicomputer hardware, and
the nAdvanced On-Line," AMAPS/Q project which affects all
existing AMAPS modules and makes the system easier to use.
This enhanced on-line capability provides for immediate
response to inquiries for information and immediate update
of all files affected by a specific transaction such as
shipping from finished goods inventory.
computer software and education courseware construction
costs that have been capitalized by the company are assets
which benefit a number of future periods. They are assets
in that they are economic resources that have future econo-
mic benefit in a manner similar to that of fixed assets.
Since these assets benefit several periods, their cost is
capitalized and allocated to the periods in a systematic and
rational manner based on an estimate of the periods of their
economic benefit. The future periods of economic benefit
are the periods in which revenues will be earned from the
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software product license and maintenance agreements and edu-
cation product license agreements. In this way there is a
matching of computer software and education courseware
construction costs with the related revenue.
The general authority in the accounting literature for
the company's accounting practices for computer software and
education courseware construction costs includes paragraphs
19 through 24 of FASS Statement of Financial Concepts No. 3
and paragraph 23 of APB Statement No.4, Chapter 6. FASS
Statement of Financial Concepts No. 3 states than an asset
has three essential characteristics:
a) it embodies a probable future benefit that involves
a capacity, singly or in combination with other
assets, to contribute directly or indirectly to
future net cash inflows,
b) a particular enterprise can obtain the benefit and
control others' access to it, and
c) the transaction or other event giving rise to the
enterprise's right to or control of the benefit has
already occurred.
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Clearly, the company's software and education courseware
meet these tests. They have a probable future benefit based
on the company's soLid past history of generating revenues
from their use and also based upon future projections. The
company has proprietary control over them and can limit
others' access to them, as evidenced by its licensing agree-
ments. The events giving rise to the company's right to
these assets and control of their benefit has occurred
through the process of the company's expenditures and
actions to protect its physical and legal control over them.
The assets have future service potential and are fully
recoverable from future revenues.
APB Statement No.4 states in part that "in the absence
of direct means of associating costs and cause and effect,
some costs are associated with specific accounting periods
as expenses on the basis of an attempt to allocate costs in
a systematic and rational manner among the periods in which
benefits are provided." The cost of construction of
Comserv's software and courseware has benefits for a number
of future periods and accordingly Comserve capitalizes such
costs and amortizes them over those periods.
There is additional accounting literature that deals
with certain aspects of the accounting for software costs.
These pronouncements are Financial Accounting Standards
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Board Statement No. 2 (FAS No.2), Financial Accounting
Standards Board Interpretation No. 6 and Financial
Accounting Standards Board Technical Bulletin No. 79-2.
Reference should be made particularly to paragraph 7 of
Interpretation No. 6 and to Technical Bulletin No. 79-2.
Exhibit I illustrates these three pronouncements.
Exhibit I below indicates that, for routine or other
ongoing efforts to enhance or improve an existing product or
adapt a product to a particular requirement, the accounting
literature only requires the expensing of (A) Market
Research: the accounting policies for the remainder of the
product processes are not mandated by specific accounting
literature but rather are covered by the general accounting
literature. For new products or significantly improved pro-
ducts, the accounting literature calls for expensing the
costs of product processes A through E.
It is Comserv's policy, as noted in the column "Comserv
Treatment" to expense Items A through F for all computer
software construction. This includes the expensing of all
such costs, even for the enhancement, improvement or adapta-
tion of existing products. Activities A through F cover the
design of the pre-production model, if this is necessary,
and culminate in a detailed final product design/definition
document.
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Comserv capital~zes software construction costs that
relate to (G) Detailed System Specification, (H) Detailed
Program Specification, (I) Programming/Testing, (J) System
Integration/Testing, (K) Quality Assurance, and (L) Product
Release. These procedures are part of Comserv's construc-
tion process, as they are integral steps in the structured
programming process once the final product design and defi-
nition have been established.
The staff of the FASB issued Technical Bulletin 79-2 to
clarify that FAS No. 2 and Interpretation No. 6 do not
require that all software costs be treated as research and
development costs. The FASB staff concluded that those com-
panies that were expensing software construction costs were
doing so not based on the determination that such costs are
research and development but rather, in many cases, based on
other factors such as an assessment of the recoverability of
those costs. The technical bulletin states that the deci-
sion to capitalize or expense software construction costs
not meeting the definition of research and development can
only be made in light of all the facts and circumstances
surrounding the particular situation. This is what Comserv
does in setting its accounting policies, which are based on
the well-supported conclusion that the software construction
costs that it capitalizes are recoverable.
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For example, substantially all of the company's software
construction endeavors involve ongoing efforts to enhance
and improve AMAPS or adapt it to particular requirements.
The success of the company's return on its investments in
enhancements, improvements, and adaptations of the AMAPS
product has been consistently outstanding.
The company's efforts at enhancing and improving its
products are part of the orderly progression necessary in
the software industry to protect and improve market posi-
tion. With the availability of additional capital, the com-
pany has accelerated certain planned enhancements, improve-
ments and adaptations of its AMAPS software and education
courseware products to capitalize on its established market
position and increase market share as well as expand reve-
nues from its existing client base. As the company con-
tinues to adapt the product to additional operating environ-
ments and make numerous enhancements and improvements in the
product, the incremental cost of each increases signifi-
cantly. AMAPS is an integrated manufacturing, accounting and
production system, consisting of nine separate modules (two
more to be completed in 1983), over a million lines of code
and some 120 separate manuals of documentation.
cement, improvement or adaptation can require
numerous modules and versions of the system.
Any enhan-
change in
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The computer services industry historically has expensed
all so-called R&D expenditures, not distinguishing particu-
larly between R&D and product construction costs as is done
at Comserv. Part of this is true because of the history of
significant expenditures of this nature in the 1960's when
building standard software products for sale was new and
experimental. In some cases this resulted in write-offs.
In addition, very few of the companies in the industry were
publicly held and were more concerned about taxes than the
accounting treatment of these costs. Therefore, they were
identified as R&D costs and were written off for tax pur-
poses. Comserve was one of the very early publicly held
companies, going public in 1971. Through most of the 70's
there were very few publicly held software product companies
in the industry. The accounting treatment given to these
types of expenses has corneunder closer scrutiny in the past
several years as many more of the companies in the computer
services industry have become publicly held.
There are four major reasons for giving careful con-
sideration to the accounting treatment of these types of
costs: (1) the accounting principle of matching revenues
with expenses (the future value of the asset), (2) recovera-
bility of the investment, (3) consideration of whether or
not the treatment distorts reported earnings, and (4) the
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establishment
balance sheet.
of the true value of the company on its
There is no disagreement that if certain of
these costs are truly research and development, they should
be expensed. On the other hand, it is questionable whether
much of the costs identified as research and development by
many companies in the industry really should be so classi-
fied. A careful interpretation of the FASS guidelines on
research and development, as stated earlier, would indicate
that computer programming software construction costs are
not R&D. Whether or not these costs are expensed or capita-
lized, the real consideration in determining the accounting
treatment involves the future value of the asset and reco-
verability of the investment. If the investment is clearly
recoverable in a reasonable period of time (supporting the
future value of the asset), then these expenses should be
matched with the revenues from the products produced. If
this is not done it results in distorted reported earnings.
In addition, if the true value of such a capital investment
is not reflected on the balance sheet, a company is not in a
position to take advantage of the full value of the company.
As a result, the company has less capability to borrow funds
against its balance sheet and leverage the shareholders I
investment.
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Referring to earlier comments on the FASB guidelines
defining research and development and the handling of soft-
ware construction expenditures, very little if any of the
expenditures called R&D by many of the companies in the com-
puter services industry could actually qualify as R&D under
the FASB guidelines. This, of course, can be very misleading
to investors. A company spending significant dollars on R&D
is normally looked upon favorably by investors, particularly
in a high technology industry such as the computer services
industry. Large R&D expenditures communicate to the
investor that the company is keeping on top of technology
and out in front in terms of the competitive nature of their
products and their long term ability to grow and survive in
a very competitive market. If, in fact, these expenditures
are really not R&D, and are not being spent on new discov-
eries and new ideas and new concepts, but are actually
expenditures to construct software products using conven-
tional and known technology, then it raises a serious
question as to whether or not the company is misleading
potential investors who are attempting to determine the
future prospects of the company. If we dispose of the term
R&D and look upon these expenditures for what they really
are, then the question of recoverability becomes a key issue
and the expenditures can be handled in a conventional busi-
ness manner.
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Another very important consideration on this matter is
management control of what has developed in the computer
services industry into very major expenditure commitments in
the construction of software products. As mentioned
earlier, one of the concerns that has been expressed about
capitalizing software construction costs is the reference
back to the 60's when some expenditures had to be written
off because of a lack of market and, therefore, no recovera-
bility of the capital that was invested. Today the industry
is much more mature. With experienced management the expos-
ure to this type of practice is reduced .significantly. On
the other hand, because of the size of the expendituxes
necessary to build software products that are acceptable in
the marketplace today, the need for good management controls
is essential. Comserve has implemented various control pro-
cesses over the past several years and continually reviews
the effectiveness of these controls. Today a preliminary
product description and business plan is prepared for
approval by a Product Steering Committee in connection with
each recommended project. If the project is approved, speci-
fied review dates are establshed in order to put in place
"go/no-go" decision points before initial funding is
approved. Upon completion of a Phase I effort, a thorough
review is made of the project, the business plan, expendi-
tures to date, the level of assurance on achieving the
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return on invested capital set forth in the business plan,
and both the "technical" and "market" risks. The business
opportunity in the marketplace is thoroughly reviewed. This
is all done prior to giving the go ahead for additional
funding on the next phase of the project. In addition, a
new "go/no-go" review decision could result in the product
being cancelled and all of the costs incurred to date
expensed. This formal product construction process is
extremely important to have in place in order to properly
assess the recoverability of invested capital in product
construction.
Exhibits 2 and 3 illustrate the Comserve control process
described above. Exhibit 2 is an overview of the Comserve
product planning and construction process. This exhibit
identifies the approval levels required through the process.
It also identifies the costs that are expensed and the costs
that are capitalized. The Exhibit 3 details the product
construction activity flow. Here again the costs that are
expensed and the costs that are capitalized are identified.
In addition, arrows indicate where the go/no go decision
review points might be in a typical project. These review
points will vary depending on the size and nature of the
project.
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Another consideration on this issue of capitalization
versus expensing of software construction costs relates to
the restrictions that expensing of these capital expendi-
tures has on the growth potential of a company. Comserve
Corporation, for example, has positioned itself in the
industry where it is facing an attractive business oppor-
tunity for expansion and growth. The company has been able
to obtain equity capital and is in a position to invest this
capital and achieve attractive returns quickly for the com-
pany shareholders. If these capital investments in product
construction cost had to be expensed, Comserv Corporation
would have to severely limit the magnitude of its product
construction costs in order to sustain an adequate earnings
growth to support the current market price of the stock.
This would put an arbitrary "cap" on Comserv's growth oppor-
tunity. Expensing these kinds of capital expenditures forces
a company in many cases to restrict its growth opportunity.
This is particularly true of small companies which have suc-
cessfully completed their "start-up" phase and have an
attractive growth opportunity in their selected market niche
but must make significant investments in product construc-
tion in order to capitalize on this business opportunity.
Earnings performance is necessary to attract the necessary
capital. Expensing all software construction costs can
severely restrict the small company's ability to grow. On
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the other hand, this policy can be very favorable to a large
software company, over $50 million in annual sales, which
has the "critical mass" in annual revenue to carry an ade-
quate level of expensed software construction costs. Faced
with this situation, management will often turn to alter-
natives which could include the purchase of software pro-
ducts. Accounting guidelines allow for capitalization of
purchased software. However, when a software product com-
pany purchases software developed by some other company, the
risk of a write-off of that purchase price increases signi-
ficantly. When a company is buying software the "technical
risk" may be minimized because the·product exists but the
"marketing" and "management risk" could be significantly
higher in attempting to integrate it into their existing
product line. The company normally will not have the people
who built the software and can run into severe difficulties
in attempting to install and support the system. One
million dollars on the balance sheet of a company reflecting
a purchase of software as opposed to one million dollars on
the balance sheet of a company reflecting the internal
construction of that same software is, in many cases, much
more subject to risk or write off. Other alternatives might
include an R&D partnership or the acquisition of a company.
In the case of an R&D partnership this could very well
result in an unnecessary dilution of the earnings of the
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company and thus a reduction in the appreciation 6f the
stock of the company for the shareholders. R&D partnerships
can be an appropriate form of finaneing in certain cases.
On the other hand, it can often be a very expensive financing
vehicle for this type of product construction where develop-
ment technical risks and marketing risks are not signifi-
cant. Acquiring another company of course offers the
acquirer an opportunity to reflect the software product as
an asset which can then be expensed over many years. Here
again, the exposure and risk is amplified considerably com-
pared to in-house construction of software. Consider the
dismal record of acquisitions and the performance of
acquired companies for the parent company in the computer
services industry.
In the case of Comserv, AMAPS is a very large, compre-
hensive product. As indicated earlier it consists of over
one million lines of code and 120 manuals of documentation
for a single version. The construction of AMAPS began in
1975 as an upgrade of a previous product, MAPS. It is a
completely integrated manufacturing system. Today there are
nine modules available and the product is still being added
to (two more to be completed in 1983). There are several
additional modules being planned. AMAPS, because it is a
completely integrated manufacturing system, does not give
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Comserv an opportunity to go out and acquire a separate
module such as the purchasing module or the cost management
module. These modules must be constructed internally and
integrated into the entire system. Comserv has an extended
user base of some 300 major manufactur ing company sites
which made a decision to do business with Comserv based on a
demonstrated commitment to extensive additional product
construction to complete the total system. This base of
users represents a ready-made market for the additional
modules to AMAPS and an assured recovery of the capital
necessary to produce these modules. This is not necessarily
true of all companies in the industry. The point here is
that the work they are doing, in excess of 90-95% of the
work being done on software products, is certainly not in
any way related to research and development. As mentioned
earlier, the question of recoverability is very key.
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APPENDIX B
THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE'S
SOFTWARE ACCOUNTING POLICY
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The material for this chapter has been taken from Illustra-
tive Accounting Procedures For Federal Agencies: Guidelines
for Accounting for Automatic Data Processing Costs, Federal
Government Accounting Pamphlet No.4, United States General
Accounting Office, 1978.
CHAPTER 2
CAPITALIZING EQUIPMENT AND SOFTWARE INVESTMENT COSTS
SECTION 1: BASIC PRINCIPLES
Computers, related equipment, and software should be
considered long-lived assets subject to capitalization and
depreciation in accordance with GAO's accounting principles
and standards for Federal agencies. The investment costs
should be recorded in the general ledger and in property
records.
SECTION 3: GUIDELINES FOR CAPITALIZING SOFTWARE
Computer software--including operating, multipurpose,
and application software--generally possesses three essen-
tial characteristics attributable to assets: long life,
significant cost, and legal identity. Whether developed in-
house or under contract, or purchased outright, software
having these characteristics should be considered an asset
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subject to capitalization in agency accounts.
for depreciation is discussed in chapter 3.
Accounting
A. ACCUMULATING INVESTMENT COSTS
GAO's Accounting Principles and Standards for Guidance
of Federal Agencies (GAO Manual title 2, subsec. 12.5) pre-
scribes that:
"Management control over the cost of assets
acquired by construction should be such as to
assure that the cost of the work is kept within
the authorized amounts and that accurate costs
are recorded and transferred to the proper
fixed property accounts when the work is
finished."
Accounting for costs of software development must meet this
requirement.
1. Recording Work-in-Process costs for Capitalization
Job order and project cost methods are recommended
for accumulating costs of new software, both by purchase and
development. Both methods provide useful information for
management control. Job order costing is recommended where
work is done within a normal hierarchial organization.
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Project costing is recommended where a single project
manager is responsible for the results, such as for a new
development effort (either in-house or by contract).
To facilitate separation of capital from mainten-
ance expense when work is completed, a separate work-in-
process subsidiary record should be established for each
application or other software system. After a new or
modified software system is tested and accepted for opera-
tions, total costs should be transferred from the work-in-
process subsidiary record to the appropriate property
account, as discussed in subsection B below. Costs for
acquiring and developing new software systems and for modi-
fying, converting, and improving existing systems which are
to be capitalized should be accumulated in subsidiary
records. Maintenance costs which are not to be capitalized
should be recorded and then treated as operating expense.
(See chapter 4.>
B. RECORDING CAPITALIZED COSTS
The following system of records and accounts is recom-
mended to appropriately record investment costs and charge
depreciation.
1. General Ledger and Property Records
Acquisition costs incurred by an agency in obtaining
software--through purchase, development or donation--should
be recorded in a general ledger asset account and in appro-
priate property records. Property records may be as detailed
as management needs, but the capitalized amount must be
recorded and reconciled with the general ledger account.
Where the investment in software is substantial, a separate
general ledger account should be established so that costs
can be readily identified.
2. Subsidiary Records
Each software system should have a separate subsid-
iary property record showing the cumulative costs incurred
in obtaining and maintaining it. The amounts should be
classified according to (1) acquisition and development,
(2) improvements, conversions, and modifications, and (3)
routine upkeep (maintenance). Minimal information to be
included in a software property record is shown below.
755
FIGURE 4
Illustrated Software Property Record
DESCRIPTION
Location
End user
Estimated life
Actual life
Date installed (month and year)
Salvage value
Depreciation amount (optional)
Costs:
Acquisition/development (initial costs)
Improvements (date, purpose, and cost incurred)
Upkeep (annual expenditures) (optional)
Such a record would provide a source of information for
management decisions, as well as for depreciation costing.
An agency with many software systems may desire a sub-
sidiary record summarizing the investment and depreciation
cost for all of its software systems. Such a record and its
relationship to the general ledger and property records is
illustrated in Figure 5.
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FIGURE 5
Illustrated Relationship Between the
General Ledger and Software Property Record
General Ledger
Item Cost
Assets:
Vehicles $
Furniture
Office equipment
ADP equipment
ADP software xxx
Etc.
$ xxx
Summar~
Software prol2ert~ Record
Code System Cost
Personnel
Payroll
Supply
Accounting
Financial
Cost
Etc.
$363,000
$ xxx
Software
Item Prol2erty Record
Description
Location
End User
Estimated life
Actual Life
Date installed
Salvage value
Cost:
Development
Improvements
Upkeep:
1975
1976
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ADP
Depreciation
$
$ 31,000
$
$
$
$
Payroll
Computer center #1
Agency-wide
12 years
June 1975
$285,000
78,000
5,000
3,000
$363,000
Payroll
C. CAPITALIZATION CRITERIA
The capitalization criteria established· by an agency as
part of its accounting policies should be applied to soft-
ware. The following criteria are provided to promote con-
sistent decisions among agencies.
1. Software To Be Capitalized
Two factors are to be considered in deciding
whether nonrecurring investment-type costs for new software
systems should be capitalized or be treated as a current
operating expense: cost and useful life. Not every software
system would warrant capitalization.
In general, the software (and hardware) of major
ADP systems (as defined by OMS Circular A-lOg) and applica-
tion or other software systems or subsystems whose acquisi-
tion cost is over $100,000 (i.e., the cumulative acquisition
cost of computer programs or software modules which have the
same application purpose) should have their acquisition cost
capitalized. Agencies are, of course, free to set the
threshold for capitalization below GAO'S dollar threshold.
Some software does not have an extended life. As a
general criterion, we recommend that costs be capitalized
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when software systems are expected to be used repetitively
for more than about 2 years. Criteria for deciding the use-
ful life of software are discussed in chapter 3.
The amounts spent for developing and modifying com-
puter programs that never become fully operational may be
expensed.
2. Cost Elements To Be Included
In The ACquisition Costs
Acquisition and development costs of computer soft-
ware designated for capitalization should include:
The price of purchased software and the estimated
useful value of software obtained by other means,
including costs for preoperation modification, con-
versions, testing, and documentation. (See GAO
Manual, title 2, subsec. 12.5.>
Salaries and benefits for agency staff and compen-
sation of contractors and other Government personnel
for developing new software and modifying software
obtained through other means. This would include
expenses for analysis, design, programming, docu-
mentation, testing and conversion. It would also
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include expenses for preparing the computer oper-
ating instructions, user procedures manual and
other documentation.
computer operating costs for testing, debugging,
and parallel processing.
Direct and indirect costs, such as office space,
travel, supplies, communications, and special
training, and normal overhead, incurred during
acquisition and development.
3. Improvements
Costs for improvements that will increase the use-
ful life of a capitalized software system should be capital-
ized. Management must decide whether work done on existing
software will increase its useful life. As guidance for
making such decisions, we recommend that costs be capital-
ized when changes are made to satisfy legislation or an
Executive order, to convert software to different equipment,
or to make processing more efficient. Unless they are sub-
stantial, costs may usually be expensed if changes are for
corrections or one-time information retrieval (such as
extracting data for a special report).
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CHAPTER 3
ACCOUNTING FOR DEPRECIATION
SECTION 1: BASIC PRINCIPLES
GAO's Accounting Principles and Standards (GAO Manual,
title 2, subsec. l2.S(h» requires each agency to adopt pro-
cedures to account for depreciation of capital assets when-
ever a periodic determination of all resources consumed in
performing services is needed. Accounting for depreciation
of ADP asset,s--software, hardware, and facilities--is
required to obtain full reimbursement of costs and is impor-
tant for management users, and others who need to know the
full cost of ADP services.
SECTION 3: ACCOUNTING FOR SOFTWARE DEPRECIATION
A. GENERAL GUIDELINES
The method of accounting for depreciation of computer
software should vary with the type of software and the
nature of its use. When depreciation of computer software
is reported it should be shown as an unfunded operating
cost. In general, the investment cost should be amortized
over a software system's useful life.
be reported as follows.
Depreciation should
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1. Operating software
Depreciation should be reported as an operating
cost along with equipment depreciation.
2. Multipurpose software
When mUltipurpose software benefits a limited
number of applications, depreciation should be assigned and
reported as a direct cost to the benefiting applications
based· on measured usage. Otherwise, multipurpose software
depreciation should be treated the same as depreciation from
operating software.
3. Application software
In general, depreciation for application systems
and software whose costs have been capitalized should be
taken and reported regularly over the life of the software.
If the application supports several program functions, or
organizational units, its depreciation should be prorated to
each systematically on the basis of measured or estimated
use. For convenience, such reporting may be done on an
annual cycle and only to major organizational units.
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B. CRITERIA FOR DECIDING USEFUL LIFE
The useful life of operating software should be based on
the useful life of the computer with which it is used. The
useful life of mUltipurpose software and applications soft-
ware should be estimated on a case-by-case basis. If such
software is designed to be relatively independent of the
computer system on which it is used, then the useful life
should be based on the planning estimates made by management
in deciding to develop or acquire the software. However, if
the software is structured to suit a particular computer
system, its economically useful life for depreciation pur-
poses should not exceed the useful life of that computer
system.
CHAPTER 4
ACCOUNTING FOR OPERATING COSTS
SECTION 5: ACCUMULATING COSTS FOR EACH USER APPLICATION
E. DISTRIBUTING MAINTENANCE COSTS FOR OPERATING SOFTWARE
1. Distributing Maintenance Costs
for Operating Software
Recurr ing costs for upkeep of operating software
(along with costs for rent and depreciation) should be
treated as operating costs of the computer with which the
software is used. The cost must be distributed to the
appropriate data processing work function (e.g., the func-
tion containing the central processing unit) and to bene-
fiting applications based on measured use of the computer in
processing. Normally the amount need not be itemized in
cost reports or user bills.
2. Distributing Maintenance Costs
for Multipurpose Software
Costs should be charged directly to applications,
based on measured or anticipated use of mUltipurpose soft-
ware in processing, when
it is used in processing data only for selected
applications and the costs are significant or
managers or users need to monitor such costs.
Otherwise, the costs should be treated the same as
costs for operating software.
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APPENDIX C
COURT CASE BR IEFS OF
SOFTWARE RELATED CASES
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This appendix contains brief descriptions of the most important
court cases that are discussed in chapters 13 and 14. Each case
includes the full name of the case, legal citation, subject summary,
issue, fact summary and holding. Some cases also include a discussion
of the dissenting opinion or other pertinent facts.
Not all cases involve computer software directly. Some cases
involve related non-software fact situations(such as film-making)
that have been cited in software tax cases. Other cases(such as film
cases) have cited software tax cases although the case itself does
not concern itself with software taxation. More recent cases tend to
incorporate the same lines of reasoning that have been used in earlier
cases, and there is considerable overlap, so the cases have not been
categorized based on tines of reasoning used. Indeed, some recent
cases mention any and all lines of reasoning that might assist in
winning the case.
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Including these cases in an appendix rather than in the body of the
thesis enhances the readaotltty of the thesis proper, since much
extraneous but interesting information can be made available without
forcing the reader to wade through it whlle reading the chapter. The
briefs are referenced by number in the chapters, and are included in
this appendix in more or less alphabetical order for ease of reference.
Briefs of the following court cases are included in this appendix.
1.Accountants Computer Services, Inc. v. Kosydar
1.Central Data Systems, Inc. v. Kosydar
1.The Andrew Jergens Co.v. Kosydar
2. Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association v. County
of Los Angeles
3. Bing Crosby Productions, Inc. v. United States
3. Sussex Pictures, Inc. v. United States
3. MCA, Inc. and Universal City StudiOS, Inc. v. United States
4. Boswell v. Paramount Television Sales, Inc.
5. Bullock v. Statistical Tabulating Corporation
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6. Bunker-Ramo Corp. v. Porterfield
7. Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corporation
8. Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. National CashRegister Corporation, Inc.
9. Chittenden Trust Companyv. King
10. cttrzens Financial Corp. v. Kosydar
11.Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell
12. Comptro ller of the Treasury v Equitable Trust Company
13. Computer Sciences Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue
14. County of Sacramento v. Assessment Appeals Board
15. Credit Bureau of Miami County, Inc. v. Coli ins
16. Crescent Amusement Company v. Carson
17. District of Columbia v. Norwood Studies, Inc.
18. District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Associates
19. F & MSchaefer Corporation v. Electronic Data Systems Corporation
20. Fingerhut Products Company v. Commissioner of Revenue
21. First Nat tonal Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock
22. First Nat ional Bank of Springfield v. Department of Revenue
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23. General Data Corp. v. Porterfield
24. Greyhound Computer Corporat ion v. State Department of
Assessments and Taxation
25. Helvey v. WabashCounty REMC
26. Honeywell Information Systems v. Maricopa County
27. Intellidata Incorporated v. State Board of Equalization
28. James v. TRESComputer Service, Inc.
29. Janesville Data Center, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue
30. Mertz v. State Tax Commission
31. Miami Citizens National Bank and Trust Companyv. Lindley
32. Michael Todd Companyv. County of Los Angeles
33. Quotron Systems, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury
34. Simplicity Pattern Company, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization
35. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Department of
Revenue
36. Spencer Gifts, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation
37. State of Alabama v. Central Computer Services, Inc.
38. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States
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39. Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.
40. ultrornc Systems Corp. v. Board of Assessors of Boston
41. University rttcrorums v. scto Township
42. Walt Disney Productions v. United States(Disney I)
43. Walt Disney Product ions v. United States(Disney II)
These court cases can be categorized in a number of different
ways. Several of the most useful classifications, listed by case
number, are given below.
Type oLI..ax
Sales tax(software cases) 1, 5, 11, 12, 14, 21, 27, 29, 36
Use tax(software cases) 9, 22, 28, 33, 36, 37
Property tax(software cases) 2, 18, 24, 26
Investment tax credit - software cases 38; nlrn cases 3, 42, 43
License tax 4
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fOro Cases
Investment tax credit 3, 42, 43
License tax 4
Sales tax 16, 17
Property tax 32, 34, 41
Other Cases
Hardware - property tax 40; use tax 23
Mailing labels - sales/use tax 20,30
Sale of service v. product 1, 7, 8, 10, 15, 31, 35, 39
Computer system as real property 2
Stock exchange information - sales tax 6
Uniform Commercial Code - "good" v. service 7, 8, 39
Taxability of software for collapsible corporation purposes 13
Credit reports 15
Replevin action(tangible v. intangible) for software 19
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Electrical energy - service v. product 25
Artwork 35
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No. 1 ACCOUNTANTS COMPUTER SERVICES, INC. v. ~OSYDARCENTRAL DATA SYSTEMS, INC. v. ~OSYDAR
THE ANDREW JERGENS CO. v. KOSYDAR
35 Ohio St.2d 120, 298 N.E.2d 519 (1973)
SUBJECT: Sales taxability of a sale involving both tangible
personal property and personal services.
ISSUE: What factors should be considered in determining
whether a sale involving both tangible personal
property and personal services is subject to the
Ohio sales tax?
FACTS: The above three cases involved the same question
and were heard simultaneously.
(1) Accountant's Computer Services, Inc. (ACS) is
a data processing company. It receives raw data
in the form of punch paper tapes or adding machine
tapes upon which are recorded debits and credits
which constitute records of current financial
transactions. ACS processes the information by
machine and furnishes individual clients with
printouts that are used by the customer as drafts
of financial statements, books of original entry,
cash receipts and disbursements journals, sales
journals and general ledgers. The printouts
duplicate work that, if performed manually by an
accountant, would be called write-up work.
ACS contended that the work it performs con-
stitutes a personal service, thereby making it
exempt from the Ohio sales tax. Kosydar, the Tax
Commissioner, contended that these transactions
represent the sale of tangible personal property
(printouts) and are subject to the Ohio sales tax.
(2) Central Data Systems, Inc. (CDS) provides
customers with the following four categories of
computing and software sales and service: (a)
data processing, including the operator's time,
machine time and the various reports and supplies
billed generally on a monthly basis, Cb) key
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punching; (c) systems design and 'programming,
which consists of consulting, although certain
computer printouts are also provided; and (d)
contract consulting.
As in the prior case, taxpayer (CDS) con-
tended that the work it performs constitutes a
personal service, which is exempt from the Ohio
sales tax. The Tax Commissioner alleged that
these transactions represent the sale of tangible
personal property (printouts) and are subject to
the Ohio sales tax.
(3) The Andrew Jergens Company (AJC) contracted
with A. C. Neilsen Company, a market research
organization. Neilsen was to compile statistical
data as well as to provide analysis and interpre-
tation of data, and to assist management in making
marketing decisions based on the data provided.
As an integral part of the service furnished,
Neilsen assigned account executives to AJC's
account whose duty it was to analyze, interpret
and present to AJC's management the information
developed by Neilsen in a meaningful and useful
manner.
Taxpayer alleged it is exempt from the Ohio
sales tax. Commissioner contended that the Ohio
sales tax should be assessed.
In each of these three cases, the Board of
Tax Appeals affirmed the Commissioner's assessment
order.
HOLDING: (1) The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the decision
in Accountants Computer Service, Inc., holding
that such transactions are subject to the Ohio
Sales tax. (2) and (3) The Court reversed the
decisions in Central Data Systems, Inc. and The
Andrew Jergens Company, holding that the transac-
tions in question primarily involved the sale of a
service rather than a product, thereby making them
exempt from the sales tax.
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(2) In Accountant's Computer Service, data was
sorted, classified and rearranged by machine.
Printouts were then delivered to the supplier of
the raw data, and it is the supplier of the data
rather than ACS that studies, alt~rs, analyzes and"
adjusts printout data. Although specially trained
personnel are required to operate the machine,
their training is not related to the real object
sought, i.e., the rearrangement of the raw
material. The production of the end product was
almost entirely accomplished by the data pro-
cessing machine, and because of, this fact the
printouts in question constitute tangible personal
property rather than a service.
(3) The Central Data Systems case can be distin-
guished from Accountant's Computer Service
because, in CDS, the company i s professional
workers applied -thinking- as well as mechanical
processing. It was the analysis and thinking
skills of CDS employees that was being sold; the
data processing machinery and related printouts
were merely used by CDS personnel to assist them
in rendering their personal service. Because the
personal service was the main item contracted for,
and the resulting printed matter constituted an
inconsequential element for which no separate
charge was made, the Court held that the sale of
the tangible personal property is not subject to
taxation.
(4) The Andrew Jergens Company case represents an
even clearer example of a transaction involving
the sale of a service rather than a product. The
A. C. Neilsen Company was hired to gather, analyze
and interpret data, and to assist AJC'S management
in making marketing decisions. It was clearly the
personal service of Neilsen and its staff that was
contracted for; the tangible personal property
that was transferred for communication purposes
was an inconsequential element without separate
charge. The entire transaction is exempt from the
Ohio sales tax.
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In its reasoning, the Court cited several
other Ohio cases where the sales tax was assessed
on the entire consideration paid in transactions
that involved insignificant and inconsequential
amounts of personal services. No reduction was
made for the portion of the consideration that was
attributable to personal services. (See Recording
Devices v. Bowers, 174 Ohio St. 518, 190 N.E.2d
258 (1963): Recording Devices v. Porterfield, 30
Ohio St.2d 208, 283 N.E.2d 626 (1972): Columbus
Coated Fabrics v. Porterfield, 30 Ohio St.2d 307,
285 N.E.2d 50 (1972): and Koch v. Kosydar, 32 Ohio
St.2d 74, 290 N.E.2d 847 (1972». The rationale
for not separating the inconsequential amount
attributable to personal services from the amount
attributable to tangible personal property is
that: (1) nearly all transactions are, of neces-
sity, mixed transactions involving at least a
slight degree of personal service, and (2) where
this degree of personal service is of insignifi-
cant consequence, both the practical problem of
attributing to such service a percentage of the
entire consideration paid, and the insignificant
effect it would have on the amount paid in taxes,
make such a distinction unreasonable and unneces-
sary.
The Ohio Supreme Court quoted an Arizona case
(Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. Arizona State Tax
Comm., 1 Ariz. App. 302, 306, 402 P.2d 423,427
(1965», which set forth the following possibili-
ties regarding mixed sales of services and prop-
erty:
"( I) The service is the main item
sold and the property sold is incidental
thereto and not separately charged (not
a taxable sale as a sale of services)•
"(2) The services and property sold
can be readily separated (one tax exempt
and the other taxable).
"(3) The service sold is incidental
to the property and not separately
charged (taxable in gross)"
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The Arizona Court, recognlzlng that the cate-
gory into which a vendor falls is a question of
fact to be determined in light of all the evi-
dence, stated that:
"When there is a fixed and ascer-
tainable relationship between the value
of the article and the value of the ser-
vice rendered in connection therewith so
that both may be separately stated, then
the vendor is engaged in both selling at
retail and furnishing services and is
subject to the tax as to one and tax
exempt as to the other. Where the prop-
erty and the services are distinct and
each is a consequential element capable
of ready separation, it cannot be said
one is an inconsequential ~lement within
the exemption provided by the statute.
See Rice v. Evatt, 144 Ohio St. 483, 59
N.E.2d 927,157 A.L.R. 572 (1945)."
Rice V. Evatt falls in the second of the three
categories mentioned above. It involved an opto~
metrist who did not separate his charge for pro-
fessional examination from his charge for glasses
and other items of personal property transferred.
Two separate and distinct transactions were being
performed therein, one, a purely professional
service, and the other purely a sale of tangible
personal property. The fact that the two trans-
actions were not billed separately is of no con-
sequence in determining the taxability of the
transactions.
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No.2 BANK OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST ANDSAVINGS ASSOCIATION v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
224 Cal. App.2d 108, 36 Cal. Rptr. 413 (1964)
SUBJECT: Computer systems as real property.
ISSUE: Is a computer system subject to taxation as real
property?
FACTS: California banks are exempt by law from the per-
sonal property tax, but not from real estate
taxes. The Bank of America (BOA) installed
several electronic computer systems and the County
of Los Angeles (COLA) classified the systems as
fixtures, and therefore subject to real estate
taxation as improvements to real property.
BOA, citing sections 104 and 105 of California's
Revenue and Taxation Code and section 660 of its
Civil Code, asserted that an article is not a fix-
ture unless permanently attached to the land or to
improvements on the land. Intention to make a
permanent addition to realty must also be con-
sidered (M.P. Moller, Inc. v. Wilson, 8 Cal.2d 31,
37, 63 P.2d 818, 821). The following seven·addi-
tional reasons were also given as to why the com-
puter systems should be considered personal
property rather than real property:
(a) the function performed is the
same as that formerly performed by
bookkeepers using manually operated,
electrically driven mechanical equip-
ment, (b) the dimension, weight and phy-
sical characteristics of the equipment
(portability, etc.) are characteristic
of personal propertY1 (c) the method of
connection (plugs) manifests a temporary
condition1 (d) the equipment in one case
occupied only 5 percent of the building1
(e) the bank moved many components in
the past and intended to do so in the
future; (f) the useful life of the
equipment ranges from 6 to 10 years,
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whereas that of the buildings is approx-
Imately 50 years, and (g) double taxa-
tion would result, since national banks
pay an excess franchise tax in lieu of a
personal property tax. Also cited was
the case of Pajaro Valley Bank v. County
of Santa Cruz, 207 Cal. App.2d 621, 24
Cal. Rptr. 639, which held that safe
deposit boxes placed in a national bank
vault were personal property and there-
fore exempt from tax.
BOLDING: The Court held that the computer systems are fix-
tures and are subject to the real estate tax.
Some of the eighteen reasons given by the Court
were: (a) the buildings themselves were special
purpose buildings with raised floors and tempera-
ture and humidity controls (City of Los Angeles v.
Klinker, 219 Cal. 198, 25 P.2d 826, 90 A.L.R.
148); and (b) the great expense of moving heavy
equipment as well as size and weight makes for
permanence of location (Southern California
Telephone Co. v. State Board, 12 Cal.2d 127, 82
P.2d 422; Bell v. Bank of Perris, 52 Cal. App.2d
66, 125 P.2d 829).
NOTE: The federal investment tax credit, which may only
be taken on personal property, generally may be
taken on computer systems. A computer system may
be classified as personal property for federal tax
purposes and as real property for state tax pur-
poses.
No.:3 BING CROSBY PRODUCTIONS, INC. v. UNITED STATES
SUSSEX PICTURES, INC. v. UNITED STATES
MCA, INC. AND UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC. v. UNITED STATES
588 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1979), 79-1 USTC 9150
SUBJECT: Film master
articles as
credit.
negatives and intermediate printing
qualifying for the investment tax
ISSUE: Are master film negatives and intermediate
printing articles tangible personal property
qualifying for the investment tax credit?
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FACTS: The companies in question produce films which are
shown at movie theaters, by the networks or by
individual television stations. The process
involved in the manufacture of these films con-
sists of three steps. In step one, the audio and
video portions are recorded and edited separately
and then combined to form the master negatives.
Step two involves the making of various intermedi-
ate or secondary film and tape articles from the
master negatives. The final step involves the
actual manufacture of the release prints. These
combine the audio and video portions onto a single
property which are then shown at movie theaters,
by television networks, or by individual televi-
sion stations. The release prints are generally
struck from the different intermediate articles
contained within step two.
The plaintiffs contended that the expenditures
incurred in steps one and two qualify for the
investment tax credit. The government contended
that (I) only step one expenditures qualify for
the investment tax creditJ (2) if predominant use
is outside the United States, then the expendi-
tures do not qualify for the investment tax credit
even though the master negatives remained within
the United States for more than 50 percent of the
year in questionJ (3) predominant use should
depend on the source of income, which approach was
adopted by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, or, alter-
natively, predominant use should be determined by
the manufacturing role of the asset.
HOLDING: For Crosby, Sussex and MCA. In order to qualify
for the investment tax credit, the property in
question must be Section 38 property, which was
defined to include all tangible personal property
with certain specific exceptions (for property
used to furnish lodging, property used by tax-
exempt organizations, property used by governmen-
tal units, and property used predominantly outside
of the United States). The property also had to
have at least an eight year life (this rule has
since been modified several times). The Tax
Reform Act of 1976 refined the manner in which the
investment credit was to be applied to movie and
television films (P.L. 94-455 Sec. 804) by making
specific rules for determining predominant use and
useful life of films.
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The question of whether tapes and film qualify for
the investment credit has been answered by the
courts on three previous occasions. In Walt
Disney Productions v. United States (DisneyIf;
480 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 934, 94 S.Ct. 1451, 39 L.Ed.2d 493, the tax-
payer was allowed to take the investment credit on
certain motion picture negatives. No distinction
was made as to which expenditures were step one
and which were step two. Treasury Regulation
Section 1.48-1 (F), which said that a motion pic-
ture film or tape was an intangible property and
therefore ineligible for the investment credit was
held invalid by the court. The court also held
that the useful life of the films for investment
credit purposes need not be the same as for depre-
ciation purposes. Additionally, the court found
that the basis of the films for investment credit
purposes should be the same as it is for depre-
ciation purposes.
In Walt Disney Production v. United States (Disney
III), 549 F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 1976), the court
found that the master negatives were tangible
property within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. Sec. 48
(a)(1) (1970) and that the investment tax credit
can be claimed for the production costs of such
property (549 F.2d at 580). The decision also
stated that the property need not be considered
intangible for investment tax credit purposes just
because it was treated as intangible for deprecia-
tion purposes. Although more than 50 percent of
Disney's income from the films came from foreign
sources, the credit was allowed because the prop-
erty in question (the negatives) was located
within the United States for more than 50 percent
of the year.
The third case on point is Texas Instruments v.
United States, 551 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1977). The
court 1n Texas Instruments followed the reasoning
in the Disney cases in holding that the films and
tapes in question were tangible property
qualifying for the investment tax credit.
In its holding, the court in Crosby, Sussex and
MCA stated that:
781
"There is no rational reason why a
distinction should be drawn between the
printing articles in step 11 or step 12,
and a taxpayer's entitlement to the
investment credit. It would frustrate
the statutory purpose of the investment
credit which was found in the Disney
cases to cover the motion picture and
television industry, to arbitrarily
attribute the production costs to only
the master negatives (step 11), and not
allow the credit for the intermediate
printing articles (step '2)." (588 F.2d
at 1299, 79-1 USTC 9150 at 86,164).
No.4 BOSWELL v. PARAMOUNT TELEVISION SALES, INC.
291 Ala. 490, 282 So.2d 892 (1973)
SUBJECT: Leased motion picture films as tangible personal
property subject to a privilege or license tax.
ISSUE: Do leased motion picture films constitute tangible
personal property for Alabama privilege or license
tax purposes?
FACTS: Paramount Television Sales filed suit to prevent
Boswell, the State Commissioner of Revenue, from
enforcing a portion of the Alabama Code which
levies a privilege or license tax on persons
engaging in the business of renting or leasing
tangible personal property. Paramount supplies
films or tapes to Alabama television stations on a
license or lease basis. The tapes or films
shipped to the television stations must be
returned to Paramount within forty-eight hours
after the scheduled broadcast date.
The question to be decided was whether Paramount
was engaged in the business of renting or leasing
tangible personal property in Alabama, which
involved both a "nexus" and "tangibility· issue.
Paramount contended that there was insufficient
nexus for tax purposes, and that, even if there
782
was sufficient nexus, the essence of the transac-
tion is an intangible right to publish and that
the transfer of this right to publish or broadcast
even though accompanied by delivery of tangible
personal property (the films, including reels and
containers) is not a rental of tangible personal
property. In the absence of a license to publish
or broadcast the film, the lease only gives the
television stations the right to use the film.
HOLDING: For Boswell. Based on the facts, it was deter-
mined that Paramount had sufficient nexus for tax
purposes. Furthermore, the Alabama Supreme Court
held the film to be tangible personal property.
In its reasoning the Court referred to Florida
Association of Broadcasters v. Kirk, Fla. App.,
264 So.2d 437, cert. denied, Fla. 268 So.2d 534
(1972), where the taxpayer was held liable for the
sales and use tax. In that case, the taxpayer
contended that it was not subject to the tax
because the use of the films was not a sale or
rental of tangible personal property. The tax-
payer tried, unsuccessfully, to distinguish
between money paid for the actual physical film
and that paid for the right to use the film. The
Florida Court rejected this argument and noted:
"Every purcbase or rental of prop-
erty is the acquisition of the right to
use that property for its intended pur-
poses. Likewise, practically every
piece of property subject to rent or
sale is a product of someone's original
idea and the rental thereof is for the
purpose of using it." (264 So.2d at
438).
Another case cited by the Alabama Court held that
the license to publish without the physical trans-
fer of films would be valueless. (See United
Artists Corp. v. Taylor, 273 N.Y. 334, 7 N.E.2d
254 (1937».
The Alabama Court also cited a Tennessee decision
that held the operators of motion picture theaters
liable for the sales tax on rented film from pro-
ducers. (See Crescent Amusement Co. v. Carson,
187 Tenn. 112, 213 S.W.2d 27 (1948».
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The Arkansas Supreme Court held in American
Television Co. v. Hervey, 490 S.W.2d 796 (1973)
that a levy of a use tax on video tape material
used by television stations pursuant to license
agreements is a tax on tangible personal property.
That Court said:
"We agree with the state that the
right to use property cannot be separated
from the property itself and the 'right'
spoken of by appellant would have no
value except for the use of the tape or
film--the two cannot be separated."
(490 S.W.2d at 799).
No.5 BULLOCK v. STATISTICAL TABULATING CORPORATION
549 S.W.2d 166 (Texas, 1977)
SUBJECT: Tangibility of computer software for sales tax
purposes.
ISSUE:
FACTS:
Is computer software tangible property subject to
the Texas sales tax, where the data contained in
the software is furnished by the purchaser?
Statistical Tabulating Corporation (STC) is
engaged in various aspects of data processing.
The allegedly taxable transaction in question
occurs as follows. A customer brings raw data,
i.e., business records, invoices, and the like to
STC. Data are then translated or transferred into
a code which a computer can read and which, in
this instance, is represented by holes punched in
a particular order on data processing cards. The
coded data may also be transmitted by tapes or by
telephone in addition to cards. Key punch cards
are then delivered to the customer with an
instruction sheet.
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STC's employees make this transfer or translation
of data on a key punch machine. The operation of
the machine is similar to the operation of a type-
writer or typeset machine. The key punch operator
"types" and thereby transfers the data onto the
cards in accordance with an instruction sheet pre-
pared either by the customer or by STC following
the customer's directions. The instruction sheet
contains 80 columns as does each data processing
card and provides a code for the translation and
for the -reading- of the cards thereafter by thecustomer.
After receiving the cards, the customer programs
his computer in accordance with the instruction
sheet. The cards are read by the computer and the
information retained in the "memory" of the
machine is permanently available to the customer
on print-out sheets. The cards have no furtheruse.
STC supplies the cards used in the transaction and
pays a sales tax when it buys the cards from a
distributor. Customers are billed by STC on
either an hourly labor rate or upon a flat rate
per thousand cards. There is no separate charge
to the customer for the cards. Except in a mini-
mal sense, there is no charge for the cards. The
charge is for the transfer or translation of the
data on to the cards.
HOLDING: For STC. Aspects of STC's business in which
customers bring in raw data and bought STCIs pro-
cessing capabilities in effecting a translation of
the data so that it would become perceptible to a
computer, does not involve a "sale of tangible
personal property at retail" so as to result in
such aspect of the business being subject to sales
tax.
Texas Statute Article 20.01(k) defines "sale" as
follows:
(1) (a) -Sale· means and inc1udes any
transfer of title or possession •••in any
manner or by any means whatsoever, of
tangible personal property for a con-
sideration.
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(2) "Sale" includes (a) the producing
fabrication, processing, printing, or
imprinting of tangible personal property
for a consideration for consumers who
furnish, either directly or indirectly,
the materials used in the producing,
fabricating, processing, printing or
imprinting.
The pertinent parts of Texas Statute Article 20
are:
Art. 20.02
There is hereby imposed a limited
sales tax at the rate of three and one-
fourth percent (3-1/4%) on the receipts
from the sale at retail of all taxable
items within this State.
Art. 20.01(W)
Taxable Items. "Taxable Items"
means tangible personal property.
Art. 20.01(P)
Tangible Personal Property. "Tangible
Personal Property" means personal prop-
erty which may be seen, weighed,
measured, felt or touched, or which is
in any other manner perceptible to the
senses.
Art• 20.01(D)
Receipts. (1) "Receipts means the
total amount of the sale or lease or
rental price •••of the retail sales of
taxable items by retailers •••without any
deduction on account of any of the
following: •••(b) the cost of the
materials used, labor or services costs,
interest paid, losses or other expenses.
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The present Court agreed with STC's contention
that the test used to determine whether a transac-
tion is a sale should be the same as that used in
Williams and Lee Scouting Service, Inc. v.
Calvert, 452 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
That case held that if the object or the essence
of the sale is not tangible personal property but
intangible property then the transaction is not
taxable under any definition of "sale."
STC argued, and the Court agreed, that the true
object of the transaction in the present case is
not the data processing card, as contended by
Bullock, but the purchase of coded or processed
data, an intangible. The essence of the transac-
tion for the customer is an intangible product,
coded data, and STews capabilities in making the
translation or coding. The coded data could be
transmitted from STC's key punch machine to custo-
mer's computer in several forms, i.e., tapes and
telephones, as well as cards.
In Williams and Lee Scouting, supra, the Court
found that the object of the transaction for the
plaintiff's subscribing customers was the scouting
service provided by plaintiff. Current statisti-
cal data on oil and gas well production was con-
tinuously gathered in the field by Williams and
Lee Scouting Service employees. The data was com-
piled and mailed to subscribing customers in regu-
lar reports duplicated by offset printing at the
plaintiff's office. The Comptroller (Calvert)
attempted to tax the whole transaction because a
tangible item, the printed report, changed hands.
In the transactions in the present case, as in
Williams and Lee Scouting, the customers are
desirous of something beyond the tangible object
involved in the transaction. As in Williams and
Lee Scouting, the information could have been
transformed into several forms. While this trans-
action is closer to just printing alone than the
transaction in Williams and Lee Scouting, the ele-
ment of service here is still the "essence of the
transaction." Although tangible personal property,
i.e., cards, does change hands, the receipt of the
cards does not constitute the essence of the
transaction, the basic purpose of the customer in
entering into the transaction.
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NOTE: Tex. Admin. Code title 34, Sec. 3.308 exempts both
prewritten (including home computer game
cartr idges) and custom programs from sales taxa-
tion. Also see Janesville Data Center, Inc. v.
Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 84 Wis.2d 341,
267 N.W.2d 656 (1978).
No.6 BUNKER-RAMOC RP.v. PORTERFIELD
21 Ohio St.2d 231, 257 N.E.2d 365 (1970)
SUBJECT: Sales taxability of the electronic dissemination
of stock exchange information.
ISSUE: Does the electronic dissemination of stock
exchange data for a fee consti tute the sale of
property subject to the Ohio sales tax, or does it
constitute the sale of a personal service not sub-
ject to the Ohio sales tax?
FACTS: Bunker-Ramo (BR) provided stock brokers and
secur i ty dealers with stock exchange information
electronically for a fee. As part of the agree-
ment, BR installed tangible personal property to
receive the electronic transmissions on the cust-
omer I s premises at a cost to BR varying between
$6,644 and $16,522. Approximately 110 BRemployees
are engaged in customer servicing and the recep-
tion, editing, transformation and preparation of
raw data that is eventually transmitted to sub-
scribers. BR employees make frequent visits to
subscriber premises to correct errors.
BR contended that the transmission of this data
consti tutes a personal service and is therefore
not subject to the Ohio sales tax. The Tax
Commissioner alleged that such transmissions
constitute the sale of tangible personal property
subject to the sales tax.
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BOLDING: For Tax Commissioner. Citing American District
Telegraph Co. v. Porterfield, 15 Ohio St.2d 92,
238 N.E.2d 782 (1968), Randall Park Jockey Club v.
Peck, 162 Ohio St. 245, 122 N.E.2d 787 (1954), and
Recording Devices Inc. v. Bowers, 174 Ohio St.
518, 190 N.E.2d 258 (1963), the Court stated that
BR's transactions would be considered sales
because they involve the transfer of possession
and licenses to use tangible personal property
unless the transactions were found to be personal
service transactions.
-An examination of the record indi-
cates that the activity which the
appellee performs is a completely mecha-
nized service transaction. It is not a
personal service transaction in the
sense that there are no people engaged
in serving directly the subscribers of
appellee. This service is rendered
automatically by computers, communica-
tion lines and reception and display
instruments.- (257 N.E.2d 368).
While some services rendered are tailored to the
personal needs of subscribers, a relatively small
number of people are required to oversee, maintain
and service the devices on the subscribers'
premises.
No.7 CARL BEASLEY FORD, INC. V. BURROUGBS CORPORATION
361 F.Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa 1973),
aff'd. 493 F.2d 1400 (3d eire 1974)
SUBJECT: programming cost classified as a -good- under the
Uniform Commercial Code.
ISSUE: Are costs expended to purchase computer programs
classified as service costs or product costs?
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FACTS: Beasley, in a bundled purchase transaction,
acquired computer hardware and software. The
acquisition did not function properly due to
faulty programming and Beasley sued for recovery
of the purchase price under the Uniform Commercial
Code. The hardware was virtually useless without
the software. The Uniform Commercial Code provi-
sion relating to breach of contract applies only
to the sale of "goods," not "services."
HOLDING: For Beasley, in this fact situation, the computer
programs in question were treated as "goods" for
Uniform Commercial Code purposes. See also
Burroughs Corporation v. Joseph Uram Jewelers,
Inc., 305 So.2d 215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
No.8 CHATLOs SYSTEMS, INC. v. NATIONAL CASH REGISTER
CORPORATION, INC.
479 F.Supp. 738 (D.N.J., 1979), 635 F.2d 1081 1980)
SUBJECT: Purchase of a computer system and the Uniform
Commercial Code.
ISSUE:
PACTS:
Does the purchase of a computer system constitute
the sale of a service or the sale of a "good"?
Chatlos purchased a computer system from NCR. The
system consisted of both hardware and software
components and was designed to provide six func-
tions for Chatlos: (1) accounts receivable, (2)
payroll, (3) order entry, (4) inventory deletion,
(5) state income tax, (6) cash receipts.
NCR represented to Chatlos that the system would
solve inventory problems, result in direct savings
of labor costs, and be programmed by capable NCR
personnel to be ·up and running" (in full opera-
tion) within six months. The system did not func-
tion as promised, and Chatlos brought an action
for breach of warranty.
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HOLDING: For Chatlos. Although this case also involved
other issues, this summary will be limited to the
issue of whether this transaction is governed by
the Uniform Commercial Code or by common law
contract law. If the sale of the computer system
is deemed to be the sale of a "good" rather than
the sale of a service, the transaction will be
governed by the Uniform Commercial Code. In order
to be classified as a "good," the property in
question must be tangible.
The District Court, citing Atlas Industries, Inc.
v. National Cash Register, 216 Kan.213, 531 P.2d
41 (1975) and Acme Pump Company, Inc. v. National
Cash Register, 32 Conn. Sup. 69, 337 A.2d 672
(C.C.P. 1974), held that this transaction was for
the sale of goods notwithstanding the incidental
service aspects and the lease arrangement (479
F.Supp. at 742-743). On appeal, both parties con-
ceded the applicability of the Uniform Commercial
Code (635 F.2d at 1084).
No.9 CHITTENDEN TRUST COMPANY v. KING
465 A.2d 1100 (Vt., 1983)
SOBJECT: Tangibility of software for use tax purposes.
ISSUE: Does a computer tape constitute tangible personal
property?
FACTS: The Department of Taxes (Department) assessed a
compensating use tax of $471 against the
Chittenden Trust Company (Bank) for the purchase
of a "canned" software tape valued at $15,700.
The Department classified the tape as tangible
personal property, subject to taxation. The Bank
contended the tape was intangible and therefore
exempt from the tax.
In the case at bar, the Bank purchased the program
in the form of magnetic tape. The programming
information could have been carried using several
other means, including punch cards, telephone
lines and personal programming. The fifteen to
twenty "man-years" needed to develop the "off the
791
shelf" program accounts for almost its total
value, since a blank magnetic tape may be pur-
chased for approximately $15. Once the informa-
tion is transferred into the computer's memory,
the tape is of negligible value to the Bank, and
may be reused, destroyed or returned to its origi-
nal distributor.
BOLDING: For the Department. The computer tape is tangible
personal property and its sale is subject to taxa-
tion. In 32 V.S.A. Sec. 970(7), tangible personal
property is defined as:
"•••personal property which may be
seen, weighed, measured, felt, touched
or in any other manner perceived by the
senses and shall include fuel and elec-
tricity, but shall not include rights
and credits, insurance policies, bills
of exchange, stocks and bonds and simi-
lar evidences of indebtedness or
ownership."
In holding that the computer tape was tangible
personal property, the Court noted that the tape
could be seen, weighed, measured and touched, and
is not a right or credit. The Court rejected the
Bank's contention that the "focus of the transac-
tion" was the transfer of intangible knowledge and
information, rather than the tangible magnetic
tape, because the purchase of an "off-the-shelf"
program does not involve the sale of personal ser-
vices, but rather the sale of tangible personal
property.
The Court also rejected the Bank's attempts to
distinguish a computer program tape from other
taxable personal property such as films, video-
tapes, books, cassettes and records. The reason-
ing was that in each, their value lies in their
respective abilities to store and later display or
transmit their contents, and a computer software
tape is no different.
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In the final page of its decision, the Court
stated that:
"It may well be that the Bank could
have procured, by way of telephone or
personal service, the same programming
information so as to avoid a use tax.
To base the tax consequences of a trans-
action on how it could have been struc-
tured 'would require rejection of the
established tax principle that a trans-
action is to be given its tax effect in
accordance with what actually occurred
and not in accordance with what might
have occurred.' Commissioner v. National
Alfalfa Dehydratlng & Ml.nl.ng Co., 417
U.S. 134, 148 (1974). This we will not
do. The Bank must accept. the conse-
quences of its choice to purchase the
program in the form of a tape."
Another recently decided case agrees with the
holding in Chittenden. See Citi zens and Southern
Systems, Inc. v. South Carollna Tax commiss ion ,
S.C. Supreme Court Opinion 22024 (filed January
ro , 1984).
No. 10 CITIZENSFINANCIALCORP. v. KOSYDAR
43 Ohio St.2d 148, 331 N.E.2d 435 (1975)
SUBJECT: Sales taxability of a transaction involving both
tangible personal property and personal services.
ISSUE: What factors should be considered in determining
whether a sale involving both tangible personal
property and personal services is subject to the
Ohio sales tax?
FACTS: Citizens Financial is a data processing company
utilizing computer equipment which is made avail-
able to the thrift industry (savings and loan
associations) and to a small number of commercial
accounts. The equipment is used 1n two ways,
designated as the ·off-line· method and the
"on-line" method.
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In the "off-line" method, the tellers at the
customer savings and loan manually record the
daily deposits and withdrawals, and the recorded
transactions are daily delivered to the taxpayer,
where the information is converted by the computer
into "computer legible media." Subsequently, tax-
payer delivers to the customer a "hard copy print-
out" which provides the customer with an accounting
journal of daily transactions, thus up-dating the
individual account records. A fee is charged
based on the number of such accounts each customer
maintains in the computer.
The "on-line" method consists of teller use of
terminals which are located at the tellers' win-
dows. Passbooks are placed in the terminals and
by means of depression of appropriate keys, the
transaction (deposit, withdrawal or loan payment)
is transmitted via telephone lines to taxpayer's
computers. The computers then make the programmed
calculation, printing the transaction on both the
customer's passbook and upon a print-out at the
terminal. Subsequently, a hard copy journal of
transactions is delivered by taxpayer to the
customer. A fee is charged, as in the off-line
method.
Taxpayer's contention with respect to the off-line
method is that the "printout" received by the
customer is an inconsequential element of a per-
sonal service transaction for which no separate
charge is made, and is therefore excepted from the
sales tax. Taxpayer contended also that the use
of its equipment by customers in connection with
the on-line method does not constitute a license
for such use, but is a part of its programming and
related personal service, and such use is an
inconsequential element for which no separate
charge is made and is excepted from the sales tax.
BOLDING: For Kosydar. The record supported the finding
that real object sought by savings and loan organ-
izations in off-line transactions with taxpayer,
which was data processing company and which made
computer equipment available to savings and loan
organizations, were print-outs of daily account
activities and thus such transactions did not come
within the sales tax exception for personal ser-
vice transactions involving transfer of tangible
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personal property as an inconsequential element of
the transfer, and that the record supported the
finding that the real object sought by organiza-
tions in on-line transactions was use of tax-
payer's computer system and thus such transactions
came within the sales tax statutory definition of
"sale," which includes all transactions where a
license to use tangible personal property is
granted for consideration.
Accountant's Computer Services, Inc. v. Kosydar,
35 Ohio St.2d 120, 298 N.E.2d 519 (1973) provides
the criteria for determining whether a sale of
tangible personal property is excepted from taxa-
tion under the last sentence of R.C. 5739.0l(B).
such sentence reads, " 'sale' and 'selling' do not
include professional, insurance, or personal ser-
vice transactions which involve the transfer of
tangible personal property as an inconsequential
element, for which no separate charges are made."
Paragraph one of the syllabus in Accountant's
Computer.Services recites, in part:
"If a consequential service is ren-
dered, then it must be ascertained
whether the transfer of the tangible
personal property was an inconsequential
element of the transaction."
Paragraph two of the syllabus then leads to the
more specific determination which is necessary for
ascertaining whether in a mixed transaction
(including both personal service and transfer of
tangible personal property), as here, the transfer
of tangible personal property is an inconsequen-
tial element of the transaction. The test recited
in Accountant's Computer Services is whether:
..* * * the real object souqht by the buyer (is)
the service per se or the property produced by the
service." As stated in the syllabus a distinction
must be made as to the "true object of the trans-
action contract."
The Court concluded that the real object sought by
the taxpayer's customers was the property pro-
duced, i.e., "hard copy printouts," and that such
transactions are subject to the sales tax.
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The next issue to be decided was the taxability of
"on-line" transactions. Of relevance here is the
first sentence of R.C. 5739.0l(B), which reads, in
pertinent part, that "sale" shall include all
transactions where ". • • a license to use or con-
sume tangible personal property is or is to be
granted • • • for a consideration in any manner...."
Taxpayer argues, as in the off-line method, that
the use of its equipment by its customers is
inconsequential as relates to its computer system
and programming thereof, and constitutes a per-
sonal service transaction under the last sentence
of R.C. 5739.0l(B) which grants exception for
". • • personal service transactions which involve
the transfer of tangible personal property as an
inconsequential element, for which no separate
charges are made."
The Court's holding that "on-line" transactions
are taxable was based on the finding that the
overall service was not substantially made by the
persons rendering the service, and a personal ser-
vice transaction did not occur. The Court cited
Koch v. Kosydar, 32 Ohio St.2d 74, 290 N.E.2d 847
(1972) as to the criteria to be used in deter-
mining whether a personal service transaction
exists.
DISSENT: In his dissent, Justice Paul W. Brown, pointing to
his dissent in United States Shoe Corp. v.
Kosydar, 41 Ohio St.2d 68, 322 N.E.2d 668 (1975),
stated that the personal service exception must be
seriously distorted before it can be construed to
impose a tax upon a service transaction. He also
cites appendix 2--3.2d of 1 Bigelow, Computer Law
Service (1975), State Sales and Use Taxes, which
indicates that similar transactions would be
exempt from the sales tax had they occurred in
Connecticut, Louisiana, New York, Texas, Virginia,
Washington or Wisconsin.
NOTE: For a detailed analysis of this case, see Michael
J. Bayer, "Citizens Financial Corporation v ,
Kosydar: Data processing and the Ohio Sales Tax
Service Exemption." Capital University Law Review,
1977, 663-672.
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No. 11 COMMERCE UNION BANK v. TIDWELL
538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976)
SUBJECT: Tangibility of computer software for Tennessee
sales tax purposes.
ISSUE: Is computer software tangible property subject to
the Tennessee sales tax?
FACTS: Commerce Union Bank (CUB) purchased computer soft-
ware for use in its business. The Commissioner of
Revenue (Tidwell) assessed a tax deficiency
against CUB, alleging that the transfer was one of
tangible personal property subject to the
Tennessee sales tax. The Tennessee statute
defined tangible personal property as "personal
property, which may be seen, weighed, measured,
felt, or touched, or is in any other manner per-
ceptible to the senses." The tax deficiency was
paid under protest and CUB filed suit to obtain a
refund.
CUB alleged that while the intellectual processes
may be embodied in tangible and physical material,
such as punch cards and magnetic tapes, the logic
or intelligence of the program is an intangible
property right, and it is this intangible property
right which is acquired when computer software is
purchased or leased.
Tidwell viewed the purchase of software as analo-
gous to the purchase of a phonograph record or the
purchase or lease of a motion picture film. He
argued that the present case is governed by
Crescent Amusement Co. v. Carson, 187 Tenn. 112,
213 S.W.2d 27 (1948), where a tax was levied on
the rental of motion picture films.
HOLDING: For Commerce Union Bank. The sale of computer
software does not constitute the sale of tangible
personal property for purposes of the Tennessee
sales tax.
In its brief, CUB argued that, while the intellec-
tual processes may be embodied in tangible and
physical material, such as punch cards and magne-
tic tapes, the logic or intelligence of the
program is an intangible property right1 and it is
this intangible property right which is acquired
when computer software is purchased or leased.
Tidwell •s argument that the purchase of software
is analogous to the purchase of a phonograph
record or the purchase or lease of a motion pic-
ture film is based on Crescent Amusement Co. v.
Carson, 187 Tenn. 112, 213 S.W.2d 27 (1948). In
that case, a tax was levied on the rental of
motion picture film. In that case, the Court
rejected Crescent's contention that the rental of
the film was merely the extension of a license to
use and exhibit a copyrighted production which
amounts only to the use of an intangible property
right.
However, the examples given in the Crescent case
differ from the situation in this case in that no
product is created. What is created and sold here
is information, and the magnetic tapes which con-
tain this information are only a method of trans-
mitting these intellectual creations from the
original to the user. It is merely incidental
that these intangibles are transmitted by way of a
tangible reel of tape that is not even retained by
the user.
In Crescent, the tax was levied on the rental of a
motion picture film. The film is inherently
related to the movie1 without the film there could
have been no movie. Therein lies the crucial dif-
ference. Magnetic tapes and cards are not a cru-
cial element of software. The whole of computer
software could be transmitted orally or electroni-
cally without any tangible manifestations of
transmission (See Heinzman, ·Computer Software--
Should It Be Treated as Tangible Property for Ad
Valorem Tax?" The Journal of Taxation, September,
1972).
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The State of Tennessee did not attempt to tax com-
puter programs purchased by CUB which were trans-
mitted to its computers from outside the State by
way of telephone lines. Without question, that
method of transmission constitutes the purchase of
intangible personal property. The principle is
the same, only the method of transmitting the
information is different.
Tidwell maintained that the sale of a phonograph
record, which is taxable as tangible personal
property, and the sale of a computer program on a
reel of magnetic tape are analogous. One who buys
a phonograph record intends to obtain possession
of a tangible item. Granted, the sound which
emanates from the record when it is played is the
object of the purchasel but the purchaser has no
other viable method of bringing the music into the
living room. The phonograph record remains in the
possession of the purchaser after its purchase,
both during periods of use and non-use.
Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell presented a differ-
ent situation. A magnetic tape is only one method
whereby information may be transmitted from the
originator to the computer of the user. That same
information may be transmitted from the originator
to the user by way of telephone lines, or it may
be fed into the user's computer directly by the
originator of the program.
When the information is transferred from the tape
to the computer, the tape is no longer of any
value to the userJ and it is not retained in the
possession of the user. The information on the
tape, unlike the phonograph record, is not
complete and ready to be used at the time of its
purchase. It must be translated into a language
understood by the computer. Once this information
has been translated and introduced into the com-
puter and the tapes returned or the punch cards
destroyed, what actually remains in the computer
is intangible knowledge, this is what was pur-
chased, not the magnetic tapes or the punch cards
(See District of Columbia v. Universal Computer
Associates, Inc., 151 u.s. App. D.C. 30, 465 F.2d
615 (1972».
Transfer of tangible personal property under these
circumstances is merely incidental to the purchase
of the intangible knowledge and information stored
on the tapes. (See Washington Times-Herald, Inc.
v. District of Columbia, 94 U.S. App. D.C. 154,
213 F.2d 23 (1954». There the newspaper had
purchased from an artist the right to reproduce
his cartoons. These cartoons were transferred to
the newspaper and were physically embodied in mats
which were then used to reproduce the cartoons in
the newspaper. In that case the Court held that
what the newspaper had purchased was the right to
reproduce the cartoons, and not the material upon
which the cartoons were impressed.
NOTE:
In a closely analogous case (Dun , Bradstreet v.
City 0f New York, 276 N•Y• 198, 11 N•E•2d 728
(1937», the New York Court of Appeals held that
financial informational services rendered to
clients of Dun , Bradstreet were nontaxable even
though reference books containing financial infor-
mation were delivered to the subscribers. No
separate charge was made for the books, and they
could not be obtained without subscribing to the
service. Also, in that case, as here, the same
service could have been rendered without trans-
ferring the reference books, but the cost of the
service would have been much higher.
The result in this case was subsequently changed
by Tenn. Code Sec. 67-3002(b), which calls for
the sales taxation of both prewritten and custom
programs.
No. 12 COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY v. EQUITABLE TRUST COMPANY
464 A.2d 248 (Md., 1983)
SUBJECT: Tang ibili ty of software for sales tax purposes.
ISSUE: Does the purchase of a "canned· or ·off-the-shelf.
program on magnetic tape constitute a transaction
upon which sales tax can be assessed?
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Equitable entered into several license agreements
whereby it obtained the nontransferable and non-
exclusive right to use several programs in perpe-
tuity. Legal title remained with the licensor.
The Comptroller alleged that these transactions
constitute transactions involving tangible per-
sonal property, namely, magnetic tapes which had
been enhanced in value by the copies of the pro-
grams coded thereon, and are subject to sales tax.
In its amicus brief, the Data processing Manage-
ment Association (DPMA) contended that the trans-
actions were licenses to use the programs, and
that such licenses are a form of intangible prop-
erty. Equitable contended that the predominant
purpose or essence of the transaction governs
classification of the sale as involving either
tangible or intangible property. In the transfer
of computer programs via magnetic tape, the pur-
pose is to obtain the program, an intangible, and
not the tangible tape. In taking this position,
Equitable is supported by the overwhelming numeri-
cal majority of reported cases applying tax
statutes restricted to tangible personal property.
BOLDING: For Comptroller. Equitable acquired tangible per-
sonal property, namely, magnetic tapes which had
been enhanced in value by the copies of the pro-
grams coded thereon. The licenses do not grant
intangible .rights from the proprietors to
Equitable, but simply erect contractual limita-
tions on the use which Equitable might otherwise
make of the statutorily unprotected program copies
it acquired. (The analysis set out here is more
fully developed in "Software and Sales Taxes: The
Illusory Intangible," 63 B.U.L. Rev. 181 (1983».
FACTS:
Equitable's principal argument is that the Court
should conceptually sever the program copy con-
tained on the magnetic tape from the tangible tape
itself. The argument is that the transaction
should be viewed as operating on two levels, one
the transfer of intangible knowledge or informa-
tion and the other the delivery of a tangible
tape. To have a scalpel for this legal surgery,
it would be necessary to adopt as part of Maryland
sales tax law a principle that the buyer's predom-
inant purpose for a transaction controls the
classification of the acquisition as either tangi-
ble or intangible.
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Quotron Systems v. Comptroller, 287 Md. 178, 411
A.2d 439 (1980), recognized a predominant purpose
test as one of several factors in determining use
tax applicability to the type of transaction
presented there. That taxpayer undertook concur-
rently to render two types of interrelated perfor-
mances. One was to maintain and continuously to
update a computerized data bank of economic infor-
mation, such as the selling prices of securities,
which its customers could randomly access through
remote terminals. The other was to install
Quotron-owned hardware, including the remote ter-
minals, on customers' premises for their use in
requesting and receiving electronic transmissions
of the economic data. In Quotron, the Court held
that the first analytical step was to characterize
the performance as a single, overall function,
either rental of equipment or the provision of
services. (Id. at 186, 411 A.2d at 443). The
dominant purpose was to obtain services and not to
rent hardware. Based on that factor, on the tax-
payer's retention of control over the hardware,
and on the fact that Quotron's hardware could not
be obtained without subscribing to the service,
the Court concluded that the transaction was the
provision of services. (Id. at 188, 411 A.2d at
444). This approach is quite similar to that
which the Court used to determine whether a con-
tract of sale is one for goods or for services
under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
where the performance involves both.
See Anthony Pools v. Sheehan, 295 Md. 285, 455
A.2d 434 (1983)~ Burton v. Artery Company, 279 Md.
94, 367 A.2d 935 (1977), Quotron did not say that
the dominant purpose of obtaining data made the
subject of the contract intangible because infor-
mation is intangible.
The rule of Quotron has been implicitly applied in
Eguitable on an aspect which is not disputed by
Equitable. In addition to providing program
copies on tape, each licensor agreed to furnish
certain installation services. One licensor also
contracted to furnish a limited amount of training
within the fixed contract price.
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The "dominant purpose- test of whether the prop-
erty in question is being purchased for its own
sake or for the (intangible) information contained
therein can also be applied, by analogy, to books,
motion picture films, video display discs, phono-
records and music tapes. In sales of these items,
the purchaser's dominant purpose ordinarily is to
obtain the knowledge, information or data thereby
conveyed. While the book is in human readable
form, the other media are machine readable. A
purchase of any of these information conveying
media is within the imposition of the sales tax as
tangible personal property. Such transactions
escape taxation only if there is an applicable
statutory exclusion or exemption. These analo-
gies, however, have been argued to other courts
which have held that tape copies of programs are
intangible.
The Court in Eguitable rejected the reasoning of
the long line of cases that hold taped copies to
be intangible because of alleged misconceptions in
the technological underpinnings of these deci-
sions, and because of the apparent departures in
reasoning from that usually applied in sales tax
cases. Secondly, there was a substantial question
whether the decision that set the course for the
line of program cases, District of Columbia v.
Universal Computer Associates, Inc., 465 F.2d 615
(D.C. Cir. 1972), is consistent with Maryland law.
Furthermore, a tape containing a copy of a canned
program does not lose its tangible character,
because its content is a reproduction of the pro-
duct of intellectual effort, just as the phono-
record does not become intangible, because it is a
reproduction of the product of artistic effort.
The price paid for a copy of a canned program
reflects the cost of developing the program which
the proprietor hopes to recover, with profit, by
spreading the cost among its customers. Simply
because the canned program on tape is much more
expensive than the typical phonorecord, the
program tape is not any less tangible.
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The Court stated that Equitable's intangibility
argument would have merit if the direct input by
keyboard, without documentation, alternative (a
service transaction) or the electronic trans-
"mission, without documentation, alternative (no
tangible carrier) is the form of transaction under
consideration. But, because a taxable transaction
might have been structured in a nont.axabLe form,
it does not thereby become nontaxable. This form
over substance argument was also adopted by the
Court in Chittenden Trust Company v. King, 465
A.2d 1100 (Vt., 1983).
Finally, Equitable argues that a purchased program
"can be and was in fact severed and exists apart
from the tangible transfer medium •••". However,
the copy delivered to Equitable does not become
severed in any physical sense from the tape when
the tape is used to structure computer memory.
The Equitable Court did not discern any legally
significant difference for sales tax purposes be-
tween the canned computer program on magnetic tape
and music on a phonograph record. As stated in
the National Commission on New Technological Uses
of Copyrighted Works, Final Report at 10 (1978):
"Both recorded music and computer programs are
sets of information in a form which, when passed
over a magnetized head, cause minute currents to
flow in such a way that desired physical work is
accomplished. " In the case of the phonograph
record, the sales tax statute in Maryland has
never been viewed as conceptually severing the
copy of the performance from the tangible carrier.
The Court concluded that the statute does not
sever copies of computer programs from the
tangible carriers employed in the subject sales.
Also see, Citizens and Southern Systems, Inc. v.
South Carolina Tax Commission, Opinion No. 22024
(filed January 10, 1984).
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No. 13 COMPUTER SCIENCES CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE
63 T.C. 321 (1914)
SUBJECT: Tangibility of computer software for collapsible
corporation purposes.
ISSUE: Is computer software tangible property, intangible
property or no property for purposes of Section
341 of the Internal Revenue Code relating to
collapsible corporations?
FACTS: Computax, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Computer
Sciences Corporation, owned a program for the com-
puter preparation of income tax returns. The IRS
contended that a collapsible corporation had been
set up with the intent of avoiding taxes. Peti-
tioner (CSC) claims that property manufactured,
constructed or produced (such as the Computax
program) by a taxpayer as used in Section 341 of
the Internal Revenue Code (relating to collapsible
corporations) was not intended to apply to intan-
gible property of any type, and, if the section
were intended to refer to intangible property,
that no such intangible property was produced
since all that CSC produced and developed for
transfer to Computax was "know-how" and goodwill
which is not "property."
BOLDING: Computer software is to be regarded as intangible
personal property for purposes of Section 341
relating to collapsible corporations.
No. 14 COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO v. ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD
32 Cal. App.3d 654, lOB Cal. Rptr. 434 (1913)
SUBJECT: Tangibility of computer software for sales tax
purposes.
ISSUE: Is computer software tangible property subject to
the California sales tax?
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FACTS: Data processing equipment and systems were furn-
ished on a conditional sales basis to the State of
California. The tax assessor, in assessing the
seLes : tax liability, valued the property at the
full contract price. The equipment and systems in
question consisted of both hardware and softwarecomponents.
HOLDING: The tax assessor was in error when he valued the
property at full contract price. The portion of
the contract price attributable to software repre-
sents intangible property not subject to the sales
tax.
No. 15 CREDIT BUREAU OF MIAMI COUNTY, INC. v. COLLINS
50 Ohio St.2d 270, 364 N.E.2d 27 (1977)
SUBJECT: Sales taxability of a transaction involving both
tangible personal property and personal services.
ISSUE: Whether the transfer of a written credit report is
excepted from the Ohio sales tax.
FACTS: Taxpayer is engaged in the business of consumer
credit reporting. It maintains approximately
50,000 files and gathers information from the
County and Federal Courthouses as well as from
credit applications that are forwarded to taxpayer
from credit grantors.
Most requests for credit information are received
by the taxpayer's employees by telephone inquiry,
and in 80 percent of the inquiries, an oral report
is given to the customer. These oral reports were
not held subject to the sales tax in the finding
of the Tax Commissioner.
Where a written report is requested, an employee,
who has just given an oral report, prepares a
written report using various forms which provide
the same information as if given orally except
that the report is written and sent to the
customer.
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It is necessary that taxpayer's employees take the
information maintained in a subject's file,
organize the information, screen it for obsolete
information and transmit the current pertinent
information to the requesting client. In addi-
tion,taxpayer's employees are required in some
cases to update the information by making an inde-
pendent verification of information contained in a
subject's file, including checking references.
The requesting customer who subscribes to tax-
payer's service, then determines, on the basis of
the credit information received from taxpayer's
employees, as well as other information, whether
to grant credit to the subject applicant.
The price of each written report is higher than
each oral report, and no matter how many written
reports are made, the price per report remains
constant, with no reduction to the customer for
more written reports.
The Tax Commissioner contended that these transac-
tions constitute the sale of tangible personal
property and are therefore subject to the Ohio
sales tax. Credit Bureau contended that these
transactions fall within the exemption of R.C.
S739.0l(B), which states that:
"•••'sale' and 'selling' do not
include professional, insurance, or per-
sonal service transactions which involve
the transfer of tangible personal prop-
erty as an inconsequential element, for
which no separate charges are made."
BOLDING: For Credit Bureau. The issue is determined based
on whether the transaction involves an inconse-
quential transfer of personal property. If it
does not, the exemption does not apply and the
entire transaction is taxable. See Accountant I s
Computer Services v. Kosydar, 35 Ohio St.2d 120,
298 N.E.2d 519 (1973); Spray Wax Car Wash v.
Collins, 46 Ohio St.2d 164, 346 N.E.2d 696 (1976);
Federated Department Stores v. Kosydar, 45 Ohio
St.2d 1, 340 N.E.2d 840 (1976), and, Citizens
Financial Corp. v. Kosydar, 43 Ohio St.2d 148, 331
N.E.2d 435 (1975). In light of the above-
mentioned cases, the Court must examine the real
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object sought by the buyer, i.e., the service per
se or the property produced by the service, and
determine whether it was the buyer's object to
obtain an act done personally by an individual as
an economic service involving either the intellec-
tual or manual personal effort of an individual,
or if it was the buyer's object to obtain the
salable end product of some individual's skill.
In the instant case the lower court held that when
a written credit report was transferred to a
customer, the true object of the transaction was
not the acquisition of the taxpayer's personal
services, but the receipt of the taxpayer's credit
report. That Court was influenced by the apparent
similarities of the Credit Bureau's activities
with those of the taxpayer in Accountant's
Computer Services. As with Accountant's Computer
Services, the taxpayer, in the opinion of the
lower court, collected, classified, and rearranged
raw data that proved useful to a particular group
of clients. In addition, the lower court stated
that, since the taxpayer's activities failed to
include any "analysis" of the information col-
lected or any "thinking" as applied to its custo-
mers' business problems, the taxpayer's services
were similar to the data processing transactions
that the Ohio court found taxable in Accountant's
Computer Services, and Citizens Financlal Corp. v.
Kosydar. (See also, Lindner Bros. v. Kosydar, 46
Ohio St.2d 162, 346 N.E.2d 690 (1976».
Challenging the lower court's conclusions, Credit
Bureau contended that where the entire operation
of a consumer reporting agency, including both the
assembling and recording of credit information
with respect to consumers and the preparation of
both oral and written credit reports communicating
credit information for a monetary fee to those
legally entitled to receive such, is personally
performed by employees of the agency, the communi-
cation of such information constitutes "personal
service transactions" within the purview of
R.C. 5739.0l(B). The delivery, by mail or other-
wise, of pieces of paper on which such written
consumer reports are prepared, even if considered
as involving a transfer of "tangible personal
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property" under the provisions of R.C. S739.01(B),
constitutes merely a transfer of tangible personal
property as an inconsequential element of the
transaction for which no separate charges aremade.
From an analysis of the fact situation in this
case, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the
true object sought by taxpayer's customers was the
credit information communicated in the report.
Although, as a matter of convenience or prefer-
ence, a written report may be requested, it is the
receipt of information which necessarily consti-
tutes the sine qua non of the transaction between
the consumer reporting agency and the person to
whom such information is communicated. Moreover,
unlike the taxpayer in Accountant's Computer
Services, taxpayer prepares and transmits both
oral and written credit reports which involve the
intellectual and manual skills of the taxpayer's
employees. Records are checked for suits, judg-
ments, liens, bankruptcies and other legal actions.
Credit histories are summarized and coded. Pur-
suant to the Fair Credit Reporting Act, Section
1681, et ~, Title 15, U.S. Code, obsolete
information must be excluded, reasonable proce-
dures must be designed to avoid factual inaccura-
cies, and the credit files must be periodically
updated and independently verified. Moreover, in
distributing credit reports, the taxpayer's
employees must ascertain the identity of those
seeking credit information and their right to
receive such reports pursuant to Section l681b,
Title 15, U.S. Code. Failure to perform any of
the aforementioned duties exposes the offender to
either criminal or civil penalties. Section l68lr
and 0, Title 15, U.S.Code.
Although the commissioner argued Citizens
Financial Corp. v. Kosydar, and Federated Depart-
ment Stores v. Kosydar, controlling in this case,
the Ohio Supreme Court disagreed and held that the
principles as set forth in Accountant's Computer
Services are controlling.
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No. 16 CRESCENT AMUSEMENT COMPANY v. CARSON
187 Tenn. 112, 213 S.W.2d 27 (1948)
SUBJECT: Motion picture film as tangible personal property
subject to sales tax.
ISSUES: Is the rental of a motion picture film a rental of
tangible personal property subject to the
Tennessee sales tax, and if it is, what is the
proper measure of the tax, the gross proceeds paid
to the producer for the rental of the film print
or the cost of the physical material in the filmprint?
FACTS: The Tennessee Sales Tax Law (Chapter 3, Public
Acts of 1947) levies a 2 percent privilege tax on
the gross amount paid for the rental of tangible
personal property. The Appellant, Crescent Amuse-
ment Company, operates motion picture theaters in
Tennessee. The pictures shown are obtained by
renting film prints from producers. The pictures
are imprinted on a roll of celluloid averaging
10,000 feet in length. Through the use of machi-
nery, the pictures are projected onto a screen,
together with sound effects. The cost of the
celluloid roll varies between $175 and $1050,
depending on length and quality of material used.
The cost of producing the movie that is on the
celluloid roll may be as much as a million
dollars, depending on material, labor and other
costs (actors' salaries, scenery, equipment, etc.)
The picture is owned by a producer, who rents the
film print to theater owners, who pay rent to the
producer based on a percentage of gross receipt.
The Tennessee Sales Tax Law defines tangible per-
sonal property as that ••••which may be seen,
weighed, measured, felt, or touched, or is in any
other manner perceptible to the senses.-
Appellee (Carson, Commissioner of Finance and Tax-
ation) contended that such transactions are taxable
under the Tennessee Sales Tax Law and that the
correct measure of the tax is the gross amount
paid to the producer for the film rental. Appell-
ant insists that such t,ransactions merely grant
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them the right to exhibit a copyrighted produc-
tion, which is an intangible property right not
subject to a sales tax which is levied on personal
property.
HOLDING: For appellee (Carson). The rental or leasing of
motion picture films is a rental or leasing of
tangible personal property within the meaning of
the Tennessee Sales Tax Law, and the correct
measure of the tax is the gross amount of rent
paid. Citing Saverio v. Carson (186 Tenn.166; 208
S.W.2d 1018 (1948», the Court stated (213 S.W.2d
27 at 29) that:
"There is scarcely to be found any
article susceptible to sale or rent that
is not the result of an idea, genius,
skill and labor applied to a physical
substance. A loaf of bread is the
result of the skill and labor of the
cook who mixed the physical ingredients
and applied heat at the temperature and
consistency her judgment dictated. A
radio is the result of the thought of a
genius, or of several such persons, com-
bined with the skill and labor of trained
technicians applied to a tangible mass
of substance. An automobile is the
result of all these elements, and of
patents, etc.; and so on, and infinitum.
If these elements should be separated
from the finished product and the sales
tax applied only to the cost of the raw
material, the sales tax act would, for
all practical purposes, be entirely
destroyed."
OTHER CASES--
APPELLEE: The appellee cited several cases in support of his
position. In United Artists Corp. v. Taylor, 273
N.Y. 334, 7 N.E.2d 254 (1937), the Court, in
holding that the New York City sales tax law
applied to the lease of a movie film print, said:
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"The transaction which is the sub-
ject of the tax under review consists of
the transfer by the distributor to the
exhibitor of the possession of corpeal
property in the form of positive and
negative prints of photoplays. with the
license to use or exhibit them for a
specified time. The license to exhibit
without the transfer of possession would
be valueless. Together they are one
transaction and constitute a sale within
the definition of Local Law No. 24."
In Saenger Realty Corp. v. Grosjean, 194 La. 470,
193 So. 710, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that
the operator of a movie theater was liable for the
Louisiana sales tax and that the measure of the
tax was the amount paid to the producer for the
lease of the film print. Other cases cited by the
appellee include: Bigsby v. Johnson, Cal. Sup.,
99 P.2d 268 (1940)1 People ex. rel. Walker
Engraving Corp. v. Graves, 243 App. Div. 652, 276
N•Y•S• 674 J 268 N.Y. 648, 198 N•E• 539; Voss v.
Gray, 70 N.D. 727, 298 N.W.l; Cuslck v.
Commonwealth, 260 Ky. 204, 84 S.W.2d 14: State Tax
Commlssion v. Hopkins, 234 Ala. 556, 176 So. 210.
OTHER CASES--
APPELLANT: The appellant cited Bur<Jes Co. v. Arnes, 359
Ill. 427, 194 N.E. 565, WhlCh held that the right
to reproduce a musical composition is a license
rather than a transfer of tangible personal pro-
perty. Also cited were A.B.C. Electrotype Co. v.
Ames, 364 Ill. 360, 4 N.E.2d 476, and Adair v.
Ames, 364 Ill. 342, 4 N.E.2d 481, which held that
prlnters and electrotypers, respectively, are
engaged in furnishing skill and labor rather than
tangible personalty in the printed matter pro-
duced.
NOTE: In 1951, the legislature changed the result of
this case by exempting theaters which pay the 2
percent privilege tax from operation of the sales
and use tax. T.C.A. Sec. 67-3013. However, the
present Tennessee Code (Sec. 67-3002(b» taxes
both prewritten and custom programs.
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No. 11 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. NORWOOD STUDIOS, INC.
336 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1964)
SUBJECT: Motion picture film prQduced for television as
tangible personal property subject to sales tax.
ISSUE: Is the sale of a motion picture produced under
contract for television the sale of personal ser-
vices or the sale of a product subject to the
sales tax?
PACTS: Norwood Studios produced under contract a series
of motion picture films for television and sold
them to the AFL-CIO. The sales tax was assessed
and the District of Columbia Tax Court set the
assessment aside on the grounds that the transac-
tions were ·personal service transactions" in
which the "tangible personal property supplied by
the petitioner to AFL-CIO was an inconsequential
element," and was therefore not subject to the
sales tax.
HOLDING: The U.S. Court of Appeals held the sales to be
sales of personal property subject to the sales
tax. Citing, People ex. reI. Walker Engraving
Corp. v. Graves, 268 N.Y. 648, 198 N.E. 539, the
Court reasoned that the production and transfer of
printed material and the like is not personal ser-
vice but a sale. The Court cited the California
Supreme Court case of Bigsby v. Johnson, 99 P.2d
268, in which printers argued that they did not
make sales but transferred personal services. The
California Supreme Court rejected that contention,
stating that: "when one places an order for
printed matter he desires not merely service but
the delivery to him of the finished product and .••
within the meaning of the Retail Sales Tax Act the
printer is engaged in selling the printed matter
to him."
In a prior case decided by this same Circuit Court
of Appeals (Washington Times-Herald v. District of
Columbia, 94 u.S. App. D.C. 154, 213 F.2d 23
(1954», a different conclusion was reached where
·mats· were furnished (but not sold) to newspapers
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for printing comic strips on a one-time basis.
The Court reasoned that the sale of all interests
constitutes a sale for sales tax purposes, but the
sale of a one-time right to use property does not.
No. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. UNIVERSAL COMPUTER ASSOCIATES
18
465 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
SUBJECT: Tangibility of computer software for personal
property tax purposes.
ISSUE:
FACTS:
Is computer software intangible, and therefore not
subject to the District of Columbia personal prop-
erty tax?
Universa1 purchased a data processing unit from
IBM for approximately $290,000. Included in the
purchase price were the computer machinery itself
(hardware) and two sets of punched cards (soft-
ware) • dne set of punched cards was a standard
set used to run the computer. OWnership of this
software was retained by IBM with the under-
standing that Universal was not to transfer the
card or the information contained thereon to third
parties. The other set of cards was a special tax
program developed jointly by personnel from IBM
and Universal and owned outright by Universal.
This special tax package represents $106,000 of
the $290,000 total purchase price.
The District of Columbia Tax Court ruled that the
software portion of the purchase was intangible
and was not subject to the personal property tax,
and that the portion representing hardware was
tangible and subject to the tax. The $290,000
purchase price was allocated 50 percent to the
hardware and 50 percent to the software.
In the present case, one expert witness testified
that hardware in the computer field generally
amounts to only about ten or twenty percent of the
purchase price. Another witness testified that
software ·in some cases goes up as high as fifty
or fifty-five percent of the total purchase
price."
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HOLDING: For the District of Columbia. The material of the
punched cards themselves is of insignificant
value. It was the knowledge contained in the
cards that gave them value,. and knowledge is
intangible. The Court likened computer· software
to the cartoon mats involved in Washington
Times-Herald v. District of Columbia, 94 U.S. App.
D.C. 154, 213 F.2d 23 (1954), where it was held
that cartoon mats which were sold by publishing
syndicates to individual newspapers were not
tangible personal property subject to the District
of Columbia sales tax. The rationale in that case
was as follows:
"The syndicates sold to the Times-
Herald the right to reproduce one time
the work of artists who make the
d·rawings. They simply sold the profes-
sional and personal services of the
artists whom they had under contract and
in so doing transferred title to the
mats, of inconsequential value, from
.which the drawing could be reproduced.
The price was paid for the artists'
work, i.e., for the right to reproduce
the impressions on the mats--not for the
mats themselves. The newspaper bought
the creation of the artist--not the
material on which it was impressed--and
the right to reproduce it. Without that
right, the comic strips mats would be
entirely worthless." (94 U.S. App. D.C.
155, 213 F.2d 24 (1954».
In the present case, the Court is of the opinion
that the knowledge stored on computer cards,
tapes, or discs is even more demonstrably intan-
gible intellectual property than the right to
reproduce from the cartoonist's drawings involved
in Washington Times-Herald.
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The present case is distinguished from District of
Columbia v. Norwood Studios, Inc., 118 U.S. App.
D.C. 358, 336 F.2d 746 (1964), which involved the
transfer of films where the producer of the films
retained no interest in them and imposed no
restriction on their use. The films became the
property of the purchasers without qualification.
Two other considerations were also cited as
lending support to the argument that software
costs can be stated separately from hardware
costs. Since 1969, IBM has been billing hardware
and software sales separately. Of greater signi-
ficance is the Internal Revenue Service rule (Rev.
Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 Cum. Bull. 303) that permits
the separation of software and hardware for depre-
ciation purposes.
No. 19 F 'M SCHAEFER CORPORATION v. ELECTRONIC DATA
SYSTEMS CORPORATION
430 F.Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
aff'd. ~. 614 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1979)
SUBJECT: Replevin action for a data processing system; also
breach of contract.
ISSUE: Is software (1) intangible and therefore (2) not
subject to replevin?
FACTS: Schaefer had contracted for the development and
supply of data processing services with Electronic
Data Systems Corporation (EDS). Schaefer alleged
breach of contract and asked for rescission (can-
cellation of the contract and a return to the
status quo). EDS counterclaimed and moved for
replevin (to get the system back) of the data pro-
cessing system.
With one exception, the remainder of the facts are
not relevant for purposes of this treatise,
because this case deals with contract law rather
than with the nature of software. The one excep-
tion is this: Schaefer argued that the system
developed by EDS is a body of intangibles, that
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is, concepts or ideas, and consists wholly of ser-
vices rendered by EDS. Likening the system to a
recorded song for which Schaefer supplied a blank
disc, Schaefer says that just as a song cannot be
replevied, so software in a data processing system
cannot be made the subject of replevin.
HOLDING: The Court found the data processing system in this
case to be tangible. Schaefer's argument was
unpersuasive partially because Schaefer offered no
case under New York law or any other law which
holds that a data processing system is intangible
or cannot be subject to replevin. While there may
be intangible parts of the system, such as the
training given Schaefer's employees in how to
operate the system, for example, those intangible
parts of the system, if they are part of it at
all, are not a part of the present motion for
replevin. What EDS seeks are the tapes, the
instructions, all supporting documentation and all
copies of same.
No. FINGERHUT PRODUCTS COMPANY v. COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE
20
258 N.W.2d 606 (Minn. 1977)
SUBJECT: Tangibility of typed and purchased mailing labels
for Minnesota use tax purposes.
ISSUE: Are typed or purchased mailing labels tangible
personal property for purposes of the Minnesota
use tax?
FACTS: Fingerhut is a direct mail merchandiser of a wide
range of consumer products. It both solicits its
customers and sells its products exclusively by
mail.
To enhance the success of its.mailing operation,
Fingerhut attempts to solicit business only from
selected individuals. Thus, roughly one-half of
the sales literature is sent to persons who have
previously purchased items by mail from Fingerhut.
The remainder of the names and addresses are
obtained from mailing lists that are rented from
mailing--list brokers. The names Supplied by the
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broker are intended for one-time use only and come
in the form of Cheshire tapes, gummed labels, heat
transfers and typed mailing lists. For this ser-
vice, Fingerhut paid a rental fee of $17.50 to $25
per thousand names. The value of the tangible
materia1 upon which the names and addresses are
printed is approximately 80 cents per thousand.
The Commissioner assessed a tax deficiency on the
rental of these lists, and on the typed mailing
lists, asserting that the lists constituted tan-
gible personal property. Fingerhut contended that
the essence of what it received from the brokers
was not a physical list of names but rather a
service which supplied highly sophisticated adver-
tising information which was an intangible com-modity.
HOLDING: Typed mailing lists used by Fingerhut were not
subject to taxation, but mailing lists in the form
of Cheshire tapes, gummed labels, and heat trans-
fers which were attached to envelopes and placed
in the mail constituted tangible personal property
subject to the use tax.
To support its argument, Fingerhut relied on Dun &
Bradstreet v. City of New York, 276 N.Y. 198, 11
N.E.2d 728 (1937), where the New York Court of
Appeals considered the applicability of a local
sales tax law in relationship to the rendition of
professional services. In that case, the taxpayer
was in the business of supplying to its subscri-
bers highly confidential information dealing with
the financial standing of persons engaged in
various businesses. As an incident to this ser-
vice, each subscriber received for his own per-
sonal use a reference book at no extra charge.
In refusing to allow the city of New York to tax
the value of this reference book, the Court artic-
ulated two factors that have since been used by
other Courts to distinguish tangible personalty
from intangibles. First, the subscriber was able
to make only a 1imited use of the books. Under
the subscription contracts, title to the books
remained in the taxpayer and the subscriber was
expressly forbidden to share the confidential
information contained therein with the public.
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Second, and more important, the physical proper-
ties of the reference book were merely incidental
to the services performed. As explained by the
Court (276 N.Y. 205, 11 N.E.2d 731):
"•••The information furnished is of
value to the subscribers and for it they
pay but not for the paper upon which the
information is conveyed or for the
reference books which are only guides to
assist in the rendition of appellant's
service. One does not think of a tele-
phone company as a seller of books to
its subscribers. It renders a service
to make that service efficient, it furn-
ishes its subscribers with books con-
taining a list of its subscribers with
their call numbers. The paper is a mere
Lnc ident.r the skilled service is that
which is required."
Fingerhut maintained that its procurement and use
of the mailing lists supplied by its brokers
satisfies both of these criteria. As in Dun &
Bradstreet, the use that may be made of the lists
is sharply restricted. Ordinarily, the brokers
permit the lists to be used only once, and
Fingerhut is required to make its mailings between
rigidly set dates. Moreover, the value of the
tangible format containing the names and addresses,
estimated at approximately 80 cents per thousand
names, is slight when compared to the $17.50 to
$25 price of a corresponding number of names.
Many of the lists also have a limited useful life.
For instance, a list that would be useful in
selling seat covers to new car owners may have a
useful life expectancy of only 6 months. Lastly,
it would have been possible for Fingerhut to
obtain the information on the mailing lists,
albeit with considerable inconvenience, without
the interference of a tangible medium. The names
and addresses could have been transmitted orally
by telephone, or someone could have contacted the
broker and manually copied the information from
the broker's lists.
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The Commissioner advanced the argument that, in
this case, the taxpayer acquired a tangible com-
modity, i.e., tapes, labels, etc., which were used
when they were physically attached to the mailings.
The fact that these labels were more valuable
because of the information they contained does
not, in the view of the Commissioner, alter their
nature as tangible personal property.
Subsequent to the Dun , Bradstreet case, a number
of courts struggled to develop meaningful tests to
distinguish the sale or use of intangible services
from personalty. Some courts have looked to the
value of the tangible format used as contrasted to
the value of the item sold. For example, in
Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405
(Tenn. 1976), the court based its finding that the
sale of a computer program was not subject to
sales tax in part on the fact that the value of
the cards containing the program was only a small
fraction of the total cost. Another approach that
has been used is to assess whether or not the
transaction has a temporary or transitory value.
If what is sold is something like marketing or
research data that has a very short useful life,
there is a greater likelihood that the transaction
is a nontaxable service. (See Williams & Lee
Scouting Service, Inc. v. Calvert, 452 S.W.2d 789
(Tex. Civ. App. 1970». A final consideration is
whether the transaction can be achieved without
the intervention of a tangible medium. Returning
to the computer program example discussed in
Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, supra, there can
be no taxable transfer when a program is trans-
mitted by the seller to the buyer's computer
electronically, as by transmission through a
telephone line. Motion pictures, on the other
hand, cannot exist without the tangible celluloid
medium, and therefore courts have uniformly sub-
jected their rental value to use tax. (See
Florida Association of Broadcasters v. Kirk, 264
So.2d 437 (Fla. Dist. App. 1972), Crescent Amuse-
ment Co. v. Carson, 187 Tenn. 112, 213 S.W.2d 27
(1948» •
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The Court in Fingerhut felt that the use of typed
mailing lists did not constitute the taxable use
of tangible property. However, use of the other
property was held to constitute a taxable event.
At 258 N.W.2d 610, the Court said:
nWe feel that the use of the Cheshire
tapes, gummed labels, and heat transfers
is•••sufficiently distinguishable from
the use of the typed mailing lists to
justify imposition of the use tax. In
these instances there is a use of the
tangible property of the medium distinct
from the use of the typed mailing lists,
in that the tapes and labels are physi-
cally separated and attached to the
envelopes. In such a case, the physical
manifestation of the property is itself
used--not merely the intangible informa-
tion.
This distinction is•••sufficiently
great to justify a different treatment
for tax purposes of the typed mailing
lists and the other rental mailing lists
in the form of Cheshire tapes, gummed
labels, and heat transfers."
No. 21 FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF FORT WORTH v. BULLOCK
584 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)
SOBJECT: Applicability of the Texas sales tax to computer
software.
ISSOE: Do standardized or "canned" or prewritten programs
constitute tangible personal property subject to
the Texas sales tax?
FACTS: Bank paid over $109,000 for four standardized pro-
grams or sets of instructions (computer software)
which enabled its computer to perform deposit and
lending functions and process general accounting.
The software was contained on magnetic tapes, but
the information could have been transmitted by
keypunch cards, telephone or various other
methods.
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The law places a tax on a sale of tangible per-
sonal property. Tangible personal property is
defined as "personal property which may be seen,
weighed, measured, felt or touched, or which is in
any other manner perceptible to the senses."
(Tex. Tax--Gen. Ann. Art. 20.01(P) (1969». To
determine whether a sale is of tangible or
intangible property, the courts apply the "essence
of the transaction" test. (Bullock v. Statistical
Tabulating Corp., 549 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. 1977». If
the object or essence of the sale is intangible
property, then the transaction is not taxable. An
important factor to be considered in arriving at
this determination is the fact that the desired
information could have been transferred in several
different ways (Williams and Lee Scouting Service,
Inc. v. Calvert, 452 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App.
1970».
In Statistical Tabulating, the Court held that
processed data contained in a coded computer card
was an intangible and not taxable. In Williams
and Lee Scouting, statistical data on oil and gas
well production was compiled and mailed to sub-
scribers in printed reports each week. The sale
was not taxed. The purchasers in both Williams
and Lee Scouting and Statistical Tabulating were
desirous of something beyond the tangible object
involved in the transaction. Unlike a phonograph
record or filmstrip when the information on the
tape, in the present case, is transferred to the
computer, the tape is no longer of any value or
importance to the user (State v. Central Computer
Services, Inc., 349 So.2d 1160 (Ala. 1977);
Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 s.w. 2d 405
(Tenn. 1976».
Bullock contended that this case is distinguish-
able from Statistical Tabulating in that the soft-
ware in the latter case was icustomized," because
it was developed specially for the purchaser. The
tapes in the present case are "canned" programs,
since they are standard items sold to numerous
customers with only slight modifications to con-
form to each purchaser's use. The service charac-
teristic is present only with ·customized· pro-
grams, according to Bullock.
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HOLDING: For Bank. The Court did not agree with Bullock's
argument that only "customized" programs should be
exempt from the sales tax. The test in each case
is not whether the product is ·customized" or
"canned,n but whether the object of the sale is
tangible personal property (See District of
Columbia v. Universal Computer Assoclates, Inc.,
151 U.S. App. D.C. 30,465 F.2d 615 (1972),
Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, supra). In
Williams and Lee Scouting, the weekly report of
oil and gas data was a "canned" publication in
that the same information was mailed to many
subscribers.
No. 22 FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF SPRINGFIELD
v.
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE
85 Ill.2d 84, 421 N.E.2d 175 (1981)
SUBJECT: Tangibility of software for use tax purposes.
ISSUE: Does the sale of applicational programs (as
opposed to operational programs) constitute the
sale of tangible personal property subject to the
Illinois use tax, where the data is contained on
magnetic tape?
FACTS: The First National Bank of Springfield (FNB) pur-
chased five applicational programs from five dif-
ferent sources. All programs were delivered on
magnetic tape, but could have been conveyed to the
bank by discs, punch cards or over the telephone.
Upon delivery, the information was removed from
the tapes and stored elsewhere, at which point the
tapes could either be used again or discarded.
FNB contended that the magnetic tapes in question
here constituted intangible personal property,
because they were, in essence, merely a means of
conveying programming instructions. FNB argued
that software primarily represents intangible ser-
vices and not tangible goods. The Department, on
the contrary, contended that the physical quali-
ties of the tapes predominate over the information
contained on them. The Department compared the
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tapes to films, phonograph records and books. All
three examples, the Department argued, represent
the physical manifestation of intangible ideas and
artistic achievement, yet all three are taxable as
tangible personal property.
In Time, Inc. v. Hulman, 31 Il1.2d 344 (1964), the
Illinois court decided that magazines are tangible
personal property and that the proceeds from their
sale would be subject to the retailers' occupation
tax were it not for an exclusion afforded to news-
papers and other materia1s "such as" newsprint.
(31 Ill.2d 344, 351-52). In discussing whether
magazines are tangible personal pro~erty, it was
said:
"The sale of magazines is essen-
tially not different from the sale of a
loaf of bread, or an automobile. While
it is true that the utility or value of
plaintiffs' magazines is in their con-
tent and not the paper and ink with
which they are printed, the taxability
of the transaction is not determined by
weighing the value of the intangible
properties of the item of sale, such as
form, organization and design, against
the value of its tangible properties,
such as weight, size and texture. The
test is, where tangible personal prop-
erty is transferred, as the parties
agree occurs in the transaction here
involved, whether the transfer is the
substance of the transaction or merely
incidental to a service. In selling
magazines by subscriptions, plaintiffs
act as retailers of tangible personal
property and as such are liable for
retailer's occupation tax, if not other-
wise exempt." (31 Il1.2d 344, 350).
In Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405
(Tenn. 1976), the Supreme Court of Tennessee held
that computer software in the form of magnetic
tapes or punch cards is intangible personal prop-
erty and, therefore, not subject to that State's
sales and use tax. The court reasoned that only
information was being created and sold, "and the
magnetic tapes which contain this information are
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only a method of transmitting these intellectual
creations from the originator to the user. It is
merely incidental that these intangibles are
transmitted by way of a tangible reel of tape that
is not even retained by the user." (538 S.W. 2d
405, 407).
The case of First National Bank v. Bullock, 584
S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), is ~early on all
fours with this case. The bank an that case
obtained licenses to use four programs~ that is,
software, which instructed the bank's computer to
perform deposit and lending functions and process
general accounting. The information was con-
tained, as here, on magnetic tapes. The court
stated that it would look to the "essence of the
transaction" to determine whether the property
purchased was tangible or intangible. (548 S.W.2d
548, 550.) The court held that, since the infor-
mation on the tapes could have been communicated
in several different ways, and the computer could
even have been programmed over the telephone or by
hand, the essence of the purchase was not the
tapes, but the process which enabled the computer
to function. The software was therefore in
essence intangible personal property and the bank
was not required to pay a sales and use tax for
the licenses it purchased (584 S.W.2d 548, 551).
HOLDING: For First National Bank. The Illinois Court pre-
viously held that where a service of skill was
rendered in the manufacture of a special milling
machine for the particular and exclusive use of a
purchaser, the sale of the product was not taxable
where it was merely incidental to the service.
(Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v. Department of
Revenue, 405, Ill. 367, 372-373 (1950». The
instant case is of a similar vein. The plaintiff
bank purchased, in substance, the means of pro-
gramming its computer so that it could perform
functions the bank needed to have performed. The
bank did not desire to spend the money or time to
formulate the programs through its own data pro-
cessing staff. Therefore, it purchased instruc-
tion programs from other sources. It simply
happened that, for the sake of convenience and
easy handling, the programs were recorded on
magnetic tapes. The tapes were certainly not the
only medium through which the information could be
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transferred. In this way~ the tapes differ from a
movie film, a phonograph record or a book, whereby
the media used are the only practicable ways of
preserving those articles.
Thus, while those articles and the tapes are simi-
lar in that they physically represent the transfer
of ideas or artistic processes, a more significant
distinction is that those articles are inseparable
from the ideas or processes, whereas computer pro-
grams are separable from the tapes. Not only may
software information be conveyed any number of
ways, but it may even be copied off of the tapes
and stored, using another medium. (See Bryant and
Mather, "Property Taxation of Computer Software,"
18 New York Law Forum 59, 67 (1972». In short,
it is not the tapes which are the substance of the
transaction, it is the information.
The Court held that the sale of computer software
in this instance is, in substance, the transfer of
intangible personal property and, as such, is not
taxable under the Illinois Use Tax Act. In sup-
port of its position, the Court cited: First
National Bank v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 548 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1979); Janesville Data Center, Inc. v.
Wisconsin De~artment of Revenue, 84 Wis. 341, 287
N.W.2d 656 ( 978); Honeywell Information Systems,
Inc. v. Maricopa County, 118 Ariz. 171, 575 P.2d
801 (1978): State v. Central Computer Services,
Inc., 349 So.2d 1160 (Ala. 1977): Commerce Union
Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976):
District of Columbia v. Universal Computer
Associates, Inc., 465 F.2d 615 (D.C. cir. 1972);
County of Sacramento v. Assessment Appeals Board
No.2, 32 Cal. App.3d 654, 108 Cal. Rptr. 434
(1973). Also cited was Cal. Revenue' Tax Code
Secs. 995, 995.1, and 995.2 (West. Supp. 1974),
which subjects operational software to property
taxation, but exempts applicational software. See
also Honeywell, Inc. v. Lithonia Lighting, Inc.,
317 F.Supp. 406 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Also Greyhound
Computer Corp. v. State Department of Assessments
and Taxation, 271 Md. 674, 320 A.2d 52 (1974),
which held that only so much of software as con-
sists of services is intangible and not taxable.
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No. 23 GENERAL DATA CORP. v. PORTERFIELD
21 Ohio St.2d 233, 257 N.E.2d 359 (1970)
SUBJECT: Computer hardware and the Ohio use tax.
ISSUE: Is the installation and use of computer equipment
used almost exclusively for the dissemination of
hotel reservation information a taxable event for
Ohio use tax purposes?
FACTS: General Data Corporation leases terminals to its
parent, Holiday Inns of America, for use in its
international reservation system. A fee of $2.50
per rental guest room per month was charged. The
Tax Commissioner assessed a use tax based on the
rentals collected for the terminals.
HOLDING: For Data General Corporation. such an assessment
was found to be an unlawful tax burden on inter-
state commerce, which is prohibited by Section 8,
Clause 3, Article I of the United States Constitu-
tion. Furthermore, the terminals are excepted
from the Ohio use tax because they are used
directly and almost exclusively in making retail
sales.
No. 24 GREYHOUND COMPUTER CORPORATION
v.
STATE DEPARTMENT OF ASSESSMENTS AND TAXATION
271 Md. 674, 320 A.2d S2 (1974)
SUBJECT: Tangibility of bundled computer software for per-
sonal property tax purposes.
ISSUE: To what extent is bundled computer software con-
sidered tangible personal property subject to the
Maryland personal property tax?
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FACTS: Greyhound purchased four computer systems from IBM
and leased them to Bendix Corporation. The systems
purchased consisted of both hardware and software
elements, but the portion of the purchase pr ice
attributable to each of these two elements was not
separately stated. Maryland treated the cost of
the software as inseparable from that of the hard-
ware and based its assessment on aggregate pur-
chase price, less depreciation, without allocating
the cost of the software package between tangible
property acquired and services to be rendered.
Some of the software acquired consisted of punched
cards, magnetic tapes and instructions covering
operation and applications, which may be con-
sidered of a tangible nature. The remaining soft-
ware consisted of personal services to be rendered
after the purchase, and included systems engineer-
ing services, educational services and mainten-
ance.
Greyhound contended that:
1. Software is not tangible personal
property subject to tax;
2. The Department may not assess soft-
ware--having substantial values--as as
if it were tangible personal property
merely because certain elements of the
software have been placed upon or relate
to certain tangible items like cards or
magnetic tapes which have insignificant
value; and
3. The tax court's finding that ·soft-
ware· was not severable from, and was an
integral part of, hardware is unsupported
by substantial evidence.
HOLDING: The Court held that it was error to treat the cost
of computer software as inseparable from that of
hardware and to base assessment on aggregate pur-
chase price, less depreciation, without allocating
the cost of the software package between tangible
property acquired and services to be rendered,
which are intangible and not subject to either the
tangible personal property tax or the intangible
personal property tax. The case was remanded for
further proceedings.
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For analogies to the film-making industry the
Court cited Michael Todd Co. v. County of Los
Angeles, 57 Cal.2d 684, 21 Cal. Rptr. 604, 371
P.2d 340 (1962), and District of Columbia v.
Norwood Studios, Inc., 118 U.S. App. D.C. 358, 336
F.2d 746 (1964). This analogy was challenged in
Heinzman, "Computer Software: Should It Be
Treated as Tangible Property for Ad Valorem Tax?"
Journal of Taxation 184, 185-186 (1972).
Two cases rejecting the idea that software is tax-
able as tangible property are District of Columbia
v. Universal Computer Associates, Inc., 465 F.2d
615 (D.C. Cir. 1972) and County of Sacramento v.
Assessment Appeals Board, 32 Cal. App.3d 654, 671,
108 Cal. Rptr. 434, 446 (1973).
No. 25 HELVEY v. WABASH COUNTY REMC
151 Ind. App. 176, 278 N.E.2d 608 (1972)
SUBJECT: The nature of electrical energy.
ISSUE: Is the sale of electrical energy the sale of a
"good" or the furnishing of a service?
FACTS: Helvey filed an action against REMC for breach of
implied and express warranties, for damages caused
to certain 110 volt household appliances. The
damage was the result of REMC furnishing electri-
city of 135 or more volts. Suit was filed four
years and two months after the incident.
Helvey contended that electrical energy is not a
transaction in goods but rather a furnishing of a
service, and that a 6 year statute of limitation
applies. REMC contended that electricity is a
"good" within the meaning of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, and that a four year statute of limita-
tions applies.
HOLDING: For REMC. In order to be a "good" under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, the property in question must
be (1) a thingJ (2) existing: and, (3) movable,
with (2) and (3) existing simultaneously. The
Court held that electricity qualifies in each
respect.
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No. 26 HONEYWELL INFORMATION SYSTEMS v. MARICOPA COUNTY
118 Ariz. 171, 575 P.2d 801 (Ct. App. 1978)
SUBJECT: Property taxation of computer software.
ISSUE: Whether the value of intangible software should be
excluded from the property tax computation in
cases where the taxpayer company sells hardware
and software as a unit (bundles).
FACTS: Honeywell sold a variety of computer services and
listed the price of each service in its catalog.
The price of each service was ·bundled,· that is,
a separate price for the hardware and software
portions was not separately stated. Software ser-
vices accounted for approximately 24.4 percent of
list price, on average. Honeywell offered various
discounts off list price averaging slightly more
than 8 percent, although some discounts were as
much as 20 percent.
Arizona assessed a personal property tax based on
the list price of the bundled hardware and soft-
ware and did not consider actual selling prices.
Some of Honeywell's competitors, most notably IBM
and Control Data, market their computer hardware
at one price and most of their software services
at separately stated prices. Arizona does not
attempt to tax the software services of these com-
panies.
Honeywell contended that:
(1) Software is intangible and should
not be taxed. If hardware and software
are bundled, the hardware and software
components should be separated for prop-
erty tax purposes.
(2) Catalog list prices are not the
proper measure of the tax. Actual
selling prices should be used instead.
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(3) Honeywell is being discriminated
against because it is being taxed on the
value of its software, whereas companies
that state the prices of hardware and
software separately are not taxed on the
software component.
HOLDING: For Honeywell. Although the issue of software
intangibility had never before been raised in the
Arizona court system, the Court agreed with
Honeywell that software is intangible. Its deci-
sion was heavily influenced by the decisions in
District of Columbia v. Universal Computer
Associates, Inc., 151 U.S. App. D.C. 30, 465 F.2d
615 (1972), County of Sacramento v. Assessment
Appeals Board, 32 Cal. App.3d 654, 108 Cal. Rptr.
434 (1973), and Greyhound Computer Corporation v.
State Department of Assessment and Taxation, 271
Md. 674, 320 A.2d 52 (1974). The Court also cited
three articles where the authors concluded the
property taxation of intangible computer software
to be unjustified (Martin, "The Revolt Against the
Property Tax on Software: An Unnecessary Conflict
Growing Out of Unbundling," 9 Suffolk Univ. L.
Rev., 118 (1974), Bryant and Mather, "Property
TaXation of Computer Software," 18 N.Y.L.F. 59
(1972), and Heinzman, "Computer Software: Should
It be Treated as Tangible Property for Ad Valorum
Tax?" 37 Journal of Taxation 184 (1972». The
Court also noted that the valuation guidelines for
electronic data processing equipment of the Inter-
national Association of Assessing Officers, of
which the officials in Maricopa County responsible
for the assessment in this case are members,
states that "in these valuation cases wherein the
prices have not yet been unbundled, in the
interest of uniformity the assessor has the duty
of taking these intangible services out of the
value. n (International Association of Assessing
Officers (IAAO), Electronic Data processing
Equipment: Valuation Guidelines, Special Report,
1972, at 11).
831
The Court also agreed that fair market value,
rather than catalog price, is the proper measure
for property tax purposes (575 P.2d. at 807),
based on Burns v. Herberger, 17 Ariz. App. 462,
498 P.2d 536 (1972) and State Tax Commission v.
United Verde Extension Mining Co., 39 Ariz. 331, 6
P.2d 889 (1931). Thus, discounts as well as the
portion of the selling price represented by soft-
ware should be taken into account when assessing
the property tax.
Finally, the Court found that Honeywell was being
deliberately and systematically discriminated
against in the valuation of the electronic data
processing equipment in question. Honeywell was
assessed for the software component and other com-
puter companies were not. Furthermore, the County
Assessor's Office had a policy of not taxing
intangible software services and made no effort to
assess personal property tax on the value of soft-
ware services supplied by the many independent
software houses and service bureaus operating in
Maricopa County.
No. 27
INTELLIDATA INCORPORATED v. STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION
139 Cal. App.3d 594, 188 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1983)
SUBJECT: Sales taxation of keypunch cards.
ISSUE: Is computer software tangible property where the
data contained in the software is furnished by the
purchaser?
FACTS: Intellidata Incorporated is a computer service
bureau. Among other operations it provides key-
punching services for corporations that own their
own computer. The keypunching service may be
described as follows:
Plaintiff's customer delivered raw data such as
sales invoices, inventory cards, billings, etc.
Plaintiff was instructed on what information from
each such business record must be transposed onto
computer-readable keypunch cards. The keypunch
cards, supplied by plaintiff, come in a standard
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size and shape and, at the time in question, were
universally used in the data processing industry.
Data was transposed onto the cards by use of a
keypunching machine which has alphabetic letters
the same as a typewriter and a numerical keyboard
similar to a 10-key adding machine. The skills of
a keypunch operator are similar to those of a
typist.
After plaintiff's employees keypunched the cards,
they were delivered to plaintiff's customers. The
customer used the cards to input the information
into its computer. After the cards were read by
the computer they had no further use to the
customer and were usually destroyed or recycled.
Plaintiff purchased the cards and paid the tax on
them. However, plaintiff's customers were not
billed for the cards used. Plaintiff considered
the consumption of the cards to be part of the
hourly rate it charged its customers for the ser-
vice the cost of the cards constituting approxi-
mately two percent of the overall cost to the
customer.
Plaintiff's principal contention, both at trial
and on appeal, was that gross receipts from the
sale of keypunching services are exempt from sales
tax because the true object of the transactions
between plaintiff and its customers are the ser-
vices rendered by plaintiff and not the media on
which the services are delivered.
California Administrative Code, title 18, section
1502 specifically deals with automatic data pro-
cessing services and equipment. Subsection (2) of
subdivision (d) of that section (hereinafter "key-
punching regulation") states in pertinent part:
"•••agreements providing solely for keypunching 1
keypunching and keystroke verification: or key-
punching, providing a proof list and/or verifying
of data, are regarded as contracts for the fabri-
cation of punched cards and sales of proof lists.
Charges therefor are taxable, whether the cards
are furnished by the customer or by the service
bureau."
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Plaintiff contended that defendant, through admin-
istrative regulation, has extended the sales tax
beyond that which the Legislature intended.
Plaintiff asserted that defendant does not have
the right to tax an activity that was not deemed
taxable under the enabling statutes. It continues
that since keypunching constitutes a nontaxable
service rather than a taxable sale of keypunch
cards, the keypunching regulation must be held an
unconstitutional act of legislation.
BOLDING:For the State Board of Equalization. The court
held that the regulation did not overreach legis-
lative intent. In its holding, the court cited
three other California cases. In People v.
Grazer, 138 Cal. App.2d 274, 291 P.2d 957 (1956),
the court held that the transfer of X-ray films
and the radiologist' s findings which accompanied
the films from the radiologist to the physician
constituted a taxable sale. In reaching this
conclusion the court stated that "the raw
mater ials consumed in producing that which (the
physician) ordered may have cost the laboratory
only a very small part of the charge made. The
expense of the producer of the pictures is almost
entirely the cost of the skilled services of the
radiologist and the technicians and the use of
equipment which is generally quite costly. But
the price charged for all taxable transfers is
more often than not largely a charge for services
rendered in connection with the tangible object
transferred." (Id. at p. 278).
The same reasoning was followed in Albers v. State
Board of Equalization, 237 Cal. App.2d 494, 47
Cal. Rptr. 69 (1965), where the court held that
the work of a commercial draftsman making drawings
for architects, engineers and business firms based
on specifications and data furnished by customers
constituted a sale of tangible personal property.
The Intellidata court also cited Simplicity
Pattern Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 27
Cal.3d 900, 167 Cal. Rptr. 366, 615 P.2d 555
(1980), which stood for the proposition that tan-
gible property may be taxed on the basis of its
total value even though virtually all of the value
is attributed to an intangible element such as
intellectual content.
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The court also made mention of Bullock v.
Statistical Tabulating Corp., 549 S.W.2d 166 (Tex.
1977), which held a contrary view for a similar
fact situation, but stated that the decision in
Statistical Tabulating was only persuasive, not
binding, because it was not decided in California.
JAMES v. TRES COMPUTER SERVICE, INC.
642 S.W.2d 347 (Mo., 1982)
SUBJECT: Tangibility of ·canned" software for use tax pur-
poses.
ISSUE:
FACTS:
Is the sale of "canned" software a taxable event?
TRES Computer Service sold ·canned" software to a
variety of customers on a non-exclusive basis.
The transaction at issue involved a sale to a
Missouri customer through the use of tapes con-
taining the data and programs. The retail value
of the tapes before they contain any information
is fifty dollars. The Missouri customer paid TRES
approximately $135,000 for the data and programs.
TRES reported to the Missouri Department of
Revenue that the transaction involved fifty
dollars--i.e., the retail value of the tapes. In
July 1979, the Department of Revenue determined
that TRES should pay a use tax based on the
$135,000 transaction value of the software.
Accordingly, the Department of Revenue made an
additional tax assessment of $4,218.75, plus
$421.88 penalty, plus $295.32 in interest. TRES
did not pay any of the additional assessment.
At the Administrative Hearing level, the parties
stipulated that: (1) the data is intangible prop-
erty: (2) the tapes on which the data is contained
and transmitted is tangible personal propertY1 and
(3) TRES could have transmitted the data and
programs to its customers electronically.
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The Director of Revenue contended that the com-
puter software is taxable as tangible personal
property because the data and programs are
inseparable from the tapes containing them. TRES,
on the other hand, views the tapes as mere con-
duits or containers for the intangible profes-
sional services sold.
BOLDING: For TRES. The computer data and programs were
intangible personal property, and they did not
become tangible personal property by reason of
their presence on magnetic tapes.
In its opinion, the Court in TRES noted that other
courts have addressed the issue, and have ruled
that the intangible character is not lost. See
State v. Central Computer Services, Inc., 349
So.2d 1160 (Ala. 1977) 1 Commerce Union Bank v.
Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976); and, First
National Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d
548 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
Other courts apply the "essence of the transac-
tion" test, whereby the data on the tapes is
merely an incidental physical commingling of the
tangible tapes and the intangible information
which is actually the subject of the transaction.
See State v. Central Computer Services, Inc., 349
So.2d 1160 (Ala. 1977); First National Bank of
Sprin1field v. Department of Revenue, 85 Ill.2d84, 5 Ill. Dec. 667, 421 N.E.2d 175 (1981).
In a related test, the court attempts to discover
the intent of the parties. If they intend that
the tapes serve only to convey the computer data
and then be discarded, the value of the profes-
sional services is not considered taxable as
tangible personal property. E.g., First National
Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock, supra; see also,
Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States, 407
F.Supp. 1326 (N.D Texas 1976). By comparison, the
court in Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, supra,
sought to ascerta1n whether a f1n1shed product was
created and sold, as opposed to whether informa-
tion was being conveyed. 538 S.W.2d at 107. The
Tidwell court decided that computer data and
programs were being conveyed and therefore the
information's value was not taxable as tangible
personal property. Id.
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The Court in TRES gave several reasons why the
data and programs should not be taxed as tangible
personal property. First, the tapes themselves
were not the ultimate object of the sale. The
customer purchased them because they contained the
data and programs which it desired for its com-
puter. The tapes are merely a medium to convey the
data and programs to the customer's computer.
After they are used to program the computer they
can be discarded. The court in Commerce Union
Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976), said
it well:
"What is created and sold here is
information and the magnetic tapes which
contain this information are only a
method of transmitting these intellec-
tual creations from the originator to
the user. It is merely incidental that
these intangibles are transmitted by way
of a tangible reel of tape that is not
even retained by the user."
Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d at 407.
The Tidwell court also stated:
"When the information is transferred
from the tape to the computer, the tape
is no longer of any value to the userl
and it is not retained in the possession
of the user. The information on the
tape, unlike a phonograph record, is not
complete and ready to be used at the time
of its purchase. It must be translated
into a language understood by the com-
puter. Once this information has been
translated and introduced into the com-
puter and the tapes returned or the
punch cards destroyed, what actually
remains in the computer is intangible
knowledge, that is what was purchased,
not the magnetic tapes or the punch
cards. District of Columbia v. Univer-
sal Computer Associates, Inc., 151 U.S.
App. D.C. 30, 465 F.2d 615 (1972).
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Transfer of tangible personal property
under these circumstances is merely
incidental to the purchase of the intan-
gible knowledge and information stored
on the tapes."
Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538
S.W.2d at 408, see also Janesville Data
Center, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of
Revenue, 84 Wis.2d 341, 267 N.W.2d 656,
658 (1978), cf., Bullock v. Statistical
Tabulating Corp., 549 S.W.2d 166 (Tex.
1977).
Second, it was not necessary that the information
purchased be put on tape. It could have been sent
to the customer through electronic communications
and fed directly into the computer. In Tidwell
the court observed:
"A magnetic tape is only one method
whereby information may be transmitted
from the originator to the user by way
of telephone lines, or it may be fed
into the user's computer directly by the
originator of the program."
Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d at 408.
See also State v. Central Computer Services, 349
So.2d 1160, 1162 (Ala. 1977).
The Director argued that the Hearing Commission's
decision is contrary to Universal Images, Inc. v.
Department of Revenue, 608 S.W.2d 417 (Mo., 1980)
because there the Court held that motion picture
film was taxable as tangible personal property at
its transaction value. The Director equated the
film with the tapes in this case. The higher
Court disagreed. Instead, they embraced the idea
that "Ct)he physical presence of the movie film is
essential to broadcasting the intangible artistic
efforts of the actors." State v. Central Computer
Services, 349 So.2d at 1162. This view is also
shared by the Illinois Supreme Court which, in
holding computer software not taxable as tangible
personal property, stated:
8)8
"The plaintiff bank purchased, in
substance, the means of programming its
computer so that it could perform func-
tions the bank needed to have performed.
The bank did not desire to spend the
money or time to formulate the programs
through its own data processing staff.
Therefore, it purchased instruction pro-
grams from other sources. It simply
happened that, for the sake of conven-
ience and easy handling, the programs
were recorded on magnetic tapes. The
tapes were certainly not the only medium
through which the information could be
transferred. In this way, the tapes
differ from a movie film, a phonograph
record or a book, whereby the media used
are the only practicable ways of pre-
serving those articles. Thus, while
those articles and the tapes are similar
in that they physically represent the
transfer of ideas of artistic processes,
a more significant distinction is that
those articles are inseparable from the
ideas or processes, whereas computer
programs are separable from the tapes."
First National Bank of Springfield v.
Department of Revenue, 85 III.2d 84, 51
Ill. Dec. 667, 421 N.E.2d at 178 (1981).
The movie film in Universal Ima~es was
purchased as a finished product w1th the
idea that the tangible film itself would
be used and reused. The tapes in TRES
are not employed in this manner,--sQ
Universal Images was held not to be
controlling in this case.
The Director also contended that the Hearing
Commission's decision conflicts with Kilbane v.
Director of Revenue, 544 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. banc 1976)
because there the Court held that the proportion-
ate percentages of labor and material would not be
considered in determining whether an item was tax-
able as tangible personal property. In Kilbane,
the appellant operated a dental laboratory and a
sales tax was imposed on the sale of bridgework
and crowns to dentists. As one of his arguments,
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he contended that there should be no sales tax on
the entire transaction value of the bridgework and
crowns because 80% to 95% of its value was labor,
whereas only 5% to 20% was materials. The Court
rejected the argument and held the dentist liable
for the tax on the bridgework and crowns. Kilbane
v. Department of Revenue, 544 S.W.2d at 12.
The Director's argument that Kilbane supports his
position that the data and programs sold here are
taxable as tangible personal property did not con-
vince the court in TRES. In Kilbane the ultimate
manifestation of the labor--the dental work sold
to dentists easily fits within the definition of
"tangible personal property." Those finished pro-
ducts were to be utilized in their manufactured
form to bring about a desired result in a patient's
dental health. Here, the professional services
(the data and programs are intangible and remain
so forever. Kilbane did not persuade the TRES
court to hold that the computer tapes in this case
are taxable as tangible personal property at the
$135,000 transaction value.
No. 29 JANESVILLE DATA CENTER, INC.
v.
WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OP REVENUE
84 Wis.2d 341, 267 N.W.2d 656 (1978)
SUBJECT: Tangibility of computer software for sales tax
purposes.
ISSUE: Is computer software tangible property subject to
the Wisconsin sales tax, where the data contained
in the software is furnished by the purchaser?
Data Center is a Wisconsin corporation engaged in
the business of transferring to key punch cards
and magnetic tapes data furnished by its customers
which its customers wish to use in computers. The
processed cards and tapes are delivered to the
customers to be ultimately read by a computer.
PACTS:
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The information on the cards and tapes is retained
in the memory of the customer's computers. After
the customers have recorded the information, the
tapes but not the cards may be returned to Data
Center for reuse.
Data Center purchased keypunch cards at a cost of
$1.06 per thousand cards, and pays a sales tax to
the supplier. The cost of the cards is included
in Data Center's gross charge to its customers.
About 5 percent of the customers supply their own
cards, and in these cases Data Center does not
impose a charge for the cost of the cards.
The Wisconsin Department of Revenue assessed a
sales tax on these transactions. Data Center
alleged that the object of these transactions was
the sale of intangible coded information, not the
sale of tangible personal property, and that the
sales tax should not be imposed.
HOLDING: For Data Center. The Wisconsin Court was persuaded
by the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Texas in
Bullock v. Statistical Tabulating Corporation, 549
S.W.2d 166 (Tex. 1977), which had a similar fact
pattern. The Texas court held that a keypunch
operation was not taxable because the object of
the transaction was the sale of intangible coded
information, not the sale of tangible personal
property. That Court said:
RWe agree with the Plaintiff's con-
tention that the true object of this
transaction is not the data processing
card as contended by the Comptroller,
but the purchase of coded or processed
data, an intangible.
R•••The essence of the transaction
for the customer is an intangible pro-
duct, coded data, and Plaintiff's capa-
bilities in making the translation or
coding. The coded data could be trans-
mitted from the Plaintiff's keypunch
machine to customer's computer in several
forms, i.e., tapes and telephones, as
well as cards.
NOTE:
"•••In the transaction before this
Court, Plaintiff's customers •••are
desirous of something beyond the tangi-
ble object involved in the transaction.
In this case, the object of the Plain-
tiff's customers is to obtain a great
deal more than the key punch cards•••
While this transaction is closer to just
printing alone than the transaction in
(other cases), the element of service
here is still the 'essence of the trans-
action. '
••••In determining the 'object of
this transaction,' many factors are
relevant. We have attempted to follow
the design and purposes of the statute.
The issue must be answered on a case by
case basis. Although tangible personal
property, i.e., cards, does change
hands, the receipt of the cards does not
constitute the essence of the transac-
tion, the basic purpose of the customer
in entering into the transaction.· (549
S.W.2d. 166, 168, 169).
Also see the holdings in Commerce Union Bank v.
Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976). Accountant's
Computer Service, Inc. v. Kosydar, 35 ohio St.2d
120, 298 N.E.2d 519 (1973), Citizens Financial
Corp. v. Kosydar, 43 Ohio St.2d 148, 331 N.E.2d
435 (1975), Miami Citizens National Bank v.
Lindley, 50 Ohio St.2d 249, 364 N.E.2d 25 (1977)J
Credit Bureau of Miami County v. Collins, 50 Ohio
St.2d 270, 364 N.E.2d 27 (1977). At present,
Wisconsin's Proposed Rule 11.71 would tax prewrit-
ten programs and also custom programs that are
sold, leased or licensed in machine-readable form.
Custom programs sold, leased or licensed in human-
readable form, such as program instructions listed
on coding sheets, are exempt.
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No. )0 MERTZ v. STATE TAX COMMISSION
89 A.D.2d 396, 456 N.Y.S.2d 501 (A.D. 1982)
SCBJECT: Sales and use taxability of the sale of computer
tapes.
ISSUE: Are transactions involving the one-time use of
mailing lists in the form of magnetic computer
tapes taxable as sales of information in New York
State?
FACTS: Petitioners are the general partners of Publishers
Clearing House, a New York limited partnership,
engaged in the business of selling magazine sub-
scriptions by direct mail solicitation throughout
the United States and Canada. To facilitate this
direct mail marketing, mailing lists, in the form
of magnetic computer tapes, are obtained from com-
panies that generate lists of names as an incident
of their business, and from companies that are
engaged in the business of compiling mailing lists
from public records. The mailing lists are
obtained on the condition that they may be used
only in connection with a single mailing, after
which they are returned to the owner. The part-
nership employed L. E. Turner & Company, a New
York corporation, as its exclusive broker to
obtain mailing lists. Included in the purchase
price paid to the broker was a 25 percent markup
as the broker's fee.
The New York State Sales Tax Bureau issued a
notice of determination and demand for the payment
of sales and use taxes due for the period
September 1, 1910 to August 31, 1913, based upon
its finding that the purchase price paid by the
partnership for the mailing lists, including the
broker's fees, was subject to sales and use tax
(Tax Law, art. 11). Following a formal hearing
held at petitioners' request, the State Tax
Commission concluded that the entire purchase
price of the mailing lists, including the broker's
fees, was taxable.
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Relying upon Matter of Alan Dre¥ Co. v. State Tax
Commission, 67 A.D.2d 1055, 413 N.Y.S.2d 516,
motion for leave to appeal denied, 47 N.Y.2d 708,
418 N.Y.S.2d 1024, 392 N.E.2d 887, (N.Y. App. Div.
1979), the Tax Commission ruled that the mailing
list transactions constituted both the sale of
tangible personal property, taxable pursuant to
section 1105 (subd. (a» of the Tax Law, and the
sale of information, taxable pursuant to section
1105 (subd. (c), para. (1» of the Tax Law.
Petitioners contended that:
(1) Taxing their purchase of mailing
lists while excluding such advertising
media as billboard space, radio broad-
cast time and newspaper advertising
space, amounts to a denial of equal pro-
tection;
(2) Pursuant to section 1119, subd.(a),
para. (4) of the Tax Law, the purchase
price of the mailing lists should be
taxed only to the extent of the percen-
tage of New York names and addresses on
the lists; and
(3) That portion of the purchase price
paid by the partnership which represents
the broker's fees of L. E. Turner &
Company must be excluded from taxable
receipts.
BOLDING: (1) transactions involving the one-time use of
mailing lists in the form of magnetic computer
tapes were taxable as sales of information,
however (2) broker's fees paid to persons for
obtaining the tapes were excludable from taxable
receipts.
The Commission misconstrued the holding in Alan
9rey. There the mailing list transactions fell
rnt.o two categories: those in which the lists
were transmitted via magnetic computer tape, and
those in which the lists were transmitted on
gummed labels. As to the transactions in the
first category, the purchasers were required to
process the tapes in order to generate the labels
or inserts necessary for the mailings, while those
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who purchased the lists on gummed labels simply
attached the labels to the mailings. The transac-
tions involving the gummed labels clearly consti-
tuted taxable sales of tangible personal property
since the gummed labels themselves, rather than
just the data contained thereon, were directly
used in the mailings.
The computer tapes, however, were not directly
used in the mailings. Instead, the data on the
tapes was read and only that data was used in the
mailings. The tapes, which were the only tangible
personal property involved, were merely the medium
by which the information that was the essence of
the transaction was transmitted. The tapes served
no other function in the transactions and, there-
fore, there was no sale of tangible personal prop-
erty. Thus, the Mertz court concluded that its
decision in Alan Drey should be construed as
holding that the transactions involving computer
tapes constituted sales of information, taxable
pursuant to section 1105, subd. (c), para. (1) of
the Tax Law, while those involving gummed labels
constituted sales of tangible personal property,
taxable pursuant to section 1105, subd. (a) of the
Tax Law. While the distinction was not important
in Alan Drey, since the main issue was simply
whether the transactions were taxable sales, the
distinction is important here, since other issues
are raised.
All of the transactions at issue here involved
magnetic computer tapes and, as discussed above,
Alan Drey compels the conclusion that the transac-
tions constituted taxable sales of information.
Petitioners' arguments to the contrary were, for
the most part, considered and rejected in Alan
Drey. Their contention here, that they purchased
mere access to an audience rather than informa-
tion, is not supported by the record. The evi-
dence establishes that in addition to the mailing
lists, the seller provided information about the
make-up of the lists, which was very important to
petitioners in employing their direct marketing
techniques.
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The Court disagreed with Petitioner's contention
that taxing their purchase of mailing lists while
excluding such advertising media as billboard
space, radio broadcast time and newspaper adver-
tising space, amounts to a denial of equal protec-
tion. Since the mailing list data and the infor-
mation about the make-up of the lists were
processed and employed in the development of
direct marketing techniques through personalized
mail solicitation, there exists a rational basis
for distinguishing petitioners from purchasers of
traditional advertising media. Petitioners failed
to carry their heavy burden of showing that the
different treatment constitutes invidious discrim-
ination (see Matter of Catapano Co. v. New York
City Finance Administration, 40 N.Y.2d 1074, 392
N.Y.S.2d 255, 360 N.E.2d 934).
The Court also rejected Petitioner's contention
that pursuant to section 1119, subd. (a), para.
(4) of the Tax Law, the purchase price of· the
mailing lists should be taxed only to the extent
of the percentage of New York names and addresses
on the lists. Section 1119, subd. (a), para. (4),
however, applies only to sales of tangible per-
sonal property, purchased for other than resale,
which is subject to certain limited uses in New
York and then is shipped out of the State for use
outside of New York. The transactions at issue
here involved the sale of information, not tangi-
ble personal property, and thus section 1119,
subd. (a), para. (4), is inapplicable. Nor is
section 1115, subd. (d) of the Tax Law of any
avail to petitioners since no tangible personal
property on which the services were performed was
delivered to the purchaser (petitioners' partner-
ship) outside the State, as required by that
exemption.
Petitioners' final argument, however, had merit.
Section 1105, subd, (c), para. (1) specifically
excludes from taxation receipts from the sale of
the ·services of advertising or other agents, or
other persons acting in a representative capacity
* * *.. This exclusion is applicable only to
sales of information, such as the transactions at
issue here. The record establishes that despite
the common ownership of L. E. Turner' Company and
petitioners' partnership, L. E. Turner' Company
NOTE:
No. 31
acted solely in a representative capacity, as the
partnership's exclusive broker in obtaining the
mailing lists. Accordingly, that portion of the
purchase price paid by the partnership which
represents the broker's fees of L. E.· Turner ,
Company must be excluded from taxable receipts
(Tax Law, Section 1105, subd. (c), para. (a», and
the tax due must be recomputed.
Also see Spencer Gifts, Inc. v. Director, Division
of Taxation, 182 N.J. Super. 179, 440A.2d 104
(N.J. Tax Ct. 1981), Fingerhut Products Compan~ v.
Commissioner of Revenue, 258 N.W.2d 606 (M~nn.
1977)1 Alan Drey Co., Inc. v. State Tax Commis-
sion, 67 A.D.2d 1055, 413 N.Y.S.2d 516, 47 N.Y.2d
708; 418 N.Y.S.2d 1024, 392 N.E.2d 887 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1979).
MIAMI CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK AND
TRUST COMPANY v. LINDLEY
50 Ohio St.2d 249, 364 N.E.2d 25 (1977)
SUBJECT: Sales taxability of a transaction involving both
tangible personal property and personal services.
ISSUE: Whether providing detailed reports in computer
printout from which reveal considerable informa-
tion for use in making informed management deci-
sions, constitutes the sale of tangible personal
property pursuant to the Ohio sales tax statute.
The bank installed a data processing system in
1967 for the purpose of doing its own computer
work. Eventually, it began doing data processing
for other banks and provided those banks with
FACTS:
various programs.
Many of Miami Citizens' programs were provided to
the correspondent banks on a daily basis. Each
program customarily consisted of a series of
WreportsW which reveal considerable information
for use by the correspondent bank in making
informed management decisions for future opera-
tions.
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The customer bank paid a set monthly fee per
account, depending upon the type of account; e.g.,
saving accounts are 15 cents per account per
month. Miami Citizens also billed separately for
changes requested in a particular customer's
program. The sales tax was assessed only on
charges for "computer print-outs," and not for
programming time.
HOLDING: For Lindley. Where a bank uses its management to
analyze the business operations of its client
correspondent banks and devises programs which
organize information taken from clients' records
and provide the client with the organized informa-
tion in computer print-out report forms, which
reports are necessary to make informed management,
operational, auditing, marketing and other busi-
ness decisions, the true object of the transac-
tions as shown by the record is the receipt of the
printed form which contains the computer-organized
data and, therefore, such transactions constitute
sales of tangible personal property pursuant to
R.C. 5739.0l(B).
In support of its position, the Court cited
Accountants' Computer Services v. Rosydar, 35 Ohio
St.2d 120, 298N.E.2d 519 (1973)J Citizens Finan-
cial Corp. v. Rosydar, 43 Ohio St.2d 148, 331
N.E.2d 435 (1975); Federated Department Stores v.
Kosydar, 45 Ohio St.2d 1, 340 N.E.2d 840(1976);
and Lindner Brothers v. Kosydar, 46 Ohio St.2d
162, 346 N.E.2d 690 (1976).
No. 32 MICHAEL TOOD COMPANY v. COUNTY OP LOS ANGELES
57 Cal.2d 684, 21 Cal. Rptr. 604,
371 P.2d 340 (1962)
SUBJECT: Motion picture film negatives as tangible personal
property subject to personal property tax.
ISSUE: Can a tangible personal property tax be assessed
on the market value of a film negative, where
nearly the entire market value of the film nega-
tive is the result of intangible copyrights?
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FACTS: The County of Los Angeles (COLA) assessed an ad
valorem personal property tax against the Michael
Todd Company (TODD) on the film negatives of a
copyrighted motion picture entit1ed "Around the
World in Eighty Days." A tax of $105,064.46 was
levied, based on an estimated cash value of
$1,526,900. It was conceded by COLA that, without
copyright protection, the negatives would have a
salvage value of $1,000. In a prior case (Roehm
v. County of Orange, 32 Cal. 2d 280, 196 P.2d 550
(1948», the California court determined that
copyrights are not subject to the personal prop-
erty tax.
TODD contended that the tax should have been
assessed on the $1,000 salvage value, since the
market value was almost entirely attributable to
the copyright protection. By allowing COLA to
assess the tax based on the market value of the
negatives, the Court would be allowing COLA to do
indirectly what it could not legally do directly,
namely, to assess a tangible personal property tax
on intangible copyrights.
In the Roehm case, the Court also stated that:
"Intangible values•••that cannot be
separately taxed as property may be
reflected in the valuation of taxable
property. Thus, in determining the
value of property, assessing authorities
may take into consideration earnings
derived therefrom, which may depend upon
the possession of intangible rights and
privileges that are not themselves
regarded as a separate class of taxable
property."
BOLDING: For COLA. The Court cited six cases where the
propriety of including nontaxable intangible
values in the valuation of otherwise taxable prop-
erty had been examined. It also quoted a pre-
viously decided case (De Luz Homes, Inc. v. County
of San Diego, 45 Cal.2d 546, 563-564, 290 P.2d 544
(1955», where the Court stated that:
"Assessors generally estimated value
by analyzing market data on sales of
similar property, replacement costs, and
income from the property •••, and since
no one of these methods alone can be
used to estimate the value of all prop-
erty, the assessor, subject to require-
ments of fairness and uniformity, may
exercise his discretion in using one or
more of them."
The Court held (371 P.2d 340 at 347) that "tested
by this rule, the method of valuation here
employed by the Los Angeles County Assessor was
proper."
No. 33QUOTRON SYSTEMS, INC. v. COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY
287 Md. 178, 411 A.2d 439 (1980)
SUBJECT: Tangibility of software for use tax purposes when
it is bundled with hardware.
ISSUE: Whether a company which provides information ser-
vices, and which makes available to its subscribers
computer hardware upon which to receive those ser-
vices, is subject to a Maryland use tax on that
part of its monthly charges which is attributable
to the use of that hardware.
FACTS: Quotron Systems, Inc. (Quotron), provides to its
subscribers a variety of financial information
services, including displays of the New York and
American stock exchange tickers, prices and sales
of selected securities, and headlines or news
stories from various wire services. It sends this
information over leased telephone and telegraph
lines from its computer in New York. Subscribers
receive the information on hardware consisting of
a computer, keyboards and display screens which
Quotron provides to its subscribers. The cost of
the hardware is approximately 20 percent of the
costs incurred by Quotron in providing the infor-
mation services. In Maryland, a subscriber cannot
receive Quotron I s financial information services
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BOLDING:
without utilizing Quotron's hardware, nor can it·
utilize Quotron's hardware without subscribing to
the information· services. While it is possible
for a subscriber which has been provided with
Quotron's hardware to utilize that hardware to
"access· its own data base, there is no evidence
to show that any Maryland subscriber has so util-
ized Quotron's hardware.
All of the hardware provided is owned installed,
maintained, repaired, relocated and insured by
Quotron. Although Quotron installs the hardware
at locations designated by the subscriber, the
computer is kept locked, usually in a locked room,
and the subscriber is not permitted any access to
it.
The comptroller contended that Quotron provides
both a service and hardware. He maintains that
when Quotron places the hardware in the sub-
scribers' offices, it has either transferred
possession of or leased tangible personal property
to its subscribers, and is therefore subject to a
use tax on the value of that property. He main-
tains that the value of the hardware consists of
all of the monthly charges other than those for
optional information services.
Quotron, however, contended that it provides only
information services. It pointed out that it is
necessary to place its hardware in its subscri-
bers' offices in order to provide those services.
It insisted that the provision of the hardware is
necessary yet nevertheless incidental to the pro-
vision of the services and, therefore, that
Quotron itself, and not the subscribers, is using
the hardware. It concluded that under these cir-
cumstances, no part of its monthly charges to
subcribers was taxable, but rather that it, not
the subscribers, must pay a use tax on the cost of
the hardware.
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the Court considered the question whether the
C & P Telephone Company, which furnished both
teletypewriter equipment and services to its sub-
scribers, was providing a telecommunication ser-
vice or renting tangible personal property.
There, the Comptroller claimed that the monthly
charge collected by C & P represented rentals for
the lease of the equipment which was tangible per-
sonal property. C & P contended that it provided
only communication services.
The record showed that the sole function of the
equipment was to transmit and receive communica-
tions, and that it had no utility in and of
itself. The equipment was located on the premises
of the subscribers who provided operators to send
and receive messages by depressing the appropriate
keys on the equipment. Although the equipment
could be used at the subscribers I discretion, it
could be used only to send and receive messages
between specified locations. C & P could not
intentionally interrupt the transmission of a
message.
Based upon these facts, this Court found that
C & P retained control of the equipment, and that
the dominant purpose of the contract was to pro-
vide a service. It determined, therefore, that
C & P provided a service and not a mere rental of
equipment, and held that the charges received from
the rendition of such communication services were
not taxable.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court first
determined that, although C & P ~rovided both
teletypewriter equipment and serVlces, it was
necessary to characterize those activities as a
single, overall function which was either a rental
of equipment or the provision of services. Having
characterized the overall function as a service,
the Court next considered whether that function
was subject to a sales tax. Thus this case estab-
lishes that in order to determine whether a sales
tax can be imposed when a company provides both a
service and related equipment, a two-step analysis
must be employed. First, the overall function
must be characterized by the examination of
various factors as either a rental or transfer of
possession, or a service. Secondly, it must be
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determined whether that function is subject to a
sales tax. In order jurisdictions in which the
same or similar questions have been considered,
the same analysis has been employed. See Askew v.
Bell, 248 So.2d 501, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971):
~at v. Mahin, 50 Ill.2d 183, 277 N.E.2d 834,
(971), J. H. Walters , Co. v. Department of
Revenue, 44 Ill.2d 95, 254 N.E.2d 485, (1969)1
Community Telecasting Serv. v. Johnson, 220 A.2d
500, (Me. 1966): Dun & Bradstreet v. Cit~ of New
York, 276 N•Y. 198, 11 N.E•2 d 728, (193 i . See
also Undercofler v. Grantham Transfer Co., 114 Ga.
App. 868, 152 S.E.2d 900, (1966): Machinery Moving
Inc. v. Porterfield, 26 Ohio St.2d 99, 269 N.E.2d
418, (1971).
In C & P the Court expressly relied upon two stan-
dards, the control of the equipment and the domi-
nant purpose of the contract, in characterizing
C & piS single, overall function as a service.
The Court, however, also took into account the
relationship between the equipment and the service
when it found that the sole function of the equip-
ment was to transmit and receive communications
and that it had no utility in and of itself.
Courts in other jurisdictions which similarly have
examined the relationship between equipment and
services in characterizing an overall function,
have applied a third standard. J. H. Walters &
Co., 44 Ill.2d at 104-05, 254 N.E.2d at 491,
community Telecasting Serv., 220 A.2d at 503,
Dun' Bradstreet, 276 N.Y. at 205, 11 N.E.2d at
731. This standard was expressed by the Supreme
court of Illinois in Snite v. Department of
Revenue, 398 Ill. 41, 46, 74 N.E.2d 877, 879-80
(1947), as follows:
wIf the article sold has no value to
the purchaser except as a result of ser-
vices rendered by the vendor and the
transfer of the article to the purchaser
is an actual and necessary part of the
service rendered, then the vendor is
engaged in the business of rendering
service and not in the business of
selling at retail. If the article sold
is the substance of the transaction and
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the service rendered is merely inciden-
tal to and an inseparable part of the
transfer to the purchaser of the article
sold, then the vendor is engaged in the
business of selling at retail, and the
tax which he pays for the privilege of
engaging in such business is measured by
the price which the purchaser pays for
the article and the service incident
thereto.·
No. J4 SIMPLICITY PATTERN COMPANY, INC.
v.
STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION
101 Cal. App.3d 184, 161 Cal. Rptr. 558 (1980)
SUBJECT: Sales taxation of master negatives and originals
of written instruction guides.
ISSUE: Are master negatives and originals of written
instruction guides tangible personal property sub-
ject to the California sales tax?
FACTS: Prior to January, 1971, Simplicity was engaged in
the business of producing and marketing audio-
visual educational materials used in training
nurses and nurses aides. The product, which
Simplicity marketed primarily to hospitals and
schools, was a ·package· comprised of a film
strip, phonograph record and instructor's guide.
In that year, Simplicity transferred to Medcom all
of the assets of that part of its operation devoted
to the above described business. In return,
Simplicity received a substantial but not a con-
trolling amount of Medcom stock. The transaction
qualified as a tax-free reorganization under both
federal and state income tax laws (Internal
Revenue Code, Sections 354 and 368(a)(1)(C), and
Revenue and Taxation Code Sections 17432 and
17461) • Among the assets transferred were com-
pleted master negatives of the various ·packages·
from which copies were produced for retail sale,
and incomplete master negatives in various stages
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of completion. These items were carried on the
books of Simplicity as inventory assets valued
according to development and production costs
incurred in the making of the master negatives.
The Board deter:mined that the transfer of these
assets was a retail sale subject to sales tax.
Simplicity contended that the real value of the
master negatives was in their intangible elements,
i.e., the literary content, and thus not subject
to sales tax.
BOLDING: For Simplicity. The Court cited the rule in
Albers v. State Board of Equalization, 237 Cal.
App.2d 494, 47 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1965), which recog-
nized that since every transfer of property
includes both tangible and intangible components,
thetaxabili ty of a particular transfer depends
upon the "true object of the transaction."
Simplicity contended that the "true object" was
the literary or intangible content and the right
to retail copies of that material. The Board's
position was one of equating the master negatives
with tools and dies which are in turn used to pro-
duce other tangible items. In short, the Board
argued that the ..true object" of the transaction
was to obtain the master negatives for their own
sake and denied that their major value was in
their intangible ingredients.
The Court said that:
"It seems evident to us that the
master negatives and the original of the
instructor's guides were products of the
expertise of the collective mind of the
Simplicity production staff and that
their primary value was in the
intangible content rather than the tan-
gible items of the film, plastic discs
and paper on which that content was
recorded. The marketable value of
copies of these master negatives lies in
their content." (161 Cal. Rptr. at 561).
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No. 35 SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY
v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE
366 So.2d 30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
SUBJECT: Sales taxability of a sale involving both tangible
personal property and personal services.
ISSUE: Does the sale of artwork that ultimately appears
in the telephone book yellow pages constitute the
sale of tangible personal property subject to the
Florida sales tax?
FACTS: The Department of Revenue assessed a tax, penalty
and interest against Southern Bell based on
alleged purchases by Southern Bell of tangible
personal' property on.which no sales tax had been
collected by the vendors. The sales tax was
assessed on transactions between Southern Bell and
artists who produced artwork used in advertise-
mentsappear inq in the yellow pages of Southern
Bell telephone books. Southern Bell contended
that its transactions with artists who created
speculative art and finished art were personal
service transactions which involved sales as
inconsequential elements for which no separate
charges were made and thus were exempt from sales
tax. Speculative art refers to rough drawings
created by artists at the specific request of the
yellow pages salesperson. Finished art refers to
designs which are actually photographed for use in
particular yellow pages advertisements. The
artists who prepare either speculative art or
finished art furnish all the materials used in the
creation of the design and the relative value of
the materials used ranges from 1 percent to 6 per-
cent of the amount paid by Southern Bell to the
artist.
Southern Bell further contended that theoretically
the artists could perform the services for which
they are engaged without tranferring any property
to Southern Bell. In the case of speculative art,
the artist could accompany the yellow pages sales-
person on a visit to a prospective advertiser or
the prospective advertiser could accompany the
salesperson to the artist's studio. In the case
of finished art, Southern Bell could photograph
the finished art at the studio of the artist.
The Department of Revenue contended that Southern
Bell purchased title and exclusive posession to
the artwork, since that is the only way Southern
Bell could obtain the benefit of the product.
Furthermore, the transfer of tangible personal
property was not an inconsequential element of the
transaction, and the personal service exemption
did not apply in this case.
BOLDING: For Southern Bell. The Court agreed with Southern
Bell's contention that these transactions fit
within the statutory exemption, which includes
"•••professional •••or personal service transactions
which involve sales as inconsequential elements
for which no separate charges are made." (F.S.
212.08(7) (e».
The Court reached its decision after considering
the following factors:
(1) Whether or not the property to be
transferred as a result of the transac~
tion is already in existence or whether
it is produced in the course of the ser-
vices rendered1
(2) The value of the individual effort
involved in the transaction as compared
to the value of the property transferred:
(3) Whether or not it is essential to
the transaction that the specific tangi-
ble personal property is created.
The Court determined that Southern Bell met all
three of the above tests. The Court cited two
other cases in further support of its position.
In Askew v. Bell, 248 So.2d 501 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1971) the court held that a court
reporter, who for a fee records a judicial or
administrative proceeding, or takes down and
transcribes testimony, is engaged in rendering a
service and the transcript which he furnishes to
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the persons who employ him is a mere incident of
that service. The Askew court held that such a
transaction would be subject to sales tax only
when transcripts are sold to third persons who are
not parties to the proceeding for which the court
reporter was engaged.
In Nova Computing Services v. Askew, D.O.A., Case
No. 76-1475: March 1, 1977, the Department of
Revenue enacted a rule construing computer soft-
ware (punched cards, paper tape and typed sheets)
to be tangible personal property and subject to
the sales tax. Nova filed a petition challenging
the validity of the rule. The Administrative
Hearing Officer in that case found that when com-
puter software is sold it is the computer informa-
tion which is transferred, and that the magnetic
tape or punch cards which contain the information
are only the means or method of transmitting it
from the originator to the user. It was further
determined that the tangible property (i.e.',punch
cards) involved in the process was an inconsequen-
tial element for which no separate charges were
made, the consequential element being intangible
property (computer information) which was not sub-
ject to the sales tax on tangible personal prop-
erty. The conclusion was that Nova and other
similar corporations were selling services to
their customers which were exempt from the sales
tax.
No. )6
SPENCER GIFTS, INC. v. DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF TAXATION
182 N.J. Super. 179, 440A.2d 104 (N.J. Tax ct. 1981)
SUBJECT: Software and sales and use taxation.
ISSUES: (1) Does the leasing of· computer information
constitute the leasing of tangible personal prop-
erty subject to either the sales or use tax?
(2) Is the rental of computer mailing lists sub-
ject to sales tax as a taxable advertising ser-
vice?
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FACTS: Spencer was engaged in the Dusiness of selling
merchandise by mail order. In connection with
that business it leases and pays for mailing list
information which is received in the form of
magnetic tapes.
Spencer leases and pays for mailing list informa-
tion. The magnetic tapes from which this informa-
tion is derived by Spencer's computer are the
means by which the desired information is trans-
mitted from the vendor to Spencer, the purchaser.
The information on the tapes is extracted by
Spencer's computer in a matter of minutes and
stored in the memory units of that computer. The
tapes are then promptly returned, unchanged, to
the lessor. The acquired information is used
shortly thereafter by Spencer for addressing and
for personalizing mailings. In most cases, no
further use can be made of the mailing list data
without addit"ionalpayments to the vendor. Spencer
pays no specific charge for or deposit on the
tapes themselves. The rental charge bears no
relation to the cost of the tape or the amount of
time the tape is in Spencer's possession. The
rental charges are based on the quantity and qual-
ity of the information contained on the tapes, not
on the physical attributes of the tape. In pur-
chasing mailing list information Spencer is solely
concerned with the quality and quantity of the
information it is acquiring, or, in the parlance
of the industry, the ·pull· of a particular list,
i.e., the number and nature of customers a partic-
ular list will attract. For example, Spencer may
seek lists containing the names of other com-
panies' customers, lists of addresses from certain
zip code areas, lists of persons who have been
solicited but who have not purchased iterns from
another vendor, lists of subscribers to certain
publications, or lists of persons in certain age
groups 1 and it balances the expected yield of a
list against its cost. Spencer is not concerned
about whose brand of magnetic tape will be sent,
how many reels of tape will be sent or about other
physical characteristics of the tapes, and those
physical characteristics do not determine cost.
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The fees paid by Spencer wfor the right to acquire
information from magnetic tapes" ranged from $30
to ·$35 per thousand names. Such information is
treated by plaintiff's lessors was valuable and
confidential business information." The informa-
tion purchased is on magnetic tapes each of which
contain anywhere from 5,000 to 500,000 names and
addresses. The cost of leasing one tape could
therefore range from between $150 to $175 for a
s,OOO-name tape to between $15,000 and $17,500 for
a 500,aaa-name tape. The approximate cost of a
reel of blank magnetic tape is $10.50 for a
2,400-foot reel.
The issue before the court is whether the leasing
of computer information is the leasing of tangible
personal property subject to tax under either
N.J.S.A. 54:32B-3 (sales tax) or N.J.S.A.
54:32B-6 (use tax), or, if intangible personal
property and not so subject to tax, whether such
leasing is taxable as advertising services under
N.J.S.A. 54:32B-3(b)(5). The act taxes every
retail sale of tangible personal property unless
the sale is specifically exempted from tax, but
only specified services are taxed in the act.
BOLDING: For Spencer. The Court held that the: (1) leasing
of computer information is not the leasing of
tangible personal property and is not subject to
either sales or use taxation, and (2) the rental
of computer mailing lists is not subject to sales
tax as a taxable advertising service.
The Director's contention that Alan Drey Co., Inc.
v. State Tax Commission, 67 A.D. 1055, 413
N.Y.S.2d 516 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979), controls the
disposition of this case was rejected by the Court
because New Jersey has no counterpart to the New
York statute that taxes information. In support
of its position that the leasing of computer
information is not taxable, Spencer cited District
of Columbia v. Universal Com~uter Associates,
Inc., 465 F.2d 615 (D.C. C1r. 1972), First
NatIonal Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d
548 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), Alabama v. Central
Computer Services, Inc., 349 So.2d 1160 (Ala.
1977) J and First National Bank of Springfield v.
Revenue Department, 85 Ill.2d 84, 51 Ill. Dec.667, 421 N.E.2d 175 (Ill. 1981).
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In Fingerhut Products Co. v. Revenue Commissioner,
258 N.W.2d 606 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1977), the tax-
payer, a direct mail merchandiser of a wide range
of consumer products, obtained names and addresses
of prospective customers from mailing-list brokers.
The lists reflected a broad spectrum of demographic
data, such as income, family size, location and
history of mail order purchasing. The names and
addresses supplied by the broker were intended for
one-time use only. The applicable Minnesota
statute imposed a use tax "for the privilege of
using, storing or consuming in Minnesota tangible
personal property." Minn. Stat. 297 A.14. The
issue before the court was whether the mailing
lists were "tangible personal property" within the
meaning of the statute. The information came to
the taxpayer from the broker in the form of
Cheshire tapes, gummed labels, heat transfers but
that the typed lists themselves were not taxable.
In reaching its conclusions the court said that in
the case of the tapes, labels and heat transfers,
the physical manifestation of the property is
itself used. However, in the case of the mailing
lists, the court said it was dealing with incor-
poreal information and that the use of the tangi-
ble medium of typed mailing lists was merely
incidental to the use of that information. The
court referred to Dun & Bradstreet v. New York
City, 276 N.Y. 198, 11 N.E.2d 728 (Ct. App. 1927).
The Court also referred to Williams & Lee Scouting
Service, Inc. v. Calvert, 452 S.W.2d 789 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1970)1 Janesville DataCenter, Inc. v.
Wisconsin Revenue Department, 84 Wis.2d 341, 267
N.W.2d 656 (Wis. 1978), Bullock v. Statistical
Tabulating Corp., 549 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977), Accountants Computer Services, Inc. v.
Kosydar, 35 Ohio St.2d 120, 298 N.E.2d 519 (Ohio
1973), Andrew Jergens Co. v. Kosydar, 35 Ohio
St.2d 120, 298 N.E.2d 519 (Ohio 1973), Avco Broad-
casting Corp. v. Lindley, 53 Ohio St.2d 64, 372
N.E.2d 350 (Ohio 1978), and Credit Bureau of Miami
County, Inc. v. Collins, 50 Ohio St.2d 270, 364
N.E.2d 27 (Ohio 1977), in support of its position.
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No. 37STATE OF ALABAMA v. CENTRAL COMPUTER SERVICES, INC.
349 So.2d 1160 (1977)
SUBJECT: Tangibility of computer software for Alabama use
tax purposes.
ISSOE: Is computer software tangible property subject to
the Alabama use tax?
FACTS: Central Computer Services, Inc., paid $236,400 to
University Computing Company of Texas for a
ninety-nine year license for the use of eight com-
puter programs. This software was used to program
Central Computer Services (CCS) computer which
provides data processing services for banks affil-
iated with Central Bancshares of the South, Inc.
Upon receipt of the software, CCS extracted the
information contained on the magnetic tapes and
punched cards, and transferred the programs to
magnetic discs owned by CCS. The tapes were then
returned to University Computing Company and the
cards were thrown away. The Alabama State Depart-
ment of Revenue assessed a use tax of $13,519.91
against CCS for its purchase of the eight computer
programs. CCS alleged the programs wereintangi-
b1e property and therefore not subject to the use
tax.
BOLDING: For CCS. What was purchased by CCS was the infor-
mation or knowledge which went into the develop-
ment of the eight programs and not the magnetic
tapes and punched cards themselves. The magnetic
tapes and punched cards were merely the means by
which this information or knowledge was trans-
ferred.
The State contended that the magnetic tapes and
punched cards are a necessary, integral part of
the computer program and that because these items
are tangible, there was a purchase of taxable
tangible personal property by CCS.
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In its argument, the State cited Boswell v.
Raramount Television Sales, Inc., 291 Ala. 490,
282 So.2d 892 (1973). In that case, the court
held that the leasing of movie films and tapes by
Paramount to television stations in Alabama
involved the leasing of tangible personal property
rather than an intangible right to publish as
Paramount argued.
The Court in the present case distinguished the
magnetic tapes and punched cards from the movie
films. In Boswell, the Court noted that the right
to publish or broadcast the motion picture was
physically inseparable from the movie film itself.
The physical presence of the movie film is essen-
tial to broadcasting the intangible artistic
efforts of the actors.
However, in the present case, the physical pre-
sence of magnetic tapes and punched cards is not
essential to the transmittal of the desired infor-
mation from its creator at University Computing
Company to CCS. This information can also be
telephoned to the computer or brought into Alabama
in the mind of an employee of University Computing
Company.
In its summary, the Court said that:
ft ••• we find in the present case that
there is an incidental physical com-
mingling of the intangible information
sought by Central Computer Services and
the tangible magnetic tapes and punched
cards themselves. We therefore hold
that the essence of this transaction was
the purchase of nontaxable intangible
information." (349 So.2d at 1162).
This case was a case of first impression in
Alabama (meaning no case having a similar fact
pattern had previously been tried in Alabama).
The Court's decision was influenced by Commerce
Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976)
and District of Columbia v. Universal Computer
Associates, Inc., 151 U.S. App. D.C. 30, 465 F.2d
615 (1972). Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell held
that computer software is intangible and therefore
not subject to the Tennessee sales tax.
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District of Columbia v. Universal Computer
Associates, Inc. held that computer software was
not subject to the District of Columbia personal
property tax on tangible property. In the
District of Columbia case, the Court described the
nature of software as follows:
••••It is the information derived by
the machine from the cards which stays
in the computer, and which is employed
repeatedly by the machine when it is
used by Universal. What rests in the
machine, then, is an intangible--'know-
ledge '--which can hardly be thought to
be subject to a personal property tax.
The only viable evidence of that know-
ledge, the punched pasteboard, could be
stacked in a warehouse, returned to IBM,
or destroyed, without interfering with
the efficiency of the computer machine
to perform its designed function. II
(151 U.S. App. D.C. at 33, 465 F.2d at
618).
NOTE: Rule C28-00l exempts both prewritten and custom
programs from sales and use taxation.
No. )8 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS, INC. v. UNITED STATES
551 F.2d 599, 39 AFTR2d 77-1383 (5th Cir. 1977)
SUBJECT: Tangibility of computer tapes for investment tax
credit and depreciation purposes.
ISSUE: Are computer tapes, including the value of the
data contained therein, considered tangible prop-
erty for investment tax credit and depreciation
purposes?
PACTS: A taxpayer is entitled to claim an investment tax
credit equal to a specified percent of the basis
of ·Section 38 property.· Under Section 48(a)(1)
of the Internal Revenue Code, "Section 38 property"
is defined to include "tangible personal property."
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Similarly, a taxpayer is entitled to a deduction
for depreciation under the double-declining bal-
ance'method if the depreciable property is ·tangi-
ble personal property."
During 1968 and 1969, a subsidiary of Texas
Instruments was engaged in the business of col-
lecting, process1ng and selling or licensing
offshore seismic information to various customers
who in turn used that information to explore for
oil and gas. While the information was furnished
to the customer in picture form depicting the con-
tours of the earth's different strata, the actual
collection and editing process involved a compli-
cated computer process.
Seismic data were transmitted by electronic
impulses and transcribed onto magnetic computer
tapes known as •field· tapes. From these field
tapes a ·final· or ·output" tape was produced,
from which the pictures were produced.
When a customer placed an order for the informa-
tion, he received a copy of the original picture
produced by the process, a map locating the points
where the sound waves were introduced into the
earth, and a report outlining the conditions under
which the tests were conducted. The TI subsidiary
company retained all field and output tapes as
well as the original analog film. Information
furnished on the picture to customers was licensed
on a non-exclusive basis. Customers were generally
not permitted to make the data available to
others.
Costs incurred in 1968 and 1969 were in excess of
$3,000,000, and were deducted by the taxpayer as
ordinary and necessary business expenses. The
Internal Revenue Service disallowed these deduc-
tions and determined that the costs should be
capitalized and amortized over a seven year
period. TI did not dispute this determination but
insisted that it was entitled to take an invest-
ment tax credit and use the double-declining
balance method of depreciation on the total capi-
talized costs of the field tapes, output tapes and
analog film. The IRS contended that these tax
benef i ts are applicable only to the cost of the
raw tape and film itself not to the full cost of
producing the tapes and film.
At the district court level (407 F.Supp. 1326),
the government's position was sustained on two
grounds. First, when a taxpayer places into ser-
vice tangible personal property that he produced
himself, the investment tax credit may be taken
only for the costs of the tangible inputs used.
Labor and other intangible costs must be excluded.
Since TI failed to allocate its costs between tan-
gible and intangible inputs, no investment tax
credit may be claimed. Second, the costs incurred
in producing and processing the seismic data on
the tapes and film did not constitute making an
investment in tangible property, but rather intan-
gible information.
On appeal, the government conceded that the dis-
trict court's analysis on the first ground was
erroneous, but sought to sustain the district
court's judgment on the second ground, arguing
that if the capital asset in which the taxpayer's
costs are invested is essentially intangible, then
all costs of acquiring or producing that asset
constitute the basis of an intangible asset and
the investment tax credit and the double declining
method of depreciation are unavailable.
BOLDING: For Texas Instruments. Treasury Regulation Sec-
tion 1.48-1(F) states that:
..Intangible property, such as
patents, copyrights, and subscription
lists, does not qualify as Section 38
property. The cost of intangible prop-
erty, in the case of a patent or copy-
right, includes all costs of purchasing
or producing the item patented or copy-
righted. Thus, in the case of a motion
picture or television film or tape, the
cost of the intangible property includes
manuscript and screen-play costs, the
cost of wardrobe and set design, the
salaries of cameramen, actors, direc-
tors, etc., and all other costs properly
includible in the basis of such film or
tape."
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Treasury regulations are ordinarily entitIed to
considerable weight in construing the statutory
language. However, the Court pointed out that the
Ninth Circuit had previously ruled the regulation
to be invalid as applied to film (Walt Disney
Productions v. United States, 327 F.Supp. 189
(C.D. Cal. 1971)1 aff'd. 2!!. appeal, 480 F.2d 66
(9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 934, 94
S.Ct. 1451, 39 L.Ed.2d 493 (1974», and the pre-
sent Court stated its agreement with the Ninth
Circuit's decision. When Congress reenacted the
investment tax credit in 1971, it expressly indi-
cated its agreement with the Disney holding that
motion pictures and TV films are tangible personal
property eligible for the investment tax credit.
(S. Rep. No. 92-437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 34, 1971
U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, pp. 1918, 1941
(1971». Furthermore, the Tax Reform Act of 1976
added Section 48(k) to the Internal Revenue Code,
and treats motion picture and TV films as tangible
personal property eligible for the investment tax
credit (see also Treasury Regulation Section7.48-l(a».
In the present case the Court held that the prop-
erty in question is tangible personal property and
therefore qualifies for the investment tax credit
and for the use of the double declining balance
method of depreciation. For investment tax credit
and depreciation purposes the basis of tangible
tapes and films on which the taxpayer recorded
seismic data includes the cost of collecting the
data and recording it on the raw tapes and film.
No. 39 TRIANGLE UNDERWRITERS, INC. v. HONEYWELL, INC.
475 P.Supp. 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1978),
rev'd. ~ other grounds, 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979)
SUBJECT: Purchase of a "turn-key" system and the Uniform
Commercial Code.
ISSUE: Does the purchase of a ·turn-key· system consti-
tute the sale of a service or the sale of a
"good"?
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FACTS: Triangle replaced its IBM system with a Honeywell
system after assurances from Honeywell that their
system would outperform IBM's, and that the system
would be "turn-key· tthe system would be pre-
prepared and could virtually be plugged in and
ready to function immediately).
Triangle elected to purchase rather than lease the
hardware, and a contract of sale was entered into.
Honeywell's compensation was limited to the pur-
chase price of the hardware1 it did not bill for
services prior to, during or subsequent to instal-
lation. The agreement did not contemplate that
Honeywell would run a data processing service for
Triangle but rather that Honeywell would develop a
completed system and deliver it "turn-key· to
Triangle to operate. After the installation and
training period, Honeywell personnel were to
withdraw, and Honeywell's major remaining obliga-
tion was to be maintenance.
The "turn-key" system consisted of both hardware
and software. Honeywell supplied both standard
programming aids of general application to its
computer and "custom application software" speci-
fically designed for a customer's individual
needs.
The system never functioned properly, and Triangle
eventually went out of business, allegedly because
of the faulty system purchased from Honeywell.
Triangle sued for fraud, breach of contract and
negligence. Honeywell asserted that a cause of
action for breach of contract is barred by the
Uniform Commercial Code, which has a four year
statute of limitations for the sale of goods.
Triangle contended that the transaction in
question constituted the sale of a service, and
that a six year statute should apply.
BOLDING: For Honeywell. The facts in this case indicate
that the contract was for the sale of goods and
not services, and the Uniform Commercial Code's
four year statute of limitations for breach of
contract applies, therefore barring Triangle's
claim.
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The Court based its reasoning on North American
Leisure Corp. v. A & B Duplicators, Ltd., 468 F.2d
695, 697 (2d Cir. 1972), which held that a con-
tract is for "service" rather than "sale" when
service predominates, and the sale of items is
incidental. In Triangle, the precise converse is
true. Triangle bought Honeywell's equipment in
the hope it would outperform IBM's equipment. The
essence of the contract was for the sale of goods.
While certain services by Honeywell were contem-
plated, the contract remains one for sale if those
services were merely incidental or collateral to
the sale of goods. (Dynamics Corporation of
America v. International Harvester Co., 429
F.Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1977».
Honeywell's compensation was limited to the pur-
chase price for the hardware1 it did not bill for
services prior, during or subsequent to installa-
tion. These are recognized indicia of a contract
for the sale of goods, and not the rendition of
professional services. (Aluminum Company of
America v. Electro Flo Corporation, 451 F.2d 1115,
1118 (10th Cir. 1971».
No. 40 ULTRONIC SYSTEMS CORP. v. BOARD OF
ASSESSORS OF BOSTON
355 Mass. 284, 244 R.E.2d 318 (1969)
SUBJECT: Peripheral equipment as personal property subject
to the personal property tax.
ISSUE: Is a computer memory drum subject to the Massachu-
setts personal property tax?
FACTS: Ultronic's memory drum was used solely to elec-
tronically receive, store, transmit, speed up, or
slow down a vast supply of information sold by
Ultronic through leased machinery. All the leased
property would be totally inoperative without the
drum, which stores information and sends it out
again over telephone lines. The Massachusetts
statute (General Laws, chapter 59, paragraph 5)
exempts from personal property taxation all per-
sonal property owned by a corporation other than
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"machinery used in the conduct of the business,
which .•.shall not be deemed to include stock in
trade or any personal property directly used•.•in
any purchasing, selling, accounting or administra-
tive function."
Ultronic contended that the computer memory drum,
both electronically and from a business viewpoint,
is an integral part of Ultronic's stock in trade,
since without it the wall panels and desk units on
lease would be of no use to its customers.
BOLDING: The drum is subject to the personal property tax.
Citing Board of Assessors of City of Brockton v.
Brockton Olympia Realty Co., 322 Mass. 351, 77
N.E.2d 391, the Court held that the statute does
not exempt machinery principally involved in pro-
ducing or processing the taxpayer's stock in
trade, which in this case is information.
No. 41 UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS v. SCIO TOWNSHIP
76 Mich. App. 616, 257 N.W.2d 265 (1977),
leave to appeal denied, 402 Mich. 880 (1978)
SUBJECT: Master film negatives as tangible personal property
subject to personal property tax.
ISSUE: Can a tangible personal property tax be assessed
on the net book value of master negative micro-
films?
FACTS: University Microfilms (UM) is in the business of
supplying copies of printed material to scholars
and libraries. UM has copied rare books, early
English and American books, periodicals, doctoral
dissertations and other sources onto microfilm.
These microfilmed copies, called master negatives,
are kept in a vault. Additional copies are pro-
duced upon request from these master negatives and
sold to customers in microfilm or photocopy form.
Scio Township assessed a personal property tax on
the master negatives based on their net book
value. UM contended that its master negatives are
not subject to Michigan's personal property tax
870
because: (1) the master negatives are intangible
property because the value of the property is in
the information that is stored and not in the film
itself, and (2) if the master negatives are held
to be tangible personal property, they are special
tools and therefore exempt from the tax.
BOLDINGz For Scio Township. In support of its contention
that the master negatives are intangible personal
property, UM cited a line of Michigan cases
holding real estate abstract books to be intangi-
ble (See Bay Trust Co. v. Bay City, 280 Mich. 44,
273 N.W. 437 (1937); Loomis v. City of Jackson,
130 Mich. 594, 90 N.W. 328 (1902); Perry v. Big
Rapids, 67 Mich. 146, 34 N.W. 530 (1887); Dart v.
woodhouse, 40 Mich. 399 29 Am. Rep. 544 (1879».
Also cited were cases holding computer software to
be intangible. (See District of Columbia v.
Universal Computer Associates, Inc., 151 U.S. App.
D.C. 30, 465 F.2d 615 (1972); Texas Instruments,
Inc. v. United States, 407 F.Supp. 1326 (N.D. Tex
1976); Greyhound Computer Corp. v. State Depart-
ment of Assessments and Taxation, 271 Md. 674, 320
A.2d 52 (1974». UM argued that its master nega-
tives are analogous to real estate abstract books
and computer software because they are only valu-
able for the information they contain.
Scio Township argued that UM's supply of master
negatives is in actuality a library and that
libraries which exist for profit are subject to
taxation. Furthermore, UM's master negatives are
not abstracts or computer software, so the cases
cited do not apply.
The Court distinguished the abstract and software
cases from the present case on several grounds.
Whereas the value of an abstract book depends on
its continual updating, the value of UM's master
negatives does not. In fact, the very reason that
UM's material is in demand is because it is in the
original and unchanged. UM has not added to the
original print on paid someone with expert know-
ledge to systematize relevant material into a new
product, as is done with computer software. The
value of the information is not peculiar to UM
alone, but is valuable in and of itself. It is
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NOTE:
for these reason~ that UM's master negatives were
held to be tangible property. The master nega-
tives did not qualify for exemption as special
tools because they did not meet the definition of
special tools.
Compare the holding in this case with that of
Michael Todd Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 57
Cal.2d 684, 21 Cal. Rptr. 604, 371 P.2d 340
(1962)1 Walt Disney Productions v. United States
(Disney I), 327 F.Supp. 189 (C.D. Cal. 1971,
aff'd. as modified, 480 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1973),
32 AFTR:2d 73-5094, cert. denied, 415 U.S. 934, 94
S.Ct. 1451, 39 L.Ed.2d 493 (1974)1 Walt Disney
Productions v. United States (Disney III), 549
F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 1977) 39 AFTR2d 77-796.
No. 42
WALT DISNEY PRODUCTIONS v. UNITED STATES (Disney I)
327 F.Supp. 189 (C.D. Cal. 1971),
aff'd. as modified,
480 F.2d 66 (9th Cir.-r973), 32 AFTR2d 73-5094,
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 934, 94 S. Ct. 1451,
39 L.Ed.2d 493 (1974)
SUBJECT: Tangibility of motion picture film negatives for
investment tax credit purposes.
ISSUES: (1) Are motion picture film negatives tangible
personal property for federal tax purposes? (2)
Do motion picture film negatives qualify for the
investment tax credit?
FACTS: The district court held that the master motion
picture film negatives in question, produced in
1962, and used in the film manufacturing process
were tangible personal property within the meaning
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, that they
had a useful life of more than 8 years, that they
were depreciable, and that they were eligible for
the investment tax credit. The Commissioner con-
tended that the negatives were not tangible per-
sonal property within the meaning of IRC Section
48(a)(1)(A) and that they did not have a useful
life of eight years, and could therefore not
qualify for the investment tax credit.
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Film negatives are used to make prints, which are
copyrighted and exhibited in theaters or on tele-
vision. The negatives are not copyrighted. The
Commissioner argued that all labor and production
costs of the negatives be attributed to the
copyrighted prints.
BOLDING: For Walt Disney Productions. Motion picture film
negatives are tangible personal property (not
withstanding Reg. 1.48-l(F), which the Court held
to be invalid) and the negatives in question had a
useful life sufficiently long to qualify for the
investment credit. Film negatives, like produc-
tion machinery, are standardized units of depreci-
able property which Disney uses to produce other
products, the positive prints. The attribution of
all the value of the film to the copyright, like
the attribution of all the value of a machine used
in production to a patent eventually procured on
it is unwarranted.
NOTE: The present case (Disney I) is the 'first of a
serie~ of Disney cases dealing with the same sub-
ject matter. Further reference may be made to
Walt Disney Productions v. United States, 74-2
USTC 9623 (C.D. Cal. 1974), appeal dismissed per
stipulation, No. 74-2988 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 1975)
(Disney II); and Walt Disney productions v. United
States, 549 F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 1977), 39 AFTR2d
77-796 (Disney III). See also Texas Instruments,
Inc. v. United States, 551 F.2d 599, 39 AFTR2d
77-1383 (5th Cir. 1977).
No. 43WALT DISNEY PRODUCTIONS v. UNITED STATES (Disney III)
549 F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 1977), 39 AFTR2d 77-796
SOBJECT: Tangibility of motion picture film negatives for
investment tax credit purposes.
ISSOES: (1) Are motion picture film negatives tangible
personal property for federal tax purposes? (2)
Do motion picture film negatives qualify for the
investment tax credit? (3) If the negatives do
qualify for investment tax credit, must a portion
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PACTS:
of the .cr ed I t be recaptured in years when the
income derived from the positive prints is earned
predominantly outside the United States, even
though the negatives remain in the USA?
Walt Disney Productions sued for a tax refund,
claiming the investment tax credit under 26 U.S.C.
Sections 38, 46-50 (1970) for the cost of fourteen
film negatives produced in 1970. The district
court granted the refund and the government
appealed.
Disney sought the investment tax credit for the
production costs of the master negative which is
used to produce positive prints. In calculating
the investment credit, Disney claimed all the
capitalized costs necessary to produce the master
negative. These costs include preparing a script
from a story, building sets, hiring and rehearsing
talent, and editing the original film negatives
and -mixing· the audio (dialogue, music and sound
effects) tapes to produce the cut picture negative
and magnetic master sound tape. Disney did not
claim the costs incurred in producing the comple-
tion negatives and did not claim as investment
credit property the original or edited dialogue,
music or sound-effect tapes, although the expense
for those items was claimed in computing the pro-
duction costs of the master negative.
The depreciable base included the capitalized
costs of producing answer prints, including the
costs of the optical sound negatives but not
including the costs of the intermediate printing
articles. The income-forecast method was used to
depreciate each film title, a method that is
generally used to depreciate intangible personal
property.
On its 1970 tax return, Disney claimed an invest-
ment tax credit equal to seven percent of its
alleged qualified investment in the master nega-
tives produced during that taxable year. The
Commissioner disallowed the investment tax credit
on the ground that Disney's production costs were
investments in intangible property, a copyright-
protected motion picture. The government main-
tained that, while a master negative includes
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tangible items such as film stock and tapes, these
tangible "things" have no separate identities or
depreciation bases for tax purposes apart from the
photoplay and intangible rights included in the
finished product. The master negatives at issue
in this case are the same type of property that
the Court previously characterized as qualifying
for the investment tax credit in Disney I and
Disney II (see previous case).
The government further argued that, since Disney
treated the property in question as intangible for
depreciation purposes, it must also be considered
as intangible (and therefore not eligible) for
investment tax credit purposes. The government
also contended that even if Disney's production
costs could qualify for the credit, a portion of
the credit allowed for prior taxable years was
subject to recapture because the motion pictures
involved were exhibited predominantly outside the
United States in 1970. In that year, more than 50
percent of Disney's gross receipts from exhibition
of prints produced from 1962-69 master negatives
came from foreign sources.
BOLDING: For Disney. Master negatives used in the film
manufacturing process were held to be tangible
property for investment tax credit purposes. The
full 7 percent credit could be claimed because the
negatives had a sufficiently long useful life.
The fact that the motion pictures involved were
exhibited outside the United States in 1970 did
not subject a portion of the investment tax credit
allowed for prior taxable years to recapture.
The decision reached in the present case (Disney
III) is in keeping with that reached in Disney I,
where an analogy was made between master negatives
and a machine that stamps out patented products
for sale. The stamping machine is tangible even
though the product it produces is protected by an
intangible copyright. The same is true of master
film negatives. Legislative history (discussed in
more detail in Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United
States) also indicates that it was the intent of
Congress that the master film negatives be treated
as tangible property qualifying for the investment
tax credit.
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Treasury Regulation Section 1.48-1(g)(i) provides
that property physically located outside the
United States during .more than 50 percent of the
year shall be considered used predominantly out-
side the United States, which would make the prop-
erty ineligible for the investment tax credit.
However, the master negatives (upon which the
investment tax credit was claimed) remained in the
united States throughout 1970. Only the exhibi-
tion prints left the country, and the investment
tax credit was not claimed on them. Therefore, no
investment tax credit need be recaptured.
The Court also held that even though the property
in question may be treated as intangible for
depreciation purposes, such treatment does not
preclude tangible treatment for purposes of the
investment tax credit.
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APPENDIX D
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
PRONOUNCEMENTS
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REV. RUL. 71-177
Summary:
the cost
separately
For depreciation and investment credi t purposes,
of a new computer includes software cost not
stated and capitalized in accordance with the
taxpayer's consistent practice.
Text: During 1968, a taxpayer purchased a new computer.
The cost of the software provided wi th the com-
puter was not separately stated. In accordance
with his consistent practice, the taxpayer capital-
ized the entire cost of the computer, including
the cos t of the software provided with it, and
deducted depreciation thereon based upon a useful
life in excess of four years.
Held, the cost of the computer, in the instant
case, includes the cost of the software provided
with it for purposes of the depreciation allowed
under Section 167 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 and the investment credit allowed under
Section 38 of the Code.
REV. RUL. 71-248
Summary: The capitalization of software costs with respect
to a new computer where such costs had previously been
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expensed is a change in method of accounting requiring the
Commissioner's consent.
Text: Advice has been requested as to the proper treat-
ment for Federal income tax purposes of certain
software costs under the circumstances described
below.
A corporation purchased a computer in 1965 which
is still in use. Software costs incurred in con-
nection with that computer have been expensed for
both book and Federal income tax purposes.
In 1970, the corporation purchased a new computer
which was installed in 1971. The installation of
the new computer required the development by the
corporation of an entirely new set of software for
use with it. Software costs were incurred by the
corporation in 1970 in connection with programming
the new computer that the corporation desires to
defer and amortize. Annual software costs in
small mounts will continue to be incurred and
deducted with respect to the old computer.
Specifically, the question here relates to whether
the deferral and amortization of software cost
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incurred in connection with the new computer would
constitute a change in method of accounting
requiring the Commissioner's consent.
Section 3.01-1 of Revenue Procedure 69-21, C.B.
1969-2, 303, states that the costs of developing
software by a taxpayer (whether or not the par-
ticular software is patented or copyrighted), in
many respects, so closely resemble the kind of
research and experimental expenditures that fall
within the purview of Section 174 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 as to warrant accounting
treatment similar to that accorded such costs
under that Section. Accordingly, it was stated
that the Service would not disturb a taxpayer's
treatment of costs incurred in developing software
where all the costs properly attributable to the
development of software by the taxpayer are con-
sistently treated as current expenses and deducted
in full in accordance with rules similar to those
applicable under Section l74(a) of the Code.
In addition, Section 3.01-2 of Revenue Procedure
69-21 states that the Service would not disturb a
taxpayer's treatment of costs incurred in its
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developing software where all the cost properly
attributable to the development of software by the
taxpayer are consistently treated as capital
expenditures that are recoverable through deduc-
tions for ratable amortization, in accordance with
rules similar to those provided by Section l74(b)
of the Code, and the regulations thereunder, over
a period of five (5) years from the date of com-
pletion of such development or over a shorter
period where the taxpayer clearly establishes that
such costs have a useful life of less than five
(5) years.
Section 1.174-3(a) of the Income Tax Regulations
permits research and experimental expenditures to
be treated on a project-by-project basis.
Revenue Ruling 68-144, 1968-1, C.B. 85, holds that
where a taxpayer had elected to currently expense
all research and experimental expenditures with
the exception of those on particular projects to
which the deferred expense method was elected, it
cannot in a later year elect the deferred expense
method on new projects unless permission is
granted by the Commissioner.
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Since, as stated above, the costs of developing
software closely resemble the kind of research and
experimental expenditures that fall within the
purview of Section 174 of the Code, such software
costs may be treated on a project-by-project
basis. Thus, the corporation which has treated as
current deductions the costs of software in con-
nection with the old computer, may capitalize
software costs with respect to the new computer
only where permission is granted by the Commis-
sioner.
An application for permission to change to a dif-
ferent method of treating software costs shall be
in writing and shall be addressed to the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, Attention T:I,
Washington, D.C. 20024. The application shall
include the name and address of the taxpayer,
shall be signed by the taxpayer (or his duly
authorized representative), and shall be filed no
later than the last day of the first taxable year
for which the change in method is to apply. The
application sha11--
882
1. State the first year to which the
requested change is to be applicable;
2. State whether the change is to apply to
all software costs paid or incurred, or
only to expenditures at;.tributable to a
particular project;
3. Include such information as will iden-
tify the projects to which the change is
applicable;
4. Indicate the number of months selected
for amortization of the costs, if any,
which are to be treated as deferred
expenses;
5. State that, upon approval of the appli-
cation, the taxpayer will make an
accounting segregation on his books and
records of software costs to which the
change is to apply;
6. State the reasons for the change.
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REV. PROC. 69-21
Summary: Guidelines in connection with the examination of
Federal income tax returns involving costs incurred to deve-
lop, purchase, or lease computer software.
Text: section 1. Purpose
The purpose of this Revenue Procedure is to pro-
vide guidelines to be used in connection with the
examination of Federal income tax returns
involving the costs of computer software.
Section 2. Background
For the purpose of this Revenue Procedure,
"computer software· includes all programs or
routines used to cause a computer to perform a
desired task or set of tasks, and the documen-
tation required to describe and maintain those
programs. computer programs of all classes, for
example, operating systems, executive systems,
monitors, compilers and translaters, assembly
routines, and utility programs, as well as appli-
cation programs, are included. "Computer soft-
ware" does not include procedures which are
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external to computer operations, such as instruc-
tions to transcription operators and external
control procedures.
Section 3. Costs of Developing Software
.01 The costs of developing software (whether or
not the particular software is patented or
copyrighted), in many respects, so closely
resemble the kind of research and experimen-
tal expenditures that fall within the purview
of Section 174 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 as to warrant accounting treatment
similar to that accorded such costs under
that Section. Accordingly, the Internal
Revenue Service will not disturb a taxpayer's
treatment of cost incurred in developing
use or to besoftware, either
held by him for
where:
for his own
sale or lease to others,
1• All of the costs properly attribu-
table to the development of software
by the taxpayer are consistently
treated as current expenses and
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deducted in full in accordance with
rules similar to those applicable
under Section 174(a) of the Code; or
2. All of the costs properly attribut-
able to the development of software
by the taxpayer are consistently
treated as capital expenditures that
are recoverable through deductions
for ratable amortization, in accord-
ance with rules similar to those
provided by Section 174(b) of the
Code and the regulations thereunder,
over a period of five (5) years from
the date of completion of such devel-
opment or over a shorter period where
such costs are attributable to the
development of software that the
taxpayer clearly establishes has a
useful life of less than five (5)
years.
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Section 4. Costs of Purchased Software
.01 With respect to cost of purchased software,
the Service will not disturb the taxpayer's
treatment of such costs if the following
practices are consistently followed:
1. Where such costs are included,
without being separately stated, in
the cost of the hardware (computer)
and such costs are treated as a part
of the cost of the hardware that is
capitalized and depreciated1 or
2. Where such costs are separately
stated, and the software is treated
by the taxpayer as an intangible
asset the cost of which is to be
recovered by amortization deductions
ratably over a period of five (5)
years or such shorter period as can
be established by the taxpayer as
appropriate in any particular case
if the useful life of the software
in his hands will be less than five
years.
887
Section 5. Leased Software
Where a taxpayer leases software for use in his
trade or business, the Service will not disturb a
deduction allowable under the provisions of
Section 1.162-11 of the Income Tax Regulations,
for rental.
Section 6. Application
.01 The costs of development of software in
accordance with the above procedures will be
treated as a method of accounting. Any
change in the treatment of such costs is a
change in method of accounting subject to the
provisions of Sections 446 and 481 of the
Code and the regulations thereunder•
•02 For taxable years ending after October 27,
1969, the date of publication of this Revenue
Procedure, the Service will not disturb the
taxpayer's treatment of software costs that
are handled in accordance with the practices
described in this Revenue procedure.
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.03 For taxable years ending prior to the date of
pUblication of this Revenue Procedure, the
Service will not disturb the taxpayer's
treatment of software costs except to the
extent that such treatment is markedly incon-
sistent with the practices described in this
Revenue Procedure. For the purpose of
applying the preceding sentence, the absence
of any formal election similar to that
required by Section 174 of the Code, or the
amortization of capitalized software costs
over a period other than the five-year period
specified in Section 174(b) of the Code, will
not characterize the taxpayer's treatment of
such costs as markedly inconsistent with the
principles of this Revenue procedure.
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DATA PROCESSING MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
POSITION STATEMENT
SOFTWARE TAXATION
(Adopted by DPMA Executive Council August, 1977,
modified by DPMA Executive Council July, 1981,
and authorized for re-issue)
The Tennessee Supreme Court defined computer software as
"information and directions loaded into the machine which
dictates different functions for the machine to perform.
What triggers these functions are referred to broadly as
'programs,' and are often accompanied by magnetic tapes and
discs, punch cards, manuals, flow charts, and expert engine-
ering assistance to comprise what is known in the industry
as computer software." Commerce Union Bank vs. George
Tidwell, June 14, 1976.
According to the decision, congruous with early deci-
sions by courts in Alabama and Florida followed by subse-
quent rulings in other states, computer software is an
intangible personal service. Any tangible property, if
used, is an inconsequential element of intangible software
for that:
891
1. Said software may be entered into a computer
directly or via telephone lines with no
tangible property with the identical result as
if tangible property were used as .the input
communications medium.
2. Such communications media are merely inter-
mediate input means of entering software into
a computer on a one-time basis before it is
transformed into its tangible end state of
binary pulses.
3. Said tangible
destroyed or
property, if
reused after
any,
being
is either
used to
transfer the intangible information therein to
the computer on a one-time basis leaving
instructions (program) and information (data)
in the computer in the form of binary pulses
as the intangible end state.
4. The value of said tangible property, if any,
is small, five percent or less, in comparison
to the value of said intangible software.
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5. Any tangible property, if used, has virtually
no value in itself. Any value is in the
information which is valuable only when read
by the computer into its tangible end state of
binary pulses.
DPMA agrees that software is an intangible personal ser-
vice and believes it should be accorded the same treatment
as services by other professions under the law.
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AFP»IDIX F
SOFTWARE VENDOR QUESTIONNAIRE
June 27, 1983
Dear Financial Officer:
In view of the diversity of accounting practices, the National
Association of Accountants is conducting an important research
study concerning software accounting policies. This study is
expected to provide information that will help accounting execu-
tives make intelligent decisions in this increasingly important
area.
The results will be made available to the AICPA Task Force on
Accounting for the Development and Sale of Computer Software.
This task force will soon make a recommendation to the Accounting
Standards Executive Committee (AcSEC), which in turn will make a
recommendation to the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the
rule-making body of the accounting profession. The Securities
and Exchange Commission has also expressed an interest in seeing
the results of our survey. The NAA's Management Accounting
Practices Committee will also receive the survey results, and may
issue a Statement on Management Accounting on the topic of
accounting for software.
In order to obtain factual information, we are asking selected
executives of software vending companies to complete the enclosed
questionnaire. Most of the questions require that you check a
response or give a brief reply, so the questionnaire should not
take more than a few minutes to complete, although I would urge
you to consider each response carefully. We would also appre-
ciate any comments on the issues you choose to add.
Results will be tabulated and incorporated into the research
report. Individual company responses will be confidential.
Please send the completed questionnaire to me in the enclosed
envelope. In order to be included in the study we must receive
your responses no later than July 15. If you check the "yes" box
on the last page of the questionnaire, we shall send you a copy
of the survey results when available. If you prefer anonymity,
you may send your request separately.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Very truly yours,
Robert W. McGee
Manager, Accounting Practices
RWM/lw/MAP8A:VLl
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NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ACCOUNTANTS
919 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022
(212) 754·9700
c/o Robert W. McGee
QUESTIONNAIRE
SOFTWARE VENDORS
Instructions: Please check appropriate response(s) and answer fol/ow-up questions. If al/ software
costs including purchased software are expensed, go to question number seven.
A. Financial Reporting for Software
1. What amortization method and time period range are used for financial statement purposes
to amortize: (1) purchased software intended for: (a) internal use or (b) resale; (2) internally
developed software intended for: (a) internal use or (b) sale?
Internally
Purchased for developed for
Internal Internal
Use Resale Use Sale
None. All such costs are expensed 01
Straight nne method 02
Sum of the years digits method 03
% declining balance method 04
Units sold method 05
Other (specify) 06
Amortization period range for each
category, in years (e.g. 3-5)
2. How are software costs classified on the balance sheet?
Internally
Purchased for developed for
Internal Internal
Use Resale Use Sale
Specific current asset line item 01
Inventory 02
Other current asset 03
Specific noncurrent asset line item 04
Included in fixed assets without
separate disclosure 05
Other noncurrent assets 06
Footnote disclosure 07
Other (specify) 08
Not included on balance sheet 09
3. Software costs appearing on the balance sheet represent what percent of total assets?
--_%
4. What costs are capitalized for internally developed software that is intended for: (1) internal
use; (2) sale.
Internal
Use Sale
Feasibility costs 01
Design costs 02
Coding costs 03
Testing costs 04
Support costs 05
Service costs 06
Other (specify) 07
5. For how many years has your company been capitalizing software costs?
___ years
6. Software costs that are not expensed are capitalized because:
The matching concept 01
An asset has been created 02
tncfusion Improves our ability to raise capital 03
Inclusion improves net income and EPS 04
Other (specify) 05
7. Software costs that are not capitalized are expensed because:
Such costs are considered research and development. 01
Uncertainty as to realization makes expensing prudent. 02
R&D cost elements are not easily separated from non·R&D
costs, so all costs are expensed. 03
Our CPA firm strongly recommends that such costs be expensed.
Management is of the opinion that certain software costs
should be capitalized 04
They are immaterial in amount. 05
They are expensed for tax purposes, and we want to use the same
accounting method per tax and book whenever possible 06
Other (soectfv) 07
B. Software Accounting Policies
8. If a product intended for sale is found to be unmarketable. but the coding is partially or
wholly reusable, and is reused in a new product intended for sale:
Previously incurred costs are never borne by the new product
(all costs are borne by the original product) 01
Previously incurred costs are apportioned if appropriate and
charged to the new product. 02
All previously incurred costs will be borne by the new product. 03
9. How are development costs shared between an internally used product and a product
developed for sale that uses all or a substantial portion of the code?
Costs are shared equally between the products. 01
Costs are apportioned. (Specify) 02
All costs are borne by the internally used product. 03
All costs are borne by the product intended for sale. 04
Costs are apportioned at current rather than historical cost 05
10. Does your company provide reserves for future maintenance costs incurred in fulfilling
warranty obligations?
If "yes, .. how are such reserves estimated? _
11. Do you think the accounting treatment for purchased software should be different than the
accounting treatment for comparable internally developed software?
Yes 01
No 02
Noopinion 03
If "yes," why? _
C. Software Accounting Implications for your Company
12. The inability to include software costs on the balance sheet adversely affects your ability
to raise capital.
Agree 01
Disagree 02
No opinion 03
Comments:
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13. The inability to include software costs on the balance sheet adversely affects the interest
rate your company must pay to obtain capital.
Agree 01
Disagree 02
Noopinion 03
14. If all software development costs were expensed rather than capitalized, the level of these
expenditures for software companies would have to be much lower; companies would be
forced to put a cap on investment in new product programs in order to reflect good earn-
ings performance to shareholders.
Agree 01
Disagree 02
Noopinion 03
15. If all software development costs were expensed rather than capitalized, the price of your
company's stock. if publicly traded. would be adversely affected.
Agree 01
Disagree 02
Noopinion 03
16. If all software development costs were expensed rather than capitalized, your company's
long· term growth would be adversely affected.
Agree 01
Disagree 02
Noopinion 03
17. Your company sometimes purchases software that could be internally developed because
it is easier to justify placing purchased software costs on the balance sheet.
Agree 01
Disagree 02
Noopinion 03
18. If company policy were to expense all software costs as incurred rather than to capitalize
a portion of software costs, my company's net income would be reduced by %.
19. Has your company ever used an R&D partnership, limited partnership or other off balance
sheet arrangement in connection with software development?
Yes 01
No 02
Noopinion 03
If "yes," what were your reasons for using such an arrangement?
899
D. Taxation of Software
20. On which categories of software is the investment tax credit or R&D tax credit taken?
Investment R&D tax
tax credit credit
Internally developed software intended for
sale 01
Internally developed software intended for
internal use 02
Purchased software intended for resale 03
Purchased software intended for internal use 04
21. Is the same software item ever:
01 02
Yes No
Capitalized for financial statement purposes
and expensed for tax purposes?
Capitalized for tax purposes and expensed for
financial statement purposes?
If either of the above answers is "yes", please use this space to describe why different
treatments are used for tax and financial accounting purposes:
22. If software is capitalized for both financial statement and tax purposes, are the amortiza-
tion method and time period used the same?
01
02
If "no," please use this space to describe why different treatments are used for tax and
financial accounting purposes?
23. How is software classified:
01 02
Tangible Intangible
For federal tax purposes?
For state sales/use tax purposes?
For personal property tax purposes?
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24. Has your company been a party to litigation involving the sales taxability of software in the
last three years?
Yes
No
If "yes," which statets)?
VVhatwere the issues? __
E. Company Profile
25. VVhich public accounting firm signs the opinion for your company's financial statements?
Arthur Andersen & Co. 01
Arthur Young & Company 02
Coopers & Lybrand 03
Oeloitte Haskins & Sells 04
Ernst & Whinney 05
Main Hurdman 06
Peat, Marwick. Mitchell & Co. 07
Price Waterhouse 08
Seidman & Seidman 09
Touche Ross & Co. 10
None 11
Other (specify) 12
26. Total software related revenues for the most recent fiscal year were:
More than $50 million 01
Between $20 - $50 million 02
Between $5 - $20 million 03
Less than $5 million 04
27. The company is:
Privately held 01
Publicly held 02
28. Title of person filling out this questionnaire
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Optional Information
Company name and address
Name and telephone number of person filling out this questionnaire
Would you be willing to participate in a confidential telephone interview?
Yes
No
Would you like to receive a summary of the research results?
Yes
No
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SOFTJARE USER QUESTIONNAIRE
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NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ACCOUNTANTS
919 Third Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022
(212) 754·9700
cia Robert W. McGee
QUESTIONNAIRE
USERS OF SOFTWARE
ACCOUNTING ASPECTS
Instructions: Please check appropriate responsels} end enswer follow-up questions. IF ALL
SOFTWARE COSTS ARE EXPENSED FOR FINANCIAL STATEMENT PURPOSES, PLEASE GO TO
QUESTION NO.8.
A. Financial Reporting for Software
1. What amortization method and time period range are used for financial statement purposes
to amortize: (1) purchased/leased: (a) systems software, (b) applications software; (2) intern-
ally developed: (a) systems software, (b) applications software?
Purchased Internally developed
Systems Applications Systems Applications
Software Software Software Software
None. All such costs are expensed 01
Straight·line method 02
Sum of the years digits method 03
% declining balance method 04
Other (specify) 05
Amortization period range for each
category, in years (e.g. 3·5)
2. What costs are capitalized for internally developed software?
Systems Applications
Software Software
Feasibility costs (and other costs incurred
prior to design costs in the software
product life cycle.) 01
Design costs 02
Coding costs 03
Testing costs 04
Support costs 05
Service costs 06
Other (specify) 07
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3. For compilers, system control programs and other software that is an integral part of the
hardware, the software is:
Expensed 01
Amortized over the same period as the hardware 02
Amortized over a shorter period than the hardware 03
Other (Specify) 04
4. Software maintenance and enhancement costs are:
Maintenance Enhancement
Expensed as incurred 01
Amortized over the remaining life of 02
the original program
Assigned its own life and amortized 03
over years using the method
of amortization
Other (specify) 04
5. During the amortization period, are there periodic financial reviews or checkpoints to
determine the need for wrlte-otts of assets?
Yes
No
6. Software costs appearing on the balance sheet represent what percent of total assets?
7. Software costs that are not expensed are capitalized because:
The matching concept 01
An asset has been created 02
Capitalization improves our ability to raise capital 03
Capitalization improves net income and EPS 04
Other (specify) 05
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8. Software costs that are not capitalized are expensed because:
Such costs are considered research and development. 01
Uncertainty as to realization makes expensing prudent. 02
R&D cost elements are not easily separated from non-R&D 03
costs, so all costs are expensed.
Our CPA firm strongly recommends that such costs be expensed. 04
Management is of the opinion that certain software costs
should be capitalized.
They are immaterial in amount. 05
They are expensed for tax purposes, and we want to use the same 06
accounting method per tax and book whenever possible.
Other (specify) 07
9. How are software costs reflected on the balance sheet?
Purchased Internally developed
Systems Applications Systems Applications
Software Software Software Software
Not included in balance sheet 01
Current asset 02
Included in fixed assets without 03
separate disclosure
Other noncurrent assets 04 f
. Footnote disclosure 05
Other (specify) 06
10. If software is leased, are the accounting rules for capital leasing considered when deter-
mining how to account for the software cost?
No 03
Yes. as a matter of corporate policy 01
Yes, if the cost is more than a certain dollar amount 02
Other (specify) 04 '
11. Do you think the accounting treatment for purchased software should be different than the
accounting treatment for comparable internally developed software?
No 02
Yes 01
No opinion 03
Why?
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12. What impact, if any, has the SEC software moratorium had on your company?
B. Tax Reporting
13. On which categories of software cost is the investment tax credit or R&D tax credit taken?
Investment R&D tax Itax credit credit
Internally developed systems software. 01
Internally developed applications software 02
Purchased systems software. 03
Purchased applications software. 04
14. How is software classified:
01 : 02
Tangible Intangible
For federal tax purposes?
,
For state sales/use tax purposes?
For personal property tax purposes?
15. Is the same software item ever:
I· 01 02
I Yes No
Capitalized for financial statement purposes and expensed I
for tax purposes?
I
Capitalized for tax purposes and expensed for financial i
statement purposes?
If either of the above answers is "yes," please use this space to describe why different
treatments are used for tax and financial accounting purposes:
16. If software is capitalized for both financial statement and tax purposes, are the amortiza-
tion method and time period used the same?
Yes
No
If "no, please use this space to describe why different treatments are used for tax and
financial accounting purposes:
17. What impact, if any, will the proposed Treasury Regulations on research and experimental
expenditures, if adopted, have on your company with respect to software (reported in the
Federal Register January 21, 1983, page 2799, right column)?
Please feel free to elaborate on any answer given, and to Include any other data that you feel
would make this study more meaningful.
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c. Company Profile
18. A. If your primary business is manufacturing or transportation, annual sales for the most
recent fiscal year were:
More than $1 billion 01
$500 million to $1 billion 02
Less than $500million 03
B. If your primary business is Financial services or a public utility, assets at the end of the
most recent fiscal year were:
$5 billion or less 02
More than $5 billion 01
19. Do you consider your company to be primarily involved in:
Manufacturing 01
Financial Services 02
Other Sevices 03
Transportation 04
Public Utility 05
Other (specify) 06
Title of person filling out this questionnaire
NAA 6&07183
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Optional Information
Company name and address
Name and telephone number of person filling out this questionnaire
Would you be willing to participate in a confidential telephone interview?
Yes
No
Would you like to receive a summary of the research results?
Yes
No
909
APPENDIX H
FIRST BANKER QUESTIONNAIRE
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NATIONALASSOCIATION OF ACCOU~~TAN·iS
9191H!ROAVENlf • Nf.W YORK NEWVO'<K 10022
July 28, 1983
Dear Lending Officer:
The National Association of Accountants, with a membership
approaching 100,000 is a leader in management accounting. Its
Management Accounting Practices Committee is conducting a
research study and would very much appreciate your assistance.
We are asking selected commercial lending officers to complete
the enclosed questionnaire. The accompanying financial data is
for a hypothetical company located in your city that is applying
for a line of credit or term loan at your bank. We would like to
determine the amount and the terms of the line or term loan you
would grant.
The questionnaire is quite short, but I would urge you to con-
sider each response carefully. I would also appreciate any com-
ments you choose to add.
Results will be tabulated and incorporated into a research
report. Individual responses will be confidential.
Please send the completed questionnaire to me in the enclosed
envelope. The accompanying financial data need not be returned.
In order to be included in the study we must receive your
response no later than August 29. If you would like a copy of
the research results, please indicate that fact in the question-
naire.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Very truly yours,
Robert W. McGee
Manager, Accounting Practices
RWM/ceo/Al-12
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NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ACCOUNTANTS
919THIRDA\lENLf • NEW YORK. NEW YORK 10022 (212) 7549700
September 1, 1983
SECOND REQUEST: Please disregard
if you have already responded.
Dear Lending Officer:
The National Association of Accountants, with a membership
approaching 100,000 is a leader in management accounting.
Its Management Accounting Practices Committee is conducting a
research study and would very much appreciate your
assistance.
We are asking selected commercial lending officers to
complete the enclosed questionnaire. The accompanying
financial data is for a hypothetical company located in your
city that is applying for a line of credit or term loan at
your bank. We would like to determine the amount and the
terms of the line or term loan you would grant.
The questionnaire is quite short, but I would urge you to
consider each response carefully. I would also appreciate
any comments you choose to add.
Results will be tabulated and incorporated into a research
report. Individual responses will be confidential.
Please send the completed questionnaire to me in the enclosed
envelope. The accompanying financial data need not be
returned. In order to be included in the study we must
receive your response no later than September 20. If you
would like a copy of the research results, please indicate
that fact in the questionnaire. Please disregard this letter
if you have already responded.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Very trUlY. y~~rs, .q
KA)I!',+ u. Yy\CI.}2.L-
Robert W. McGee
Manager, Accounting Practices
RWM/pm
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NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ACCOUNTANTS
919 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022
(212) 754-9700
clo Robert W. McGee
QUESTIONNAIRE
CAMPBELL CORPORATION
Instructions: The above-mentioned corporation has applied to your bank for a line of credit or term
loan. Please indicate the amount of the line you would grant, or whether the term loan would be ap-
proved, and additional terms you would require.
A. Line of Credit
1. How large a line of credit would your bank be willing to grant to this company?
2. If your bank would not approve a line of credit for this company, please indicate why the ap-
plication would be denied.
If your bank would not grant a line of credit to this company and you have answered the
previous question, please go to question no. 5. Otherwise, proceed to the next question.
3. What rate of interest would you charge?
4. What additional terms would you impose?
B. Term Loan
5. If, instead of a line of credit, the company had applied for a $2,000,000, 5 year loan, would
your bank grant the loan?
a. Yes
b. No
6. Do you consider this loan to be:
a. extremely risky
b. risky
____ c. marginal
d. safe
e. extremely safe
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7. If your bank would not approve this term loan, please indicate why the application would be
denied.
If your bank would not grant this term loan and you have answered the previous question,
please go to question no. 14. Otherwise, proceed to the next question.
8. What rate of interest would you charge for the term loan?
9. What compensatory balance would be required?
10. What restrictions on working capital would be imposed?
11. How much additional debt would the company be permitted to incur?
12. What is the maximum annual dividend that could be paid?
13. What additional terms would you impose?
C. Respondent Profile
14. The bank's total assets are:
a. more than $5 billion.
b. $5 billion or less.
15. The person completing this questionnaire has had years experience in a loan
department.
16. The person completing this questionnaire is a(n):
a. senior or executive vice president of other senior officer.
b. vice president, secretary or treasurer.
c. assistant vice president or other assistant officer.
d. not an officer.
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17. The office where this questionnaire is being completed is located in the:
a. Northeast (CT, MA, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT)
b. South (AL, AR, DE, DC, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN. TX, VA,
WV)
____ c. North Central (IL, IN, lA, KS, MI. MN. MO, NE, NO, OH, SO, WI)
____ d. West (AK, AZ, CA, CO, HI, ID, MT, NV, NM, OR, UT, WA. WY)
O. Optional Information
18. Would you be willing to participate in a confidential telephone interview?
~ a. Yes
____ b. No
If yes, please indicate your name and telephone number _
19. If you would like to receive a copy of the research findings, please indicate where the find-
ings should be sent.
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NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ACCOUNTANTS
919 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022
(212) 754-9700
c/o Robert W. McGee
QUESTIONNAIRE
EDWARDS CORPORATION
Instructions: The above-mentioned corporation has applied to your bank for a line of credit or term
loan. Please indicate the amount of the line you would grant, or whether the term loan would be ap-
proved, and additional terms you would require.
A. Line of Credit
1. How large a line of credit would your bank be willing to grant to this company?
2. If your bank would not approve a line of credit for this company, please indicate why the ap-
plication would be denied.
If your bank would not grant a line of credit to this company and you have answered the
previous question, please go to question no. 5. Otherwise, proceed to the next question.
3. What rate of interest would you charge?
4. What additional terms would you impose?
B. Term Loan
5. If, instead of a line of credit, the company had applied for a $2,000,000,5 year loan, would
your bank grant the loan?
____ a. Yes
b. No
6. Do you consider this loan to be:
a. extremely risky .
b. risky
c. marginal
d. safe
e. extremely safe
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7. If your bank would not approve this term loan, please indicate why the application would be
denied.
If your bank would not grant this term loan and you have answered the previous question,
please go to question no. 14.Otherwise, proceed to the next question.
B. What rate of interest would you charge for the term loan?
9. What compensatory balance would be required?
10.What restrictions on working capital would be imposed?
11. How much additional debt would the company be permitted to incur?
12.What is the maximum annual dividend that could be paid?
13.What additional terms would you impose?
C. Respondent Profile
14. The bank's total assets are:
a. more than $5 billion.
b. $5 billion or less.
15. The person completing this questionnaire has had years experience in a loan
department.
16. The person completing this questionnaire is am):
____ a. senior or executive vice president of other senior officer.
b. vice president, secretary or treasurer.
____ c. assistant vice president or other assistant officer.
d. not an officer.
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17. The office where this questionnaire is being completed is located in the:
____ a. Northeast (CT, MA, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, vn
b. South (AL, AR, DE, DC, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA,
WV)
____ c. North Central (IL, IN, lA, KS, MI, MN, MO, NE, NO, OH, SO, WI)
d. West (AK, AZ, CA, CO, HI, ID, MT, NV, NM, OR, UT, WA, WY)
D. Optional Information
18. Would you be willing to participate in a confidential telephone interview?
a. Yes
b. No
If yes, please indicate your name and telephone number _
19. If you would like to receive a copy of the research findings, please indicate where the find-
ings should be sent.
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APPENDIX I
SECOh~ BANKER QUESTIONNAIRE
919
February 3, 1984
Dear Lending Officer:
The National Association of Accountants is conducting a research
study to determine the effect certain financial data has on bank
lending decisions. The results of this study are expected to be
of interest both to accountants and commercial lending officers,
and we are asking a select number of lending officers such as
yourself to help us make this study a success by completing the
enclosed brief questionnaire. We would like to learn your views.
The questionnaire is quite short, but I would urge you to con-
sider each response carefully. I would also appreciate any com-
ments you choose to add. Individual responses will remain
confidential.
Please assist us in making this study a success by sending me the
completed questionnaire in the enclosed envelope. The accom-
panying financial data need not be returned. If you would like
to receive a copy of the research results, please indicate that
fact in the questionnaire.
Please have your response in the mail no later than February 24,
1984.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Very truly yours,
12~JJL;t L·J ~ 9;2 c. (,_ ...eJ_
Robert W. McGee
Manager
Management Accounting Practices
Enclosure
RWM/jc/CPTE/WLI
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NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ACCOUNT ANTS
919 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022
(212) 754-9700 clo Robert W. McGee
COMMERCIAL LENDING OFFICER QUESTIONNAIRE
BACKGROUND
The two fictitious companies in this study are Campbell Corporation and Edwards Corporation. Both
companies apply to your bank for a loan and are new prospective customers that could establish a long-
term relationship with your bank. For purposes of these applications, assume that:
1. These applications are the only ones pending in your files;
2. Loanable funds in your bank are scarce, but are sufficient to grant both loan requests;
3. Management of both firms expect past trends of the results of operations and financial position
to continue into the near future;
4. The integrity and competence of management of both companies is impeccable;
5. Granting the loans will not violate any laws or bank lending policies;
6. The loans are to be repaid in a single payment from funds generated from operations;
7. A 20-30% compensating balance is to be maintained.
INSTRUCTIONS: Please fill in the blanks or place an "X" in the space provided. If a question does not
apply, leave it blank. .
A. LnuJing Qu~slions
For questions 1-6, assume that Campbell Corporation and Edwards Corporation each ap-
ply for a $3million unsecured 5 year term loan. The proceeds are to be used to acquire the
rights to additional software that is believed to be marketable, but has not yet been
marketed.
1. Would your bank grant the loan?
Campbell Edwards
a. Yes
b. No
2. What interest rate would you charge?
Campbell
Prime plus %
Edwards
--_%
3. How would you rate this loan for each corporation?
Campbell Edwards
a. Extremely risky
b. Risky
c. Marginal
d. Safe
e. Extremely safe
4. On a scale of OCJb - 100CJb, what are the chances that the corporation will de-
fault on the loan, if made?
Campbell CJb Edwards %
5. Additional terms are sometimes imposed on commercial loans. For example,
there may be restrictions on working capital, further debt, dividends, officers'
salaries, etc. If your bank granted a loan to both Campbell and Edwards, would
lending terms be:
a. More restrictive for Campbell than for Edwards
--b. Less restrictive for Campbell than for Edwards
__ c. Equally restrictive
921 ,SEE OTHER SIDE,
6. For purposes of this question only, assume that your bank had only $5 million
available to lend. How much would be lent to:
\ Campbell $ Edwards $ _
7. If~instead of a term loan, Campbell and Edwards each applied for an unsecured
line of credit, what is the maximum line your bank would be willing to grant
to: '.
'.
Campbell $ Edwards $ _
\,
8. If your bank would treat applications by Campbell and Edwards differently,
please indicate the reasons for the different treatments.
Feel free to use more space if needed.
\
\,
\.
B. R~pcntiml Pro/ilt
9. The bank's total assets are:
a. More than $5 billion
==b. SS billion or less .
10. The person completing this questionnaire has had years experience in
a loan department.
11. The person completing this questionnaire is a(n):
__ a. Senior or executive vice president or other senior officer
__ b. Vice president. secretary or treasurer
c. Assistant vice president or other assistant officer
_d. Not an officer.
12. The office where this questionnaire is being completed is located in the:
a. Northeast (CT,MA,ME,NH,Nl,NY,PA,RI,VT)
-b. South (AL,AR,DE,DC,FL,GA,KY,LA,MD,MS,NC,OK,PR,SC,TN,TX,VA,WV)
c. North Central (IL,IN,lA,KS,MI,MN,MO,NE,ND,OH,SD,WI)
==d. West (AK,AZ,CA,CO,HI,ID,MT,NV,NM,OR,UT,WA,WY)
c. Ophonal In/ormIl/iqn \
\
13. Would you be willing to participate in a confidential telephone interview?
If yes, please indicate your name and telephone numbel:
\
14. If you would like to receive a copy of the research findings, please
indicate where the findings should be sent.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ACCOUNT ANTS
919 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022
(212) 754-9700 c/o Robert W. McGee
COMMERCIAL LENDING OFFICER QUESTIONNAIRE
BACKGROUND
The two fictitious companies in this study are Campbell Corporation and Edwards Corporation. Both
companies apply to your bank for a loan and are new prospective customers that could establish a long-
term relationship with your bank. For purposes of these applications, assume that;
1. These applicati~s are the only ones pending in your files;
2. Loanable funds in your bank are scarce, but are sufficient to grant both loan requests;
3. Management of both firms expect past trends of the results of operations and financial position
to continue into the near future;
4. The integrity and competenceef management of both companies is impeccable;
S. Granting the loans will not vtolateany laws or bank lending policies;
6. The loans are to be repaid in a single payment from funds generated from operations;
7. A 20-30% compensating balance is to be maintained.
INSTRUCTIONS; Please fill in the blanks or place an "X" in the space provided. If a question does not
apply, leave it blank.
A. LnuJing Questions
For questions 1-6, assume that Campbell Corporation and Edwards Corporation each ap-
ply for a $3 million unsecured 5 year term loan. The proceeds are to be used to acquire the
rights to additional software that is believed to be marketable, but has not yet been
marketed. / \
1. Would your bank grant the loan?,., Campbell Edwards
a. Yes
b. No
2. What interest rate would you charge?
Campbell
Prime plus %
/
/
Edwards
--_%
3. How would you rate this loan for each corporation?
Campbell Edwards
a. Extremely risky
b. Risky
c. Marginal
d. Safe
e. Extremely safe
4. On a scale of 0% - 100%, what are the chances that the corporation will de-
fault on the loan, if made?
Campbell % Edwards %
S. Additional terms are sometimes imposed on commercial loans. For example,
there may be restrictions on working capital, further debt, dividends, officers'
salaries, etc. If your bank granted a loan to both Campbell and Edwards, would
lending terms be:
a. More restrictive for Campbell than for Edwards
=:b. Less restrictive for Campbell than for Edwards
__ c. Equally restrictive
(SEE OTHER SIDE)
6. For purposes of this question only, assume that your bank had only $5 million
available to lend. How much would be lent to:
Campbell $ Edwards $ _
7. If, instead of a term loan, Campbell and Edwards each applied for an unsecured
line of credit, what is the maximum line your bank would be willing to grant
to:
Campbell $ Edwards $. _
8. If your bank would treat applications by Campbell and Edwards differently,
please indicate the reasons for the different treatments.
Feel free to use more space if needed.
B. Rtspondml Pro/ilt
9. The bank's total assets are:
a. More than $5 billion
==:b. $5 billion or less
10. The person completing this questionnaire has had years experience in
a loan department.
11. The person completing this questionnaire is a(n):
a. Senior or executive vice president or other senior officer
--b. Vice president, secretary or treasurer
c. Assistant vice president or other assistant officer
--d. Not an officer.
12. The office where this questionnaire is being completed is located in the:
a. Northeast (CT,MA,ME,NH,NJ,NY,PA,RI,VT)
--b. South (AL,AR,DE,DC,FL,GA,KY,LA,MD,MS,NC,OK,PR,SC,TN,TX,VA,WV)
c. North Central (IL,IN,IA,KS,MI.MN,MO,NE,ND,OH,SD,WI)
--d. West (AK,AZ,CA,CO,HI,ID,MT,NV,NM,OR,UT,WA,WY)
C. Oplionalln/omIlllion
13. Would you be willing to participate in a confidential telephone interview?
If yes, please indicate your name and telephone number
14. If you would like to receive a copy of the research findings, please
indicate where the findings should be sent.
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NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ACCOUNTANTS
919 Third Avenue New York, NY 1002.2
(212) 754-9700 clo Robert W. McGee
COMMERCIAL LENDING OFFICER QUESTIONNAIRE
BACKGROUND
The two fictitious companies in this study are Campbell Corporation and Edwards Corporation. Both
companies apply to your bank for a loan and are new prospective customers that could establish a long-
term relationship with your bank. For purposes of these applications, assume that:
1. These applicati~s are the only ones pending in your files:
2. Loanable funds in your bank are scarce, but are sufficient to grant both loan requests;
3. Management of both firms expect past trends of the results of operations and financial position
to continue into the near future,
4. The integrity and competenceef management of both companies is impeccable;
5. Granting the loans will not violate-any laws or bank lending policies,
6. The loans are to be repaid in a single payment from funds generated from operations;
7. A 20-30% compensating balance is to be maintained.
INSTRUCTIONS: Please fill in the blanks or place an "X" in the space provided. If a question does not
apply, leave it blank.
A. Lnll/ing Qutstions
For questions 1-6, assume that Campbell Corporation and Edwards Corporation each ap-
ply for a $3million unsecured 5 year term loan. The proceeds are to be used to acquire the
rights to additional software that is believed to be marketable, but has not yet been
marketed. /
1. Would your bank grant the loan?
/
I
a. Yes
b. No
2. What interest rate would you charge?
Campbell
Prime plus %
/
Campbell Edwards
Edwards
--_%
3. How would you rate this loan for each corporation?
Campbell Edwards
a. Extremely risky
b. Risky
c. Marginal
d. Safe
e. Extremely safe
4. On a scale of 0% - 100%, what are the chances that the corporatiun will de-
fault on the loan, if made?
Campbell ~ Edwards %
5. Additional terms are sometimes imposed on commercial loans. For example,
there may be restrictions on working capital, further debt, dividends, officers'
salaries, etc. If your bank granted a loan to both Campbell and Edwards, would
lending terms be:
a. More restrictive for Campbell than for Edwards
==b. Less restrictive for Campbell than for Edwards
_c. Equally restrictive
,SEE OTHER SIDE)
APPENDIX J
FINANCIAL ANALYST QUESTIONNAIRE
92.3
February 1, 1984
Dear Financial Analyst:
The National Association of Accountants is conducting a research
study to determine the effect certain financial data has on stock
investment decisions. The results of this study are expected to
be of interest both to accountants and financial analysts, and we
are asking a select number of financial analysts such as yourself
to help us make this study a success by completing the enclosed
brief questionnaire. We would like to learn your views.
The questionnaire is quite short, but I would urge you to con-
sider each reponse carefully. I would also appreciate any com-
ments you choose to add. Individual responses will remain
confidential.
Please assist us in making this study a success by sending me the
completed questionnaire in the enclosed envelope. The accom-
panying financial data need not be returned. If you would like
to receive a copy of the research results, please indicate that
fact in the questionnaire.
Please have your response in the mail no later than February 20.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Very truly yours,
Ii (~,-,/iv. In.:: G-.u_
Robert W. McGee
Manager
Management Accounting Practices
Enclosure
RWM/jc/CPTE/MLI
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ACCOUNTANTS
919 Third Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022
(212) 754-9700
clo Robert W. McGee
STOCK INVESTMENT
Instructions: Please fill in the blanks or place an "X" in the space provided.
BACKGROUND
The two fictitious companies to be compared in this study are Campbell Corporation and Edwards
Corporation. The setting of the study is as toltows: Suppose you are to consult an individual
investor, named George Madison, with respect to his personal investment portfolio. Mr. Madison is
a vice-president of a large manufacturing corporation and is a resident of your city. He is
acquainted with Andrew Monroe, the President of Campbell Corporation and Lyndon Adams, the
President of Edwards Corporation. Mr. Madison confronts you with an annual report for each of
these companies and asks you to compare them as investment alternatives. Mr. Madison is 32
years old, single, and in excellent health. His salary provides more than enough income for his
present needs. He has $50,000 in cash which he desires to invest in common stocks, preferably
stocks which appear likely to have substantial price growth over the next five to ten years.
QUESTIONS
1. If Mr. Madison wants to allocate $30,000 between these two investment alternatives, what pro-
portions would you recommend for each common stock offering?
Campbell Corporation %
Edwards Corporation
Total
----_%
100 %
2. Given only the information provided to you, what value or price per share would you place on
the common stock of these two companies at their annual report dates?
Campbell Corporation $ per share
Edwards Corporation $ per share
3. Do you consider an investment in Campbell Corporation stock to be:
___ a. extremely risky
___ b. risky
___ c. marginal
___ d. safe
___ e. extremely safe
4. Do you consider an investment in Edwards Corporation stock to be:
___ a. extremely risky
___ b. risky
___ c. marginal
___ d. safe
e. extremely safe
925 (SEE OTHER SIDE)
- 2 -
5. Which company will experience more growth over the next five years?
___ a. Campbell Corporation
___ b. Edwards Corporation
___ c. equal growth
___ d. no opinion
6. Please state the reasons for your answers to the first five questions. Feel free to use more
space if needed.
/
!
7. Do you consider yourself to be a ~ecialist in the software industry?
___ a. yes
b. no
,-
,/
,/
/
/
OPTIONAL INFORMATION /
/
8. Would you be willing, to participate in a confidential telephone interview?
___ a. yes /
b. no,'
If yes, please indicate your name and telephone number
9. If you would like to receive a summary of the research findings, please indicate where the find-
ings should be sent.
- 2 -
5. Which company will experience more growth over the next five years?
___ a. Campbell Corporation
___ b. Edwards Corporation
___ c. equal growth
___ d. no opinion
6. Please state the reasons for your answers to the first five questions. Feel free to use more
space if needed.
7. Do you consider yourself to be a specialist in the software industry?
___ a. yes
___ b. no
OPTIONAL INFORMATION
8. Would you be willing to participate in a confidential telephone Interview?
a. yes
___ ' b. no
If yes, please indicate your name and tetepnor-e number
9. If you would like to receive a summary of the research findings, please indicate where the find-
ings should be sent.
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NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ACCOUNTANTS
919 Third Avenue
New Vork, N.V. 10022
(212) 754-9700
clo Robert W. McGee
-,
""""<,
Instructions: Please fill in the blan'k:; or place an "X" in the space provided.
BACKGROUND ~ ,/
The two fictitious companies to be compared in this study are Campbell Corporation and Edwards
Corporation. The setting of the study is as follows: Suppose you are to consult an individual
investor, named George Madison, with respect to his personal investment portfolio. Mr. Madison is
a vice-president of a large manufacturing corporation and is a resident of your city. He is
acquainted with Andrew Monroe, the President of 'Campbe" Corporation and Lyndon Adams, the
President of Edwards Corporation. Mr. Madison confronts you with an annual report for each of
these companies and asks you to compare them as investment alternatives. Mr. Madison is 32
years old, single, and in excellent health. His salary/provides more than enough income for his
present needs. He has $50,000 in cash which he d~ires to invest in common stocks, preferably
stocks which appear likely to have sUbstantial7r' .e growth ~:er the next five to ten years.
QUESTIONS \
\
1. If Mr. Madison wants to allocate $30,000between these two \lnvestment alternatives, what pro-
portions would you recommend for eac.~common stock offeri~?
} \
,. Campbell Corporation %
/
STOCK INVESTMENT
Edwards Corporation
Total
----_%
100 %
\
2. Given only the information provided to you, what value or price per share would you place on
the common stock of these two companies at their annual report dates? ".,
Campbell Corporation $ per share
Edwards Corporation $ per share
3. Do you consider an investment in Campbell Corporation stock to be:
___ a. extremely risky
___ b. risky
___ c. marginal
___ d. safe
___ e. extremely safe
4. Do you consider an investment In Edwards Corporation stock to be:
___ a. extremely risky
___ b. risky
___ c. marginal
___ d. safe
___ e. extremely safe
(SEE OTHER SIDE)
APPENDIX K
FINANCIAL INFORMATION
CAr.PBELL AND EDWARDS CORroRATION
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Short-Term Liquidity Ratios
1. Current Ratio
2. Quick (Acid Test) Ratio
3. Cash Equivalents and
Marketable Securities/
Current Liabilities
4. Working Capital/Total
Assets
Long-Term Solvency Ratios
5. Net Worth/Long Term Debt
6. Total Debt/Net Worth
7. Net Worth/Fixed Assets
8. Total Debt/Total Assets
Turnover (Activity) Ratios
9. Sales/Cash and Marketable
Securities
10. Sales/Accounts Receivable
11. Sales/Working Capital
12. Sales/Total Assets
13. Sales/Net Worth
Rrofitabi1ity Ratios
14. Operating Income/Sales
15. Net Income/Sales
16. Operating Income/Total
Assets
17. Operating Income/Net
Worth
FINANCIAL RATIOS
CAMPBELL
1983 ---TI82-
2.2:1
2.1:1
0.8:1
0.20:1
0.90:1
1.58:1
0.99:1
0.57:1
3.31:1
2.27:1
2.36:1
0.47:1
1.30:1
0.14:1
0.10:1
0.07:1
0.18:1
(OVER)
2.7:1
2.6:1
1.3:1
0.36:1
12.88:1
0.40:1
3.25:1
0.26:1
2.47:1
2.67:1
1.89:1
0.68:1
1.06:1
0.15:1
0.13:1
0.10:1
0.16:1
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___ EDWARDS
1983 ~~_
2.2:1
2.1:1
0.8:1
0.25:1
0.54:1
2.65:1
0.59:1
0.73:1
3.31:1
2.27:1
2.36:1
0.60:1
2.18:1
2.7:1
2.6:1
1.3:1
0.46:1
10.44:1
0.49:1
2.63:1
0.33:1
2.47:1
2.67:1
1.89:1
0.87:1
1.30:1
(0.09):1 (0.01):1
(0.08):1 0.03:1
(0.05):1 (0.01):1
{0.20):1 (0.01):1
CAMPBELL EDWARDS
1983 1982 -.-.------1983 -1.982----- ----
Investor Ratios
18. Percentage of Earnings
Retained 100% 100% 100% 100%
19. Earnings (Loss) Per
Share $0.76 $0.71 $(0.63) $0.16
20. Fully Diluted Earnings
(Loss) Per Share $0.76 $0.71 $(0.63) $0.16
21. Earnings Before Interest
and Tax/Earnings Before
Tax 1.28:1 1.03:1 0.52:1 1.15:1
22. Dividend Payout 0 0 0 0
23. Dividend Yield 0 0 0 0
24. Book Value Per Share $5.95 $5.18 $3.54 $4.20
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CAMPBELL CORPORATION
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE AGING SCHEDULE - 1983
Trade accounts receivable Coll_ectible
$4,968,776
851,790
709,825
567(861
$2.t..Q_98 (252
Doubtful
Not past due
1-30 days past due
31-60 days past due
More than 60 days past due
$ 99,375
42,590
70,983
240,052
$453(000
Unbilled accounts recei~able
Unbilled accounts receivable amount to $3,925,395 as of December
31, 1983. Based on past experience, it is estimated that, once
billed, approximately 6 percent of these receivables, or
$235,524, will be uncollectible.
FIVE YEAR PROJECTIONS_----
It is anticipated that the company will continue to experience
rapid growth over the next five years, and will earn substantial
net income in each of the next five years.
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EDWARDS CORPORATION
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE AGING SCHEDULE - 1983
!£!de accounts receivable Collectible Doubtful
Not past due
1-30 days past due
31-60 days past due
More than 60 days past due
$4,968,776
851,790
709,825
567,861
$.L..Q.2.8,252
$ 99,375
42,590
70,983
240,052
$453 ,00q_
Unbilled accounts receivable
Unbilled accounts receivable amount to $3,925,395 as of December
31, 1983. Based on past experience, it is estimated that, once
billed, approximately 6 percent of these receivables, or
$235,524, will be uncollectible.
FIVE YEAR PROJECTIONS
It is anticipated that the company will continue to experience
rapin growth over the next five years, and will earn substantial
net income in each of the next five years.
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General Description
The Company and its subsidiaries (the "Company") offers a
variety of products and services designed to satisfy the informa-
tion and control requirements of its customers' manufacturing
operations. The Company's software products business has grown
to represent the major source of revenue for the Company. The
Company also provides educational, training, and implementation
support services to its customers to enable them to use its soft-
ware products more effectively. The Company is a Delaware cor-
poration organized in 1968.
The following table shows the Company's annual revenue and
the percentage of annual revenue derived from proprietary soft-
ware products and related products and services during the past
five years. Revenue from proprietary software products has grown
significantly since 1978 and represents approximately two-thirds
of total revenue in 1982. Educational products and services
revenue has increased most significantly the past two years, from
4% of revenue in 1980 to 13% of revenue in 1982. Professional
services revenue has decreased slightly as a percentage of reve-
nue during the past five years; processing services revenue has
decreased as a percentage of revenue during the past five years.
Revenue S of Total
1982 1981 1980 1979 1978 1982 1981 1980 1979 1978
Revenue Source
Proprietary software
products •••••••••••• $16,664 $11 ,928 $ 6,839 $ 3,325 $ 1,896 66,. 68,. 64,. 5a 45,.
Related products and
services:
Educational •••••••••• 3,319 1,134 417 134 13 6 4 2
Professional ••••••••• 2,905 2,498 1,619 1,112 656 12 14 15 17 15
Proc8ssing .•••••••••• 2,187 2,107 1,829 1,922 1,705 9 _g 17 .2Q ~
Total $25,075 $17,667 $10,704 $ 6,493 $ 4,257 100,. 100,. 100,. 100,. 100,.- - - - -
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CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS
Year ended December 31
Revenues ••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Costs and expenses:
Operating costs •••••.•••••••••••
Selling expenses ••••••••••••••••
General and administrative
expenses ••••••••••••••••••••••
Amortization of computer soft-
ware and educational course-
ware construction costs •••••••
Provision for doubtful accounts.
Total costs and expenses ••••
Operating income .•••••••••••
Other income (expense):
Interest income ...••......•.••••
Interest expense (Note 1) •••••••
Miscellaneous •..•.••.•••..•.•...
Total other 1ncome
(expense), net •..•••.•.••••
Income before income taxes ••
Income taxe 8 ••••••••••••••••••••••
Net income
Earnings per common share and
common stock equivalent (Note 1)
Weighted average number
of common shares and
common stock equivalents
outstanding .••...••.••...•..
Earnings per common share assuming
full dilution (Note 1) ••••••••••
Weighted average number of
common shares and common
stock equivalents out-
standing assuming full
dilution .
1982
$25,075,499
7,011 ,258
8,102,694
4,423,141
1,742,932
291,000
21 571,025
3,504,474
1,219,127
0,008,519
(68,975
141 633
3,646,107
1,094,000
$ 2,552,107
$ .76
3,346,457
$ .76
4,024,481
1981
)
)
$17,667 ,477
5,727,232
5,635,140
2,698,992
719,882
la5 000
14.966 246
2,701 231
1,052,093
025,170
---
926,923
3,628,154
1,415,000
$ 2,213,154
$ .71
3,117,237
$ .71
3,126,025
See accompanying notes to consolidated financial statements
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1980
)
$10,703,503
3,526,699
3,623,340
1,257,151
469,593
165 451
9 042 234
1 661 269
72,870
(I72,008
(I21 000
(220 138
1,441,131
538,000
$ 903,131
$ .45
1,988,772
$ .42
2,178,638
)
)
)
CAMPBELL CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
ASSETS December 31
Current assets:
Cash, including time deposits ••••••••••••••••
Short-term investments, at cost
(approximates market) ••••••••••••••••••••••
Trade accounts receivable, less allowance
for doubtful accounts of $453,000 and
$320,000, respectively •••••••••••••••••••••
Unbilled accounts receivable (Note 2) ••••••••
Int~rest receivable ••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Prepaid expenses and other current assets ••••
Total current assets •••••••••••••••••••••
Computer software and educational courseware
construction costs (Note 1) ••••••••••••••••••
Less accumulated amortization ••••••••••••••••
Property and equipment, at cost (Note 1):
Computer equipment •••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Office furniture, fixtures, and equipment ••••
Leasehold improvements •••••••••••••••••••••••
Less accumulated depreciation and
amort iza t ion .
Construction 1n progress (Note 3) ••••••••••••
Other long-term assets (Note 4) ••••••••••••••••
1982
$ 7,578,434
---
7,098,252
3,925,395
294,576
729,275
19 625.932
15,282,654
3 936 550
11 346 104
8,243,492
2,231,144
697.809
11,172,445
2.726.274
8,446,171
11 ,112,064
19.558.235
2 772,500
$53,302,771
See accompanying notes to consolidated financial statements.
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1981
$ 6,836,350
308,000
4,142,179
2,482,581
464,464
520,484
14.754.058
7,790,838
2 193.618
5 597.220
4,409,037
1,408,703
614 031
6,431,771
1 356 744
5,075,027
72 .496
5.147.523
371 264
$25,870,065
CAMPBELL CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
LIABILITIES AND COMMON
STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY December 31
Current liabilities:
Current portion of long-term debt •••••.••••••
Accounts payable •••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••
Income taxes payable ••••••.••••••••••••••••.•
Accrued liabilities (Note 5) •••••••••••••••••
Deferred revenue, principally advance
payments •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Total current liabilities ••••••••••••••••
Deferred income taxes •.•.••...••...••••.... ····
Long-term debt (Note 7)••••••••••••••••••••••••
Common stockholders' equity (Notes 7. 8 and 9):
Common stock, $.10 par value. Authorized
10,000,000 shares; issued 3,264,349 shares
and 3,240,233 shares at December 31, 1982
and December 31, 1981 .•••..••.••••.•••.••.•
Additional paid-in capital ••••••.••••••••••••
Retained earnings •.••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Less: Unearned compensation •••••••••••••••••
Cost of 15,000 common shares held in
treasury .
Total common stockholders' equity ••••••••••
Commitments (Note 10)
1982
$ 456,988
3,373,016
12,000
2,026,310
3.143 218
9.011 532
3,526,000
21,439,687
326,435
12,888,595
6,438 391
19,653,421
317,442
10,427
19,325,552
$53,302,771
See accompanying notes to consolidated financial statements.
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1981
$ 339,527
1,879,591
81,000
1,805,355
1,300,731
5 406.204
2,444,800
1,298,290
324,023
13 ,029,788
3,886,284
17,240,095
508,897
10 427
16.720 771
$25,870,065
CAMPBELL CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES
NOTES TO CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
1. SUMMARY OF ACCOUNTING POLICIES
Principles of Consolidation:
The consolidated financial statements include the accounts of
the parent company and its wholly owned subsidiaries, after elim-
ination of significant intercompany accounts and transactions.
Revenue Recognition:
At the time of entering into licensing agreements for the use
of proprietary software, the Company recognizes the lesser of
one-half of the revenue or the nonrefundable portion of the
agreement price paid by the customer at that time. The remainder
of the agreement price is recognized as revenue upon effective
delivery of the software. Revenue related to other services is
recognized as the services are performed.
Computer Software and Educational Courseware Construction Costs:
The Company owns various proprietary computer software pro-
ducts that it licenses to customers and operates in its computer
services facility. Certain costs related to the enhancement,
improvement, and adaptation to particular requirements of the
Company's existing proprietary software are capitalized and are
being amortized primarily on a straight-line basis over the esti-
mated period of benefit, which is generally six years for soft-
ware designed to operate on IBM-compatible mainframe computer
equipment, and four years for all other software. The costs of
purchased software are capitalized and amortized on the same
basis. The costs incurred in the search for or evaluation of
product or process alternatives or in the design of pre-production
models or in conceptual formulation or translation of knowledge
into designs for new or significantly improved software products
are charged to research and development expense as incurred.
Costs related to software deemed to have an impaired future value
are written off immediately or amortized over the remaining esti-
mated period of benefit once this becomes apparent. Net software
construction costs amounted to $9,634,616 and $5,060,840 at
December 31, 1982 and 1981~ respectively.
The Company designs and constructs educational courseware
that aids customers in effectively utilizing the Company's soft-
ware products. These courseware construction costs are capital-
ized and are being amortized over the estimated period of benefit,
which is four years. Net educational courseware construction
costs amounted to $1,711,488 and $536,380 at December 31, 1982
and 1981, respectively.
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NOTES TO CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
Income Taxes:
Provisions for Federal and state income taxes include deferred
income taxes representing the tax effects of timing differences
between taxable and financial statement income. The principal
timing difference relates to accounting for software and educa-
tional courseware construction costs. Income taxes have not been
provided for on the undistributed earnings of the Company's
Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC), since it is the
Company's intent to reinvest such earnings indefinitely.
Investment tax credits are recognized as a reduction of in-
come tax expense in the year the assets are placed in service.
Research and development tax credits are recognized as a reduc-
tion of income tax expense in the year eligible costs are
incurred.
Property and Equipment:
Property and equipment are carried at cost. Certain items of
equipment acquired under capital lease agreements, which are
essentially financing arrangements, have been capitalized and are
reflected in the accompanying consolidated balance sheets as
assets under property and equipment and as related obligations
under long-term debt.
Depreciation of computer equipment, and furniture, fixtures,
and equipment, including assets under capital leases, is computed
on the straight-line method based on estimated useful lives of
five or eight years. Prior to 1981 all property and equipment
was being depreciated over eight years. After 1980, computer
equipment has been depreciated over five years to more accurately
reflect its economic life. The effect of this change is not
material to the financial statements. Leasehold improvements are
amortized over the useful lives of the assets or the terms of the
leases, whichever is less.
Deferred Debenture Costs:
Costs incurred in connection with the Company's sale of
$20,000,000 of 11% convertible subordinated debentures in July
1982 are included in Other Long-Term Assets on the Company's
balance sheet (see Note 4). These costs are being amortized on a
straight-line basis over the 20-year term of the debentures.
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Deferred Processing Acquisition Costs:
Costs incurred to acquire two small processing service busi-
nesses are included in Other Long-Term Assets on the Company's
balance sheet (see Note 4). These costs are being amortized on a
straight-line basis over the life of the processing contracts,
which is 60 and 87 months, respectively.'
Capitalization of Interest Costs:
In 1982, the Company applied Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 34, Capitalization of Interest Costs, to its
accounting for construction in progress on its new headquarters
building. This statement requires that interest costs related to
certain long-term construction projects be capitalized rather
than charged directly to expense. Accordingly, of total interest
costs of $1,478,842 incurred in 1982, $470,323 was capitalized.
There were no significant construction projects that would have
required interest to be capitalized in 1981 or 1980.
Earnings Per Common Share:
Earnings per common share and common stock equivalent is com-
puted by dividing net income (less dividends on preferred stock
in 1980) by the weighted average number of common shares and com-
mon stock equivalents (stock options and warrant) outstanding
during each period.
Earnings per common share assuming full dilution is computed
by dividing net income (after adjusting for non-capitalized
interest on debentures, net of tax, for 1980 and 1982) by the
weighted average number of common shares and common stock equiva-
lents. For 1980, weighted shares included common shares applic-
able to the 10% convertible subordinated debentures and preferred
stock, which were converted in 1980 (see Note 7). For 1982,
weighted shares included common shares applicable to the 11% con-
vertible subordinated debentures issued in July 1982 (see Note 7).
Translation of Foreign Currencies:
Effective January 1, 1982, the Company adopted the provisions
of Statement of Financial Accounting Standrds No. 52, Foreign
Currency Translation. In accordance with this statement, the
u.S. dollar has been selected as the functional currency for all
foreign subsidiaries and, accordingly, foreign currency transla-
tion adjustments and foreign currency transaction gains and
losses, which were immaterial in amount during 1982, are reflected
in income.
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The balance sheet accounts denominated in foreign currencies
have been translated at current exchange rates for monetary items
and at historical rates for all other items. Income and expense
accounts have been translated at weighted average rates prevail-
ing during the year, except for those accounts which related to
assets and liabilities translated at historical rates.
Reclassifications:
Certain amounts relating to 1980 and 1981 have been reclassi-
fied to conform to the 1982 presentation.
2. UNBILLED ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE
Unbilled accounts receivable consist primarily of customer
accounts for which software product revenue has been earned and
recognized in the financial statements but which have yet to be
billed to customers. These accounts are payable in installments
by customers within one year. Upon invoicing to customers,
unbilled accounts receivable are classified as trade accounts
receivable.
3. CONSTRUCTION IN PROGRESS
In February 1982, the Company exercised options to purchase
81 acres of land in Any town, USA, for $2,030,000, upon which its
new corporate headquarters is being built. The total estimated
cost of the project is approximately $14,000,000. The Company
will move to the new facility in April 1983. Financing for the
construction was provided by the 11% convertible subordinated
debentures issued July 1982 (see Note 7).
4. OTHER LONG-TERM ASSETS
Other long-term assets at December 31, 1982 and 1981 consist
of the following:
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Year ended December 31
Long-term unbi11ed accounts
receivable ••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Deferred debenture costs, net
(Note 1) •.......•......•••••••••..••
Deferred processing acquisition
costs, net (Note 1)•••••••••••••••••
1982
$ 1,500,000
886,038
386 462
$ 2,772,500
1981
$
371 264
$ 371,264
Long-term unbilled accounts receivable consist primarily of
customer accounts for which software product revenue has been
earned and recognized in the financial statements but which have
yet to be billed to customers. These accounts are payable in
installments by customers with terms extending beyond one year.
Only the portion of customers' payments that extend beyond one
year are classified as long-term assets (Note 2).
5. ACCRUED LIABILITIES
Accrued liabilities consist of:
Year ended December 31
Accrued commissions •••••••••••••••••••
Accrued bonuses •••••••••••••••••••.•••
Accrued vacation ..•...••••.•••••••.•••
Accrued salaries ..•.•....••.••••••••••
Other ....................•.•..........
1982
$ 488,355
647,264
404,537
488,429
(2 275)
$ 2,026,310
6. LINE OF CREDIT
1981
$ 640,257
573,912
265,193
291,309
34 684
$ 1,805,355
At December 31, 1982 and 1981, the Company had a bank commit-
ment for a $6,000,000 revolving line of credit available through
December 31, 1983, all of which was unused at December 31, 1982
and 1981. A compensating balance of one and one-half percent of
the commitment is required by the bank. The annual interest rate
is one-half of one percent above the bank's prime rate, plus a
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commitment fee of one-eighth of one percent per year on the full
amount of the commitment. The outstanding balance at December 31,
1983, if any, will convert to a term loan with interest based on
the prime rate at that date, maturing in monthly installments to
December 31, 1986. The line of credit is unsecured.
7. LONG-TERM DEBT AND REDEEMABLE PREFERRED STOCK
Long term debt at December 31, 1982 and 1981 is summarized as
follows:
Year ended December 31
11% convertible subordinated
debentures due July 1, 2002 .
12.3%-21.4% capital lease
obligations payable in monthly
installments to March 1987 ••••••••••
10.0%-16.1% equipment contracts
payable in monthly installments
to April 1987 •••••••••••••••••••••••
Less current portion ••••••••••••••••••
1982
$20,000,000
1,466,675
430,000
(456 988)
$21,439,687
1981
$
1,630,344
7,473
(339 527)
$ 1,298,290
On July 9, 1982, the Company issued $20,000,000 of 11% con-
vertible subordinated debentures due July 1, 2002, with interest
payable January 1 and July 1.
The debentures are convertible into shares of common stock of
the Company at a conversion price of $14.50 per share (equivalent
to a conversion rate of approximately 68.97 shares of common
stock for each $1,000 principal amount of the debentures), sub-
ject to certain adjustments.
The debentures are redeemable at any time on no less than 30
days notice at the option of the Company, in whole or in part, at
redemption prices declining from 111.0% of the principal amount
initially to 100% of the principal amount on and after July 1,
1992, together with accrued interest. However, prior to July 1,
1984, the debentures may not be redeemed unless, for a period of
30 consecutive trading days immediately preceding the date of the
notice of redemption, the closing bid price for the Company's
common stock has averaged at least 150% (or $21.75 per share) of
the conversion price of the debentures. Annual sinking fund pay-
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ments of $1,500,000, commencing on July 1, 1992, are calculated
to retire 75% of the issue prior to maturity.
Aggregate minimum annual payments due on long-term debt,
including capital leases, at December 31, 1982 are as follows:
$1983, $456,988; 1984, $469,434; 1985, $478,588; 1986, $394,373;
1987, $97,295; and thereafter, $-0-.
Future minimum lease payments under capital leases together
with the present value of the net minimum lease payments as of
December 31, 1982, are summarized as follows:
December 31
1983 .
1984 ..•.•.••...••....••..••.•...•..•.••...•
1985 .•.........••.....•...••..............•
1986 eo ••••••••••••••••••••••••••
1987 •••••..•.•.••..•••••.•••.•••..•.•••..••
Total minimum lease payments •.••••••.••••••
Amount representing interest •••••••••••••••
Present value of net minimum lease
payments •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
1982
$ 563,176
523,278
479,257
332,069
11,526
1,909,306
(442 631)
$ 1,466,675
Equipment under capitalized leases, with costs approximately
$2,628,000 and $2,415,000 and accumulated depreciation approxi-
mating $751,000 and $276,000 at December 31, 1982 and 1981,
respectively, is included in property and equipment.
Redeemable Preferred Stock:
On July 23, 1980, the Company completed the public sale of an
additional 660,000 shares of common stock at $5.00 per share,
which resulted in the automatic conversion of the Company's 10%
subordinated convertible debentures and 8% cumulative convertible
preferred stock into 300,000 shares of common stock.
8. COMMON STOCK
On March 27, 1981, the Board of Directors declared a three-
for-two stock split effected in the form of a 50% stock dividend,
paid on June 1, 1981, to holders of record of common shares on
May 25, 1981. As a result, a transfer of $107,741 was made from
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retained earnings to common stock for the par value of shares
issued. All share, price per share, and stock option data
appearing in the consolidated financial statements and notes
thereto has been adjusted retroactively, as of December 31, 1981,
to reflect the stock dividend.
9. STOCK OPTIONS, RESTRICTED STOCK AGREEMENTS,
AND WARRANT
Stock Options:
The Company has options outstanding under three stock option
plans as of December 31, 1982. The Qualified Stock Option Plan
expired on January 17, 1979; options granted under this plan con-
tinue to be exercisable until December 8, 1983. Option prices
could not be less than 100% of fair market value on the date of
grant. Options granted are exercisable in four annual and cumu-
lative installments beginning one year from the date of grant and
expire five years from the date of grant.
Under the General Stock Option Plan, option prices could not
be less than 100% of fair market value on the date of grant and
the options granted are exercisable immediately and expire five
years from the date of grant. The General Stock Option Plan was
terminated in 1979; options granted under the Plan continue to be
exercisable until November 15, 1983.
The 1979 General Stock Option Plan originally provided that
option prices may not be less than 85% of fair market value on
the date of grant, that options granted become exercisable in
four annual and cumulative installments beginning one year from
date of grant, and that the options expire ten years from the
date of grant. The Plan was amended at the May 12, 1983 Annual
Shareholders' Meeting to allow for the granting of incentive
stock options as provided in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981. Outstanding stock options under the Plan were converted to
incentive stock options. The 1979 General Stock Option Plan, as
amended, provides that option prices may not be less than 100% of
fair market value on the date of the grant, and that options
granted become exercisable in three annual and cumulative install-
ments beginning one year from the date of grant. Options must be
fully exercised in the order in which they were granted before
subsequent options may be exercised, and expire ten years from
the date of grant. On the date the options are exercised, the
excess of the proceeds received over the par value of the shares
is credited to additional paid-in capital for all plans. No
amounts are charged to income with respect to the stock option
transactions under these plans.
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Options
Available Currently
for Grant Option. Outstanding Exercisable
Shares Shares Price eer Share Shares
Balance at
December 31, 1980 •.••• 63,649 149,125 $ .67 to $11 .33 62,043
Options granted ••••••• (16,720) 16,720
Options exercised ••••• (45,920) $ .67 to $ 4.58
Options terminated •••• 4 875 (4 875)
Balance at
December 31, 1981. •••• 51,804 115,050 $ .67 to $15.88 52,893
Options authorized •••• 100,000
Options granted •••.••• (147,318) 147,318
Options exercised ••••• 17,448 $ .67 to $11.75
Options terminated •••• S~675 (5,675)
Balance at
December 31, 1982 ••••• 10,161 239,245 $1.67 to $18.25 58,816
During 1980, options for 49,350 shares were exercised at
prices ranging from $.67 to $3.75 per share.
Restricted Stock Agreements:
The Restricted Stock Plan was terminated in 1982: shares will
no longer be issued under that Plan. The terms of the Plan, how-
ever, remain in effect for those shares previously issued.
The Company's Restricted Stock Plan reserved common stock for
issuance to officers and employees at the discretion of the Board
of Directors. The Company has also sold restricted stock to
officers of the Company at $1.00 per share. The rights to
restricted shares vest with respect to one-third of the shares in
each of the third, fourth and fifth years of service after issue.
The difference between the purchase price, if any, and the fair
market value of the common stock at the date on which the number
of shares are determined and become issuable is considered to be
compensation. This amount is charged to expense over the periods
of the restriction including the year of the grant. At December
31, 1982, there were no restricted common shares issuable related
to 1982 grants.
During 1981 and 1980, 61,575 and 53,136 restricted shares
were issued with an aggregate market value at the date they were
issuable of $723,506 and $232,863, respectively. Participants
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eligible to receive restricted stock in 1982 were given an oppor-
tunity to elect incentive stock options under the terms of the
1979 General Stock Option Plan, as amended. The formula con-
verting the restricted stock awards to incentive stock options
was 1.42 shares for each allocated share of restricted stock,
plus a cash bonus of $2.00 per allocated share of restricted
stock. During 1982, 413 restricted shares with an aggregate
market value of $6,298 were issued. Consideration received from
participants in the Restricted Stock Plan in 1980 was $68,349.
No consideration was received in 1981 or 1982.
Warrant
In 1980, the Company issued a warrant to purchase 30,000
shares of common stock in connection with a public offering of
its common stock. The initial exercise price was $5.50 per
share, subject to annual increases of $.50 per share. The exer-
cise period was four years, from July 23, 1981 through July 22,
1985. In June 1982, the Company reacquired the warrant for
$202,000.
10. COMMITMENTS
Aggregate minimum annual rentals due under long-term noncan-
cellable operating leases of property and equipment, exclusive of
capital leases (see Note 7), are as follows at December 31, 1982:
1983, $708,000; 1984, $390,000; 1985, $65,000; 1986, $19,000;
1987, $19,000.
Rent expense, exclusive of capital leases, for the years
ended December 31, 1982, 1981 and 1980 was $1,275,304, $684,163
and $400,000, respectively.
In January 1983, the Company exercised an option to purchase
its existing corporate headquarters facility and the adjoining
land in Any town, USA, for $1,330,000. As of December 31, 1982,
the facility was under an operating lease, with payments totaling
$280,000 through December 31, 1984.
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11. COMPANY BUSINESS
Industry Segment:
For each of the last five years, the Company's business has
been in a single industry segment, computer services -- the
design, construction, and marketing of computer software, educa-
tional courseware, and related services. Therefore, all of the
revenue, operating profit, and assets of the Company are attribu-
table to that industry segment.
International Operations:
The Company is engaged in one industry segment, both domesti-
cally and worldwide.
Sales and marketing opera~ions outside the United States are
conducted principally through a sales subsidiary in the United
Kingdom, by direct export sales from the parent corporation, and
through various representative and distributorship arrangements.
The Company's international operations include a facility in
Ireland that provides software products to the international
sales subsidiary. A portion of international sales consists of
software contracted domestically, and either sold to the inter-
national sales subsidiary or to the client directly as an export
sale.
Intercompany transfers (sales) between geographic areas are
accounted for at prices which generally approximate the prices of
similar transactions with unaffiliated parties.
The retained earnings of all the Company's international sub-
sidiaries have been reinvested to support their operations.
Revenues by geographic area are summarized as follows:
-15- 947
CAMPBELL CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES
NOTES TO CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
Revenue
Sales to Unaffiliated Customers:
United States ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Europe ••••••...•.•.•.•.•••.••.•.•••.••••.••
Other foreign ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Total Sales to Unaffiliated Customers ••••
Intercompany Sales between Geographic Areas to:
United States .....................•..........
Europe ...........•...•..•.•..•.•..........•..
Total Sales between Geographic Areas
Intercompany El iminat ions ••••••••••••••••••••
Revenue •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.••••
$21,897,334
2,523,683
654 482
25 075 499
63,818
1J407 ,643
1.471 .461
(1 471,461)
$25,075,499(1)
Revenues attributable to geographic areas other than the
United States were immaterial in 1980 and 1981.
(1) Includes export sales to customers of $1,322,143.
12. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENSE
Research and development expense amounted to $123,101,
$6,068, and $-0- in 1982, 1981, and 1980, respectively.
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
The Board of Directors and Shareholders
Campbell Corporation:
We have examined the consolidated balance sheets of Campbell
Corporation and subsidiaries as of December 31, 1982 and 1981 and
the related consolidated statements of operations, common stock-
holders' equity, and changes in financial position for each of
the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 1982. Our
examinations were made in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards and, accordingly, included such tests of the
accounting records and such other auditing procedures as we con-
sidered necessary in the circumstances.
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In our opInIon, the aforementioned consolidated financial
statements present fairly the financial position of Campbell
Corporation and subsidiaries at December 31, 1982 and 1981 and
the results of their operations and the changes in financial
position for each of the years in the three year period ended
December 31, 1982, in conformity with generally accepted account-
ing principles applied on a consistent basis.
PEAT, MARWICK, MITCHELL & CO.
Anytown, USA
March 23, 1983
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General Description
The Company and its subsidiaries (the "Company") offers a
variety of products and services designed to satisfy the informa-
tion and control requirements of its customers' manufacturing
operations. The Company's software products business has grown
to represent the major source of revenue for the Company. The
Company also provides educational, training, and implementation
support services to its customers to enable them to use its soft-
ware products more effectively. The Company is a Delaware cor-
poration organized in 1968.
The following table shows the Company's annual revenue and
the percentage of annual revenue derived from proprietary soft-
ware products and related products and services during the past
five years. Revenue from proprietary software products has grown
significantly since 1978 and represents approximately two-thirds
of total revenue in 1982. Educational products and services
revenue has increased most significantly the past two years, from
4% of revenue in 1980 to 13% of revenue in 1982. Professional
services revenue has decreased slightly as a percentage of reve-
nue during the past five years; processing services revenue has
decreased as a percentage of revenue during the past five years.
Revenue I of Totel
1982 1981 1980 1979 1978 1982 1981 1980 1979 1978
Revenue Source
Proprietary software
products •••••••••••• $16,664 $11,928 $ 6,839 $ 3,325 $ 1,896 66' 68~ 64~ 5a 45l'e
Related products and
services:
Educational •••••••••• 3,319 1,134 417 134 13 6 4 2
Professional ••••••••• 2,905 2,498 1,619 1,112 656 12 14 15 17 15
Processing ••••••••••• 2,187 2,107 1,829 1,922 1,705 9 .zz 17 30 40
Total $25,075 $17,667 $10,704 $ 6,493 $ 4,257 100~ lOO~ 100~ 100~ 100~- - - - -
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Year ended December 31
Revenue s ....•......••.•.••........
Costs and expenses:
Operating tosts •••••••••••••••••
Selling expenses .•••••••••••••••
General and administrative
expenses ••••••••••••••••••••••
Provision for doubtful
accounts ••••••••••••••••••••••
Total costs and expenses ••••
Operating income (10s8) •••••
Other income (expense):
Interest income ..•••••••••.•..••
Interest expense (Note 1)•••••••
Miscellaneous •.•.••••.••••••••••
Total other ~ncome
(expense), net ...•••..•.•.•
Income before income taxes ••
Income taxes .
Net income (loss)
Earnings (loss) per common
share and common stock
equivalent (Note 1).•.••.•••.•..
Weighted average number
of common shares and
common stock equivalents
outstanding •••••••••••.•••••
Earnings (loss) per common
share assuming full
dilution (Note 1)•••••••••••••••
Weighted average number of
common shares and common
stock equivalents out-
standing assuming full
dilution ••••••••••••.•••••••
1982
$25,075,499
14,503,297
8,102,694
4,423,141
291,000
27,320.132
(2.244.633
1,219,127
(1,008,519
(68.975
141,633
(2,103,000
---
$ (2,103,000
$ (.63
3,346,457
$ (.63
4,024,481
1981
)
$17,667,477
9,258,867
5,635,140
2,698,992
185,000
17 777,999
010.522
1,052,093
(125,170
---
926.923
816,401
318,401
$ 498,000
$ .16
3,117,237
$ .16
3,126,025
)
)
)
)
)
)
See accompany~ng notes to consolidated financial statements
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1980
)
$10,703,503
4,957,116
3,623,340
1,257,151
165.451
10.003.058
700.445
72,870
(172,008
(121.000
(220,138
480,307
179,307
$ 301,000
$ .15
1,988,772
$ .14
)
) )
)
2,178,638
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ASSETS December 31
Current assets:
Cash, including time deposits ••••••••••••••••
Short-term investments, at cost
(approximates market) ••••••••••••••••••••••
Trade accounts receivable, less allowance
for doubtful accounts of $453,000 and
$320,000, respectively •••••••••••••••••••••
Unbilled accounts receivable (Note 2) ••••••••
Interest receivable ••••••.•••••••••••••••••••
Prepaid expenses and other current assets ••••
Total current assets ••..••.••••.•••••.•••
Property and equipment, at cost (Note 1):
Computer equipment .•......•..•.•••••.••.•••.•
Office furniture, fixtures, and equipment ••••
Leasehold improvements •••••••••••••••••••••••
Less accumulated depreciation and
amort iza t ion ..•............•...•...•....•..
Construction 1n progress (Note 3) ••••••••••••
Other long-term assets (Note 4) ••••••••••••••••
1982
$ 7,578,434
---
7,098,252
3,925,395
294,576
729,275
19,625 932
8,243,492
2,231,144
697 809
11 ,172,445
2,726.274
8,446,171
11 ,112.064
19.558.235
2,772.500
$41,956,667
See accompanying notes to consolidated financial statements.
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1981
$ 6,836,350
308,000
4,142,179
2,482,581
464,464
520 484
14 754 058
4,409,037
1,408,703
614 031
6,431,771
1,356,744
5,075,027
72 496
5.147 523
371 264
$20,272,845
EDWARDS CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES
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LIABILITIES AND COMMON
STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY December 31
Current liabilities:
Current portion of long-term debt ••••••••••••
Accounts payable •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Income taxes payable .
Accrued liabilities (Note 5) •••••••••••••••••
Deferred revenue, principally advance
payment s •••...••....•.•....•.•..•.........•
Total current liabilities ••••••••••••••••
Deferred income taxes ••.•.••••••••.•..••.•..•••
Long-term debt (Note 7)••••••••••••••.•••••••••
Common stockholders' equity (Notes 7, 8 and 9):
Common stock, $.10 par value. Authorized
10,000,000 shares; issued 3,264,349 shares
and 3,240,233 shares at December 31, 1982
and December 31, 1981 ••••.•..••••..•..••••.
Additional paid-in capital •••••••••••••••••••
Retained earnings (deficit) ••••••••••••••••••
Less: Unearned compensation •••••••••••••••••
Cost of 15,000 common shares held in
treasury .
Total common stockholders' equity ••••••••••
Commitments (Note 10)
1982
$ 456,988
3,373,016
12,000
2,026,310
3.143.218
9 011.532
---
21,439,687
326,435
12,888,595
(1,381 ,713
11,833,317
317,442
10 427
11,505,448
$41,956,667
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1981
)
$ 339,527
1,879,591
81,000
1,805,355
1.300,731
5 406,204
12,577
1,298,290
324,023
13.029,788
721.287
14,075,098
508,897
10.427
13,555,774
$20,272.845
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1. SUMMARY OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
Principles of Consolidation:
The consolidated financial statements include the accounts of
the parent company and its wholly owned subsidiaries, after elim-
ination of significant intercompany accounts and transactions.
Revenue Recognition:
At the time of entering into licensing agreements for the use
of proprietary software, the Company recognizes the lesser of
one-half of the revenue or the nonrefundable portion of the
agreement price paid by the customer at that time. The remainder
of the agreement price is recognized as revenue upon effective
delivery of the software. Revenue related to other services is
recognized as the services are performed.
Computer Software and Educational Courseware Construction Costs:
The Company owns various proprietary computer software pro-
ducts that it licenses to customers and operates in its computer
services facility. Costs related to the enhancement, improve-
ment, and adaptation to particular requirements of the Company's
existing proprietary software are expensed as incurred. The
costs of purchased software are also expensed as incurred. The
costs incurred in the search for or evaluation of product or pro-
cess alternatives or in the design of pre-production models or in
conceptual formulation or translation of knowledge into designs
for new or significantly improved software products are charged
to research and development expense as incurred. Net software
construction costs amounted to $9,634,616 and $5,060,840 at
December 31, 1982 and 1981, respectively.
The Company designs and constructs educational courseware
that aids customers in effectively utilizing the Company's soft-
ware products. These courseware construction costs are expensed
as incurred. Net educational courseware construction costs
amounted to $1,711,488 and $536,380 at December 31, 1982 and
1981, respectively.
Income Taxes:
Provisions for Federal and state income taxes include deferred
income taxes representing the tax effects of timing differences
between taxable and financial statement income. Income taxes
have not been provided for on the undistributed earnings of the
Company's Domestic Internation~l Sales Corporation (DISC), since
it is the Company's intent to reinvest such earnings indefinitely.
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Investment tax credits are recognized as a reduction of in-
come tax expense in the year the assets are placed in service.
Research and development tax credits are recognized as a reduc-
tion of income tax expense in the year eligible costs are
incurred.
Property and Equipment:
Property and equipment are carried at cost. Certain items of
equipment acquired under capital lease agreements, which are
essentially financing arrangements, have been capitalized and are
reflected in the accompanying consolidated balance sheets as
assets under property and equipment and as related obligations
under long-term debt.
Depreciation of computer equipment, and furniture, fixtures,
and equipment, including assets under capital leases, is computed
on the straight-line method based on estimated useful lives of
five or eight years. Prior to 1981 all property and equipment
was being depreciated over eight years. After 1980, computer
equipment has been depreciated over five years to more accurately
reflect its economic life. The effect of this change is not
material to the financial statements. Leasehold improvements are
amortized over the useful lives of the assets or the terms of the
leases, whichever is less.
Deferred Debenture Costs:
Costs incurred in connection with the Company's sale of
$20,000,000 of 11% convertible subordinated debentures in July
1982 are included in Other Long-Term Assets on the Company's
balance sheet (see Note 4). These costs are being amortized on a
straight-line basis over the 20-year term of the debentures.
Deferred processing ACquisition Costs:
Costs incurred to acquire two small processing service busi-
nesses are included in Other Long-Term Assets on the Company's
balance sheet (see Note 4). These costs are being amortized on a
straight-line basis over the life of the processing contracts,
which is 60 and 87 months, respectively.
Capitalization of Interest Costs:
In 1982, the Company applied Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 34, Capitalization of Interest Costs, to its
accounting for construction in progress on its new headquarters
building. This statement requires that interest costs related to
certain long-term construction projects be capitalized rather
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than charged directly to expense. Accordingly, of total interest
costs of $1,478,842 incurred in 1982, $470,323 was capitalized.
There were no significant construction projects that would have
required interest to be capitalized in 1981 or 1980.
Earnings Per Common Share:
Earnings per common share and common stock equivalent is com-
puted by dividing net income (less dividends on preferred stock
in 1980) by the weighted average number of common shares and com-
mon stock equivalents (stock options and warrant) outstanding
during each period.
Earnings per common share assuming full dilution is computed
by dividing net income (after adjusting for non-capitalized
interest on debentures, net of tax, for 1980 and 1982) by the
weighted average number of common shares and common stock equiva-
lents. For 1980, weighted shares included common shares applic-
able to the 10% convertible subordinated debentures and preferred
stock, which were converted in 1980 (see Note 7).For 1982,
weighted shares included common shares applicable to the 11% con-
vertible subordinated debentures issued in July 1982 (see Note 7).
Translation of Foreign Currencies:
Effective January 1, 1982, the Company adopted the provisions
of Statement of Financial Accounting Standrds No. 52, Foreign
Currency Translation. In accordance with this statement, theu.s. dollar has been selected as the functional currency for all
foreign subsidiaries and, accordingly, foreign currency transla-
tion adjustments and foreign currency transaction gains and
losses, which were immaterial in amount during 1982, are reflected
in income.
The balance sheet accounts denominated in foreign currencies
have been translated at current exchange rates for monetary items
and at historical rates for all other items. Income and expense
accounts have been translated at weighted average rates prevail-
ing during the year, except for those accounts which related to
assets and liabilities translated at historical rates.
Reclassifications:
Certain amounts relating to 1980 and 1981 have been reclassi-
fied to conform to the 1982 presentation.
957
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2. UNBILLED ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE
Unbilled accounts receivable consist primarily of customer
accounts for which software product revenue has been earned and
recognized in the financial statements but which have yet to be
billed to customers. These accounts are payable in installments
by customers within one year. Upon invoicing to customers,
unbilled accounts receivable are classified as trade accounts
receivable.
3. CONSTRUCTION IN PROGRESS
In February 1982, the Company exercised options to purchase
81 acres of land in Any town, USA, for $2,030,000, upon which its
new corporate headquarters is being built. The total estimated
cost of the project is approximately $14,000,000. The Company
will move to the new facility in April 1983. Financing for the
construction was provided by the 11% convertible subordinated
debentures issued July 1982 (see Note 7).
4. OTHER LONG-TERM ASSETS
Other long-term assets at December 31, 1982 and 1981 consist
of the following:
Year ended December 31 1982 1981
(Note 1) ••••..••.....••••....••••••.
$ 1,500,000
Deferred processing acquisition
costs, net (Note 1)••••••••••••••••• 386 462
$
Long-term unbilled accounts
receivable ••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Deferred debenture costs, net
886,038
371 264
$ 2,772,500 $ 371,264
Long-term unbilled accounts receivable consist primarily of
customer accounts for which software product revenue has been
earned and recognized in the financial statements but which have
yet to be billed to customers. These accounts are payable in
installments by customers with terms extending beyond one year.
Only the portion of customers' payments that extend beyond one
year are classified as long-term assets (Note 2).
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5. ACCRUED LIABILITIES
Accrued liabilities consist of:
Year ended December 31 1982
$ 488,355
647,264
404,537
488,429
(2 275)
$ 2,026,310
Accrued commissions •••••••••••••••••••
Accrued bonuses •••••••••••••••••••••••
Accrued vacation ••••••••••••••••••••••
Accrued salaries •..••.•••.•.••....••.•
Other ...............................•.
6. LINE OF CREDIT
1981
$ 640,257
573,912
265,193
291,309
34 684
$ 1,805,355
At December 31, 1982 and 1981, the Company had a bank commit-
ment for a $6,000,000 revolving line of credit available through
December 31, 1983, all of which was unused at December 31, 1982
and 1981. A compensating balance of one and one-half percent of
the commitment is required by the bank. The annual interest rate
is one-half of one percent above the bank's prime rate, plus a
commitment fee of one-eighth of one percent per year on the full
amount of the commitment. The outstanding balance at December 31,
1983, if any, will convert to a term loan with interest based on
the prime rate at that date, maturing in monthly installments to
December 31, 1986. The line of credit is unsecured.
7. LONG-TERM DEBT AND REDEEMABLE PREFERRED STOCK
Long term debt at December 31, 1982 and 1981 is summarized as
follows:
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Year ended December 31
11% convertible subordinated
debentures due July 1, 2002 •••••••••
12.3%-21.4% capital lease
obligations payable in monthly
installments to March 1987 ••••••••••
10.0%-16.1% equipment contracts
payable in monthly installments
to April 1987 •••••••••••••••••••••••
Less current portion ••••••••••••••••••
1982
$20,000,000
1,466,675
430,000
(456 988)
$21,439,687
1981
$
1,630,344
7,473
(339 527)
$ 1,298,290
On July 9, 1982, the Company issued $20,000,000 of 11% con-
vertible subordinated debentures due July 1, 2002, with interest
payable January 1 and July 1.
The debentures are convertible into shares of common stock of
the Company at a conversion price of $14.50 per share (equivalent
to a conversion rate of approximately 68.97 shares of common
stock for each $1,000 principal amount of the debentures), sub-
ject to certain adjustments.
The debentures are redeemable at any time on no less than 30
days notice at the option of the Company, in whole or in part, at
redemption prices declining from 111.0% of the principal amount
initially to 100% of the principal amount on and after July 1,
1992, together with accrued interest. However, prior to July 1,
1984, the debentures may not be redeemed unless, for a period of
30 consecutive trading days immediately preceding the date of the
notice of redemption, the closing bid price for the Company's
common stock has averaged at least 150% (or $21.75 per share) of
the conversion price of the debentures. Annual sinking fund pay-
ments of $1,500,000, commencing on July 1, 1992, are calculated
to retire 75% of the issue prior to maturity.
Aggregate minimum annual payments due on long-term debt,
including capital leases, at December 31, 1982 are as follows:
$1983, $456,988; 1984, $469,434; 1985, $478,588i 1986, $394,373i
1987, $97,295; and thereafter, $-0-.
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Future minimum lease payments under capital leases together
with the present value of the net minimum lease payments as of
December 31, 1982, are summarized as follows:
December 31
1983 ...•...........•..•........•...........
1984 ••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••.•.••••.•••
1985 ...............•..•.....•..•...........
1986 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.••
1987 ••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••.•.•••••••
Total minimum lease payments •••••••••••••••
Amount representing interest •••••••••••••••
Present value of net minimum lease
payments ••••••••• ~•••••••••••••••••••••••
1982
$ 563,176
523,278
479,257
332,069
11 526
1,909,306
(442 631)
$ 1,466,675
Equipment under capitalized leases, with costs approximately
$2,628,000 and $2,415,000 and accumulated depreciation approxi-
mating $751,000 and $276,000 at December 31, 1982 and 1981,
respectively, is included in property and equipment.
Redeemable Preferred Stock:
On July 23, 1980, the Company completed the public sale of an
additional 660,000 shares of common stock at $5.00 per share,
which resulted in the automatic conversion of the Company's 10%
subordinated convertible debentures and 8% cumulative convertible
preferred stock into 300,000 shares of common stock.
8. COMMON STOCK
On March 27, 1981, the Board of Directors declared a three-
for-two stock split effected in the form of a 50% stock dividend,
paid on June 1, 1981, to holders of record of common shares on
May 25, 1981. As a result, a transfer of $107,741 was made from
retained earnings to common stock for the par value of shares
issued. All share, price per share, and stock option data
appearing in the consolidated financial statements and notes
thereto has been adjusted retroactively, as of December 31, 1981,
to reflect the stock dividend.
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9. STOCK OPTIONS, RESTRICTED STOCK AGREEMENTS,
AND WARRANT
Stock Options:
The Company has options outstanding under three stock option
plans as of December 31, 1982. The Qualified Stock Option Plan
expired on January 17, 19791 options granted under this plan con-
tinue to be exercisable until December 8, 1983. Option prices
could not be less than 100% of fair market value on the date of
grant. Options granted are exercisable in four annual and cumu-
lative installments beginning one year from the date of grant and
expire five years from the date of grant.
Under the General Stock Option Plan, option prices could not
be less than 100% of fair market value on the date of grant and
the options granted are exercisable immediately and expire five
years from the date of grant. The General Stock Option Plan was
terminated in 19791 options granted under the Plan continue to be
exercisable until November 15, 1983.
The 1979 General Stock Option Plan originally provided that
option prices may not be less than 85% of fair market value on
the date of grant, that options granted become exercisable in
four annual and cumulative installments beginning one year from
date of grant, and that the options expire ten years from the
date of grant. The Plan was amended at the May 12, 1983 Annual
Shareholders' Meeting to allow for the granting of incentive
stock options as provided in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981. Outstanding stock options under the Plan were converted to
incentive stock options. The 1979 General Stock Option Plan, as
amended, provides that option prices may not be less than 100% of
fair market value on the date of the grant, and that options
granted become exercisable in three annual and cumulative install-
ments beginning one year from the date of grant. Options must be
fully exercised in the order in which they were granted before
subsequent options may be exercised, and expire ten years from
the date of grant. On the date the options are exercised, the
excess of the proceeds received over the par value of the shares
is credited to additional paid-in capital for all plans. No
amounts are charged to income with respect to the stock option
transactions under these plans.
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Options
Available Currently
for Grant Option. Outstanding Exercisable
Shares Shares Price eer Share Shares
Balance at
December 31, 1980••••• 63,649 149,125 s .67 to $11.33 62,043
Options granted ••••••• (16,720> 16,720
Options exercised ••••• (45,920) $ .67 to $ 4.58
Options terminated •••• 4 875 (4,875)
Balance at
December 31, 1981. •••• 51,804 115,050 $ .67 to $15.88 52,893
Options authorized •••• 100,000
Options granted ••••••• (147,318) 147,318
Options exercised ••••• 17,448 $ .67 to $11.75
Options terminated •••• 5,675 (5,675)
Balance at
December 31, 1982••••• 10,161 239,245 $1.67 to $18.25 58,816
During 1980, options for 49,350 shares were exercised at
prices ranging from $.67 to $3.75 per share.
Restricted Stock Agreements:
The Restricted Stock Plan was terminated in 1982; shares will
no longer be issued under that Plan. The terms of the Plan, how-
ever, remain in effect for those shares previously issued.
The Company's Restricted Stock Plan reserved common stock for
issuance to officers and employees at the discretion of the Board
of Directors. The Company has also sold restricted stock to
officers of the Company at $1.00 per share. The rights to
restricted shares vest with respect to one-third of the shares in
each of the third, fourth and fifth years of service after issue.
The difference between the purchase price, if any, and the fair
market value of the common stock at the date on which the number
of shares are determined and become issuable is considered to be
compensation. This amount is charged to expense over the periods
of the restriction including the year of the grant. At December
31, 1982, there were no restricted common shares issuable related
to 1982 grants.
During 1981 and 1980, 61,575 and 53,136 restricted shares
were issued with an aggregate market value at the date they were
issuable of $723,506 and $232,863, respectively. Participants
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eligible to receive restricted stock in 1982 were given an oppor-
tunity to elect incentive stock options under the terms of the
1979 General Stock Option Plan, as amended. The formula con-
verting the restricted stock awards to incentive stock options
was 1.42 shares for each allocated share of restricted stock,
plus a cash bonus of $2.00 per allocated share of restricted
stock. During 1982, 413 restricted shares with an aggregate
market value of $6,298 were issued. Consideration received from
participants in the Restricted Stock Plan in 1980 was $68,349.
No consideration was received in 1981 or 1982.
Warrant
In 1980, the Company issued a warrant to purchase 30,000
shares of common stock in connection with a public offering of
its common stock. The initial exercise price was $5.50 per
share, subject to annual increases of $.50 per share. The exer-
cise period was four years, from July 23, 1981 through July 22,
1985. In June 1982, the Company reacquired the warrant for
$202,000.
10. COMMITMENTS
Aggregate mlnlmum annual rentals due under long-term noncan-
cellable operating leases of property and equipment, exclusive of
capital leases (see Note 7), are as follows at December 31, 1982:
1983, $708,000; 1984, $390,000; 1985, $65,000; 1986, $19,000;
1987, $19,000.
Rent expense, exclusive of capital leases, for the years
ended December 31, 1982, 1981 and 1980 was $1,275,304, $684,163
and $400,000, respectively.
In January 1983, the Company exercised an option to purchase
its existing corporate headquarters facility and the adjoining
land in Any town, USA, for $1,330,000. As of December 31, 1982,
the facility was under an operating lease, with payments totaling
$280,000 through December 31, 1984.
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11. COMPANY BUSINESS
Industry Segment:
For each of the last five years, the Company's business has
been in a single industry segment, computer services -- the
design, construction, and marketing of computer software, educa-
tional courseware, and related services. Therefore, all of the
revenue, operating profit, and assets of the Company are attribu-
table to that industry segment.
International Operations:
The Company is engaged in one industry segment, both domesti-
cally and worldwide.
Sales and marketing operations outside the United states are
conducted principally through a sales subsidiary in the United
Kingdom, by direct export sales from the parent corporation, and
through various representative and distributorship arrangements.
The company's international operations include a facility in
Ireland that provides software products to the international
sales subsidiary. A portion of international sales consists of
software contracted domestically, and either sold to the inter-
national sales subsidiary or to the client directly as an export
sale.
Intercompany transfers (sales) between geographic areas are
accounted for at prices which generally approximate the prices of
similar transactions with unaffiliated parties.
The retained earnings of all the Company's international sub-
sidiaries have been reinvested to support their operations.
Revenues by geographic area are summarized as follows:
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Revenue
Sales to Unaffiliated Customers:
United States ..........•...............•••.
Europe ...................••.••.......•...•.
Other foreign ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Total Sales to Unaffiliated Customers ••••
Intercompany Sales between Geographic Areas to:
United States .
Europe .
Total Sales between Geographic Areas
Intercompany Eliminat ions ••••••••••••••••••••
Revenue ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
$21,897,334
2,523,683
654.482
25,075,499
63,818
1,407,643
1471,461
(I471,461)
$25,075,499(1)
Revenues attributable to geographic areas other than the
United States were immaterial in 1980 and 1981.
(1) Includes export sales to customers of $1,322,143.
12. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENSE
Research and development expense amounted to $123,101,
$6,068, and $-0- in 1982, 1981, and 1980, respectively.
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
The Board of Directors and Shareholders
Edwards Corporation:
We have examined the consolidated balance sheets of Edwards
Corporation and subsidiaries as of December 31, 1982 and 19B1 and
the related consolidated statements of operations, common stock-
holders' equity, and changes in financial position for each of
the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 1982. Our
examinations were made in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards and, accordingly, included such tests of the
accounting records and such other auditing procedures as we con-
sidered necessary in the circumstances.
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In our opinion, the aforementioned consolidated financial
statements present fairly the financial position of Edwards
Corporation and subsidiaries at December 31, 1982 and 1981 and
the results of their operations and the changes in financial
position for each of the years in the three year period ended
December 31, 1982, in conformity with generally accepted account-
ing principles applied on a consistent basis.
PEAT, MARWICK, MITCHELL & CO.
Any town, USA
March 23, 1983
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In the early stages of this research, the author sent letters to a
number of accounting organizations to inquire whether there were any
rules addressing the issue of software account ing in their respect ive
countries. Many of the organizations responded to my inquiry; some
did not. The answers of those responding were all in the negative. No
country from which an accounting organization responded had any
rules addressing software accounting. However, several
organizations responded that they follow either the American, British
or International rules.
Although apparently no country has rules addressing the
treatment of computer software, Mr. B.V. Piggott, former
Chairman( 1981-84) of the ICMA's Information Technology Committee,
a major policy-making committee of the Institute, has offered his
views to a third party who was kind enough to pass them on to me.
Mr. Piggott is of the opinion that all software expenditures should be
expensed as incurred, with the possible exception of initial software
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expenditures, which might be classified as deferred revenue and
written off over a short period, say, three to five years, similar to
initial goodwill. His opinion is based on the perception that "The end
result of writing programs does not have the same type of
permanence as a factory, a vehicle or an item of plant. Protection of
copyright is of doubtful efficacy, a market is rarely assured and
rival products can cause problems at any time, maintenance costs can
be substantial and are often difficult to distinguish from
improvements. One could go further and say that software is not
tangible but a couection of ideas which must be transcribed to make
them marketable."
His view is a good summary of the expensing view that is being
advocated in the United States. However, I do not agree with his
arguments. Although a software program does not have the same type
of permanence as a factory, a vehicle or an item of plant, many
software products can reasonably be expected to have economic value
for at least 12 months, and some software is used for a number of
years even though better software has been developed since the
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introduction of the original software in question. Copyright law
pertaining to software is in a state of flux in the United States and,
although it is not always possible to obtain a copyright on software,
it is by no means impossible. In any event, a copyright can be applied
for, and it will not be known for years after the application whether
the copyright is valid, so having a copyright of Questionable validity
is not a sur ncient reason to expense software.
His argument that a market is rarely assured could be advanced
for any number of other products as well as for software. Software 15
not unique In this respect. However, much market research is done
prior to the complet ion of a software product, and construct ion of the
product would not go forward if a market were not reasonably
assured. Although rival products can cause problems at any time, this
fact is not sufficient to warrant expense treatment. If and when
another product comes along that causes problems that are of such
magnitude to make the original software product worthless, the costs
that have been accumulated for the construction of that product can
then be written off to expense. In fact, the rnatcrunq concept would
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require such treatment. Expensing such costs as incurred would be a
m ismatch of revenue and expense.
Mr. Piggott is correct when he states that maintenance costs can
be substanttat and are often difficult to distinguish from
improvements. When classification of such costs are difficult, it is
up to management to make an informed dec tsion based on all the facts
and circumstances, just as they would do with a plant expenditure
that could reasonably be viewed as either maintenance or an
improvement. In less difficult cases, enhancements should be
capital tzeo and maintenance costs should be expensed.
His argument regarding tangibi I ity has been advanced by the
various U.S. State and federal courts since 1972, and the courts have
been unable to agree on whether software IS tangible or mtangible.
However, whether software is tangible or not is beside the point. If
the software in question has probable future economic benefit, it fits
the definition of an asset and should be classified as such. If not, then
it should be expensed.
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Below are the names of the accounting organizations contacted In
reference to national software accounting policies.
Australia
Australian Society of Accountants
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia
Argentina
Federacion Argent ina de Colegios
Austria
Institut Osterreichischer Wirtschaftsprufer
Kammer der Wirtschaftstreuhander
Bahamas
Bahamas Inst itute of Chartered Accountants
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Bangladesh
The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh
The Institute of Cost & Management Accounting of Bangladesh
Belgium
cnarnore BeIge des Comptables
College National des Experts Cornptables de BelgIque
Institut des Reviseurs agrees par ta Cornrrussion Bancarre
tnstrtut des Reviseurs D'Enterprtses
Bermuda
The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bermuda
Bonvia
CoJegio de Economlstas
Federacion National de Contadores
Botswana
Associat ion of Accountants in Botswana
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srazu
Instituto dos Auditores
British Isles
The Association of Authorised Public Accountants
Associat ron of Cer tmeo Accountants
Associat Ion of Cost and Execut lve Accountants
Associanon of tnternattonat Accountants
British Association of Accountants and Auditors
Chartered Institute of PubliC Finance
Institute of Admtrustratwe Accounting
The Institute of certineo Public Accountants in Ireland
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales
Inst i tute of Chartered Accountants in Ire land
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Scotland
Institute of Cost and Management Accountants
Institute of Internal Auditors, UK Chapter
Society of Company and Commercial Accountants
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Burma
Burma Society of Accountants
Canada
Canadian Instltute of Chartered Accountants
Cert if ieo General Accountants' Associauon of Canada
La Corporat ron protesstorme l le des comptables generaux ncenc.es du
Quebec
orcre des comptables agrees du Quebec
Canadian Association of Data Processmg Service Organizations
Soclety of Management Accountants of Canada
Colombia
Institute Nacronal de Contadores Publicos
Chi le
Colegio de Contadores
Sociedad Nacionat de Contadores
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Costa Rica
Coleqto de Contadores Publicos de Costa Rica
Cyprus
Institute of Certlfied Public Accountants of Cyprus Ltd.
Denmark
Foreningen af Statsautoriserede Revtsorer
Dominican Republic
Instituto de Contadores Publicos Autorrzaoos
EQuador
Federacion Nacional de Contadores
Ethiopia
Ethiopian Professional Association of Accountants and Auditors
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Europe
Union Europeenne des Experts Comptables Economiques et Financiers
F ij i
The Fiji Institute of Accountants
Finland
KHT-Yhdistys-Foreningen CGR
France
Compagnie NationaJe des Commissaires aux Comptes
Conseil NatIOnal de la Comptabilite
Consei I suoeneor des rorore des Experts Comptables et des
Comptables Agrees
Societe de Comptabi I ite de France
Inst itut Francais des Experts Comptab les
Societe des Experts Comptables Francais
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Germany
Institut der Wirtschaftsprufer 1nDeutschland e.V.
Ghana
Institute of Chartered Accountants(Ghana)
Greece
The Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Greece
The Institute of Incorporated Public Accountants
Guatemala
Association NaclOnal de Contadores
Corporacion de Contadores de Guatemala
Colegio de Economistas, Contadores Publicos y Audltores
Guyana
Inst itute of Chartered Accountants of Guyana
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Honduras
Colegio de Peritos Mercantiles y Contadores PubllCOS de Honduras
Hong Kong
Associat ion of Chartered Accountants in Hong Kong
Hong Kong Society of Accountants
Ice land
Felag Loggi 1tra Endurskodenda
India
Inst itute of Chartered Accountants of India
Institute of Cost and Works Accountants of India
Indonesia
Ikat an Akuntan Indones ia
Israel
Institute of Certified Public Accountants in Israel
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Italy
Federazrcne Nazionale dei Collegi dei Ragionieri
Consiglio Nazronale dei Dottori Commercialisti
Consiglio Naztonale dei Ragionieri e Periti Commerciali
Instituto di Richerche Economico-Aziendali
Japan
Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Nippon Koninkaikeishi Kyokai
Kenya
Assocratton of Accountants in East Africa
Lebanon
Middle East Society of Associated Accountants
Luxembourg
Ordre des Experts Comptables Luxembourgeois
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Malaya
Malaysian Association of Certified Public Accountants
Malta
The Inst 1tute of Accountants
Mexico
Colegio de Contadores Publicos de Mexico
Instituto nexicaro de Contadores Publlcos
Monaco
orcre des Experts-Comptables de la Principaute de Monaco
Netherlands
Nederlands Instituut van Registeraccountants
New Zealand
New Zealand Society of Accountants
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Nigeria
Inst i tute of Chartered Accountants inN igeri a
Norway
Norges 5tatsautoriserte Revisorers Forening
Pal<tstan
Institute of Chartered Accountants of PakIstan
Inst itute of Cost and Management Accountants of Pak istan
Panama
Associacion de Contadores y Contadores Pub1icos Autorizados
Colegio de contaoores Publicos Autortzacos de Panama
Assoctacion de MujereS Contadores de Panama
Paraguay
Colegio de Contadores de Paraguay
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Peru
Federaclon de Coleqios de Contadores Publicos del Peru
Inst ituto de Contadores deI Peru
Phi hpptnes
Philippine Institute of Cert uteo Public Accountants
Phi 1 ippine Assoc tat JOnof Management Accountants
Portugal
Soc iecaoe Portuguesa de Contabi 1 idade
Puerto Rico
ColeglO de Contadores Pub1icos Autor izaoos de Puerto Rico
Republic of China
National Federation of Certified Public Accountants Associations of
the Republlc of China
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Singapore
Singapore Society of Accountants
South Africa
The National Council of Chartered Accountants(SA)
South America
Colegio de Contadores Publicos de Nicaragua
South Korea
Korean tnstrtute of Cert tr ieo Public Accountants
Spain
Illustre Colegio Official de Titulares Mercantiles de Barcelona
Instituto de Censores Jurados de Cuentas de Espana
Sri Lanka
The Inst i tute of Chartered Accountants of Sri Lanka
Institute of Cost and Management Accountants
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Sweden
Foreningen Auktoriserade Revisor FAR
5venksa Revisorsamfundet 5RS
Switzerland
Chambre Suisse des Societ tes flduclaires et des Experts-Comptab les
Tanzania
The National Board of Accountants and Audltors
Thailand
Institute of Certified Accountants and Aucttors of Thailand
Turkey
Turkiye Muhasbe Uzmanlari Dernegi
Uruguay
CoIeqio de Doctores en Ciencias Economicas y Contadores de J Uruguay
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Venezuela
Asoctacion de Contadores de Venezuela(CNTC)
Federacion de Colegios de Contadores Publicos de Venezuela
Colegio Nacional de Tecnios en Contabilidad
west Indies
The Inst itute of Chartered Accountants of Barbados
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Jamaica
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Trinidad and Tobago
Yugoslavia
Savez Racunovodstvenih i Finansijskih Radnika Jugoslavije
Zambia
Zambia Associat ion of Accountants
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NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ACCOUNTANTS
MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING PRACTICES COMMITTEE
Henry R. Anderson
Director, School of Accountancy
University of Central Florida, Orlando
Dennis R. Beresford
Partner
Ernst & Whinney, Cleveland
Louis Bisgay
Director, Management Accounting Practices
National Association of Accountants, New York
John F. Chironna, Committee Chairman
Director of Accounting Practices
IBM, Tarrytown, NY
Bernard R. Doyle
Manager, Corporate Accounting Services
General Electric Co., Fairfield, CT
James Don Edwards
J. M. Tull Professor of Accounting
University of Georgia, Athens
Penelope A. Flugger
Auditor
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., New York
William J. Ihlanfeldt
Assistant Controller
Shell Oil Company, Houston
Robert W. McGee
Manager, Accounting Practices
National Association of Accountants, New York
Earl R. Milner
Vice President and Controller
A. o. Smith Corporation, Milwaukee
Bryan H. Mitchell
Controller
A. C. Nielsen Co., Northbrook, IL
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Stanley R. Pylipow
Vice President - Finance & Administration
Fisher Controls, St. Louis
Allen H. Seed, III
Senior Consultant
Arthur D. Little, Inc., Cambridge, MA
William J. Shannon
Corporate Controller
Ingersoll Milling Machine, Rockford, IL
Howard L. Siers
Assistant Comptroller
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Company, Inc., Wilmington, DE
Robert B. Sweeney
Memphis State Chair of Accountancy
Memphis State University
Armin C. Tufer
Partner
Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, Chicago
Arthur Wyatt
Partner
Arthur Andersen & Co., Chicago
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ACCOUNTANTS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MAP STATEMENT PROMULGATION
Louis Bisgay
Director, Management Accounting Practices
National Association of Accountants, New York
John F. Chironna
Director of Accounting Practices
IBM, Tarrytown, NY
Herbert C. Knortz
Executive Vice President & Comptroller
ITT, New York
Robert W. McGee
Manager, Accounting practices
National Association of Accountants, New York
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Allen H. Seed, III
Senior Consultant
Arthur D. Little, Inc., Cambridge, MA
Herbert H. Seiffert
Assistant Treasurer
Johnson & Johnson, New Brunswick, NJ
Howard L. Siers
Assistant Comptroller
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Company, Inc., Wilmington, DE
Donald J. Trawicki
Partner
Touche Ross & Company, New York
MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS OF AICPA ACCOUNTING STANDARDS DIVISION
TASK FORCE ON ACCOUNTING FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND SALE OF
COMPUTER SOFTWARE
Joseph D. Lhotka, Task Force Chairman
Clifton, Gunderson & Company, Denver
Roger Cason, Chairman
Accounting Standards Executive Committee, New York
Naomi S. Erickson
Manager, Accounting Standards
AICPA, New York
Penelope Flugger
Auditor
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., New York
James Gillespie
Main Hurdman, Boston
William Graves
President
Management Science America, Inc., Atlanta
Ralph L. Harris
Financial Consultant
IBM, White Plains, NY
Robert K. Herdman
Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C.
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Sally Hoffman
Main Hurdman, Stamford, CT
Julia Johnston
ADAPSO, Arlington, VA
Thomas P. Kelly
Vice President - Technical
AICPA
Robert W. McGee
Manager, Accounting Practices
National Association of Accountants, New York
I. Sigmund Mosley, Jr.
Vice President, Secretary, Treasurer
Management Science America, Inc., Atlanta
Francis O'Brien
Arthur Young & Company, Los Angeles
James Porter
Vice President
Informatics General Corporation, Woodland Hills, CA
Gregory A. Ray
Financial Accounting Standards Board, Stamford, CT
Paul Rosenfield
Director, Accounting Standards
AICPA, New York
Lawrence J. Schoenberg
Chairman & Chief Executive Officer
AGS, Mountainside, NJ
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